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freedom of speech

noun phrase

Definition of freedom of speech, examples of freedom of speech in a sentence.

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Dictionary Entries Near freedom of speech

freedom of religion

freedom of the press

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“Freedom of speech.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary , Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/freedom%20of%20speech. Accessed 26 Aug. 2024.

Legal Definition

Legal definition of freedom of speech.

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freedom of speech

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• Business LibreTexts - Freedom of Speech
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freedom of speech , right, as stated in the 1st and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States , to express information, ideas, and opinions free of government restrictions based on content. A modern legal test of the legitimacy of proposed restrictions on freedom of speech was stated in the opinion by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in Schenk v. U.S. (1919): a restriction is legitimate only if the speech in question poses a “clear and present danger”—i.e., a risk or threat to safety or to other public interests that is serious and imminent . Many cases involving freedom of speech and of the press also have concerned defamation , obscenity , and prior restraint ( see Pentagon Papers ). See also censorship .

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freedom of speech

• the right of people to express their opinions publicly without governmental interference, subject to the laws against libel, incitement to violence or rebellion, etc.
• The right to speak without censorship or restraint by the government. Freedom of speech is protected by the First Amendment (see also First Amendment ) to the Constitution . ( See clear and present danger .)

Word History and Origins

Origin of freedom of speech 1

Example Sentences

This was a freedom-of-speech issue, not a sex-offense trial.

Other community leaders quickly became involved, citing freedom-of-speech issues.

More About Freedom Of Speech

What is freedom of speech .

Freedom of speech is the right to express yourself publicly without the government interfering.

In the United States, the freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States through the First Amendment . (In other countries, freedom of speech may be protected or restricted based on a country’s constitution or laws.)

Although the term contains the word speech , freedom of speech extends to nonverbal means of expression, such as writing books, drawing pictures, wearing certain clothing, or performing dances.

Freedom of speech is often thought to mean that you can express yourself however you want in person or in media (including on the internet) without government interference. as long as you don’t break the law. In most cases, this is true in the U.S., since the Supreme Court has often ruled that the government can only restrict a citizen’s free speech if there is a credible fear of danger or threat.

However, there are some forms of expression that are not considered to be protected by the right to freedom of speech , such as speech that is thought to encourage sedition or insurrection against the government. Similarly, threatening to harm someone can be considered a criminal offense. The classic example of the kind of speech that is not protected is shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater (when it is not true)—due to it being potentially dangerous to others (the people in the theater).

There are some aspects of freedom of speech that are often misunderstood. The Constitution only protects your right to freedom of speech from the government. A private business, such as a social media platform or the company you work for, can restrict your speech if it violates their rules or negatively impacts their business. This is why social media platforms can ban people for violating the terms of service and why companies can legally terminate employees for some forms of expression, such as using language around customers that’s considered inappropriate.

Why is freedom of speech important?

In the United States, the right to freedom of speech is protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution, ratified in 1791. According to the amendment, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech .”

Although the amendment only mentions Congress , the Supreme Court has ruled that no government body can restrict freedom of speech .

The Supreme Court has also ruled that the right of freedom of speech protects even unpopular or offensive speech. For example, burning American flags (that you own) or expressing racist opinions is protected by the First Amendment.

However, the Supreme Court has restricted freedom of speech in certain circumstances that don’t involve threats or illegal activity, such as defamation , libel , fighting words , obscenity , and false advertising.

Besides these instances, the government is also able to restrict the freedom of speech of government employees. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) can legally punish broadcasters who don’t make an effort to prevent children from being exposed to content considered inappropriate.

Did you know … ?

The United Nations considers freedom of speech a universal human right . This stance was established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.

What are real-life examples of freedom of speech ?

This photograph shows Vietnam War protesters outside the White House. The government cannot silence peaceful protests like this one due to the right of freedom of speech .

“Anti-Vietnam war protest and demonstration in front of the White House in support of singer Eartha Kitt” by Warren K Leffer and Thomas O’Halloran. Source: Library of Congress

In general, Americans are fiercely protective of their freedom of speech , although many people do not realize that private companies can limit speech.

I'm so thankful for freedom of speech. — David Hogg (@davidhogg111) November 21, 2018

Freedom of speech is essential to every function of our country. Medicine too. — Dr. David Samadi (@drdavidsamadi) July 30, 2020

What other words are related to freedom of speech ?

• First Amendment

Quiz yourself!

True or False?

The right to freedom of speech only applies to verbal communication.

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• Amnesty International UK / Issues

What is freedom of speech?

'Freedom of speech is the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, by any means.'

Is freedom of speech a human right?

In the UK, Article 10 of the 1998 Human Rights Act protects our right to freedom of expression:

Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.

Are freedom of speech and freedom of expression the same thing? In the UK, freedom of speech is legally one part of the wider concept of freedom of expression.

Does freedom of speech have limits?

...and when it can't.

ANTI-PROTEST LAWS IN THE UK

Protest is not only a human right. It is a powerful way to change the world ✊🏽 People in power, afraid of change & afraid to be held accountable, want us to think that coming together to protect our rights doesn’t work. 🧵 5 protests that show #PeoplePower can win human rights — Amnesty UK (@AmnestyUK) August 23, 2023

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National security and public order.

RIGHT TO PROTEST IN THE UK

Rights and reputations of others

Media and journalists, whistleblowers, rights and responsibilities.

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freedom of speech

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Freedom of speech is the right to speak, write, and share ideas and opinions without facing punishment from the government. The First Amendment protects this right by prohibiting Congress from making laws that would curtail freedom of speech.

Even though freedom of speech is protected from infringement by the government, the government is still free to restrict speech in certain circumstances. Some of these circumstances include:

• Obscenity and Indecency – In Alliance for Community Media v. FCC , the Supreme Court found that obscenity and child pornography have no right to protection from the First Amendment, and as such, the government has the ability to ban this media altogether. But when it comes to indecency, which is generally defined by the courts as something describing or depicting offensive sexual activity, the Supreme Court has found this speech protected. But the government can regulate this speech on radio and television, so long as it’s for a compelling reason and is done in the least restrictive manner. 
• Defamation – Private and public figures are able to sue someone for statements they have made. Public figures must prove that the person made the statement with malice , which means knowing the statement was false or having a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. (See  New York Times v. Sullivan ) . Private figures must prove the person failed to act with reasonable care when they made the statement. 
• Incitement – If a person has the intention of inciting the violations of laws that is imminent and likely, while directing this incitement at a person or groups of persons, their speech will not be protected under the First Amendment. This test was created by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio . 
• Fighting words  

While the public has a right to freedom of speech when it comes to the U.S. government, the public does not have this right when it comes to private entities. Companies and private employers are able to regulate speech on their platforms and within their workplace since the First Amendment only applies to the government. This right allowed Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter to ban President Donald Trump from their sites in 2021 without legal repercussion. Companies like Facebook and YouTube were also able to ban misleading information on Covid-19 during the 2020 pandemic.

The Supreme Court recently affirmed that private entities are not restricted by the First Amendment in the case Manhattan Community Access Corporation v. Halleck . Manhattan Neighborhood Network is a nonprofit that was given the authority by New York City to operate public access channels in Manhattan. The organization decided to suspend two of their employees after they received complaints about a film the employees produced. The employees argued that this was a violation of their First Amendment freedom of speech rights because they were being punished due to the content of their film. The Supreme Court held that Manhattan Neighborhood Network was not a government entity or a state actor , so the nonprofit couldn’t be subjected to the First Amendment.

In another case, Nyabwa v. Facebook , the Southern District of Texas also affirmed that private entities are not subject to the First Amendment. There, the plaintiff had a Facebook account, which spoke on President Donald Trump’s business conflicts of interest. Facebook decided to lock the account, so the plaintiff was no longer able to access it. The plaintiff decided to sue Facebook because he believed the company was violating his First Amendment rights. The court dismissed the lawsuit stating that the First Amendment prevents Congress and other government entities from restricting freedom of speech, not private entities. 

[Last updated in June of 2021 by the Wex Definitions Team ] 

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First Amendment

By: History.com Editors

Updated: July 27, 2023 | Original: December 4, 2017

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the freedom of speech, religion and the press. It also protects the right to peaceful protest and to petition the government. The amendment was adopted in 1791 along with nine other amendments that make up the Bill of Rights—a written document protecting civil liberties under U.S. law. The meaning of the First Amendment has been the subject of continuing interpretation and dispute over the years. Landmark Supreme Court cases have dealt with the right of citizens to protest U.S. involvement in foreign wars, flag burning and the publication of classified government documents.

Bill of Rights

During the summer of 1787, a group of politicians, including James Madison and Alexander Hamilton , gathered in Philadelphia to draft a new U.S. Constitution .

Antifederalists, led by the first governor of Virginia , Patrick Henry , opposed the ratification of the Constitution. They felt the new constitution gave the federal government too much power at the expense of the states. They further argued that the Constitution lacked protections for people’s individual rights.

The debate over whether to ratify the Constitution in several states hinged on the adoption of a Bill of Rights that would safeguard basic civil rights under the law. Fearing defeat, pro-constitution politicians, called Federalists , promised a concession to the antifederalists—a Bill of Rights.

James Madison drafted most of the Bill of Rights. Madison was a Virginia representative who would later become the fourth president of the United States. He created the Bill of Rights during the 1st United States Congress, which met from 1789 to 1791 – the first two years that President George Washington was in office.

The Bill of Rights, which was introduced to Congress in 1789 and adopted on December 15, 1791, includes the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

First Amendment Text

The First Amendment text reads:

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

While the First Amendment protected freedoms of speech, religion, press, assembly and petition, subsequent amendments under the Bill of Rights dealt with the protection of other American values including the Second Amendment right to bear arms and the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.

Freedom of Speech

The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech . Freedom of speech gives Americans the right to express themselves without having to worry about government interference. It’s the most basic component of freedom of expression.

The U.S. Supreme Court often has struggled to determine what types of speech is protected. Legally, material labeled as obscene has historically been excluded from First Amendment protection, for example, but deciding what qualifies as obscene has been problematic. Speech provoking actions that would harm others—true incitement and/or threats—is also not protected, but again determining what words have qualified as true incitement has been decided on a case-by-case basis.

Freedom of the Press

This freedom is similar to freedom of speech, in that it allows people to express themselves through publication.

There are certain limits to freedom of the press . False or defamatory statements—called libel—aren’t protected under the First Amendment.

Freedom of Religion

The First Amendment, in guaranteeing freedom of religion , prohibits the government from establishing a “state” religion and from favoring one religion over any other.

While not explicitly stated, this amendment establishes the long-established separation of church and state.

Right to Assemble, Right to Petition

The First Amendment protects the freedom to peacefully assemble or gather together or associate with a group of people for social, economic, political or religious purposes. It also protects the right to protest the government.

The right to petition can mean signing a petition or even filing a lawsuit against the government.

First Amendment Court Cases

Here are landmark Supreme Court decisions related to the First Amendment.

Free Speech &  Freedom of the Press :

Schenck v. United States , 1919: In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Socialist Party activist Charles Schenck after he distributed fliers urging young men to dodge the draft during World War I .

The Schenck decision helped define limits of freedom of speech, creating the “clear and present danger” standard, explaining when the government is allowed to limit free speech. In this case, the Supreme Court viewed draft resistance as dangerous to national security.

New York Times Co. v. United States , 1971: This landmark Supreme Court case made it possible for The New York Times and Washington Post newspapers to publish the contents of the Pentagon Papers without risk of government censorship.

The Pentagon Papers were a top-secret Department of Defense study of U.S. political and military involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1967. Published portions of the Pentagon Papers revealed that the presidential administrations of Harry Truman , Dwight D. Eisenhower , John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson had all misled the public about the degree of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Texas v. Johnson , 1990: Gregory Lee Johnson, a youth communist, burned a flag during the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas to protest the administration of President Ronald Reagan .

The Supreme Court reversed a Texas court’s decision that Johnson broke the law by desecrating the flag. This Supreme Court Case invalidated statutes in Texas and 47 other states prohibiting flag-burning.

Freedom of Religion:

Reynolds v. United States (1878): This Supreme Court case upheld a federal law banning polygamy, testing the limits of religious liberty in America. The Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment forbids government from regulating belief but not from actions such as marriage.

Braunfeld v. Brown (1961): The Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania law requiring stores to close on Sundays, even though Orthodox Jews argued the law was unfair to them since their religion required them to close their stores on Saturdays as well.

Sherbert v. Verner (1963): The Supreme Court ruled that states could not require a person to abandon their religious beliefs in order to receive benefits. In this case, Adell Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist, worked in a textile mill. When her employer switched from a five-day to six-day workweek, she was fired for refusing to work on Saturdays. When she applied for unemployment compensation, a South Carolina court denied her claim.

Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971): This Supreme Court decision struck down a Pennsylvania law allowing the state to reimburse Catholic schools for the salaries of teachers who taught in those schools. This Supreme Court case established the “Lemon Test” for determining when a state or federal law violates the Establishment Clause—that’s the part of the First Amendment that prohibits the government from declaring or financially supporting a state religion.

Ten Commandments Cases (2005): In 2005, the Supreme Court came to seemingly contradictory decisions in two cases involving the display of the Ten Commandments on public property. In the first case, Van Orden v. Perry , the Supreme Court ruled that the display of a six-foot Ten Commandments monument at the Texas State Capital was constitutional. In McCreary County v. ACLU , the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that two large, framed copies of the Ten Commandments in Kentucky courthouses violated the First Amendment.

Right to Assemble & Right to Petition:

NAACP v. Alabama (1958): When Alabama Circuit Court ordered the NAACP to stop doing business in the state and subpoenaed the NAACP for records including their membership list, the NAACP brought the matter to the Supreme Court. The Court ruled in favor of the NAACP, which Justice John Marshall Harlan II writing: “This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations.”

Edwards v. South Carolina (1962): On March 2, 1961, 187 Black students marched from Zion Baptist Church to the South Carolina State House, where they were arrested and convicted of breaching the peace. The Supreme Court ruled in an 8-1 decision to reverse the convictions, arguing that the state infringed on the free speech, free assembly and freedom to petition of the students.

The Bill of Rights; White House . History of the First Amendment; The University of Tennessee, Knoxville. Schenck v. United States ; C-Span .

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Freedom of Speech

[ Editor’s Note: The following new entry by Jeffrey W. Howard replaces the former entry on this topic by the previous author. ]

Human beings have significant interests in communicating what they think to others, and in listening to what others have to say. These interests make it difficult to justify coercive restrictions on people’s communications, plausibly grounding a moral right to speak (and listen) to others that is properly protected by law. That there ought to be such legal protections for speech is uncontroversial among political and legal philosophers. But disagreement arises when we turn to the details. What are the interests or values that justify this presumption against restricting speech? And what, if anything, counts as an adequate justification for overcoming the presumption? This entry is chiefly concerned with exploring the philosophical literature on these questions.

The entry begins by distinguishing different ideas to which the term “freedom of speech” can refer. It then reviews the variety of concerns taken to justify freedom of speech. Next, the entry considers the proper limits of freedom of speech, cataloging different views on when and why restrictions on communication can be morally justified, and what considerations are relevant when evaluating restrictions. Finally, it considers the role of speech intermediaries in a philosophical analysis of freedom of speech, with special attention to internet platforms.

1. What is Freedom of Speech?

2.1 listener theories, 2.2 speaker theories, 2.3 democracy theories, 2.4 thinker theories, 2.5 toleration theories, 2.6 instrumental theories: political abuse and slippery slopes, 2.7 free speech skepticism, 3.1 absoluteness, coverage, and protection, 3.2 the limits of free speech: external constraints, 3.3 the limits of free speech: internal constraints, 3.4 proportionality: chilling effects and political abuse, 3.5 necessity: the counter-speech alternative, 4. the future of free speech theory: platform ethics, other internet resources, related entries.

In the philosophical literature, the terms “freedom of speech”, “free speech”, “freedom of expression”, and “freedom of communication” are mostly used equivalently. This entry will follow that convention, notwithstanding the fact that these formulations evoke subtly different phenomena. For example, it is widely understood that artistic expressions, such as dancing and painting, fall within the ambit of this freedom, even though they don’t straightforwardly seem to qualify as speech , which intuitively connotes some kind of linguistic utterance (see Tushnet, Chen, & Blocher 2017 for discussion). Still, they plainly qualify as communicative activity, conveying some kind of message, however vague or open to interpretation it may be.

Yet the extension of “free speech” is not fruitfully specified through conceptual analysis alone. The quest to distinguish speech from conduct, for the purpose of excluding the latter from protection, is notoriously thorny (Fish 1994: 106), despite some notable attempts (such as Greenawalt 1989: 58ff). As John Hart Ely writes concerning Vietnam War protesters who incinerated their draft cards, such activity is “100% action and 100% expression” (1975: 1495). It is only once we understand why we should care about free speech in the first place—the values it instantiates or serves—that we can evaluate whether a law banning the burning of draft cards (or whatever else) violates free speech. It is the task of a normative conception of free speech to offer an account of the values at stake, which in turn can illuminate the kinds of activities wherein those values are realized, and the kinds of restrictions that manifest hostility to those values. For example, if free speech is justified by the value of respecting citizens’ prerogative to hear many points of view and to make up their own minds, then banning the burning of draft cards to limit the views to which citizens will be exposed is manifestly incompatible with that purpose. If, in contrast, such activity is banned as part of a generally applied ordinance restricting fires in public, it would likely raise no free-speech concerns. (For a recent analysis of this issue, see Kramer 2021: 25ff).

Accordingly, the next section discusses different conceptions of free speech that arise in the philosophical literature, each oriented to some underlying moral or political value. Before turning to the discussion of those conceptions, some further preliminary distinctions will be useful.

First, we can distinguish between the morality of free speech and the law of free speech. In political philosophy, one standard approach is to theorize free speech as a requirement of morality, tracing the implications of such a theory for law and policy. Note that while this is the order of justification, it need not be the order of investigation; it is perfectly sensible to begin by studying an existing legal protection for speech (such as the First Amendment in the U.S.) and then asking what could justify such a protection (or something like it).

But of course morality and law can diverge. The most obvious way they can diverge is when the law is unjust. Existing legal protections for speech, embodied in the positive law of particular jurisdictions, may be misguided in various ways. In other words, a justified legal right to free speech, and the actual legal right to free speech in the positive law of a particular jurisdiction, can come apart. In some cases, positive legal rights might protect too little speech. For example, some jurisdictions’ speech laws make exceptions for blasphemy, such that criminalizing blasphemy does not breach the legal right to free speech within that legal system. But clearly one could argue that a justified legal right to free speech would not include any such exception. In other cases, positive legal rights might perhaps protect too much speech. Consider the fact that, as a matter of U.S. constitutional precedent, the First Amendment broadly protects speech that expresses or incites racial or religious hatred. Plainly we could agree that this is so as a matter of positive law while disagreeing about whether it ought to be so. (This is most straightforwardly true if we are legal positivists. These distinctions are muddied by moralistic theories of constitutional interpretation, which enjoin us to interpret positive legal rights in a constitutional text partly through the prism of our favorite normative political theory; see Dworkin 1996.)

