drug trafficking essay pdf

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Book contents

• Frontmatter
• 1 Introduction: Trafficking as Transnational Crime
• 2 Drug Trafficking
• 3 Human Trafficking
• 4 Wildlife Trafficking
• 5 Diamond Trafficking
• 6 Arms Trafficking
• 7 Antiquities Trafficking
• 8 Conclusion: A Social Theory of Transnational Criminal Markets

2 - Drug Trafficking

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2021

The nature and extent of the harm

Drug trafficking is considered to be the largest revenue generator globally among the variety of transnational criminal markets (Reuter 2014), and despite the huge criminal justice infrastructure aimed at reducing drug trafficking, the problem is getting worse. The number of people using drugs worldwide was estimated by the World Drug Report to be 30 per cent higher in 2019 than it was 10 years earlier, in 2009 (UNODC 2019). Globally, 11 million people injected drugs in 2017, while 271 million people were estimated to have used illegal drugs in that year, which is 5.5 per cent of the global population aged between 15 and 64. The harm caused by drug misuse is a continuing global crisis. In the US alone, 47,000 opioid overdose deaths were recorded in 2017, up 13 per cent from 2016. More drugs are being illegally produced than ever before (for cocaine in 2017 a 25 per cent increase on 2016, at 1,976 tons), and more are being seized. Synthetic drugs are a growing part of the problem, with synthetic opioids such as fentanyl finding a market in North America and tramadol in West, Central and North Africa (UNODC 2019).

The picture, as we shall see, is one of a catastrophic failure of law and policy to control this global criminal market. The criminal justice supply-chain intervention approach has not reduced illicit drug consumption despite sometimes very large seizures. At the demand end, government initiatives targeted at treatment and prevention are not reaching enough users, with the 2019 World Drug Report finding that globally only around one in seven people with drug disorders received treatment. The figure is considerably less than this in prisons where clandestine but widespread illicit drug use takes place, usually without access to standard harm-reduction measures such as needle exchange programmes or substitution therapy, giving prisoners an elevated risk of contracting serious diseases like HIV and Hepatitis C (UNODC 2019). Drug policies are a source of racial injustice, such as the much-debated difference in sentencing dispositions for crack versus powder cocaine, the first more likely to be found in the possession of black offenders, the second in the hands of whites.

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• Drug Trafficking
• Simon Mackenzie , Sheffield Hallam University
• Book: Transnational Criminology
• Online publication: 25 February 2021
• Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.46692/9781529203851.003

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Executive summary

Introduction, transnational crime and development, the pacific drugs landscape, drivers of the drug trade, the impact on security and societies in the pacific, the regional response, conclusion: a pacific-led, partner-supported approach, drug trafficking in the pacific islands: the impact of transnational crime.

The Pacific has become a lucrative drug corridor, driven by cartels, criminal organisations, and local gangs. Regional states and traditional partners must act rapidly and adaptively in response.

• The Pacific “drug highway” has spilled over into domestic markets for illicit drug consumption and production in the Pacific Islands region. Drug trafficking has evolved significantly with the rise of local actors in transnational criminal networks.
• Capacity shortfalls and a disconnect between regional law enforcement infrastructure and national law enforcement agencies undermine trust and are detrimental to intelligence sharing and interoperability in cross-border policing efforts.
• The deportation policies of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States are exacerbating crime and addiction within Pacific nations. They undermine the policy objectives of development partners in the region and will need urgent review.

Transnational crime [1] — specifically drug production and trafficking — is one of the most serious security issues facing the Pacific Islands region. Methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine trafficking is on the rise. The Pacific Islands have become a production site and trafficking destination as well as trafficking thoroughfare, and indigenous/local crime syndicates now work in partnership with transnational crime syndicates. The criminal deportee policies of Australia, the United States, and New Zealand are contributing to the problem, as is the Covid-19 pandemic, by exacerbating the vulnerabilities on which transnational organisations and local crime actors capitalise. The Pacific and its partners have responded by strengthening regional policing architecture and governance through enhanced law enforcement mechanisms, but challenges remain as the illicit drug trade adapts and takes root in the region.

Over the past two decades, increased connectivity within and across the Pacific Islands region [2] (hereafter “the Pacific”) has enhanced its broad economic opportunities as well as exacerbated its vulnerabilities. [3] In particular, the period has seen a significant increase in the trafficking of methamphetamine, cocaine, and precursors. Situated along a maritime corridor utilised for legitimate trade between major economic markets on the Asian and American borders of the Pacific Rim, [4] the region has been a principal trans-shipment hub for drugs. It is valuable to Asian organised crime syndicates and Mexican and South American cartels as a transit route and occasional production site, targeting the lucrative markets in Australia and New Zealand where the street value of methamphetamine and cocaine is amongst the highest in the world.