Second, we can distinguish rights-based theories of free speech from non-rights-based theories. For many liberals, the legal right to free speech is justified by appealing to an underlying moral right to free speech, understood as a natural right held by all persons. (Some use the term human right equivalently—e.g., Alexander 2005—though the appropriate usage of that term is contested.) The operative notion of a moral right here is that of a claim-right (to invoke the influential analysis of Hohfeld 1917); it thereby correlates to moral duties held by others (paradigmatically, the state) to respect or protect the right. Such a right is natural in that it exerts normative force independently of whether anyone thinks it does, and regardless of whether it is codified into the law. A tyrannical state that imprisons dissidents acts unjustly, violating moral rights, even if there is no legal right to freedom of expression in its legal system.

For others, the underlying moral justification for free speech law need not come in the form of a natural moral right. For example, consequentialists might favor a legal right to free speech (on, e.g., welfare-maximizing grounds) without thinking that it tracks any underlying natural right. Or consider democratic theorists who have defended legal protections for free speech as central to democracy. Such theorists may think there is an underlying natural moral right to free speech, but they need not (especially if they hold an instrumental justification for democracy). Or consider deontologists who have argued that free speech functions as a kind of side-constraint on legitimate state action, requiring that the state always justify its decisions in a manner that respects citizens’ autonomy (Scanlon 1972). This theory does not cast free speech as a right, but rather as a principle that forbids the creation of laws that restrict speech on certain grounds. In the Hohfeldian analysis (Hohfeld 1917), such a principle may be understood as an immunity rather than a claim-right (Scanlon 2013: 402). Finally, some “minimalists” (to use a designation in Cohen 1993) favor legal protection for speech principally in response to government malice, corruption, and incompetence (see Schauer 1982; Epstein 1992; Leiter 2016). Such theorists need not recognize any fundamental moral right, either.

Third, among those who do ground free speech in a natural moral right, there is scope for disagreement about how tightly the law should mirror that right (as with any right; see Buchanan 2013). It is an open question what the precise legal codification of the moral right to free speech should involve. A justified legal right to freedom of speech may not mirror the precise contours of the natural moral right to freedom of speech. A raft of instrumental concerns enters the downstream analysis of what any justified legal right should look like; hence a defensible legal right to free speech may protect more speech (or indeed less speech) than the underlying moral right that justifies it. For example, even if the moral right to free speech does not protect so-called hate speech, such speech may still merit legal protection in the final analysis (say, because it would be too risky to entrust states with the power to limit those communications).

2. Justifying Free Speech

I will now examine several of the morally significant considerations taken to justify freedom of expression. Note that while many theorists have built whole conceptions of free speech out of a single interest or value alone, pluralism in this domain remains an option. It may well be that a plurality of interests serves to justify freedom of expression, properly understood (see, influentially, Emerson 1970 and Cohen 1993).

Suppose a state bans certain books on the grounds that it does not want us to hear the messages or arguments contained within them. Such censorship seems to involve some kind of insult or disrespect to citizens—treating us like children instead of adults who have a right to make up our own minds. This insight is fundamental in the free speech tradition. On this view, the state wrongs citizens by arrogating to itself the authority to decide what messages they ought to hear. That is so even if the state thinks that the speech will cause harm. As one author puts it,

the government may not suppress speech on the ground that the speech is likely to persuade people to do something that the government considers harmful. (Strauss 1991: 335)

Why are restrictions on persuasive speech objectionable? For some scholars, the relevant wrong here is a form of disrespect for citizens’ basic capacities (Dworkin 1996: 200; Nagel 2002: 44). For others, the wrong here inheres in a violation of the kind of relationship the state should have with its people: namely, that it should always act from a view of them as autonomous, and so entitled to make up their own minds (Scanlon 1972). It would simply be incompatible with a view of ourselves as autonomous—as authors of our own lives and choices—to grant the state the authority to pre-screen which opinions, arguments, and perspectives we should be allowed to think through, allowing us access only to those of which it approves.

This position is especially well-suited to justify some central doctrines of First Amendment jurisprudence. First, it justifies the claim that freedom of expression especially implicates the purposes with which the state acts. There are all sorts of legitimate reasons why the state might restrict speech (so-called “time, place, and manner” restrictions)—for example, noise curfews in residential neighborhoods, which do not raise serious free speech concerns. Yet when the state restricts speech with the purpose of manipulating the communicative environment and controlling the views to which citizens are exposed, free speech is directly affronted (Rubenfeld 2001; Alexander 2005; Kramer 2021). To be sure, purposes are not all that matter for free speech theory. For example, the chilling effects of otherwise justified speech regulations (discussed below) are seldom intended. But they undoubtedly matter.

Second, this view justifies the related doctrines of content neutrality and viewpoint neutrality (see G. Stone 1983 and 1987) . Content neutrality is violated when the state bans discussion of certain topics (“no discussion of abortion”), whereas viewpoint neutrality is violated when the state bans advocacy of certain views (“no pro-choice views may be expressed”). Both affront free speech, though viewpoint-discrimination is especially egregious and so even harder to justify. While listener autonomy theories are not the only theories that can ground these commitments, they are in a strong position to account for their plausibility. Note that while these doctrines are central to the American approach to free speech, they are less central to other states’ jurisprudence (see A. Stone 2017).

Third, this approach helps us see that free speech is potentially implicated whenever the state seeks to control our thoughts and the processes through which we form beliefs. Consider an attempt to ban Marx’s Capital . As Marx is deceased, he is probably not wronged through such censorship. But even if one held idiosyncratic views about posthumous rights, such that Marx were wronged, it would be curious to think this was the central objection to such censorship. Those with the gravest complaint would be the living adults who have the prerogative to read the book and make up their own minds about it. Indeed free speech may even be implicated if the state banned watching sunsets or playing video games on the grounds that is disapproved of the thoughts to which such experiences might give rise (Alexander 2005: 8–9; Kramer 2021: 22).

These arguments emphasize the noninstrumental imperative of respecting listener autonomy. But there is an instrumental version of the view. Our autonomy interests are not merely respected by free speech; they are promoted by an environment in which we learn what others have to say. Our interests in access to information is served by exposure to a wide range of viewpoints about both empirical and normative issues (Cohen 1993: 229), which help us reflect on what goals to choose and how best to pursue them. These informational interests are monumental. As Raz suggests, if we had to choose whether to express our own views on some question, or listen to the rest of humanity’s views on that question, we would choose the latter; it is our interest as listeners in the public good of a vibrant public discourse that, he thinks, centrally justifies free speech (1991).

Such an interest in acquiring justified beliefs, or in accessing truth, can be defended as part of a fully consequentialist political philosophy. J.S. Mill famously defends free speech instrumentally, appealing to its epistemic benefits in On Liberty . Mill believes that, given our fallibility, we should routinely keep an open mind as to whether a seemingly false view may actually be true, or at least contain some valuable grain of truth. And even where a proposition is manifestly false, there is value in allowing its expression so that we can better apprehend why we take it to be false (1859: chapter 2), enabled through discursive conflict (cf. Simpson 2021). Mill’s argument focuses especially on the benefits to audiences:

It is is not on the impassioned partisan, it is on the calmer and more disinterested bystander, that this collision of opinions works its salutary effect. (1859: chapter 2, p. 94)

These views are sometimes associated with the idea of a “marketplace of ideas”, whereby the open clash of views inevitably leads to the correct ones winning out in debate. Few in the contemporary literature holds such a strong teleological thesis about the consequences of unrestricted debate (e.g., see Brietzke 1997; cf. Volokh 2011). Much evidence from behavioral economics and social psychology, as well as insights about epistemic injustice from feminist epistemology, strongly suggest that human beings’ rational powers are seriously limited. Smug confidence in the marketplace of ideas belies this. Yet it is doubtful that Mill held such a strong teleological thesis (Gordon 1997). Mill’s point was not that unrestricted discussion necessarily leads people to acquire the truth. Rather, it is simply the best mechanism available for ascertaining the truth, relative to alternatives in which some arbiter declares what he sees as true and suppresses what he sees as false (see also Leiter 2016).

Note that Mill’s views on free speech in chapter 2 in On Liberty are not simply the application of the general liberty principle defended in chapter 1 of that work; his view is not that speech is anodyne and therefore seldom runs afoul of the harm principle. The reason a separate argument is necessary in chapter 2 is precisely that he is carving out a partial qualification of the harm principle for speech (on this issue see Jacobson 2000, Schauer 2011b, and Turner 2014). On Mill’s view, plenty of harmful speech should still be allowed. Imminently dangerous speech, where there is no time for discussion before harm eventuates, may be restricted; but where there is time for discussion, it must be allowed. Hence Mill’s famous example that vociferous criticism of corn dealers as

starvers of the poor…ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn dealer. (1859: chapter 3, p. 100)

The point is not that such speech is harmless; it’s that the instrumental benefits of permitting its expressions—and exposing its falsehood through public argument—justify the (remaining) costs.

Many authors have unsurprisingly argued that free speech is justified by our interests as speakers . This family of arguments emphasizes the role of speech in the development and exercise of our personal autonomy—our capacity to be the reflective authors of our own lives (Baker 1989; Redish 1982; Rawls 2005). Here an emphasis on freedom of expression is apt; we have an “expressive interest” (Cohen 1993: 224) in declaring our views—about the good life, about justice, about our identity, and about other aspects of the truth as we see it.

Our interests in self-expression may not always depend on the availability of a willing audience; we may have interests simply in shouting from the rooftops to declare who we are and what we believe, regardless of who else hears us. Hence communications to oneself—for example, in a diary or journal—are plausibly protected from interference (Redish 1992: 30–1; Shiffrin 2014: 83, 93; Kramer 2021: 23).

Yet we also have distinctive interests in sharing what we think with others. Part of how we develop our conceptions of the good life, forming judgments about how to live, is precisely through talking through the matter with others. This “deliberative interest” in directly served through opportunities to tell others what we think, so that we can learn from their feedback (Cohen 1993). Such encounters also offer opportunities to persuade others to adopt our views, and indeed to learn through such discussions who else already shares our views (Raz 1991).

Speech also seems like a central way in which we develop our capacities. This, too, is central to J.S. Mill’s defense of free speech, enabling people to explore different perspectives and points of view (1859). Hence it seems that when children engage in speech, to figure out what they think and to use their imagination to try out different ways of being in the world, they are directly engaging this interest. That explains the intuition that children, and not just adults, merit at least some protection under a principle of freedom of speech.

Note that while it is common to refer to speaker autonomy , we could simply refer to speakers’ capacities. Some political liberals hold that an emphasis on autonomy is objectionably Kantian or otherwise perfectionist, valorizing autonomy as a comprehensive moral ideal in a manner that is inappropriate for a liberal state (Cohen 1993: 229; Quong 2011). For such theorists, an undue emphasis on autonomy is incompatible with ideals of liberal neutrality toward different comprehensive conceptions of the good life (though cf. Shiffrin 2014: 81).

If free speech is justified by the importance of our interests in expressing ourselves, this justifies negative duties to refrain from interfering with speakers without adequate justification. Just as with listener theories, a strong presumption against content-based restrictions, and especially against viewpoint discrimination, is a clear requirement of the view. For the state to restrict citizens’ speech on the grounds that it disfavors what they have to say would affront the equal freedom of citizens. Imagine the state were to disallow the expression of Muslim or Jewish views, but allow the expression of Christian views. This would plainly transgress the right to freedom of expression, by valuing certain speakers’ interests in expressing themselves over others.

Many arguments for the right to free speech center on its special significance for democracy (Cohen 1993; Heinze 2016: Heyman 2009; Sunstein 1993; Weinstein 2011; Post 1991, 2009, 2011). It is possible to defend free speech on the noninstrumental ground that it is necessary to respect agents as democratic citizens. To restrict citizens’ speech is to disrespect their status as free and equal moral agents, who have a moral right to debate and decide the law for themselves (Rawls 2005).

Alternatively (or additionally), one can defend free speech on the instrumental ground that free speech promotes democracy, or whatever values democracy is meant to serve. So, for example, suppose the purpose of democracy is the republican one of establishing a state of non-domination between relationally egalitarian citizens; free speech can be defended as promoting that relation (Whitten 2022; Bonotti & Seglow 2022). Or suppose that democracy is valuable because of its role in promoting just outcomes (Arneson 2009) or tending to track those outcomes in a manner than is publicly justifiable (Estlund 2008) or is otherwise epistemically valuable (Landemore 2013).

Perhaps free speech doesn’t merely respect or promote democracy; another framing is that it is constitutive of it (Meiklejohn 1948, 1960; Heinze 2016). As Rawls says: “to restrict or suppress free political speech…always implies at least a partial suspension of democracy” (2005: 254). On this view, to be committed to democracy just is , in part, to be committed to free speech. Deliberative democrats famously contend that voting merely punctuates a larger process defined by a commitment to open deliberation among free and equal citizens (Gutmann & Thompson 2008). Such an unrestricted discussion is marked not by considerations of instrumental rationality and market forces, but rather, as Habermas puts it, “the unforced force of the better argument” (1992 [1996: 37]). One crucial way in which free speech might be constitutive of democracy is if it serves as a legitimation condition . On this view, without a process of open public discourse, the outcomes of the democratic decision-making process lack legitimacy (Dworkin 2009, Brettschneider 2012: 75–78, Cohen 1997, and Heinze 2016).

Those who justify free speech on democratic grounds may view this as a special application of a more general insight. For example, Scanlon’s listener theory (discussed above) contends that the state must always respect its citizens as capable of making up their own minds (1972)—a position with clear democratic implications. Likewise, Baker is adamant that both free speech and democracy are justified by the same underlying value of autonomy (2009). And while Rawls sees the democratic role of free speech as worthy of emphasis, he is clear that free speech is one of several basic liberties that enable the development and exercise of our moral powers: our capacities for a sense of justice and for the rational pursuit a lifeplan (2005). In this way, many theorists see the continuity between free speech and our broader interests as moral agents as a virtue, not a drawback (e.g., Kendrick 2017).

Even so, some democracy theorists hold that democracy has a special role in a theory of free speech, such that political speech in particular merits special protection (for an overview, see Barendt 2005: 154ff). One consequence of such views is that contributions to public discourse on political questions merit greater protection under the law (Sunstein 1993; cf. Cohen 1993: 227; Alexander 2005: 137–8). For some scholars, this may reflect instrumental anxieties about the special danger that the state will restrict the political speech of opponents and dissenters. But for others, an emphasis on political speech seems to reflect a normative claim that such speech is genuinely of greater significance, meriting greater protection, than other kinds of speech.

While conventional in the free speech literature, it is artificial to separate out our interests as speakers, listeners, and democratic citizens. Communication, and the thinking that feeds into it and that it enables, invariably engages our interests and activities across all these capacities. This insight is central to Seana Shiffrin’s groundbreaking thinker-based theory of freedom of speech, which seeks to unify the range of considerations that have informed the traditional theories (2014). Like other theories (e.g., Scanlon 1978, Cohen 1993), Shiffrin’s theory is pluralist in the range of interests it appeals to. But it offers a unifying framework that explains why this range of interests merits protection together.

On Shiffrin’s view, freedom of speech is best understood as encompassing both freedom of communication and freedom of thought, which while logically distinct are mutually reinforcing and interdependent (Shiffrin 2014: 79). Shiffrin’s account involves several profound claims about the relation between communication and thought. A central contention is that “free speech is essential to the development, functioning, and operation of thinkers” (2014: 91). This is, in part, because we must often externalize our ideas to articulate them precisely and hold them at a distance where we can evaluate them (p. 89). It is also because we work out what we think largely by talking it through with others. Such communicative processes may be monological, but they are typically dialogical; speaker and listener interests are thereby mutually engaged in an ongoing manner that cannot be neatly disentangled, as ideas are ping-ponged back and forth. Moreover, such discussions may concern democratic politics—engaging our interests as democratic citizens—but of course they need not. Aesthetics, music, local sports, the existence of God—these all are encompassed (2014: 92–93). Pace prevailing democratic theories,

One’s thoughts about political affairs are intrinsically and ex ante no more and no less central to the human self than thoughts about one’s mortality or one’s friends. (Shiffrin 2014: 93)

The other central aspect of Shiffrin’s view appeals to the necessity of communication for successfully exercising our moral agency. Sincere communication enables us

to share needs, emotions, intentions, convictions, ambitions, desires, fantasies, disappointments, and judgments. Thereby, we are enabled to form and execute complex cooperative plans, to understand one another, to appreciate and negotiate around our differences. (2014: 1)

Without clear and precise communication of the sort that only speech can provide, we cannot cooperate to discharge our collective obligations. Nor can we exercise our normative powers (such as consenting, waiving, or promising). Our moral agency thus depends upon protected channels through which we can relay our sincere thoughts to one another. The central role of free speech is to protect those channels, by ensuring agents are free to share what they are thinking without fear of sanction.

The thinker-based view has wide-ranging normative implications. For example, by emphasizing the continuity of speech and thought (a connection also noted in Macklem 2006 and Gilmore 2011), Shiffrin’s view powerfully explains the First Amendment doctrine that compelled speech also constitutes a violation of freedom of expression. Traditional listener- and speaker-focused theories seemingly cannot explain what is fundamentally objectionable with forcing someone to declare a commitment to something, as with children compelled to pledge allegiance to the American flag ( West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1943). “What seems most troubling about the compelled pledge”, Shiffrin writes,

is that the motive behind the regulation, and its possible effect, is to interfere with the autonomous thought processes of the compelled speaker. (2014: 94)

Further, Shiffrin’s view explains why a concern for free speech does not merely correlate to negative duties not to interfere with expression; it also supports positive responsibilities on the part of the state to educate citizens, encouraging and supporting their development and exercise as thinking beings (2014: 107).

Consider briefly one final family of free speech theories, which appeal to the role of toleration or self-restraint. On one argument, freedom of speech is important because it develops our character as liberal citizens, helping us tame our illiberal impulses. The underlying idea of Lee Bollinger’s view is that liberalism is difficult; we recurrently face temptation to punish those who hold contrary views. Freedom of speech helps us to practice the general ethos of toleration in a manner than fortifies our liberal convictions (1986). Deeply offensive speech, like pro-Nazi speech, is protected precisely because toleration in these enormously difficult cases promotes “a general social ethic” of toleration more generally (1986: 248), thereby restraining unjust exercises of state power overall. This consequentialist argument treats the protection of offensive speech not as a tricky borderline case, but as “integral to the central functions of the principle of free speech” (1986: 133). It is precisely because tolerating evil speech involves “extraordinary self-restraint” (1986: 10) that it works its salutary effects on society generally.

The idea of self-restraint arises, too, in Matthew Kramer’s recent defense of free speech. Like listener theories, Kramer’s strongly deontological theory condemns censorship aimed at protecting audiences from exposure to misguided views. At the core of his theory is the thesis that the state’s paramount moral responsibility is to furnish the social conditions that serve the development and maintenance of citizens’ self-respect and respect for others. The achievement of such an ethically resilient citizenry, on Kramer’s view, has the effect of neutering the harmfulness of countless harmful communications. “Securely in a position of ethical strength”, the state “can treat the wares of pornographers and the maunderings of bigots as execrable chirps that are to be endured with contempt” (Kramer 2021: 147). In contrast, in a society where the state has failed to do its duty of inculcating a robust liberal-egalitarian ethos, the communication of illiberal creeds may well pose a substantial threat. Yet for the state then to react by banning such speech is

overweening because with them the system’s officials take control of communications that should have been defused (through the system’s fulfillment of its moral obligations) without prohibitory or preventative impositions. (2021: 147)

(One might agree with Kramer that this is so, but diverge by arguing that the state—having failed in its initial duty—ought to take measures to prevent the harms that flow from that failure.)

These theories are striking in that they assume that a chief task of free speech theory is to explain why harmful speech ought to be protected. This is in contrast to those who think that the chief task of free speech theory is to explain our interests in communicating with others, treating the further issue of whether (wrongfully) harmful communications should be protected as an open question, with different reasonable answers available (Kendrick 2017). In this way, toleration theories—alongside a lot of philosophical work on free speech—seem designed to vindicate the demanding American legal position on free speech, one unshared by virtually all other liberal democracies.

One final family of arguments for free speech appeals to the danger of granting the state powers it may abuse. On this view, we protect free speech chiefly because if we didn’t, it would be far easier for the state to silence its political opponents and enact unjust policies. On this view, a state with censorial powers is likely to abuse them. As Richard Epstein notes, focusing on the American case,

the entire structure of federalism, divided government, and the system of checks and balances at the federal level shows that the theme of distrust has worked itself into the warp and woof of our constitutional structure.

“The protection of speech”, he writes, “…should be read in light of these political concerns” (Epstein 1992: 49).

This view is not merely a restatement of the democracy theory; it does not affirm free speech as an element of valuable self-governance. Nor does it reduce to the uncontroversial thought that citizens need freedom of speech to check the behavior of fallible government agents (Blasi 1977). One need not imagine human beings to be particularly sinister to insist (as democracy theorists do) that the decisions of those entrusted with great power be subject to public discussion and scrutiny. The argument under consideration here is more pessimistic about human nature. It is an argument about the slippery slope that we create even when enacting (otherwise justified) speech restrictions; we set an unacceptable precedent for future conduct by the state (see Schauer 1985). While this argument is theoretical, there is clearly historical evidence for it, as in the manifold cases in which bans on dangerous sedition were used to suppress legitimate war protest. (For a sweeping canonical study of the uses and abuses of speech regulations during wartime, with a focus on U.S. history, see G. Stone 2004.)

These instrumental concerns could potentially justify the legal protection for free speech. But they do not to attempt to justify why we should care about free speech as a positive moral ideal (Shiffrin 2014: 83n); they are, in Cohen’s helpful terminology, “minimalist” rather than “maximalist” (Cohen 1993: 210). Accordingly, they cannot explain why free speech is something that even the most trustworthy, morally competent administrations, with little risk of corruption or degeneration, ought to respect. Of course, minimalists will deny that accounting for speech’s positive value is a requirement of a theory of free speech, and that critiquing them for this omission begs the question.

Pluralists may see instrumental concerns as valuably supplementing or qualifying noninstrumental views. For example, instrumental concerns may play a role in justifying deviations between the moral right to free communication, on the one hand, and a properly specified legal right to free communication, on the other. Suppose that there is no moral right to engage in certain forms of harmful expression (such as hate speech), and that there is in fact a moral duty to refrain from such expression. Even so, it does not follow automatically that such a right ought to be legally enforced. Concerns about the dangers of granting the state such power plausibly militate against the enforcement of at least some of our communicative duties—at least in those jurisdictions that lack robust and competently administered liberal-democratic safeguards.

This entry has canvassed a range of views about what justifies freedom of expression, with particular attention to theories that conceive free speech as a natural moral right. Clearly, the proponents of such views believe that they succeed in this justificatory effort. But others dissent, doubting that the case for a bona fide moral right to free speech comes through. Let us briefly note the nature of this challenge from free speech skeptics , exploring a prominent line of reply.

The challenge from skeptics is generally understood as that of showing that free speech is a special right . As Leslie Kendrick notes,

the term “special right” generally requires that a special right be entirely distinct from other rights and activities and that it receive a very high degree of protection. (2017: 90)

(Note that this usage is not to be confused from the alternative usage of “special right”, referring to conditional rights arising out of particular relationships; see Hart 1955.)

Take each aspect in turn. First, to vindicate free speech as a special right, it must serve some distinctive value or interest (Schauer 2015). Suppose free speech were just an implication of a general principle not to interfere in people’s liberty without justification. As Joel Feinberg puts it, “Liberty should be the norm; coercion always needs some special justification” (1984: 9). In such a case, then while there still might be contingent, historical reasons to single speech out in law as worthy of protection (Alexander 2005: 186), such reasons would not track anything especially distinctive about speech as an underlying moral matter. Second, to count as a special right, free speech must be robust in what it protects, such that only a compelling justification can override it (Dworkin 2013: 131). This captures the conviction, prominent among American constitutional theorists, that “any robust free speech principle must protect at least some harmful speech despite the harm it may cause” (Schauer 2011b: 81; see also Schauer 1982).

If the task of justifying a moral right to free speech requires surmounting both hurdles, it is a tall order. Skeptics about a special right to free speech doubt that the order can be met, and so deny that a natural moral right to freedom of expression can be justified (Schauer 2015; Alexander & Horton 1983; Alexander 2005; Husak 1985). But these theorists may be demanding too much (Kendrick 2017). Start with the claim that free speech must be distinctive. We can accept that free speech be more than simply one implication of a general presumption of liberty. But need it be wholly distinctive? Consider the thesis that free speech is justified by our autonomy interests—interests that justify other rights such as freedom of religion and association. Is it a problem if free speech is justified by interests that are continuous with, or overlap with, interests that justify other rights? Pace the free speech skeptics, maybe not. So long as such claims deserve special recognition, and are worth distinguishing by name, this may be enough (Kendrick 2017: 101). Many of the views canvassed above share normative bases with other important rights. For example, Rawls is clear that he thinks all the basic liberties constitute

essential social conditions for the adequate development and full exercise of the two powers of moral personality over a complete life. (Rawls 2005: 293)

The debate, then, is whether such a shared basis is a theoretical virtue (or at least theoretically unproblematic) or whether it is a theoretical vice, as the skeptics avow.

As for the claim that free speech must be robust, protecting harmful speech, “it is not necessary for a free speech right to protect harmful speech in order for it to be called a free speech right” (Kendrick 2017: 102). We do not tend to think that religious liberty must protect harmful religious activities for it to count as a special right. So it would be strange to insist that the right to free speech must meet this burden to count as a special right. Most of the theorists mentioned above take themselves to be offering views that protect quite a lot of harmful speech. Yet we can question whether this feature is a necessary component of their views, or whether we could imagine variations without this result.

3. Justifying Speech Restrictions

When, and why, can restrictions on speech be justified? It is common in public debate on free speech to hear the provocative claim that free speech is absolute . But the plausibility of such a claim depends on what is exactly meant by it. If understood to mean that no communications between humans can ever be restricted, such a view is held by no one in the philosophical debate. When I threaten to kill you unless you hand me your money; when I offer to bribe the security guard to let me access the bank vault; when I disclose insider information that the company in which you’re heavily invested is about to go bust; when I defame you by falsely posting online that you’re a child abuser; when I endanger you by labeling a drug as safe despite its potentially fatal side-effects; when I reveal your whereabouts to assist a murderer intent on killing you—across all these cases, communications may be uncontroversially restricted. But there are different views as to why.

To help organize such views, consider a set of distinctions influentially defended by Schauer (from 1982 onward). The first category involves uncovered speech : speech that does not even presumptively fall within the scope of a principle of free expression. Many of the speech-acts just canvassed, such as the speech involved in making a threat or insider training, plausibly count as uncovered speech. As the U.S. Supreme Court has said of fighting words (e.g., insults calculated to provoke a street fight),

such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. ( Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 1942)

The general idea here is that some speech simply has negligible—and often no —value as free speech, in light of its utter disconnection from the values that justify free speech in the first place. (For discussion of so-called “low-value speech” in the U.S. context, see Sunstein 1989 and Lakier 2015.) Accordingly, when such low-value speech is harmful, it is particularly easy to justify its curtailment. Hence the Court’s view that “the prevention and punishment of [this speech] have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”. For legislation restricting such speech, the U.S. Supreme Court applies a “rational basis” test, which is very easy to meet, as it simply asks whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. (Note that it is widely held that it would still be impermissible to selectively ban low-value speech on a viewpoint-discriminatory basis—e.g., if a state only banned fighting words from left-wing activists while allowing them from right-wing activists.)

Schauer’s next category concerns speech that is covered but unprotected . This is speech that engages the values that underpin free speech; yet the countervailing harm of the speech justifies its restriction. In such cases, while there is real value in such expression as free speech, that value is outweighed by competing normative concerns (or even, as we will see below, on behalf of the very values that underpin free speech). In U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, this category encompasses those extremely rare cases in which restrictions on political speech pass the “strict scrutiny” test, whereby narrow restrictions on high-value speech can be justified due to the compelling state interests thereby served. Consider Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 2010, in which the Court held that an NGO’s legal advice to a terrorist organization on how to pursue peaceful legal channels were legitimately criminalized under a counter-terrorism statute. While such speech had value as free speech (at least on one interpretation of this contested ruling), the imperative of counter-terrorism justified its restriction. (Arguably, commercial speech, while sometimes called low-value speech by scholars, falls into the covered but unprotected category. Under U.S. law, legislation restricting it receives “intermediate scrutiny” by courts—requiring restrictions to be narrowly drawn to advance a substantial government interest. Such a test suggests that commercial speech has bona fide free-speech value, making it harder to justify regulations on it than regulations on genuinely low-value speech like fighting words. It simply doesn’t have as much free-speech value as categories like political speech, religious speech, or press speech, all of which trigger the strict scrutiny test when restricted.)

As a philosophical matter, we can reasonably disagree about what speech qualifies as covered but unprotected (and need not treat the verdicts of the U.S. Supreme Court as philosophically decisive). For example, consider politically-inflected hate speech, which advances repugnant ideas about the inferior status of certain groups. One could concur that there is substantial free-speech value in such expression, just because it involves the sincere expression of views about central questions of politics and justice (however misguided the views doubtlessly are). Yet one could nevertheless hold that such speech should not be protected in virtue of the substantial harms to which it can lead. In such cases, the free-speech value is outweighed. Many scholars who defend the permissibility of legal restrictions on hate speech hold such a view (e.g., Parekh 2012; Waldron 2012). (More radically, one could hold that such speech’s value is corrupted by its evil, such that it qualifies as genuinely low-value; Howard 2019a.)

The final category of speech encompasses expression that is covered and protected . To declare that speech is protected just is to conclude that it is immune from restriction. A preponderance of human communications fall into this category. This does not mean that such speech can never be regulated ; content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations (e.g., prohibiting loud nighttime protests) can certainly be justified (G. Stone 1987). But such regulations must not be viewpoint discriminatory; they must apply even-handedly across all forms of protected speech.

Schauer’s taxonomy offers a useful organizing framework for how we should think about different forms of speech. Where does it leave the claim that free speech is absolute? The possibility of speech that is covered but unprotected suggests that free speech should sometimes be restricted on account of rival normative concerns. Of course, one could contend that such a category, while logically possible, is substantively an empty set; such a position would involve some kind of absoluteness about free speech (holding that where free-speech values are engaged by expression, no countervailing values can ever be weighty enough to override them). Such a position would be absolutist in a certain sense while granting the permissibility of restrictions on speech that do not engage the free-speech values. (For a recent critique of Schauer’s framework, arguing that governmental designation of some speech as low-value is incompatible with the very ideal of free speech, see Kramer 2021: 31.)

In what follows, this entry will focus on Schauer’s second category: speech that is covered by a free speech principle, but is nevertheless unprotected because of the harms it causes. How do we determine what speech falls into this category? How, in other words, do we determine the limits of free speech? Unsurprisingly, this is where most of the controversy lies.

Most legal systems that protect free speech recognize that the right has limits. Consider, for example, international human rights law, which emphatically protects the freedom of speech as a fundamental human right while also affirming specific restrictions on certain seriously harmful speech. Article 19 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights declares that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds”—but then immediately notes that this right “carries with it special duties and responsibilities”. The subsequent ICCPR article proceeds to endorse legal restrictions on “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”, as well as speech constituting “propaganda for war” (ICCPR). While such restrictions would plainly be struck down as unconstitutional affronts to free speech in the U.S., this more restrictive approach prevails in most liberal democracies’ treatment of harmful speech.

Set aside the legal issue for now. How should we think about how to determine the limits of the moral right free speech? Those seeking to justify limits on speech tend to appeal to one of two strategies (Howard and Simpson forthcoming). The first strategy appeals to the importance of balancing free speech against other moral values when they come into conflict. This strategy involves external limits on free speech. (The next strategy, discussed below, invokes free speech itself, or the values that justify it, as limit-setting rationales; it thus involves internal limits on free speech.)

A balancing approach recognizes a moral conflict between unfettered communication and external values. Consider again the case of hate speech, understood as expression that attacks members of socially vulnerable groups as inferior or dangerous. On all of the theories canvassed above, there are grounds for thinking that restrictions on hate speech are prima facie in violation of the moral right to free speech. Banning hate speech to prevent people from hearing ideas that might incline them to bigotry plainly seems to disrespect listener autonomy. Further, even when speakers are expressing prejudiced views, they are still engaging their autonomous faculties. Certainly, they are expressing views on questions of public political concern, even false ones. And as thinkers they are engaged in the communication of sincere testimony to others. On many of the leading theories, the values underpinning free speech seem to be militate against bans on hate speech.

Even so, other values matter. Consider, for example, the value of upholding the equal dignity of all citizens. A central insight of critical race theory is that public expressions of white supremacy, for example, attack and undermine that equal dignity (Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, & Crenshaw 1993). On Jeremy Waldron’s view (2012), hate speech is best understood as a form of group defamation, launching spurious attacks on others’ reputations and thereby undermining their standing as respected equals in their own community (relatedly, see Beauharnais v. Illinois 1952).

Countries that ban hate speech, accordingly, are plausibly understood not as opposed to free speech, but as recognizing the importance that it be balanced when conflicting with other values. Such balancing can be understood in different ways. In European human rights law, for example, the relevant idea is that the right to free speech is balanced against other rights ; the relevant task, accordingly, is to specify what counts as a proportionate balance between these rights (see Alexy 2003; J. Greene 2021).

For others, the very idea of balancing rights undermines their deontic character. This alternative framing holds that the balancing occurs before we specify what rights are; on this view, we balance interests against each other, and only once we’ve undertaken that balancing do we proceed to define what our rights protect. As Scanlon puts it,

The only balancing is balancing of interests. Rights are not balanced, but are defined, or redefined, in the light of the balance of interests and of empirical facts about how these interests can best be protected. (2008: 78)

This balancing need not come in the form of some crude consequentialism; otherwise it would be acceptable to limit the rights of the few to secure trivial benefits for the many. On a contractualist moral theory such as Scanlon’s, the test is to assess the strength of any given individual’s reason to engage in (or access) the speech, against the strength of any given individual’s reason to oppose it.

Note that those who engage in balancing need not give up on the idea of viewpoint neutrality; they can accept that, as a general principle, the state should not restrict speech on the grounds that it disapproves of its message and dislikes that others will hear it. The point, instead, is that this commitment is defeasible; it is possible to be overridden.

One final comment is apt. Those who are keen to balance free speech against other values tend to be motivated by the concern that speech can cause harm, either directly or indirectly (on this distinction, see Schauer 1993). But to justify restrictions on speech, it is not sufficient (and perhaps not even necessary) to show that such speech imposes or risks imposing harm. The crucial point is that the speech is wrongful (or, perhaps, wrongfully harmful or risky) , breaching a moral duty that speakers owe to others. Yet very few in the free speech literature think that the mere offensiveness of speech is sufficient to justify restrictions on it. Even Joel Feinberg, who thinks offensiveness can sometimes be grounds for restricting conduct, makes a sweeping exception for

[e]xpressions of opinion, especially about matters of public policy, but also about matters of empirical fact, and about historical, scientific, theological, philosophical, political, and moral questions. (1985: 44)

And in many cases, offensive speech may be actively salutary, as when racists are offended by defenses of racial equality (Waldron 1987). Accordingly, despite how large it looms in public debate, discussion of offensive speech will not play a major role in the discussion here.

We saw that one way to justify limits on free speech is to balance it against other values. On that approach, free speech is externally constrained. A second approach, in contrast, is internally constrained. On this approach, the very values that justify free speech themselves determine its own limits. This is a revisionist approach to free speech since, unlike orthodox thinking, it contends that a commitment to free speech values can counterintuitively support the restriction of speech—a surprising inversion of traditional thinking on the topic (see Howard and Simpson forthcoming). This move—justifying restrictions on speech by appealing to the values that underpin free speech—is now prevalent in the philosophical literature (for an overview, see Barendt 2005: 1ff).

Consider, for example, the claim that free speech is justified by concerns of listener autonomy. On such a view, as we saw above, autonomous citizens have interests in exposure to a wide range of viewpoints, so that they can decide for themselves what to believe. But many have pointed out that this is not autonomous citizens’ only interest; they also have interests in not getting murdered by those incited by incendiary speakers (Amdur 1980). Likewise, insofar as being targeted by hate speech undermines the exercise of one’s autonomous capacities, appeal to the underlying value of autonomy could well support restrictions on such speech (Brison 1998; see also Brink 2001). What’s more, if our interests as listeners in acquiring accurate information is undermined by fraudulent information, then restrictions on such information could well be compatible with our status as autonomous; this was one of the insights that led Scanlon to complicate his theory of free speech (1978).

Or consider the theory that free speech is justified because of its role in enabling autonomous speakers to express themselves. But as Japa Pallikkathayil has argued, some speech can intimidate its audiences into staying silent (as with some hate speech), out of fear for what will happen if they speak up (Pallikkathayil 2020). In principle, then, restrictions on hate speech may serve to support the value of speaker expression, rather than undermine it (see also Langton 2018; Maitra 2009; Maitra & McGowan 2007; and Matsuda 1989: 2337). Indeed, among the most prominent claims in feminist critiques of pornography is precisely that it silences women—not merely through its (perlocutionary) effects in inspiring rape, but more insidiously through its (illocutionary) effects in altering the force of the word “no” (see MacKinnon 1984; Langton 1993; and West 204 [2022]; McGowan 2003 and 2019; cf. Kramer 2021, pp. 160ff).

Now consider democracy theories. On the one hand, democracy theorists are adamant that citizens should be free to discuss any proposals, even the destruction of democracy itself (e.g., Meiklejohn 1948: 65–66). On the other hand, it isn’t obvious why citizens’ duties as democratic citizens could not set a limit to their democratic speech rights (Howard 2019a). The Nazi propagandist Goebbels is said to have remarked:

This will always remain one of the best jokes of democracy, that it gave its deadly enemies the means by which it was destroyed. (as quoted in Fox & Nolte 1995: 1)

But it is not clear why this is necessarily so. Why should we insist on a conception of democracy that contains a self-destruct mechanism? Merely stipulating that democracy requires this is not enough (see A. Greene and Simpson 2017).