Of equal significance has been the emergence of indigenous regional organised crime groups and networks with links to organised crime syndicates in Australia, New Zealand, and further afield. This growth has been driven by the spill-over effect of trafficked drugs into local markets, spreading from largely elite and expatriate populations into the wider community, and the arrival of criminal deportees from Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.

This analysis identifies the key trends and dynamics driving the drug market in the Pacific and the implications for societies, traditional power structures, and states. This paper focuses on two highly addictive stimulants — crystal methamphetamine and cocaine — as well as precursors and chemicals necessary for their manufacturing. The analysis highlights the inter-connectedness of transnational criminal activities and the need for a holistic mapping of those connections to better understand the transnational crime landscape and the intersections with national and local level Pacific criminal networks.

Transnational crime in the Pacific represents a microcosm of a wider global trend. Cited as one of six key global security challenges in the United Nations Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, transnational crime erodes human security and undermines “the rule of law within and across borders”. [5] In a region plagued by “unmet development challenges”, [6] transnational crime and illicit drugs are a cross-cutting threat to development, security, and governance in the Pacific.

At the global level, transnational crime is recognised as a multi-dimensional driver of state fragility. [7] In 2014, the UN Secretary-General highlighted organised crime as one of the primary factors affecting conflict and stability, obstructing economic development and legitimate commerce, and holding people, communities, and countries captive in a negative spiral of fragility and underdevelopment. [8] Accordingly, reducing transnational and organised crime has been recognised as one of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), [9] specifically SDG Target 16.4. [10] Drug trafficking is the largest revenue generator globally among the variety of transnational criminal markets. [11]

In the Pacific, there is a growing recognition that transnational crime can generate significant insecurity, disrupt traditional and cultural mechanisms, fuel corruption, weaken key security sectors, and undermine formal and informal governance. Accordingly, the Pacific Transnational Crime Network (PTCN) was established in 2002 by the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police. More recently, and reflecting the complex challenges and growing urgency of tackling transnational crime in the region, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) elevated the issue in its Boe Declaration on Regional Security (2018), which identified transnational crime as one of four paramount challenges confronting the region.

The production and trafficking of illicit drugs are the most typical forms of transnational crime. [12] The Pacific’s extensive and porous maritime jurisdictional boundaries, differences in governance structures, and heterogeneity in law enforcement capacity have contributed to the region’s attractiveness as a transit route and, increasingly, production site.

In 2019, Interpol President Kim Jong Yang stated:

[T]here is no doubt that Pacific Islands Countries face a unique set of challenges, caught in the midst of the Pacific highway between major suppliers of illicit goods, large demand hubs, and thousands of miles of coastline to monitor. At the same time, some of the Pacific Islands are seeing the trans-shipment of narcotics through their territories devolve into a growing domestic demand for illicit drugs. [13]

The illegal drug trade in Australia is estimated to be worth AU$11.3 billion [14] and in New Zealand up to an estimated AU$1.86 billion per annum. [15] The drugs typically arrive by air, with 85–99 per cent of seizures for heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, and MDMA from airfreighted cargo. Alternative transport is by sea (in containers and yachts) and light plane.

The Pacific is the principal transit route for the trafficking of drugs and chemical precursors bound from Asia and South America to Australia and New Zealand, where consumers pay some of the highest prices globally. [16] In both Australia and New Zealand, methamphetamine and cocaine usage has been steadily increasing, [17] and reached record levels in April and June 2020 despite the disruption of supply chains due to Covid-19. [18]

Recent growth in the Pacific drug market has alarmed the region’s law enforcement officers. In Fiji, for example, there were only 148 drug-related policing cases (including arrests for cocaine and heroin) in 2009. By 2018, this had risen to almost 1400 arrests; methamphetamine cases rose from two in 2009 to 113 in 2019. [19] This reflects both increased drug trafficking activity and volume due to rising demand and prices in Australia and New Zealand, as well as strengthened enforcement capacity.

The trafficking and trade in drugs in the Pacific is driven by five interconnected networks of actors: Chinese and Asian syndicates; Mexican and South American cartels; Australian organised crime; New Zealand organised crime; and local or hybrid indigenous drug gangs.