Finally, consider Shiffrin’s thinker-based theory. Shiffrin’s view is especially well-placed to explain why varieties of harmful communications are protected speech; what the theory values is the sincere transmission of veridical testimony, whereby speakers disclose what they genuinely believe to others, even if what they believe is wrongheaded and dangerous. Yet because the sincere testimony of thinkers is what qualifies some communication for protection, Shiffrin is adamant that lying falls outside the protective ambit of freedom of expression (2014) This, then, sets an internal limit on her own theory (even if she herself disfavors all lies’ outright prohibition for reasons of tolerance). The claim that lying falls outside the protective ambit of free speech is itself a recurrent suggestion in the literature (Strauss 1991: 355; Brown 2023). In an era of rampant disinformation, this internal limit is of substantial practical significance.

Suppose the moral right (or principle) of free speech is limited, as most think, such that not all communications fall within its protective ambit (either for external reasons, internal reasons, or both). Even so, it does not follow that laws banning such unprotected speech can be justified all-things-considered. Further moral tests must be passed before any particular policy restricting speech can be justified. This sub-section focuses on the requirement that speech restrictions be proportionate .

The idea that laws implicating fundamental rights must be proportionate is central in many jurisdictions’ constitutional law, as well as in the international law of human rights. As a representative example, consider the specification of proportionality offered by the Supreme Court of Canada:

First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair “as little as possible” the right or freedom in question[…] Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance” ( R v. Oakes 1986).

It is this third element (often called “proportionality stricto sensu ”) on which we will concentrate here; this is the focused sense of proportionality that roughly tracks how the term is used in the philosophical literatures on defensive harm and war, as well as (with some relevant differences) criminal punishment. (The strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny tests of U.S. constitutional law are arguably variations of the proportionality test; but set aside this complication for now as it distracts from the core philosophical issues. For relevant legal discussion, see Tsesis 2020.)

Proportionality, in the strict sense, concerns the relation between the costs or harms imposed by some measure and the benefits that the measure is designed to secure. The organizing distinction in recent philosophical literature (albeit largely missing in the literature on free speech) is one between narrow proportionality and wide proportionality . While there are different ways to cut up the terrain between these terms, let us stipulatively define them as follows. An interference is narrowly proportionate just in case the intended target of the interference is liable to bear the costs of that interference. An interference is widely proportionate just in case the collateral costs that the interference unintentionally imposes on others can be justified. (This distinction largely follows the literature in just war theory and the ethics of defensive force; see McMahan 2009.) While the distinction is historically absent from free speech theory, it has powerful payoffs in helping to structure this chaotic debate (as argued in Howard 2019a).

So start with the idea that restrictions on communication must be narrowly proportionate . For a restriction to be narrowly proportionate, those whose communications are restricted must be liable to bear their costs, such that they are not wronged by their imposition. One standard way to be liable to bear certain costs is to have a moral duty to bear them (Tadros 2012). So, for example, if speakers have a moral duty to refrain from libel, hate speech, or some other form of harmful speech, they are liable to bear at least some costs involved in the enforcement of that duty. Those costs cannot be unlimited; a policy of executing hate speakers could not plausibly be justified. Typically, in both defensive and punitive contexts, wrongdoers’ liability is determined by their culpability, the severity of their wrong, or some combination of the two. While it is difficult to say in the abstract what the precise maximal cost ceiling is for any given restriction, as it depends hugely on the details, the point is simply that there is some ceiling above which a speech restriction (like any restriction) imposes unacceptably high costs, even on wrongdoers.

Second, for a speech restriction to be justified, we must also show that it would be widely proportionate . Suppose a speaker is liable to bear the costs of some policy restricting her communication, such that she is not wronged by its imposition. It may be that the collateral costs of such a policy would render it unacceptable. One set of costs is chilling effects , the “overdeterrence of benign conduct that occurs incidentally to a law’s legitimate purpose or scope” (Kendrick 2013: 1649). The core idea is that laws targeting unprotected, legitimately proscribed expression may nevertheless end up having a deleterious impact on protected expression. This is because laws are often vague, overbroad, and in any case are likely to be misapplied by fallible officials (Schauer 1978: 699).

Note that if a speech restriction produces chilling effects, it does not follow that the restriction should not exist at all. Rather, concern about chilling effects instead suggests that speech restrictions should be under-inclusive—restricting less speech than is actually harmful—in order to create “breathing space”, or “a buffer zone of strategic protection” (Schauer 1978: 710) for legitimate expression and so reduce unwanted self-censorship. For example, some have argued that even though speech can cause harm recklessly or negligently, we should insist on specific intent as the mens rea of speech crimes in order to reduce any chilling effects that could follow (Alexander 1995: 21–128; Schauer 1978: 707; cf. Kendrick 2013).

But chilling effects are not the only sort of collateral effects to which speech restrictions could lead. Earlier we noted the risk that states might abuse their censorial powers. This, too, could militate in favor of underinclusive speech restrictions. Or the implication could be more radical. Consider the problem that it is difficult to author restrictions on hate speech in a tightly specified way; the language involved is open-ended in a manner that enables states to exercise considerable judgment in deciding what speech-acts, in fact, count as violations (see Strossen 2018). Given the danger that the state will misuse or abuse these laws to punish legitimate speech, some might think this renders their enactment widely disproportionate. Indeed, even if the law were well-crafted and would be judiciously applied by current officials, the point is that those in the future may not be so trustworthy.

Those inclined to accept such a position might simply draw the conclusion that legislatures ought to refrain from enacting laws against hate speech. A more radical conclusion is that the legal right to free speech ought to be specified so that hate speech is constitutionally protected. In other words, we ought to give speakers a legal right to violate their moral duties, since enforcing those moral duties through law is simply too risky. By appealing to this logic, it is conceivable that the First Amendment position on hate speech could be justified all-things-considered—not because the underlying moral right to free speech protects hate speech, but because hate speech must be protected for instrumental reasons of preventing future abuses of power (Howard 2019a).

Suppose certain restrictions on harmful speech can be justified as proportionate, in both the narrow and wide senses. This is still not sufficient to justify them all-things-considered. Additionally, they must be justified as necessary . (Note that some conceptions of proportionality in human rights law encompass the necessity requirement, but this entry follows the prevailing philosophical convention by treating them as distinct.)

Why might restrictions on harmful speech be unnecessary? One of the standard claims in the free speech literature is that we should respond to harmful speech not by banning it, but by arguing back against it. Counter-speech—not censorship—is the appropriate solution. This line of reasoning is old. As John Milton put it in 1644: “Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?” The insistence on counter-speech as the remedy for harmful speech is similarly found, as noted above, throughout chapter 2 of Mill’s On Liberty .

For many scholars, this line of reply is justified by the fact that they think the harmful speech in question is protected by the moral right to free speech. For such scholars, counter-speech is the right response because censorship is morally off the table. For other scholars, the recourse to counter-speech has a plausible distinct rationale (although it is seldom articulated): its possibility renders legal restrictions unnecessary. And because it is objectionable to use gratuitous coercion, legal restrictions are therefore impermissible (Howard 2019a). Such a view could plausibly justify Mill’s aforementioned analysis in the corn dealer example, whereby censorship is permissible but only when there’s no time for counter-speech—a view that is also endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

Whether this argument succeeds depends upon a wide range of further assumptions—about the comparable effectiveness of counter-speech relative to law; about the burdens that counter-speech imposes on prospective counter-speakers. Supposing that the argument succeeds, it invites a range of further normative questions about the ethics of counter-speech. For example, it is important who has the duty to engage in counter-speech, who its intended audience is, and what specific forms the counter-speech ought to take—especially in order to maximize its persuasive effectiveness (Brettschneider 2012; Cepollaro, Lepoutre, & Simpson 2023; Howard 2021b; Lepoutre 2021; Badano & Nuti 2017). It is also important to ask questions about the moral limits of counter-speech. For example, insofar as publicly shaming wrongful speakers has become a prominent form of counter-speech, it is crucial to interrogate its permissibility (e.g., Billingham and Parr 2020).

This final section canvasses the young philosophical debate concerning freedom of speech on the internet. With some important exceptions (e.g., Barendt 2005: 451ff), this issue has only recently accelerated (for an excellent edited collection, see Brison & Gelber 2019). There are many normative questions to be asked about the moral rights and obligations of internet platforms. Here are three. First, do internet platforms have moral duties to respect the free speech of their users? Second, do internet platforms have moral duties to restrict (or at least refrain from amplifying) harmful speech posted by their users? And finally, if platforms do indeed have moral duties to restrict harmful speech, should those duties be legally enforced?

The reference to internet platforms , is a deliberate focus on large-scale social media platforms, through which people can discover and publicly share user-generated content. We set aside other entities such as search engines (Whitney & Simpson 2019), important though they are. That is simply because the central political controversies, on which philosophical input is most urgent, concern the large social-media platforms.

Consider the question of whether internet platforms have moral duties to respect the free speech of their users. One dominant view in the public discourse holds that the answer is no . On this view, platforms are private entities, and as such enjoy the prerogative to host whatever speech they like. This would arguably be a function of them having free speech rights themselves. Just as the free speech rights of the New York Times give it the authority to publish whatever op-eds it sees fit, the free speech rights of platforms give them the authority to exercise editorial or curatorial judgment about what speech to allow. On this view, if Facebook were to decide to become a Buddhist forum, amplifying the speech of Buddhist users and promoting Buddhist perspectives and ideas, and banning speech promoting other religions, it would be entirely within its moral (and thus proper legal) rights to do so. So, too, if it were to decide to become an atheist forum.

A radical alternative view holds that internet platforms constitute a public forum , a term of art from U.S. free speech jurisprudence used to designate spaces “designed for and dedicated to expressive activities” ( Southeastern Promotions Ltd., v. Conrad 1975). As Kramer has argued:

social-media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter and YouTube have become public fora. Although the companies that create and run those platforms are not morally obligated to sustain them in existence at all, the role of controlling a public forum morally obligates each such company to comply with the principle of freedom of expression while performing that role. No constraints that deviate from the kinds of neutrality required under that principle are morally legitimate. (Kramer 2021: 58–59)

On this demanding view, platforms’ duties to respect speech are (roughly) identical to the duties of states. Accordingly, if efforts by the state to restrict hate speech, pornography, and public health misinformation (for example) are objectionable affronts to free speech, so too are platforms’ content moderation rules for such content. A more moderate view does not hold that platforms are public forums as such, but holds that government channels or pages qualify as public forums (the claim at issue in Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump (2019).)

Even if we deny that platforms constitute public forums, it is plausible that they engage in a governance function of some kind (Klonick 2018). As Jack Balkin has argued, the traditional model of free speech, which sees it as a relation between speakers and the state, is today plausibly supplanted by a triadic model, involving a more complex relation between speakers, governments, and intermediaries (2004, 2009, 2018, 2021). If platforms do indeed have some kind of governance function, it may well trigger responsibilities for transparency and accountability (as with new legislation such as the EU’s Digital Services Act and the UK’s Online Safety Act).

Second, consider the question of whether platforms have a duty to remove harmful content posted by users. Even those who regard them as public forums could agree that platforms may have a moral responsibility to remove illegal unprotected speech. Yet a dominant view in the public debate has historically defended platforms’ place as mere conduits for others’ speech. This is the current position under U.S. law (as with 47 U.S. Code §230), which broadly exempts platforms from liability for much illegal speech, such as defamation. On this view, we should view platforms as akin to bulletin boards: blame whoever posts wrongful content, but don’t hold the owner of the board responsible.

This view is under strain. Even under current U.S. law, platforms are liable for removing some content, such as child sexual abuse material and copyright infringements, suggesting that it is appropriate to demand some accountability for the wrongful content posted by others. An increasing body of philosophical work explores the idea that platforms are indeed morally responsible for removing extreme content. For example, some have argued that platforms have a special responsibility to prevent the radicalization that occurs on their networks, given the ways in which extreme content is amplified to susceptible users (Barnes 2022). Without engaging in moderation (i.e., removal) of harmful content, platforms are plausibly complicit with the wrongful harms perpetrated by users (Howard forthcoming).

Yet it remains an open question what a responsible content moderation policy ought to involve. Many are tempted by a juridical model, whereby platforms remove speech in accordance with clearly announced rules, with user appeals mechanisms in place for individual speech decisions to ensure they are correctly made (critiqued in Douek 2022b). Yet platforms have billions of users and remove millions of pieces of content per week. Accordingly, perfection is not possible. Moving quickly to remove harmful content during a crisis—e.g., Covid misinformation—will inevitably increase the number of false positives (i.e., legitimate speech taken down as collateral damage). It is plausible that the individualistic model of speech decisions adopted by courts is decidedly implausible to help us govern online content moderation; as noted in Douek 2021 and 2022a, what is needed is analysis of how the overall system should operate at scale, with a focus on achieving proportionality between benefits and costs. Alternatively, one might double down and insist that the juridical model is appropriate, given the normative significance of speech. And if it is infeasible for social-media companies to meet its demands given their size, then all the worse for social-media companies. On this view, it is they who must bend to meet the moral demands of free speech theory, not the other way around.

Substantial philosophical work needs to be done to deliver on this goal. The work is complicated by the fact that artificial intelligence (AI) is central to the processes of content moderation; human moderators, themselves subjected to terrible working conditions at long hours, work in conjunction with machine learning tools to identify and remove content that platforms have restricted. Yet AI systems notoriously are as biased as their training data. Further, their “black box” decisions are cryptic and cannot be easily understood. Given that countless speech decisions will necessarily be made without human involvement, it is right to ask whether it is reasonable to expect users to accept the deliverances of machines (e.g., see Vredenburgh 2022; Lazar forthcoming a). Note that machine intelligence is used not merely for content moderation, narrowly understood as the enforcement of rules about what speech is allowed. It is also deployed for the broader practice of content curation, determining what speech gets amplified — raising the question of what normative principles should govern such amplification; see Lazar forthcoming b).

Finally, there is the question of legal enforcement. Showing that platforms have the moral responsibility to engage in content moderation is necessary to justifying its codification into a legal responsibility. Yet it is not sufficient; one could accept that platforms have moral duties to moderate (some) harmful speech while also denying that those moral duties ought to be legally enforced. A strong, noninstrumental version of such a view would hold that while speakers have moral duties to refrain from wrongful speech, and platforms have duties not to platform or amplify it, the coercive enforcement of such duties would violate the moral right to freedom of expression. A more contingent, instrumental version of the view would hold that legal enforcement is not in principle impermissible; but in practice, it is simply too risky to grant the state the authority to enforce platforms’ and speakers’ moral duties, given the potential for abuse and overreach.

Liberals who champion the orthodox interpretation of the First Amendment, yet insist on robust content moderation, likely hold one or both of these views. Yet globally such views seem to be in the minority. Serious legislation is imminent that will subject social-media companies to burdensome regulation, in the form of such laws as the Digital Services Act in the European Union and the Online Safety Bill in the UK. Normatively evaluating such legislation is a pressing task. So, too, is the task of designing normative theories to guide the design of content moderation systems, and the wider governance of the digital public sphere. On both fronts, political philosophers should get back to work.

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• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) , adopted: 16 December 1966; Entry into force: 23 March 1976.
• Free Speech Debate
• Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University
• van Mill, David, “Freedom of Speech”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/freedom-speech/ >. [This was the previous entry on this topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – see the version history .]

ethics: search engines and | hate speech | legal rights | liberalism | Mill, John Stuart | Mill, John Stuart: moral and political philosophy | pornography: and censorship | rights | social networking and ethics | toleration

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the editors and anonymous referees of this Encyclopedia for helpful feedback. I am greatly indebted to Robert Mark Simpson for many incisive suggestions, which substantially improved the entry. This entry was written while on a fellowship funded by UK Research & Innovation (grant reference MR/V025600/1); I am thankful to UKRI for the support.

Copyright © 2024 by Jeffrey W. Howard < jeffrey . howard @ ucl . ac . uk >

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Look up a word, learn it forever.

Freedom of speech, /ˈfridəm əv spitʃ/.

Other forms: freedoms of speech

The phrase freedom of speech refers to a citizen's right to speak her own opinions without being punished by a government. In the United States, the First Amendment to the Constitution specifically protects freedom of speech .

The First Amendment right to freedom of speech is considered one of the most basic political rights by many Americans, and it has great importance to most people throughout the world. When a person has freedom of speech, he is free to communicate his ideas fully, as long as he doesn't incite violence or tell harmful lies about another person. The importance of this civil right is reflected by the fact that it's the first of the ten amendments making up the US Bill of Rights.

• noun a civil right guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution synonyms: free speech see more see less type of: civil right right or rights belonging to a person by reason of citizenship including especially the fundamental freedoms and privileges guaranteed by the 13th and 14th amendments and subsequent acts of Congress including the right to legal and social and economic equality

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What Does Free Speech Mean?

Among other cherished values, the First Amendment protects freedom of speech. The U.S. Supreme Court often has struggled to determine what exactly constitutes protected speech. The following are examples of speech, both direct (words) and symbolic (actions), that the Court has decided are either entitled to First Amendment protections, or not.

The First Amendment states, in relevant part, that:

“Congress shall make no law...abridging freedom of speech.”

Freedom of speech includes the right:

• Not to speak (specifically, the right not to salute the flag). West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette , 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
• Of students to wear black armbands to school to protest a war (“Students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate.”). Tinker v. Des Moines , 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
• To use certain offensive words and phrases to convey political messages. Cohen v. California , 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
• To contribute money (under certain circumstances) to political campaigns. Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
• To advertise commercial products and professional services (with some restrictions). Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council , 425 U.S. 748 (1976);  Bates v. State Bar of Arizona , 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
• To engage in symbolic speech, (e.g., burning the flag in protest). Texas v. Johnson , 491 U.S. 397 (1989);  United States v. Eichman , 496 U.S. 310 (1990).

Freedom of speech does not include the right:

• To incite imminent lawless action. Brandenburg v. Ohio , 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
• To make or distribute obscene materials. Roth v. United States , 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
• To burn draft cards as an anti-war protest. United States v. O’Brien , 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
• To permit students to print articles in a school newspaper over the objections of the school administration.  Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier , 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
• Of students to make an obscene speech at a school-sponsored event. Bethel School District #43 v. Fraser , 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
• Of students to advocate illegal drug use at a school-sponsored event. Morse v. Frederick, __ U.S. __ (2007).

Disclaimer: These resources are created by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts for use in educational activities only. They may not reflect the current state of the law, and are not intended to provide legal advice, guidance on litigation, or commentary on legislation. 

DISCLAIMER: These resources are created by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts for educational purposes only. They may not reflect the current state of the law, and are not intended to provide legal advice, guidance on litigation, or commentary on any pending case or legislation.

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The first amendment, interactive constitution: the meaning of free speech.

August 13, 2017 | by Geoffrey R. Stone and Eugene Volokh

In this essay from the National Constitution Center's Interactive Constitution project, Geoffrey R. Stone from the University of Chicago Law School and Eugene Volokh from the UCLA School of Law explain the meanings and limitations of free speech and a free press under the First Amendment.

Although the First Amendment says “Congress,” the Supreme Court has held that speakers are protected against all government agencies and officials: federal, state, and local, and legislative, executive, or judicial. The First Amendment does not protect speakers, however, against private individuals or organizations, such as private employers, private colleges, or private landowners. The First Amendment restrains only the government.

The Supreme Court has interpreted “speech” and “press” broadly as covering not only talking, writing, and printing, but also broadcasting, using the Internet, and other forms of expression. The freedom of speech also applies to symbolic expression, such as displaying flags, burning flags, wearing armbands, burning crosses, and the like.