Cocaine accounts for the largest volume of seized illicit drugs transiting through the region, with a record eight tonnes seized between mid-2016 and 2018. [20] In May 2018, authorities from Papua New Guinea discovered a haul of cocaine packaged in cloth bags on Wasim Island near Jinlageg Point, assessing it to weigh between 220 and 330 kilograms. Buried in the sand, the cocaine was found by a local fisherman and handed over to a radio operator. Six Chinese and one Montenegrin returned on a fishing boat to retrieve the cocaine. [21] The seven were later apprehended at sea by a joint Papua New Guinea police and defence operation. [22]

In July 2020, more than 500 kilograms of cocaine worth AU$160 million was seized by the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) after a twin-engine Cessna crash-landed en route to Queensland at a makeshift airfield on the outskirts of the capital, Port Moresby. A two year investigation by Australian and Papua New Guinean authorities had tracked members of a Melbourne-based criminal syndicate and were waiting to seize the aircraft on its arrival in Australia. [23] The incident highlighted the role of local criminal partners who had facilitated the transport of the cocaine from a yacht to the airfield and then onto the aircraft.

Since late 2016, there has been a noticeable increase in the detection of cocaine in all sub-regions of the Pacific due to greater inter-agency cooperation, such as through the Transnational Serious and Organised Crime (TSOC) Pacific Taskforce agreement between Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and Tonga. However, regional law enforcement bodies claim that the Pacific itself represents only a very small consumer base. [24] Factors limiting the market are the high price of cocaine, and an expatriate or elite user demographic. Yet, a critical paucity of formal data at the national and regional levels on drug trafficking, production, and distribution in the Pacific, and the lack of reliable statistics has impaired the ability of law enforcement to assess the problem accurately. [25]

The cultural, social, and hierarchical web of Pacific Islands families and societies serves as a further barrier, the framework creating both a frontline against illicit activities, but at times also providing a shield for actors reliant on impenetrable networks. One Pacific Islands security official said:

It is difficult when we know an individual is involved in drug crime but is related to a family member, a minister, a judge in the courts, a senior official. Who do we question? The doors close. Conducting investigations here isn’t like doing investigations in Australia…there are layers of cultural obligations and implications. [26]

From transit point to production site

In 2004, the discovery of the largest “super lab” in the southern hemisphere changed the Pacific drug landscape. On 9 June that year, as part of Operation Outrigger, five kilograms of crystal methamphetamine, 700 litres of liquid methamphetamine, and sufficient precursor chemicals to produce an additional 1000 kilograms of methamphetamine were seized from a warehouse in Suva. [27] The network of drug traffickers included Chinese nationals with Chinese triad links, one Fijian national, and four Hong Kong passport holders. Key players Yuen Yei Ha and her husband Zhong Qiang had recently obtained Fijian citizenship.

The operation, a collaboration between police from Fiji, Australia, and New Zealand, highlighted three issues: (1) the region had shifted from transit point to production site; (2) the success of the operation was dependent on local facilitation and was therefore fuelling local corruption; [28] and (3) the existing legislation was outdated and did not criminalise precursors. Since 2004, small scale production labs have proliferated in Fiji, [29] Tonga, [30] the Marshall Islands, [31] the Northern Marianas, [32] and Papua New Guinea. [33]

Domestic legislation has been slow in responding to increased illicit drug production. In 2004, Fiji passed legislation to strengthen its drug laws and policing powers, and in 2019 the Ministry of Defence and National Security drafted a national narcotics strategy and framework. In 2020, Tonga amended its Illicit Drugs Control Act [34] with acting Justice Minister Samiu Vaipulu stating that “ice” (methamphetamine) is “Tonga's killing virus, not Covid-19”. [35] The amendment, modelled on New Zealand’s Drug Act, directly targets methamphetamine usage.

National security strategies, which PIF members committed to under the Boe Declaration, have sought to align domestic focus on transnational crime with the regional architecture. The newly developed national security strategies of Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu all identify transnational crime and the spill-over of drug abuse into local communities as key security issues. A central theme across the three national security strategies is that there is considerable reliance on regional and international counter drug trafficking initiatives.