The Supreme Court has held that restrictions on speech because of its content —that is, when the government targets the speaker’s message—generally violate the First Amendment. Laws that prohibit people from criticizing a war, opposing abortion, or advocating high taxes are examples of unconstitutional content-based restrictions. Such laws are thought to be especially problematic because they distort public debate and contradict a basic principle of self-governance: that the government cannot be trusted to decide what ideas or information “the people” should be allowed to hear.

There are generally three situations in which the government can constitutionally restrict speech under a less demanding standard.

1. In some circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that certain types of speech are of only “low” First Amendment value, such as:

a. Defamation: False statements that damage a person’s reputations can lead to civil liability (and even to criminal punishment), especially when the speaker deliberately lied or said things they knew were likely false. New York Times v. Sullivan (1964).

b. True threats: Threats to commit a crime (for example, “I’ll kill you if you don’t give me your money”) can be punished. Watts v. United States (1969).

c. “Fighting words”: Face-to-face personal insults that are likely to lead to an immediate fight are punishable. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942). But this does not include political statements that offend others and provoke them to violence.  For example, civil rights or anti-abortion protesters cannot be silenced merely because passersby respond violently to their speech. Cox v. Louisiana (1965).

d. Obscenity: Hard-core, highly sexually explicit pornography is not protected by the First Amendment. Miller v. California (1973). In practice, however, the government rarely prosecutes online distributors of such material.

e. Child pornography: Photographs or videos involving actual children engaging in sexual conduct are punishable, because allowing such materials would create an incentive to sexually abuse children in order to produce such material. New York v. Ferber (1982).

g. Commercial advertising: Speech advertising a product or service is constitutionally protected, but not as much as other speech. For instance, the government may ban misleading commercial advertising, but it generally can’t ban misleading political speech. Virginia Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council (1976).

Outside these narrow categories of “low” value speech, most other content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional. Even entertainment, vulgarity, “hate speech” (bigoted speech about particular races, religions, sexual orientations, and the like), blasphemy (speech that offends people’s religious sensibilities), and violent video games are protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has generally been very reluctant to expand the list of “low” value categories of speech.

2. The government can restrict speech under a less demanding standard when the speaker is in a special relationship to the government. For example, the speech of government employees and of students in public schools can be restricted, even based on content, when their speech is incompatible with their status as public officials or students. A teacher in a public school, for example, can be punished for encouraging students to experiment with illegal drugs, and a government employee who has access to classified information generally can be prohibited from disclosing that information. Pickering v. Board of Education (1968).

3. The government can also restrict speech under a less demanding standard when it does so without regard to the content or message of the speech. Content-neutral restrictions, such as restrictions on noise, blocking traffic, and large signs (which can distract drivers and clutter the landscape), are generally constitutional as long as they are “reasonable.” Because such laws apply neutrally to all speakers without regard to their message, they are less threatening to the core First Amendment concern that government should not be permitted to favor some ideas over others. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (1994). But not all content-neutral restrictions are viewed as reasonable; for example, a law prohibiting all demonstrations in public parks or all leafleting on public streets would violate the First Amendment. Schneider v. State (1939).

Courts have not always been this protective of free expression. In the nineteenth century, for example, courts allowed punishment of blasphemy, and during and shortly after World War I the Supreme Court held that speech tending to promote crime—such as speech condemning the military draft or praising anarchism—could be punished. Schenck v. United States (1919). Moreover, it was not until 1925 that the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment limited state and local governments, as well as the federal government. Gitlow v. New York (1925).

But starting in the 1920s, the Supreme Court began to read the First Amendment more broadly, and this trend accelerated in the 1960s. Today, the legal protection offered by the First Amendment is stronger than ever before in our history.

Geoffrey R. Stone is Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Eugene Volokh is Gary T. Schwartz Distinguished Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.

To read more from these authors on Matters of Debate about freedom of speech and freedom of the press, go to our Interactive Constitution First Amendment section at  https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/amendments/amendment-i/interpretations/266

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Definition of freedom of speech noun from the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary

freedom of speech

• the right of/to freedom of speech

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Find the answers with Practical English Usage online, your indispensable guide to problems in English.

Nearby words

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Freedom of Speech

Definition of freedom of speech, what is freedom of speech.

Freedom of speech is the right afforded to a person to be able to speak his or her mind without fear that the government will censor or restrict what they have to say, or will retaliate against them for expressing himself. People are often confused by this concept, however, thinking that they can say anything that pops into their heads without repercussion. Just because you are allowed to say whatever you want does not mean that you will not suffer consequences as a result – it just means that the government cannot violate your right to do so.

Freedom of Speech Amendment

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

Freedom of Speech Quotes

Freedom of speech examples in legal cases, gitlow v. new york (1925), brandenburg v. ohio (1969), related legal terms and issues.

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freedom of speech  

Liberty to express opinions and ideas without hindrance, and especially without fear of punishment. Despite the constitutional guarantee of free speech in the United States, legal systems have not treated freedom of speech as absolute. Among the more obvious restrictions on the freedom to say just what one likes where one likes are laws regulating incitement, sedition, defamation, slander and libel, blasphemy, the expression of racial hatred, and conspiracy. The liberal tradition has generally defended freedom of the sort of speech which does not violate others’ rights or lead to predictable and avoidable harm, but it has been fierce in that defence because a free interchange of ideas is seen as an essential ingredient of democracy and resistance to tyranny, and as an important agent of improvement. The distinction between an action falling under the description of speech and one which does not is not clear cut, because many non‐verbal actions can be seen as making a statement—for example, burning a flag or destroying a symbol. Again, valued freedom of speech embraces publication—writing, broadcasting, distributing recordings—as well as oral delivery of ideas.... ...

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freedom noun

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Earlier version

• freedom in OED Second Edition (1989)

In other dictionaries

• frēo-dōm, frīg-dōm in Dictionary of Old English
• frẹ̄dọ̄̆m, n. in Middle English Dictionary

What does the noun freedom mean?

There are 25 meanings listed in OED's entry for the noun freedom , three of which are labelled obsolete. See ‘Meaning & use’ for definitions, usage, and quotation evidence.

freedom has developed meanings and uses in subjects including

How common is the noun freedom ?

How is the noun freedom pronounced?

British english, u.s. english, where does the noun freedom come from.

Earliest known use

Old English

The earliest known use of the noun freedom is in the Old English period (pre-1150).

freedom is a word inherited from Germanic.

Nearby entries

• freecycling, n. 2003–
• freed, adj. 1579–
• free-denize, v. 1577–1630
• free-denized, adj. 1577
• free denizen, n. 1551–
• free-denizen, v. 1609–56
• free dive, v. 1955–
• free-diver, n. 1951–
• free-diving, n. 1948–
• freedman, n. 1587–
• freedom, n. Old English–
• freedom, v. 1548–
• freedom box, n. 1755–
• freedom ceremony, n. 1897–
• freedom fighter, n. 1910–
• freedom fighting, adj. & n. 1915–
• freedom fine, n. 1684–
• freedomless, adj. 1821–
• freedom march, n. 1947–
• freedom papers, n. 1821–
• freedom ride, n. 1961–

Meaning & use

Ða se Honoratus weox & þeah mid mycclum mægnum, oþ þæt æt nyxstan he wæs gearad mid freodome fram his hlaforde þam forecwedenan.

Nis ha þenne sariliche..akeast & into þeowdom idrahen, þe of se muchel hehschipe & se seli freodom schal lihte se lahe into a monnes þeowdom.

Þou shalt me, louerd, fre maken..Þoru þe wile i fredom haue.

Slake þe hond fro þy seruaunt and he askeþ fredome .

And whom with freedam thow ȝyuest, thou shalt not suffre to goon awey voyd.

[The king of France] restorit the pape agayn jn his fredome .

The Bechep of Sanct Andros is put to his fredoume .

Thus he long while in thraldome there remayned..Vntill his owne true loue his freedome gayned.

They will write any thing for monie, as letters of freedome for servants to runne away from their Masters.

Gross Ingratitude in the person..made Free, forfeits his Freedom , and Re-asserts him to his former Conditions of Slavery.

I know the Captain of the Prison Guards, Aw'd by the Authority of your Name.., Will ne'er dispute the noble Captive's Freedom .

Neither age nor force Can quell the love of freedom in a horse.

In prison? my friend in prison? I will rise this moment, and procure his freedom !

The colored Jews boast of their letters of freedom given by an ancient King of India.

Face to face with the alarming truth that we must lose our own freedom or grant it to the slave.

I became your slave when you first grew up to be Master, and it was you who gave me my freedom , not she, wasn't it?

‘Joe,’ she said, still busy with the cloth, ‘the missus is going to give you your freedom .’

The consul would request a letter of freedom from the chief of police for any slave seeking refuge at the consulate.

In 1334 he was captured and ransomed by the Scots, gaining his freedom in time to fight in Edward III's major Scottish campaign of 1335.

Towns in the Jamaican mountains where runaway slaves lived in freedom .

• letter of freedom 1613 Exemption or release from slavery or imprisonment; = liberty , n.¹ I.1b.
• free paper 1820– a. (In plural ) U.S. (now historical ) = freedom papers , n. ; b. a newspaper which is distributed free of charge.

Ne læt usic costunga cnyssan to swiðe, ac þu us freo don [ read freodom] gief, folca waldend, from yfla gehwam, a to widan feore.

Hig forwel oft þæt lof gelengað, þæt hig þa syxtan tid wynsumlice geglengað, wilnigende mid þissum þeowdome cuman to ecum freodome .

His fredom was binomen him al And put in seruage as a þral.

Þe oþer uridom is þe ilke þet habbeþ þe guodemen..þet god heþ yvryd..uram þe þreldome of þe dyeule.

Þat lesiþ þe fredom þat Crist haþ purchasid, and makiþ men þralle to synne.

From the thraldome of the princes of the worlde, to the fredome of glory and kyngdome of god.

Freedome and immunity from all evil.

True liberty; that is, freedom from the Bondage of Sin and Corruption, from the slavery of Satan, from the dominion of every vile Affection.

Our spirit..is so straitened by the bands of sin..that there is no freedom .

Tunnelling..to find my way out of the prison of doubt into the freedom of faith.

A new measure for realizing individualism and freedom from the bondage of tradition, and an opportunity to investigate and search for truth, were needed.

We were slaves to sin and wrong but God paid for our freedom .

• custiness Old English Generosity, munificence. Cf. cust , n.¹ 3b.
• douth-give Old English Liberality, munificence.
• freedom Old English– figurative . Liberation from the bondage or dominating influence of sin, spiritual servitude, worldly ties, etc.
• largesse ?c1225– The willingness to spend freely; (the virtue of) generosity; liberality, munificence. Also: this virtue personified.
• freeship a1250 Liberality, generosity. Obsolete .
• franchise c1325–1658 Nobility of mind; liberality, generosity, magnanimity. Obsolete .
• largity a1382–1642 Abundance; generosity.
• largeness a1387–1700 Liberality, generosity; bounty; prodigality. Also as a personification. Obsolete .
• liberality c1390– The quality of giving or spending freely; generosity, largesse.
• bounty a1400– Goodness shown in giving, gracious liberality, munificence: usually attributed to God, or to the great and wealthy, who have it in their power to…
• honesty a1400–1808 Generosity, liberality; hospitality. Obsolete ( Scottish in later use).
• freeness c1400– Readiness; generosity, liberality.
• large c1400–1537 Generosity; liberal giving of gifts. Later also as int. : = largesse , n. 2b. Obsolete .
• liberalness c1410–1845 Liberality, generosity. Obsolete .
• munificence c1425– The quality of being munificent; great generosity or liberality in giving.
• plenty c1425–1500 Liberality or generosity. Obsolete . rare .
• bounteousness c1440– The quality of being bounteous or liberal; liberality, munificence.
• magnificence c1450–1879 Great bounty, liberality, or munificence, esp. on the part of rulers or of God; sometimes as one of the moral virtues of Aristotelian ethics. Obsolete …
• bountifulness 1489– The quality of being bountiful; generous liberality, bounteousness.
• bountines 1512–1607 Bounteousness.
• royalty 1548– Kinglike or majestic character or quality; lordliness; munificence, generosity.
• magnificency ?c1550–1668 Splendour or sumptuousness; grandeur of appearance. Cf. magnificence , n. 4a, 5a. Obsolete .
• munificency ?c1550– Munificence, generosity; an instance of this.
• free-heartedness 1583–
• profuseness 1584– The quality or state of being profuse; extravagance; abundance.
• bountihead 1590–1621 Bounteousness.
• lavishness 1590– Unlimited bounty; extravagance, prodigality.
• frankness 1591–1763 Liberality, bounteousness, generosity. Also, luxuriance. Obsolete .
• ingenuousness 1611–87 Nobility of disposition; generosity. Obsolete .
• fruitfulness a1616 Productiveness in general. Of immaterial things. Also, profitableness, utility; occasionally †liberality.
• generosity 1634– Readiness to give more of something, esp. money, than is necessary or expected; liberality, munificence. (Now the most common sense.)
• open-handedness a1640– Generosity; (also) openness, honesty.
• large-heartedness 1640– Magnanimity, generosity.
• communicativeness 1653– The quality of being communicative (in various senses); esp. ability or readiness to communicate.
• unsparingness 1818–
• free-handedness 1860– Open-handedness, liberality.
• big-heartedness 1872– The fact or quality of being big-hearted, esp. generosity, magnanimity.
• ungrudgingness 1885–
• two-handedness 1891–
• outgivingness 1968–
• impeccability 1613– The quality or character of being impeccable; freedom from liability to sin, wrongdoing, or error.
• impeccancy 1615– The quality of being impeccant; sinlessness; inerrancy.
• impeccance 1677 = impeccancy , n.

Give him his freedom ,..if you can.

The petitioner asked her to give him his freedom , and offered to relieve her of the child.

Miss Allasio had been under contract to Dino De Laurentiis, but is..seeking her freedom from that deal.

The reserve clause..made a player the property of his team unless he was traded or given his freedom .

I basically had to buy my freedom —give him my inheritance—as he said he couldn't afford to live on his own.

Ac ðonne hie hit eall ryhtlice gedæled hæbben, ðonne ne teon hie nanwuht ðæs lofes & ðæs geðonces to him, ðylæs hie..him selfum ne te [l] len to mægene hiora freodom [L. suae liberalitatis ] .

Ich heom habbe i-freoied for mines fader saule & for mine freo-dome .

Bliþe was eche a barn ho best miȝt him plese & folwe him for his fredom & for his faire þewes.

He ȝaf him [ sc. Adam] ..Feirlek and freodam and muche miht.

He of knyghthod and of fredom flour.

Nay but me shulde thinke suich a yifte ful of gret fredom ..and of gret curteysye.

On Fredome is led foirfaltour.

With grace indewid in fredome as alexandre.

Treuth, mercie, fredome , and iustice, Thir four makis ane nobill king.

• earlship Old English Nobility, lordship; manliness, valour; an act of this. Obsolete .
• freedom Old English–1586 Nobility or generosity of character, magnanimity. Cf. free , adj. A.I.3. Obsolete .
• noblesse ?c1225– The quality of being noble in birth or rank, or in character or mind.
• anour c1330–1475 Dignity, nobility; honour.
• freely a1350–1475 A person who is noble, excellent, etc.
• noblehead a1382–1550 Nobleness.
• noblety a1387–1600 Members of the nobility collectively; the aristocracy.
• noblé c1395–1500 Nobility.
• nobility a1400–1678 The quality of having high status or value; renown or distinction arising from excellence. Chiefly with reference to things. Obsolete .
• generosity ?a1475–1862 Aristocratic birth or lineage; nobility. Obsolete ( archaic in later use).
• apparage ?1504 Noble extraction, nobility, rank, quality.
• gentry state 1563 The condition of being of high social rank or status; the condition of being of gentle birth.
• quality 1579– Nobility, high birth or rank, good social position; chiefly in phrase person (also man, woman, gentleman, lady, people, etc.) of quality . Now archaic .

Æt þæm cirre wurdon Ahteniense swa wælhreowlice forslagen & forhiened þæt hie na siþþan nanes anwaldes hi ne bemætan ne nanes freodomes .

Dauid..witegode be Israela folces freodome ; hu hy sceoldon beon alæd of Babilonia þeowdome.

Þe men be free, and nouȝt soget to lordeshepe of oþer naciouns, and put hem to perill of deeþ by cause of freedome .

Now ere þei in seruage fulle fele þat or was fre, Our fredom þat day for euer toke þe leue.

The..mony bataillis yat he did for the fredome of Rome.

Fredome all solace to man giffis, He levys at ese that frely levys.

For þis fredome ..mak we defens.

If hee wil needes become an oppressour, why should they not defend the freedome of their countrie?

They died for the Libertie and Free-dome of their Cittie.

May those be doubly curst, that would betray Their Country's Freedom , to a Foreign Sway.

Freedom consists in a People being Governed by Laws made with their own Consent.

They, that fight for freedom , undertake The noblest cause mankind can have at stake.

The Poles are hostile to the Russians as enemies to their freedom and nationalization.

A love of freedom rarely felt, Of freedom in her regal seat Of England.

Smyrna was struggling to maintain its freedom against the Seleucid power.

My peoples and My Allies are united in their resolve to continue the fight against the aggressor nations until freedom is made secure.

Another objection to social planning is that it is felt to increase the power of the state and restrict individual freedom .

The new housing..was one of the many notable markers along the Lithuanian people's long and arduous road to freedom , progress, and socialism.

A red Phrygian cap (a symbol of freedom during the American and French revolutions).

• freedom Old English– The state or fact of not being subject to despotic or autocratic control, or to a foreign power; civil liberty; independence.
• freeship a1225–75 Freedom, liberty. Obsolete .
• freelage c1225– = freedom , n. (in various senses); esp. (in later use) the freedom of a borough (see freedom , n. II.14b).
• franchise c1300–1648 Freedom; exemption from servitude or subjection. Obsolete .
• liberty c1405– Freedom or release from slavery, bondage, or imprisonment.
• largesse 1487–1765 Freedom, liberty (to do something); frequently in at one's largesse , at liberty; at one's own discretion; (cf. at one's large ). Obsolete .
• liberty c1405– Freedom from arbitrary, despotic, or autocratic control; independence, esp. from a foreign power, monarchy, or dictatorship. Cf. civil liberty , n. 2.
• civil liberty 1614– Freedom of the individual within society; spec. the liberty to which all members of a community or society are entitled within the bounds of laws…

In hac uita tantum pęnitentię patet libertas, post mortem uero nulla correctionis est licentia : on þysum life foran hreowsunge geopenað freohdom æfter deaþe soðlice nan þreagincge ys leaf.

Þe fredom sal be at vnderstand: Þi bodi bind sal nakin band [etc.] .

Fisshes þat han fredom to enviroun all the costes of the see at here owne list comen of hire owne will to profren hem to the deth.

With fredome to hald ane horse..summyr and wyntyr.

And Romaines fight for freedome in your choice.

The quhilkis..Suld haue fredome ..To pas or þan to duell þar still.

Alexander of Macedon..shall rule very powerfully, & with great freedome and absolutenesse.

All his Majesties Subjects have had equal freedom to Trade.

Fantasia, is a Kind of Air, wherein the Composer..has all the Freedom and Liberty allowed him for his Fancy or Invention, that can reasonably be desir'd.

Thought, word, and deed, his liberty evince, His freedom is the freedom of a prince.

Contending that merchants should be left at perfect freedom , to act as their own interests and experience may direct.

It is absolutely necessary to maintain..the freedom of other men to labour if they like.

This freedom to speak one's mind was powerfully reinforced by the tradition of science.

A sense of evenhanded integrity that reaffirmed PEN as the champion of writers' freedom everywhere.

Nor did I want to give up the things in life I loved, like the freedom to travel.

• freedom Old English– The state of being able to act without hindrance or restraint; liberty of action. Frequently with to and infinitive.
• freeness late Old English– The quality or state of being free (in various senses of the adjective); freedom.
• liberty a1393– The condition of being able to act or function without hindrance or restraint; faculty or power to do as one likes.
• licence ?a1400– Liberty of action conceded or acknowledged; an instance of this.
• wilfulness c1460–1553 Liberty to do what one will; free will or choice; voluntary action. Obsolete .
• deliverance 1488–1550 Scottish . Freedom or permission to depart; the completion of a task entitling one to this. Obsolete .
• immunity 1549–1680 Freedom from ordinary restraints; undue liberty, licence. Also: an instance of this. Obsolete .
• latitude 1605– Freedom from narrow restrictions; width or liberality of construction or interpretation; tolerated or permitted variety of action or opinion.
• voluntariness 1612– The state or condition of being voluntary, free, or unconstrained; absolute freedom or liberty in… Of actions.
• liberum arbitrium 1642– Free choice; freedom of will.
• free agency a1646– The state or fact of being a free agent; the capacity to act without restriction or constraint; freedom of thought, action, or movement.
• libertinism 1649– Freedom of action; unrestrained liberty.
• unrestrainedness 1698–
• unrestraint 1755– The state or quality of being unrestrained; freedom from restraint.
• relaxity 1759– The state of being relaxed; an instance of this.
• head 1804– Freedom of action or manoeuvre. See also earlier to give (a horse) his (also her, its, etc.) head at phrases P.4e.ii, to take head (see phrases…
• laissez-aller 1818– Absence of restraint; unconstrained ease and freedom.
• unrestrictedness 1825–
• uninhibitedness 1947– Freedom from inhibitions.

The implied admission is that it is right he should have the particular freedom so defined. And hence the several particular freedoms deducible may fitly be called..his rights .

A world full of restricted and undisciplined people, overtaken by power, by possessions and great new freedoms , and unable to make any civilised use of them whatever.

In the future days..we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms . The first is freedom of speech and expression... The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way... The third is freedom from want... The fourth is freedom from fear.

We must recognize that the four freedoms face extermination in the total war to come.

An economic way of life supported on the newly-painted pillars of the four freedoms .

Our forebears struggled for centuries to achieve the freedoms which we enjoy today, including the right of opposition parties and the press to question Government policy.

• Tanzimat 1850– collective . A series of reforming edicts issued by the Turkish government between 1839 and 1876, which aimed to rationalize governmental and…
• four freedoms 1892– As a count noun: a particular type of freedom (sense I.4a), esp. when regarded as a right; a civil liberty. Usually in plural .
• Truman Doctrine 1947– The principle first enunciated by Truman in March 1947 that the United States should ‘support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation’.
• glasnost 1986– In relation to the affairs of the Soviet Union: a declared party policy since 1985 of greater openness and frankness in public statements…

Ðu sægst þæt God selle ælcum men freodom swa good to donne swa yfel.

Ælc man hæfð agenne freodom , þæt he wat hwæt he wile, and wat hwæt he nele, ac God us ne nyt swa þeah þæt we god don sceolon, ne eac us ne forwyrnð yfel to wyrcenne, forðan þe he us forgeaf agenne cyre.

Uri-wyl, huer-by he may chyese, and do, uryliche oþer þet guod oþer þet kuead. Þerne uridom he halt of god.

God Almyghty, þat puttes in monnis fredame to chese gode or yvel.

It semeth..to contrarien gretly, that God knoweth byforn all thinges and that ther is any fredom of liberte [Latin libertatis arbitrium ] .

The presciens of God is nocht presciens be necessite, bot be fredome and contingence.

It shal be much meritorious, as proceding not of necessity, but of freedom and good will.

There is indeed a necessity which takes away freedom and voluntarinesse from men.

In this then consists Freedom ( viz .) in our being able to act, or not to act, according as we shall choose, or will.

You are digressing from our Subject, to the Doctrines of Freedom and Necessity, which have perplexed the Pagan and Christian World.

I am, in truth for both Freedom and Necessity.

The doctrine of Freedom was first elaborated into a metaphysical scheme, implying its opposite Necessity, by St. Augustin against Pelagius.

The freedom which is said to characterise mental life, and is distinguished from the necessity of nature.

That an act must be voluntary to be free indicates an inner condition of freedom .

The problem of reconciling determinism in the phenomenal world with the existence of moral responsibility and human freedom .

• freedom Old English– The fact of not being controlled by or subject to fate; the power of self-determination attributed to the will.
• free will 1340– The power of an individual to make free choices, not determined by divine predestination, the laws of physical causality, fate, etc. Also: the…
• arbitry c1374–1647 Power to choose or act; own will or pleasure; arbitrary will.
• advisement a1398–1590 The capacity to make decisions; free will; the fact of having decided to do something; deliberateness, intentionality. Later also: a decision; a…
• freedom of will ?c1400– Free will; the ability to choose freely.
• liberty ?c1400– Philosophy and Theology . The fact of not being controlled by or subject to fate; freedom of will. Frequently opposed to necessity . Cf. liberty of will …
• liberal arbitre ?1483–1518 Freedom of action; free will.
• contingence c1530– The coming to pass of anything without predetermination, freedom from necessity; chance; happening by chance; = contingency , n. II.3.
• indifferency a1555–1714 Indetermination of the will; freedom of choice; an equal power to take either of two courses. Obsolete .
• contingency 1561– The quality or condition of being contingent. The condition of being free from predetermining necessity in regard to existence or action; hence…
• freedom of thought 1591– Freedom to think or reason without restriction or interference; (also) free will.
• self-willingness 1591–1674 Voluntary or unconstrained action or impulse; an instance of this.
• volunt 1611 One's own will.
• voluntariness 1643– The state or condition of being voluntary, free, or unconstrained; absolute freedom or liberty in… Of persons.
• uncommandedness 1646–
• autexousy 1678 Free will.
• volency 1686–1768 The power of willing or determining to act in a certain way.
• inconditionality 1696 The quality of being unconditional.
• unconditionality a1714– The quality of being unconditional.
• indifference 1728– Indetermination of the will (cf. indifferency , n. I.3), or of a body to rest or motion; neutrality.
• volition 1738– The power or faculty of willing.
• vacancy 1754– Absence of any determining influence or factor. rare .
• voluntarity 1794–1819 Voluntariness, willingness, spontaneity.
• autonomy 1803– More generally: liberty to follow one's will; control over one's own affairs; freedom from external influence, personal independence.
• unconditionalness 1843–
• unconditionedness 1854–

Þat he his werk do with a fredome of spirite [ variant reading fredome of hert & spirite] .

We found such humanity, and such a freedome and desire to take strangers as it were into their bosom.

I had been accustomed to hardships and hazards, therefore I did with much freedom undertake it.

He had no Freedom to undertake an Imployment that might abstract him so long from them.

He was in bad humour, and had, according to his phrase, no freedom for conversation with us.

• will Old English– Consent, acquiescence, approval; favourable disposition. Usually in with a person's will . Now Scottish .
• goodwill late Old English– Ready or willing consent; (in later use) spec. cheerful consent or acquiescence.
• wilfulness a1398–1408 Readiness of will, willingness, inclination.
• freedom a1425–1830 Readiness or willingness to act; keenness, enthusiasm. Cf. free , adj. A.III.15. Obsolete ( Scottish in later use).
• towardness 1461–1692 Disposition, inclination towards or to do something; readiness, willingness. Obsolete .
• willingness 1535– The quality or state of being willing; freedom from reluctance; disposition to consent or comply; (as a general quality) disposition to do what is…
• towardliness a1569– Good disposition towards something, willingness; spec. aptness to learn, docility, tractableness; forwardness in learning, ‘promise’; ingenuity…
• fitness 1604 Readiness, inclination. (Cf. fit , adj. 5a, 5b.)
• inclinableness 1608–1841 A tendency to behave, think, feel, etc., in a particular way; inclination, readiness, willingness. Also: the quality or character of being easily…
• lubency 1623–69 Willingness or pleasure (in regard to action or activity).
• proneness a1640–61 Readiness of mind, willingness, eagerness. Obsolete .
• libence 1654 Willingness.
• promptitude 1712 A prompting, an impulse; an inclination. Obsolete .
• allubescency 1727–1809 Willingness; contentment.
• willinghood 1841–92 Willingness, readiness of mind (esp. as a personal quality or disposition).
• unhesitatingness 1876–

It appeareth that the purenesse and freedom from sinne is..the ende and scope of all the documentes and preceptes in holy scriptures.

Promising to the doers long life, health.. freedome from losses, and the like.

Though age from folly could not giue me freedom It does from childishnesse.

Subjective perfection, in respect of the person, obeying, in his sincerity and freedom from guile.

The contemplation of our own freedom from the evils which we see represented.

I could have hugged him for his liberality, and freedom from bigotry.

There is a freedom from cant about the authoress, which..I could not have anticipated.

The tree is selected, first, for straightness, second, smoothness, third, freedom from knots or limbs.

This collection is that of..editors, critics, and writers of fiction, whose combined opinion insures catholicity of taste and freedom from bias.

The same general features are required: a slow tuning rate, freedom from backlash, good signal-handling ability, and good frequency stability.

Freedom from plant pathogens such as clubroot and honey fungus cannot be guaranteed if field vegetable, garden or untreated wood waste are included.

You will I know take my freedom of speech in good part.

Being all under the Rose, they had priviledge to speak all things with freedome .

This amorous Prince looked upon that freedom of conversation which was between her and Cecinua, with a very jealous eye.

They are generally too distrustful of one another for the Freedoms that are us'd in such kind of Conversations.

I talked a great deal to him with the freedom I have long used to him on this and on other subjects.

Outspoken , Given to freedom of speech, not accustomed to conceal one's sentiments.

His symposia attracted a closer observation from the freedom of his conversation.

And laughed and joked with everyone..with the utmost freedom .

Kawakami began to make political speeches, and was repeatedly put in prison because of the freedom of his remarks.

He scarcely needed to assure Lake that despite the freedom of his criticism, he would if possible ‘contribute personally in forwarding any plan’.

Many questions were asked with the frankness and freedom that women feel amongst women.

• frankness 1553– esp. in speech: Outspokenness. More fully, frankness of speech (in early use = ‘liberty of speech’).
• freedom 1585– Frankness, openness, familiarity (in conversation or social interaction); outspokenness; (occasionally) an instance of this.
• apertness 1604–69 Plainness of speech; freedom of utterance.
• ingenuity 1614– Freedom from dissimulation; honesty, straightforwardness, sincerity; honourable or fair dealing; freedom from reserve, openness, candour, frankness…
• unreservedness 1713 The quality of being unreserved; absence of or freedom from reserve, restraint, or inhibition.
• unreserve 1717– Absence of or freedom from reserve; frankness, candour; uninhibitedness.
• candour 1769– Freedom from reserve in one's statements; openness, frankness, ingenuousness, outspokenness.
• free-spokenness 1858–

Your eye..Is fixt upon this Captaine for his freedome , And happily you find his tongue too forward.

This Love, I have taken the freedom to style ‘Seraphic Love’.

Let her alone to make the best use of those innocent Freedoms I allow her.

The young Women who run into greater Freedoms with the Men.

He was at play the other day with the Count de Gramont, who, upon his taking too many freedoms , told him [etc.] .

Our modern misses; who..look offendedly grave at those freedoms in conversation.

The splendid sofa, which, though made for rest, He then had thought it freedom to have press'd.

When the officers do not eat or drink, or make too many freedoms with them [ sc. the seamen] .

I'll take the freedom of telling you you show a queer kind of gratitude to a man who's got into all this mess along of your affairs.

The summary of these discussions, I have found that Lawrence later put into print, and I take the freedom to quote at length his view on these matters.

• familiarity c1410– Frequently euphemistic . Sexual or romantic intimacy, esp. of an inappropriate nature. Also: an act or instance of this. Now somewhat rare .
• particularity 1591–1844 Special attentiveness to a person; familiarity of behaviour or manner; an instance of this. Obsolete .
• freedom a1625– The overstepping of due or customary bounds in speech or behaviour; undue familiarity; an instance of this, a liberty (esp. in to take the freedom (t …
• over freedom 1668
• over-familiarity 1676– The quality or state of being over-familiar; excessive or undue familiarity; (also occasionally) an instance of this.

You cannot with such freedome purge your selfe.

I humbly Thank your Ldship for the freedome of Access you were Pleasd to give my Messenger.

Neither majesty and elegance of form, strength of body, freedom of movement, nor other external qualities, constitute the principal dignity of animated beings.

The freedom , with which the particles of fluids move on each other, renders it [ sc. the spirit level] an instrument capable of the greatest delicacy.

The sun's rays penetrate our atmosphere with freedom .

All his movements showed a certain constraint and want of freedom .

The cool roominess of it, the freedom of one's movements.

She put on the blue sari with pleasure, enjoying its soft freedom after her constricting bodice and corset.

Barn hens stay inside but have freedom of movement and access to nests and perches.

• clearness a1616– Freedom from anything obstructive.
• freedom 1705 Facility or ease in action or activity; absence of encumbrance or hindrance.
• disencumbrance 1712–93 Deliverance or freedom from encumbrance.
• disembarrassment 1818– The action of disembarrassing or fact of being disembarrassed; freedom from embarrassment.
• unencumberedness 1891–

I alwayes lov'd you for the freedom of your genius.

Mr. John Smith 1700. The best mezzotinter that has appeared, who united softness with strength, and finishing with freedom .

Nature..But seldom..Vouchsafes to man a poet's just pretence. Fervency, freedom , fluency of thought [etc.] .

The lines are played over the forms with.. freedom and taste.

For by knowing..what was to be done in every figure they designed, they naturally attained a freedom and spirit of outline.

The Symbolist school..aimed at greater freedom , a less strict prosody, and a more musical poetry.

Its meter and the variations exhibit by turns both the ease and freedom of the improviser and the careful workmanship of the artist.

The greater freedom of execution in the Chatsworth drawing suggests that it was made for a different purpose than the National Gallery sheet.

• decorum a1568–1756 That which is proper, suitable, seemly, befitting, becoming; fitness, propriety, congruity. esp. in dramatic, literary, or artistic composition…
• humour a1568–1811 Character, style, or spirit (of a musical or literary composition, etc.). Obsolete .
• variety 1597– As a literary, musical, or artistic quality.
• strength 1608– Of feelings, ideas, beliefs, etc., or the expression of these. Energy or vigour of literary or artistic conception or execution; creative vitality…
• uniformity 1625– The condition of having the parts similar in appearance; presentation of one regular or unvaried form on this account; similarity of appearance…
• barbarity 1644– Barbarism of style in art.
• freedom 1645– Boldness or vigour in conception or execution, esp. of a literary or other artistic work; the fact of not strictly observing conventions of style or…
• boldness 1677– transferred . Vigour or freedom of conception or execution; forcibleness.
• correctness 1684– The quality or condition of being correct; conformity to an acknowledged rule or standard, to what is considered right, or to fact; freedom from…
• clinquant 1711– Literary or artistic ‘tinsel’, false glitter.
• unity 1712– With reference to a work of art or literature: agreement of the various parts of which something is composed so as to form a whole which exhibits…
• contrast 1713– Fine Arts . The juxtaposition of varied forms, colours, etc., so as to heighten by comparison the effect of corresponding parts and of the whole…
• meretriciousness 1727– The quality or fact of being meretricious; showy superficiality; tawdriness.
• airiness 1734– Graceful delicacy or lightness of style; refinement.
• pathos 1739– The quality of the transient or emotional, as opposed to the permanent or ideal (contrasted with ethos ); emotion, passion. Chiefly with reference to…
• chastity 1760– Exclusion of meretricious ornament; purity of style, modesty, chasteness.
• vigour 1774– As an artistic or literary quality.
• prettyism 1789– Studied and superficial or affected prettiness of style, expression, or manner; an instance of this; an item embodying this.
• mannerism 1803– The adoption, to a pronounced or (according to some writers) excessive degree, of a distinctive style, manner, or method of treatment, esp. in…
• serio-comic 1805– With the . That which is serio-comic; serio-comic works, performances, etc., considered as a class.
• actuality 1812– Realism in description or representation.
• largeness 1824– Breadth of artistic treatment or style; expansiveness, lack of restraint.
• local colour 1829– (Esp. with reference to works of art or literature) evocative representation of the customs, manner of speech, dress, or other features…
• subjectivity a1834– The quality in literature or art which depends on the expression of the personality or individuality of the artist; the individuality of an…
• idealism 1841– The practice of idealizing or the tendency to idealize; the habit of representing things in an ideal form, or as they might be; treatment of a…
• pastoralism 1842– Concern with pastoral themes in literature or art. Also: pastoral quality or character; a pastoral trait or affectation.
• inartisticality a1849–
• academicism 1852– The state or quality of being academic, esp. in the arts (see academic , adj. B.4); conventionality, esp. when excessively formal.
• anti-realism 1854– A tendency to reject or transcend lifelike representation or a single reality, esp. in literature and the arts.
• realism 1856– Esp. in reference to art, film, and literature: close resemblance to what is real; fidelity of representation, rendering the precise details of the…
• colour contrast 1858– The juxtaposition of different colours, contributing to the overall visual effect of an image, item, etc.; an instance of this; cf. contrast , n. II.2.
• crampedness 1858– Cramped quality; narrowness resulting from restraint.
• niggling 1858–86 spec. Over-elaboration of detail in art. Obsolete .
• audacity 1859– Bold departure from the conventional form; daring originality.
• superreality 1859– Heightened or transcendent reality; spec. = surreality , n.
• literalism 1860– In art, literature, etc.: (adherence to) realistic or literal representation, without idealization, distortion, or aesthetic interpretation.
• pseudo-classicism 1861– False, spurious, or imitative classicism; an instance of this.
• sensationalism 1862– Esp. in literature or the media: the use of sensational material or language, or a sensationalistic style, in order to provoke public interest or…
• sensationism 1862– Esp. in literature or the media: the use of sensational material or language, or a sensationalistic style, in order to provoke public interest or…
• chocolate box 1865– A box or tin filled with chocolates, stereotypically one decorated in a conventionally pretty or sentimental style; (hence) an artistic style or…
• pseudo-classicality 1867– = pseudo-classicism , n.
• academism 1871– = academicism , n. 2.
• actualism 1872– Realism in description or representation; = actuality , n. 4a.
• academicalism 1874– = academicism , n. 2.
• ethos 1875– Character or characterization as revealed in action or its representation; the quality of the permanent, as opposed to the transient or emotional…
• terribilità 1877– Awesomeness or emotional intensity of conception and execution in an artist or work of art.
• local colouring 1881– = local colour , n.
• neoclassicism 1893– Neoclassical style or principles in the arts, or adherence to these; spec. (a) Art and Architecture , an 18th cent. style characterized by a…
• mass effect 1902– a. An effect due to or dependent on mass or combined number; a total or grand effect; b. chiefly Metallurgy , the effect of size and shape in…
• attack 1905– A precise and forceful action or manner in beginning a musical piece, passage, or phrase. Also: forceful and decisive style in music or other arts.
• verismo 1908– Realism or naturalism in the arts; esp. with reference to Italian opera of the late 19th century. Frequently attributive . Cf. verism , n.
• kitsch 1921– Art, objects, design, or entertainment having popular appeal but considered to be vulgar, of low quality, or lacking artistic merit, esp. due to…
• abstraction 1923– Freedom from or absence of representational qualities; a style or method characterized by this freedom. In other arts, esp. music.
• build-up 1927– A period of preparation or exposition that precedes a climactic or exciting point with increasing intensity, esp. in a play, piece of music, or…
• self-consciousness 1932– A studied or artificial quality inherent in an artist's work, a person's behaviour, etc., suggestive of excessive self-awareness; self-conscious…
• surreality 1936–
• tension 1941– figurative . A straining, or strained condition, of the mind, feelings, or nerves. The conflict created by interplay of the constituent elements of a…
• sprezzatura 1957– Ease of manner, studied carelessness; the appearance of acting or being done without effort; spec. of literary style or performance.
• kitschness 1966– The quality of being kitsch.

[Appointed to] be equally divided amongst the 48 freemen entitled to daills, and that each of them have a share thereto..to continue to be divided by lot, with the other freedoms .

They [ sc. the feuars of the village of Crawford] have used to hold what has been called a freedom , consisting of four or five acres of croft land for each family.

Each of these freemen possesses what is called a lot or freedom , containing about four acres of arable land.

The Newton people divided them [ sc. the lands] into 48 portions. These were denominated freedoms .

The town of Crawford was divided into 25 freedoms which were partly infield lying runrig, partly outfield and the remainder commonty.

• cotland Old English–1866 The piece of arable land (of about 5 acres) held along with his cot by the Old English cotset or cottar.
• thegn-land Old English– Land held by a thegn.
• knightte c1380 A knight's estate or property.
• lairdship 1397– An estate belonging to a laird.
• marchionat c1449 A marquisate. In quot.: the March of Ancona; cf. march , n.³ II.7.
• thanage a1500– The tenure by which lands were held by a thane; the land held by a thane, a thane-land; also the rank, office, or jurisdiction of a thane.
• pittancery 1519– The office or position of pittancer; the estate administered by a pittancer.
• marquesy a1525–86 = marquisate , n.
• marquisdom 1530– = marquisate , n.
• marquisate 1541– In some continental European countries: the territorial lordship or possessions of a marquis or margrave. Also (in extended use): the territory or…
• peership 1594–1728 French History . The territory or fief of a peer. Obsolete .
• peerdom 1611– The territory or fief of a French peer. Now historical .
• vavasory 1611– An estate held by a vavasour.
• thane-land a1641– (See also thegn-land , n. ) Land held by a thane, or by military tenure.
• marquisship a1680 = marquisate , n. Also used as an honorific title (as your marquisship , etc.).
• starosty 1681– In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: the domain of or district overseen by a starosta ( starosta , n. 2).
• freedom 1752– Scottish . A piece of common land allotted by certain communities to freemen, or to other appropriately qualified members. Now historical and rare .
• peerage 1759 The territory or fief of a peer. Obsolete .
• pollam 1765– In South India: an estate or territory held by a poligar. Frequently in plural (with modifying word or capital initial): a specific group of such…
• senatory 1804– The landed estate granted to a senator under the consulate and the first empire.
• squireship 1824– The estate of a squire.
• majorat 1827– In France, Spain, Italy, and some other countries: an entailment of an estate by primogeniture; an estate attached to the right of primogeniture.
• dukery 1837– The residence or estate of a duke; spec. (usually plural , the Dukeries ) a district in Nottinghamshire containing several ducal estates.
• patroonship 1848– The office or position of patroon; the estate of a patroon ( patroon , n. 4).
• squatment 1860– The act of squatting; land occupied by squatting.

A free point has three degrees of freedom , inasmuch as the most general displacement which it can take is resolvable into three, parallel respectively to any three directions, and independent of each other... If the point be constrained to remain always on a given surface, one degree of constraint is introduced, or there are left but two degrees of freedom.

The five degrees of freedom being three of translation and two of rotation about two axes.

This expression gives the whole of the internal entropy, when the vibrational degrees of freedom do not contribute to the total.

The position of one rigid body relative to another may be defined by six co-ordinates, and it is therefore said to have six degrees of freedom .

This type of gyro..has a rotor suspended on a spherical air bearing which acts both as a spin bearing and provides for two further degrees of rotational freedom .

The number of independent ways a robot can move is also known as the robot's degrees of freedom .

The hand mechanism itself has 15 degrees of freedom and five fingers.

• degree of freedom 1867– degree of freedom . Physics and Mechanics . Each of the independent modes or directions in which an object may undergo displacement, translation, or…

Such systems may conveniently be called invariant, univariant, divariant, &c., according as they possess no, one, two, &c., degrees of freedom .

We shall therefore define the number of degrees of freedom of a system as the number of the variable factors, temperature, pressure, and concentration of the components, which must be arbitrarily fixed in order that the condition of the system may be perfectly defined.

A system consisting of one phase only, e.g., solid, liquid or gaseous, of water has two degrees of freedom ,..for..it is necessary to specify both temperature and pressure to define completely the state of the system.

The stochasticity inherent in the climate system's many degrees of freedom .

Gibbs derived a corollary of general validity, the phase rule , formulated as δ = n + 2 − r . This specifies the number of independent variations δ (usually called ‘ degrees of freedom ’) in a system of r coexistent phases containing n independent chemical components.

• degree of freedom 1899– degree of freedom . Physical Chemistry . An independent capability of a system to vary without altering the number of phases and components present…

We shall show that Elderton's Tables of Goodness of Fit..may still be applied, but that the value of n ′ with which the table should be entered is not now equal to the number of cells, but to one more than the number of degrees of freedom in the distribution.

In the quantity Σ( x − m ) 2 there are n independent contributions of the type ( x − m ) 2 , and hence we may say that n is the number of degrees of freedom of that estimate; but in the quantity Σ( x − x̄ ) 2 we have used the data to estimate x̄ , and hence the number of degrees of freedom is lowered by unity, i.e. equals n − 1.

It is thus natural to speak of the number of degrees of freedom , ν, of a function such as χ 2 , meaning thereby that it is distributed as the sum of squares of ν independent standardized normal variates.

Q(3) is the Box–Ljung test statistic of the null hypothesis of white-noise residuals from one through three lags, which has a chi-square distribution with three degrees of freedom .

If the null hypothesis is true and there are 2 and 100 degrees of freedom , then researchers should expect to find F values of 3.09 or lower 95% of the time, and values of 4.82 or lower 99% of the time.

• degree of freedom 1922– degree of freedom . Statistics . A property of a statistical distribution or of a statistic, equal to the number of values that can be arbitrarily and…

Þæt Æðelwyrd bruce ðæs landæs on Geocham his dæg on freodome be Godes leafe..ðonne yftær his dæge Eadric, gif he libbe, his dæg wið ðon gofole ðe hit gecwedæn is, ðæt sint v pund & ælce gære æne dægfeorme In hiowum.

We eow wulleð suteliche seggen of þa fredome þe limpeð to þan deie þe is iclepeð..sunedei.

Ar [ð] ur..sette grið he sette frið and alle freodomes .

He graunted hem fredom [Latin immunitatem ] þat dede þat deede.

Savying to þe saide roialme of Englond, and to alle the kyngges lieges and subjettes therof..alle their libertees, fredoms , lawes, custumes and priveleges, þat they, their auncestres and predecessours, haveth had.

With all other pertynentis and fredomes longyng to the same lond.

Many thynges be commune to cytezyns amonge them selfe, as.. fredomes , iudgementes voyces in elections.

[Athelwulph] gaue to them..libertie and fredome from all seruage and ciuil charges.

Infeoffing with Toll, implies Freedome from Custome, etc. With Caruage, from taxation by Carues.

That all y e auntient freemen of y e respective Corporacions should enjoy their former freedoms and Priviledges.

K. John..granted to Robert de Lisieux..Quittance or Freedom from Tallage.

All Foreigners might freely come and reside in any Part of this Kingdom..with the like Privileges and Freedoms as our selves.

Freedom from arrest, a privilege at that time necessary for the cause of liberty.

The Danish Government passed two new..laws granting freedom from remeasurement in Danish ports to all foreigners according reciprocity.

A negative declaration to establish that certain persons were not members of a certain club was really intended to establish their freedom from the duty of paying the debts of the club.

The years that followed saw one Puritan disappointment after another as Charles reduced the freedoms and privileges of dissenters from the Anglican faith.

The list of privileges enjoyed by its citizens included.. freedom from liability to liturgic service elsewhere.

• freedom Old English– Exemption from a service, obligation, charge, or duty; the state of being so exempted; an instance of this; an immunity, a privilege. Cf. franchise …
• privilege Old English– Ecclesiastical Law . A special ordinance issued by the Pope, granting exemption from certain civil or canon laws in the execution of a particular…
• liberty 1404– As a mass noun: immunity, exemption, or privilege possessed by an individual or corporation. Now rare .
• freedomship 1583– The fact of possessing freedom (in various senses).
• franchisement 1781–92 A privilege. Obsolete .
• freeship late Old English–1426 Exemption from a service, obligation, charge, or duty; an immunity, a privilege; = immunity , n. 1. Obsolete .
• exemption c1380– The action of exempting, or the state of being exempted (see exempt , v. 4) from a liability, obligation, penalty, law, or authority; freeing…
• immunity c1384– Chiefly Law and in legal contexts. Exemption from a service, obligation, or duty; freedom from liability to taxation, jurisdiction, etc…
• unpunishment c1450– Exemption from punishment; impunity.
• impunity 1532– Exemption from punishment or penalty.
• faculty 1533– A dispensation, license: esp. Ecclesiastical an authorization or license granted by an ecclesiastical superior to someone to perform some action or…
• licence 1551 Liberty (to do something), leave, permission. Now somewhat rare . †Also occasionally exemption from (something). †Formerly often in licence and leave …
• vacuity a1620–65 Complete freedom or exemption from something. Obsolete .

Ðis is Heanburge friodom , se waes bigeten mid ðy londe aet Iddeshale.

Ic Ealdhelm brohte to Ine Wessexena kyncge & to Æþelræde Myrcena kyncge þas privilegia, þæt sind syndrie freodomas þe se apostolica papa Sergius awrat to ðæra apostola mynstre Petres & Paules.

And ic wille þet ealle þa freodom & ealle þa forgiuenesse þe mine forgengles geafen [ sc. to St Peter's monastery] þet hit stande.

In grete hinderyng of the kynges poeple and in brekynges of fredom of the citee.

Everech son of a burgeys..render to the baillives of the toun the swerd with which his father was sworen to meyntenyn the fredom [French fraunchise ] of the toun.

Vsurping apon the fredomez & priuilegis of the said burghe.

If you deny it, let the danger light vpon your charter and your Citties freedome .

The great Freedoms then those Kings to these [Universities] did giue.

Cities and Towns; of which the old had their ancient Freedoms and Jurisdictions confirmed, or others annexed.

The Hans Towns in lower Germany, as Bruges and Sluys by their Situation, as well as by the Immunities and Freedoms granted them by their Earls, became possessed of the Staple of English Wool.

He is the Provost of Perth, and..must see the freedoms and immunities of the burgh preserved.

He..abolished all freedoms granted to the town by antecedent rulers.

A historically unique international commercial federation, based entirely on urban rights and freedoms granted to these German towns in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

The royal ceremony established the dependency of the mayor and the city's freedoms on the king's pleasure.

• freedom Old English– Immunity, exemption, or privilege possessed by a city, corporation, etc.; an instance of this.
• franchise c1300– A legal immunity or exemption from a particular burden or exaction, or from the jurisdiction of a particular tribunal, granted to an individual, a…
• franchise 1387– In wider sense: a special privilege or exclusive right to perform some public function, granted by a sovereign power to any person or body of…
• privilege c1390– As a mass noun: the fact or state of being privileged. In later use also: the existence of economic and social privileges associated with rank or…
• monopoly 1578– An exclusive privilege conferred by a monarch, state, etc., of selling a particular commodity or of trading with a particular region.
• octroi 1578–1855 A concession, a grant; a privilege granted by a government, esp. an exclusive right of trade or other commercial privilege. Obsolete .
• concession 1837– A privilege or right granted by a government, commercial organization, etc., to an individual or company, typically allowing the holder to trade…

Barges and Ferybotes and othir vessels that be commynge & goynge in the fredom of the Citee.

A lettre to eschete al wol that gais oute of the fredome .

Makand him custumar of the burgh and fredome of Dunde enduring the Kingis will.

The actes and lawes of certeine Municipies or freedomes .

[He] gaue it the name of the new Bermudas, whereunto he hath laid out, and annexed to be belonging to the freedome , and corporation for euer, many miles of Champion, and woodland.

Passing over Tower-hill, they come again into the freedom .

While within the City itself there were oil-lamps set up at regular intervals in all the streets, there were none outside the Freedom .

Temple Bar..marks the boundary of the Freedom of London and the beginning of the Liberty of Westminster.

• freedom 1423– †A city or corporation possessing such immunity ( obsolete ); the district over which the immunity extends; the liberties (see liberty , n.¹ II.6c). Now…
• city 1481– Ancient History . A Greek or Roman city-state; = polis , n.²
• free city 1575– a. (Now historical ) (in Germany under the Holy Roman Empire) a sovereign city-state; (sometimes) spec. = imperial city , n. (b); b. a semi-autonomous…
• imperial city 1603 Now chiefly historical (a) a city that is the seat of an empire, or that is itself a sovereign or independent state; (b) a city of the Holy Roman…
• city republic 1838– A city-state constituted as a republic.
• city-state 1840– A self-governing or sovereign state consisting of a city and its surrounding territory; the community of people living in, or the body politic of…
• territory a1398– The land or district lying round a city or town and under its jurisdiction; spec. = territorium , n. Also: the land attached to a temple, monastery…
• liberty ?1435– A district subject to a particular jurisdiction. Now chiefly historical . In England and Ireland: an area of local administration distinct from…
• terroir a1460–83 Land, territory. Cf. territory , n.¹ 1a. Obsolete .
• territor 1466–1757 = territory , n.¹ 1.
• field a1533– The territory belonging to or associated with a city or town. Now rare ( historical in later use).
• lowy 1576– A liberty ( liberty , n.¹ II.6c.i) that extends around a castle, abbey, or similar, usually for about a league.
• nomarchy 1656 Each of various administrative divisions of a country. Obsolete . rare .
• territorium 1720– The area of land surrounding and within the boundaries of a Roman city, municipium , etc., and under its jurisdiction. Also more generally: the…

The names þe wheche hauen paied yn partie of payment dyuerse percell of monye for her Fredam and her Entres of þe Fraternite, & welen paie nomor.

Rescewyd of stewene heyne for hys fredome , xxxiij s. iiij d.

That na man enter to the fredoum of the gild bot he that sall pay v li.

All on-fre man that sall happin to..ressaue the fredome of the craft..sall pay..ten pundis mair for thair fredome, togidder with ane dennar as efferis.

Quhatsomever gild brother wretis cartallis..sall..tyne his fredome .

Disfranchised of all freedom or comfort in that Company, of whom I had well deserved.

Lewis Baboon had taken up the trade of Clothier and Draper, without serving his Time, or Purchasing his Freedom .

Of no better Consequence, than if a private Dealer was admitted to the Freedom of Trade in a Corporation, without a Stock to carry it on.

It was lately proposed in the City, to present him [ sc. the Duke of Hamilton] with the freedom of some company.

The Goldsmiths' Company intend to confer the freedom of their ancient guild upon his Lordship.

The journeyman always looked forward to the period when he would be admitted to the freedom of the trade.

At a meeting of the Court of the Musicians' Company it was..unanimously resolved to bestow upon the Lord Mayor the honorary freedom of the Company.

In 1997..he was awarded the Freedom of the Worshipful Company of Saddlers.

• freedom 1423– The right of participating in the privileges attached to membership of a guild, company, etc.; (also) the liberty or right to practise a trade.

The tribune answeride: Y with myche summe gat this fredom [Latin civilitatem ] . And Poul seide; And Y was borun a citeseyn of Rome.

John Lyllyng..prayed yam yai wald vouchesaufe to restor hym to hys fredom of ye cite, and take of hym yarfor c li.

Thei Stonde in the same Fredome as a man boron in ynglond or Walys.

Our franches, freedom , or conuersation is in heauen.

Unlesse they might be donati civitate . i. enioy the Franchises and Freedome of Rome.

They might be admitted to the Freedom of the City.

The magistrates intended next day to compliment us with the freedom of their town.

They presented me with the freedom of the city.

Admitted to the freedom free gratis.

The freedom of his native city of Edinburgh was transmitted to him in a valuable gold box.

An Act to enable Municipal Corporations to confer the Honorary Freedom of Boroughs upon persons of distinction.

Four Colonial Premiers..visited Bristol yesterday to receive the freedom of the city and attend [etc.] .

Nine-tenths of all London citizens had entered the freedom through obtaining apprenticeship and guild membership.

Mr Mandela is to..receive the freedom of London and honorary doctorates from eight universities.

• freedom a1425– The right of participating in the privileges attached to citizenship of a town or city (in later use chiefly as an honour conferred upon an eminent…

Unencumbered with the Corporation Burthens, Freedoms , Town Duties, Services, and the like.

Exclusive of the masters, there are numberless faulty expences among the workmen; clubs, garnishes, freedoms , and such like impositions.

• freedom 1724–59 A fee or fine paid to acquire the freedom of a company, or the right to practise a trade; = freedom fine , n. Obsolete .

Pray Gentlemen, let the freedome of this Roome Be mine a little.

Hee would not permit Merchants and Sea-men to enjoy a freedom of that Sea..but at an extraordinarie rate.

They having the freedom of our Ship, to go to and fro between Decks.

These Brothers..had the Freedom of the Gardens and Library.

If you chuse to relinquish Your right to y e freedom of Drury-Lane Playhouse, you certainly will do as you please.

Let any competent person just peruse the extracts which we have made—(we shall give him the freedom of the whole work for the same purpose).

Having conferred on you the freedom of the library, he will not concern himself by observing how you use it.

They considered that they had the freedom of the place, hissing unpopular speakers, vociferating their wishes.

We were joined..by a man I had seen in the house before, one of those silent, unintroduced, unexplained people who appeared to have the freedom of the house.

• room Old English– Opportunity or scope ( to do something); (also) leisure or time ( to do something). Also (now regional ): occasion, reason, cause. Now somewhat rare .
• leisure 1303–1640 Freedom or opportunity to do something specified or implied. Obsolete .
• liberty c1425– Freedom to do a specified thing; permission, leave. Frequently with to or (now rare ) of .
• free chase 1467– The right to hunt game, especially on one's own propery; an instance of this. Cf. frank-chase , n.
• scope 1534– Room for exercise, opportunity or liberty to act; free course or play. Often in phrases, to give scope (to a person or thing) ; to have or take scope …
• roomth a1540– Sufficient space or scope for or to do something. Now rare .
• swinge 1542–1687 Freedom of action, free scope, licence; liberty to follow one's inclinations: = swing , n.² I.5. to have or take one's swinge , to give (a person or th …
• swing 1584– Freedom of action, free scope: = swinge , n.¹ 2; esp. in to take, have one's (full) swing , to allow oneself every freedom, indulge oneself to the…
• blank charter 1593 A document given to the agents of the crown in Richard II.'s reign, with power to fill it up as they pleased; hence figurative liberty to do as one…
• freedom 1623– In extended use: unrestricted use of or access to something; the free run of a place.
• field 1639– As a mass noun: scope, opportunity; extent of material for some specified action or operation. Frequently with for .
• play 1641– Free action; freedom, opportunity, or room for action; scope for activity.
• range 1793 Opportunity or scope for ranging about; liberty to range. Cf. free range , n. & adj.
• expatiation a1848– The action of walking abroad, or wandering at large; also, an instance of the same. literal and figurative . Also, opportunity or room for…
• leaveway 1890– A degree of freedom; scope, leeway.
• open slather 1919– open slather ( Australian and New Zealand colloquial ), freedom to operate without interference, a free-for-all.
• headroom 1932– figurative and in extended use: scope or opportunity for freedom of action, upward movement, etc.

Þan ne weneþ it nat þat fredom of wille [Latin arbitrii libertatem ] be distourbed or ylett by prescience.

Mercy, strength, beautye, lyghtnes, fredome of wyll , shalbe to the right wyse people.

The naturall desire in men to be well, maketh nothing to proue the fredome of wyll , no more than in metalles and stones, doth the affection inclinyng to the perfection of their substance.

He confesses a rational sovrantie of soule, and freedom of will in every man.

'Tis enough there, for the freedom of the will to stand alone in spontaneitate ad bonum , or self-willingness to good.

Such persons, as are intestable for want of liberty or freedom of will .

You are desired, Cleanthes, to inform me..whether you are a Necessitarian in the strictest sense, or only deny absolute Freedom of Will .

What is a world,..left to the conduct of blind chance, or directed by general and unchangeable law, by which all freedom of will must be made useless?

The freedom of the will is not shown in acting without motive, but in choosing between motives.

The punishableness of an act, in itself criminal, presupposes reason and freedom of will in the actor.

Man has been given..release to an existence of his own, endued with a certain freedom of will .

If you want a second scoop of ice cream and no one is forcing you to eat it, then eating a second scoop is fully demonstrative of your freedom of will .

For þis libertee haþ fredom of conscience þat þe wraþþe of more myȝty folk haþ alwey ben despised of me for saluacioun of ryȝt.

Such obstinate blinde Papistes as will not learne the fredome of conscience taught in the Scriptures, and serue the lorde in singlenes of hart, but put their hole deuocion in outward obseruation of mans traditions.

Their princely power, which the nobles restraine and Commons receiue with this prouiso, that their accustomed freedome of conscience bee no way prohibited or interrupted.

If every man ought to have freedom of conscience ..you must indulge Papists this liberty as well as others.

The demands for the Queen were..That they might have liberty to serve God with Freedom of Conscience .

How destructive to the Safety of Religion, to the Freedom of Conscience !

The National Assembly..have lately made two or three fundamental strokes towards liberty and freedom of conscience .

The Liberal papers, on behalf of the Dissenters of England, loudly complain of this attempted blow to freedom of conscience .

As soon as it became known that Maryland law gave freedom of conscience , settlers began to come from all the world.

The new régime's policy of freedom of conscience does not allow of the imposition of oaths.

Freedom of conscience was beginning to creep in and with it the freedom to try out other forms of Christian belief.

• franchise c1300–1483 Spiritual freedom, esp. that enjoyed before the Fall of Man. Obsolete .
• freedom of conscience ?c1400– Freedom to follow one's own beliefs in matters of religion and morality, esp. when regarded as a right.
• liberty of conscience a1555– Freedom to follow one's own beliefs in matters of religion and morality, esp. when regarded as a right.
• freedom of religion 1573– Freedom to practise the religion of one's choice, esp. when regarded as a right.

S. Iohn the Baptiste, who died for the lyke liberty and fredome of speache , as S. Quillian, and S. Lamberte did.

They have denied all the Loyall Nobility and Gentry the freedom of Speech , which is the greatest Priviledge of Parliament Critically.

I am humbly to apply to Your Majesty..that in our Debates, Liberty and Freedom of Speech may be allowed us.

Setting up to Bully your Sovereign, [is] contrary to the intent and meaning of that Freedom of Speech , which you claim as a Right.

Congress shall make no law..abridging the freedom of speech , or of the press.

An organizer of that systematic espionage which broke up all freedom of speech .

The struggle for the elementary right of freedom of speech , of which the events of Bloody Sunday formed such a dramatic episode.

It is an order imposing freedom of speech , thought, religion and assembly on the Japanese people.

These smart-alec upstarts, because we have freedom of speech , are allowed to go and more or less demoralize people.

Because of the sacrosanct constitutional right to freedom of speech the media and lawyers can talk about cases..openly.

• franchise 1567–1653 Freedom or licence of speech or manners. Obsolete .
• freedom of speech 1567– Freedom to express one's opinions without censorship, legal penalty, or any other restraint, esp. when regarded as a right.
• freedom of expression 1650– (a) Frankness or openness in the expression of one's thoughts, feelings, etc.; cf. sense I.8a; (b) the right to express oneself without interference…
• free speech 1765– The freedom to express one's opinions without censorship, legal penalty, etc.; freedom of expression.
• free expression ?1865– The unconstrained or uninhibited expression of one's thoughts, feelings, creative capacities, etc.

Albeit the King had in manye Edictes before that time permitted the freedome of Religion , yet his meaning euer was to reteyne and cause to be reteyned of all men, the onely Romishe or Popishe Religion within his Realme.

In Austria freedome of Religion was granted by the Emperors Maximillian and Matthias.

A rebellious and scandalous Letter,..full of pretended Grievances, and unreasonable Demands, as namely, to have freedom of Religion .

As for enlarging the Freedom of Religion in Upper Silesia and elsewhere, this Court will venture all Consequences rather than submit to it.

By a declaration of rights, I mean one which shall stipulate freedom of religion , freedom of the press, freedom of commerce against monopolies, trial by juries in all cases, no suspensions of the habeas corpus, no standing armies.

We have freedom of the press, and freedom of religion , and why should we not enjoy a freedom of fashions?

Freedom of religion is one of our mottoes, and we can have no State interference with religion in India.

It was pretty well agreed that the right to two official languages, freedom of religion , and provincial control over education would be ‘entrenched’ clauses of the constitution [of Canada] .

The American commitment to free speech and freedom of religion ..has emerged as a North Star giving guidance amidst the chaos and tragedy.

If this be so that a man hath not freedom of thought against a ruler of the people, how much then are they giltie of capitall crime before God and men, who do proceed not to disclosing, but to counsell giuing.

This infinite variety of choice or freedome of thought in man and Angels.

We ar now at som leisure from our ordinary Occupations, and have therby the advantage of enjoying that freedom of Thought which is inconsistant with the Cares of the World.

Freedom of Thought is like Freedom in Actions.

Freedom of thought , unshackled by the trammels of authority.

We must be looking for a religious philosophy, and our main hope ought to be that it will be such a one as fulfils the conditions of a philosophy—the very foremost of which is, unrestricted freedom of thought .

The French Academy is now the last resting-place in France of freedom of thought .

The agitations for freedom of thought , an unstamped press, Owenist Socialism..and the Reform movement.

It is freedom of thought itself and when thought is free what can bind us?

The Czech Government's assertions..that there was freedom of thought and association behind the Iron Curtain.

He seemed to wish the same freedome of the Presse , which his Lordship had found.

This freedom of the Press , had so manifest an Influence upon the minds of the People.

That the freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty and can never be restrained but by despotic governments.

Congress shall make no law..abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.

This bill..appears to us to be a most dangerous invasion of the just freedom of the press .

Have you dropped into the Reading Rooms, and seen what they call the freedom of the press in the town newspaper?

The rectitudinous inquisition that is enjoyed under the freedom of the press .

Freedom of the press , one of the inherent rights of the American people, cannot exist under dictatorships.

It is a system in which there is no freedom of the press , where justice is undermined and where the military hierarchy is allowed to hold sway.

• liberty of the press 1633– Freedom to print and publish anything without interference or censorship, esp. when regarded as a right; cf. freedom of the press n. at freedom , n. …
• freedom of the press 1646– Freedom to print and publish anything without interference or censorship, esp. when regarded as a right.
• free press 1679– A press having the freedom to operate without interference or censorship; (also) freedom of the press.
• press freedom 1705–

The Art of Eloquence, and of well speaking, require both Art and Nature together; as..a disposition in all the Organs, abundance of fluent conceptions,.. freedome of expression , [etc.] .

Some choose to pray to God, and praise him in a stinted Form of Words, others with greater Liberty and Freedom of Expression .

Therefore, my dear Lady, make no Apology for your Freedom of Expression , it is the genuine Dictates of an honest Heart.

Socialism had always attached great importance to freedom of expression .

Give your pupils freedom of expression in the earliest stages of their studies.

An immunity from Press criticism, which, if enforced by episcopal authority, must inevitably mean an absolute disintegration of lay Catholic opinion, and annihilation of its freedom of expression .

In this stimulating atmosphere, receptive to new ideas, your freedom of expression will be gladly indulged.

Since the Human Rights Act.., newspapers have been able to point to Article 10, which gives a measure of protection for freedom of expression .

The future transition from these restraints to the almost unbounded freedom of association at school, proved injurious to Nugent.

It is only in a republic, with a perfectly free press, freedom of speech, and freedom of association , that such potent means could have been so rapidly and extensively organized.

How can freedom of labor be reconciled with freedom of association ?

Prior to that time, societies in general were forbidden and political assemblies not allowed. On April 6, 1848, a measure of freedom of association was proclaimed.

The Northern Ireland Government, in the interest of freedom of association , permitted the demonstration to take place.

The Charter of Rights provides for free expression, freedom of association .

• personal liberty 1655– The freedom of an individual to act as he or she wishes.
• freedom of association 1833– Freedom to socialize or form an association with whom one pleases, esp. when regarded as a right.

Pronunciation

• ð th ee
• ɬ rhingy ll

Some consonants can take the function of the vowel in unstressed syllables. Where necessary, a syllabic marker diacritic is used, hence <petal> /ˈpɛtl/ but <petally> /ˈpɛtl̩i/.

• a trap, bath
• ɑː start, palm, bath
• ɔː thought, force
• ᵻ (/ɪ/-/ə/)
• ᵿ (/ʊ/-/ə/)

Other symbols

• The symbol ˈ at the beginning of a syllable indicates that that syllable is pronounced with primary stress.
• The symbol ˌ at the beginning of a syllable indicates that that syllable is pronounced with secondary stress.
• Round brackets ( ) in a transcription indicate that the symbol within the brackets is optional.

View the pronunciation model here .

* /d/ also represents a 'tapped' /t/ as in <bitter>

Some consonants can take the function of the vowel in unstressed syllables. Where necessary, a syllabic marker diacritic is used, hence <petal> /ˈpɛd(ə)l/ but <petally> /ˈpɛdl̩i/.

• i fleece, happ y
• æ trap, bath
• ɑ lot, palm, cloth, thought
• ɔ cloth, thought
• ɔr north, force
• ə strut, comm a
• ər nurse, lett er
• ɛ(ə)r square
• æ̃ sal on

Simple Text Respell

Simple text respell breaks words into syllables, separated by a hyphen. The syllable which carries the primary stress is written in capital letters. This key covers both British and U.S. English Simple Text Respell.

b, d, f, h, k, l, m, n, p, r, s, t, v, w and z have their standard English values

• arr carry (British only)
• a(ng) gratin
• o lot (British only)
• orr sorry (British only)
• o(ng) salon

Date of use

Variant forms.

• early Old English freodoom , friadom
• Old English freodum ( rare ) , freogdom (in a late copy) , freohdom ( rare ) , freowdom (probably transmission error) , frigedom ( rare )
• Old English–early Middle English freodom , friodom
• late Old English frigdom , frydom
• late Old English–early Middle English fridom
• early Middle English friedom
• Middle English ffredam , ffredom , fredam , fredame , fredowm , fredowme , freedam , freodam
• Middle English–1500s ffredome
• Middle English–1600s fredome , freedome
• Middle English–1800s fredom
• Middle English– freedom
• 1500s–1600s freedoom , freedoome
• 1600s ffreedom , ffreedome
• pre-1700 freddome , fredom , fredome , fredoum , fredoume , fredowm , fredowme , fredum , fredume , fredwm , fredwme , freedome , freidom , freidome , fridome , friedom , friedome
• pre-1700 ; 1700s– freedom

β. southern

• Middle English uridom , vridom

freedom is one of the 1,000 most common words in modern written English. It is similar in frequency to words like adopt , fear , historical , operate , and protein .

It typically occurs about 80 times per million words in modern written English.

freedom is in frequency band 6, which contains words occurring between 10 and 100 times per million words in modern written English. More about OED's frequency bands

Frequency of freedom, n. , 1750–2010

* Occurrences per million words in written English

Historical frequency series are derived from Google Books Ngrams (version 2), a data set based on the Google Books corpus of several million books printed in English between 1500 and 2010.

The overall frequency for a given word is calculated by summing frequencies for the main form of the word, any plural or inflected forms, and any major spelling variations.

For sets of homographs (distinct entries that share the same word-form, e.g. mole , n.¹, mole , n.², mole , n.³, etc.), we have estimated the frequency of each homograph entry as a fraction of the total Ngrams frequency for the word-form. This may result in inaccuracies.

Frequency of freedom, n. , 2017–2023

Modern frequency series are derived from a corpus of 20 billion words, covering the period from 2017 to the present. The corpus is mainly compiled from online news sources, and covers all major varieties of World English.

Compounds & derived words

• All compounds & derived words
• Curated compounds
• unfreedom , n. c1380– (un-, prefix¹ affix 6.)
• out-freedom , n. 1527–1798 The right to a share of common land outside a town.
• freedom , v. 1548– transitive. To set free; to free.
• freedomship , n. 1583– The fact of possessing freedom (in various senses).
• non-freedom , n. 1659–
• over freedom , n. 1668
• gospel-freedom , n. 1680–
• freedom fine , n. 1684– A payment made on being admitted to the freedom of a city, guild, or corporation.
• press freedom , n. 1705–
• freedom-giving , adj. a1719–
• freedom-loving , adj. 1745–
• freedom box , n. 1755– (Esp. in Ireland in the 18th and 19th centuries) a box designed to hold a document granting the freedom of a town or city.
• freedomless , adj. 1821– Without freedom.
• freedom papers , n. 1821– Documents proclaiming the holder to be a free person (as opposed to a slave); also occasionally in singular.
• academic freedom , n. 1834– a. (Also academic freedom of thought) the freedom of a teacher to state personal opinions openly without censorship, or without the fear of…
• freedom scroll , n. 1841– A scroll commemorating the conferring of the freedom of a town, city, etc., on a particular person (cf. freedom, n. II.14b).
• freedom-hating , adj. 1856–
• freedom song , n. 1858– A song about or in praise of freedom, esp. from slavery, oppression, etc.; (South African) a strongly political song or chant of a type sung at…
• freedom-lover , n. 1862–
• freedom movement , n. 1891–
• freedom ceremony , n. 1897– A ceremony in which the freedom of a town, city, etc., is conferred on a person (cf. freedom, n. II.14b).
• freedom fighter , n. 1910– A person who fights for freedom or liberation; a person who takes part in a resistance movement against the established political system of a…
• freedom struggle , n. 1913–
• freedom fighting , adj. & n. 1915– a. adj. That fights for freedom or liberation; b. n. the action of fighting for freedom or liberation; (armed) resistance against the established…
• freedom march , n. 1947– A march in celebration of or in support of freedom; esp. = freedom walk, n.
• freedom walk , n. 1957– A walk or march organized as a form of political demonstration, esp. (now historical) as a protest against racial segregation; cf. freedom ride, n.
• value freedom , n. 1959– The state of being value-free; objectiveness.
• freedom ride , n. 1961– An organized ride (in buses, etc.) by people demonstrating against racial segregation.
• freedom rider , n. 1961– A person who takes part in a freedom ride.
• freedom walker , n. 1961– a. U.S. a person who takes part in a freedom walk (now chiefly historical); b. New Zealand a hiker travelling without a guide.

Ye sd cloth he received upon the account of his ffredome cloths.

A homespun jacket with pewter buttons and a pair of leather-breeches, formed his freedom -suit.

We well remember the ‘Freedomtreat’ given at the hospitable mansion of his master.

Then he was accused by John Myers of withholding his freedom clothes.

Their apprentices received board, clothing, a freedom -suit,..and some formal schooling.

Entry history for freedom, n.

freedom, n. was revised in June 2008.

freedom, n. was last modified in March 2024.

oed.com is a living text, updated every three months. Modifications may include:

• further revisions to definitions, pronunciation, etymology, headwords, variant spellings, quotations, and dates;
• new senses, phrases, and quotations.

Revisions and additions of this kind were last incorporated into freedom, n. in March 2024.

Earlier versions of this entry were published in:

OED First Edition (1898)

• Find out more

OED Second Edition (1989)

• View freedom in OED Second Edition

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Telegram Becomes Free Speech Flashpoint After Founder’s Arrest

Pavel Durov, the founder of the app, which has more than 900 million users, was taken into custody by the French authorities.

By Adam Satariano Paul Mozur and Aurelien Breeden

Adam Satariano reported from London, Paul Mozur from Taipei, Taiwan, and Aurelien Breeden from Sigottier, France.

Telegram, founded in 2013 by the Russian entrepreneur Pavel Durov, has grown into one of the world’s largest online communication tools and is central to everyday life in countries like Russia, Ukraine and India for messaging, getting independent news and exchanging views.

The company’s growth — it now has more than 900 million users — has been driven partly by a commitment to free speech. Telegram’s light oversight of what people say or do on the platform has helped people living under authoritarian governments communicate and organize. But it has also made the app a haven for disinformation, far-right extremism and other harmful content.

Many were shocked when reports emerged on Saturday across French news media that Mr. Durov had been arrested in France on charges related to the spread of illicit material on the service. A French judicial official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss an ongoing investigation, confirmed on Sunday evening that Mr. Durov was in police custody. As word spread online over the weekend, news of his detention became a flashpoint in a continuing debate about free speech on the internet.

Elon Musk, the owner of X, which has adopted a similarly hands-off approach to content moderation, posted “#FreePavel” on his X account. “It’s 2030 in Europe and you’re being executed for liking a meme,” he also said.

Leonid Volkov, formerly a top adviser to Aleksei A. Navalny, the Russian opposition leader who died in prison last year, wrote on Telegram that although the platform had become a useful tool for criminals, Mr. Durov should be released. “Durov is not an ‘accomplice’ to the crimes committed by Telegram users,” he said.

The reaction over the news of the arrest showed how concerns about free expression, censorship and government oversight of online content are rising at a time when regulatory scrutiny of speech on the internet around the world has ramped up. National governments, especially those in the European Union, have intensified pressure on companies to address disinformation, online extremism, child safety and the spread of illicit material.

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