The local drug market

The domestic market for drugs in the Pacific has traditionally consisted of expatriate, tourist, and some local cannabis users. In the past decade, the local drug market has grown, with facilitators being paid in drugs for services, then selling them onwards. This has contributed to rising addiction amongst locals and the emergence of a local drug network. The PTCN identified a “dramatic increase” in drug-related activity between 2014 and 2017 with the rapid expansion of methamphetamine availability across all sub-regions of the Pacific due to the drug’s low cost and highly addictive properties. [36]

In Tonga, between 2016 and 2019, police data showed that drug-related arrests rose sharply from 25 (2016–17) to 57 (2018–19). [37] In parallel, weapons seizures almost doubled, from 10 (2016–17) to 19 (2018–19). [38] According to the Tongan Attorney General’s Office, 70 per cent of drug raids in Tonga recover weapons. [39] Officials reported that the increase in drug offences indicated the growing presence of methamphetamine in the kingdom, and correlated with an increase in drug-related crime such as robberies and house break-ins. [40]

In response, the Tongan government declared a “war on drugs” and established the Tonga Police Drug Enforcement Taskforce in April 2018. In the first year of operation, the taskforce made 263 arrests and seized more than 30 kilograms of methamphetamine with a street value in excess of AU$24 million. [41] However, Tongan police claim they are “only scratching the surface”. [42]

Trafficking methods and trends

The maritime transport sector is the main vector in drug trafficking across the region. The Pacific is heavily dependent on maritime shipping with more than 80 per cent of all international cargo (both container and non-container) transported by ship. [43] Containerisation is one of the primary modes of trafficking illicit drugs in the Pacific, with the trend likely to grow. Container tonnage in the Pacific is estimated to increase from the 1.7 million tons or 12.1 per cent of total seaborne cargo it represented in 2000, to 4.2 million tons or 19 per cent in 2030. [44] Oversight within the maritime transport sector is especially challenging and is further compounded by disparities in port infrastructure.

Yachts and pleasure craft are also highly versatile vehicles for trafficking drugs between the Pacific, Australia, and New Zealand. From December 2016 to November 2017, Pacific-based law enforcement agencies seized approximately 7.6 tonnes of cocaine on board 11 small craft believed to be bound for Australia; a significant increase in both the frequency and volume from previous years. Fiji’s Revenue and Customs Authority manager stated in 2020 that most of the pleasure craft — approximately five to ten per day — originate from New Zealand and Australia, and that “it’s like looking for the needle in the haystack of legitimacy…when you go fishing you don’t expect to catch all the fish in the ocean”. [45]

Cross-border collaboration between national and regional security agencies is critical in the effort to stem the maritime flow of drug traffic. For example, the Australian Federal Police (AFP), New South Wales Police, Australian Border Force, and United Kingdom and New Caledonian authorities cooperated to seize a large shipment of methamphetamine in 2020 from a yacht intercepted off the coast of New South Wales with links to a broader trafficking operation stretching between Mexico, New Caledonia, and Norfolk Island. [46]

Recent seizures reveal that Papua New Guinea remains a key transit site into Australia, including attempts to traffic AU$90 million of cocaine through the Torres Strait in 2018 and the discovery in 2019 by a community on Budi island of 11 duffle bags of cocaine worth AU$50 million buried at a local beach. [47]

The Pacific drug trade is propelled by a complex web of external and local syndicates, regional actors and hybridised networks. It is facilitated by criminal deportation policy settings in Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.

Organised crime

External organised crime actors have played a central role in establishing, fuelling, and maintaining the drug market in the Pacific and driving the growth of local drug production and consumption.

Australia and New Zealand’s prolific and high-profile organised crime networks — including outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs) — have expanded their activities offshore and into the Pacific. [48] There has been a notable increase in OMCG members travelling to the Pacific since 2016 — most commonly to the Cook Islands and Fiji. One report cites an increase from 90 members travelling to seven Pacific destinations in 2016–17, to 140 members in 2017–18 — an increase of more than 50 per cent. [49] A regional security sector official noted in 2019 that “the outlaw motorcycle gangs are one of the key links between the syndicates and cartels and the Australian and New Zealand drug markets — the Pacific is caught in the middle”. [50]

Fiji is a valuable trans-shipment point, and the largest Pacific-based OMCG is the Fiji Rebels. Established by expatriates linked to the New South Wales chapter in 2012, the Fiji Rebels has chapters in Suva and Nadi consisting of both Australian and Fijian nationals. [51] In 2014, the Australian Crime Commission suspected that the Fiji chapter was being used as a conduit for drug shipments from South America to Australia and other countries in the region. [52]

The New Zealand-based Head Hunters motorcycle gang is particularly active in the Cook Islands, with a senior Head Hunters member (of Cook Islander descent) residing in the Cook Islands and well connected across both the gang and the local community. [53] In response to the number of gang members travelling to the Cook Islands, an operation led by Cook Islands Immigration has prevented the entry of overseas gang members and criminals, including nearly 40 individuals in 2019 alone. [54]

The Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre (PTCCC) stated in 2018 that despite the increase in OMCG members travelling to the Pacific, the threat of OMCGs is no longer assessed as increasing due to “effective control measures and proactive/targeted responses”, which have contributed to better management of the associated risk of OMCGs. [55] Samoa’s national security strategy, however, identifies OMCGs with links to organised crime as a concern across several Pacific countries and an “emerging threat” in Samoa. [56]

Asian syndicates, notably Chinese, and Mexican and South American cartels are also principal actors in regional drug markets. Chinese criminal syndicates and triads with links to Chinese commercial interests in the Pacific have been dominant, but are now being challenged by South American and Mexican cartels — and in some cases are collaborating with them. Mexican cartels have been identified as active in Australia over the past decade [57] and US government reports have detected growing links between Chinese organised crime syndicates and Mexican cartels. [58]

Criminal deportees

The criminal deportee policies of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States are a significant contributor to the growth in transnational crime in the Pacific. [59] The majority of deportees from these countries have criminal records and are removed to Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands. A 2014 study reported that most deportees removed to the Pacific are male, between the ages of 25 and 35, on average having spent more than 12 years away from their country of citizenship, and are incarcerated for an average of four years in the host country, with a large number separated from families. [60]

Available data on the deportees is not comprehensive. Deportations from Australia are difficult to disaggregate. Department of Home Affairs statistics for the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 cited 1021 visa cancellations under Section 501, including 477 New Zealanders and 16 Fijians. The majority of offences were drug related (234), followed by assault (169). [61] Deportations and removals from New Zealand under the Immigration Act (2009) to the Pacific Islands [62] between 2013 and 2018 totalled 1040. Of the deportations, 400 were due to criminal convictions, and 640 were for non-criminal reasons. [63] The most common Pacific destinations for deportees are Samoa (145 in five years), Tonga (120), and Fiji (113).

Data from the United States is similarly difficult to disaggregate, however between 2004 and 2018, 321 individuals were deported to Fiji, 136 to Samoa, and 350 to Tonga. [64] The data on deportees to US “compact of association” territories — the Marshall Islands , Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau — is incomplete, but number 61, 514, and 101 deportations respectively. [65] In the 2017–18 period, US-based deportees were being returned to the Pacific in increasing numbers, with the Federated States of Micronesia being notified at least once a week of pending deportations. [66] Overall, more than 3500 Pacific nationals were deported from Australia, New Zealand, and the United States between 2004 and 2020. The number is likely far higher given the gaps in reporting.

Barriers to reintegration for these deportees are significant. [67] For example, it is unclear which country — host or recipient — bears responsibility for providing resettlement support. Communication between the deporting countries and receiving countries is inadequate. As a Tongan Police spokesperson noted: “Australia doesn’t advise us when they send deportees to Tonga.” [68] A Tongan deportee from New Zealand said, “I’ve never been here before [as an adult]. I don’t speak the language. I grew up as a Kiwi. I don’t know how to live here. I just want to go home.” [69]

The lack of support for deportees in their home countries means many vulnerable individuals turn (or return) to crime and drug smuggling. This is particularly apparent when deportees are not accepted or integrated into local communities [70] and are forced to create their own support mechanisms and power structures. A number of deportees bring their links to the gangs and diaspora from their host countries into the Pacific. [71]

The PTCN has assessed the criminal deportee threat as steadying due to improved information exchange and legislative reform, which has assisted in better managing the associated risks. [72] Despite this, given the small population sizes of Pacific countries and territories, the impact on communities and the state itself of these deportations can be significant. [73]

UNESCO research in Samoa and Tonga revealed that 83 per cent of deportees had been incarcerated due to gang activities during their adolescence in the host country and 37 per cent had been investigated or charged following deportation. Of those, almost half had served prison time. [74] The PTCN notes instances in Fiji and Samoa of offenders who were originally deported for drug-related convictions being arrested in their home countries for drug trafficking offences. [75] Dependence on remittances, difficulty obtaining employment, the challenges of integration, and cultural alienation are all contributing factors. According to one Pacific Islands official, “the deportees started the fire, but now the fire is out of control” [76] with locals involved at all levels of importation, facilitation, sales, and trafficking.

The deportee policies of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States undermine, and are in direct contradiction with, their stated foreign policy objectives of strengthening the stability and prosperity of the region. As a member of a Tongan civil society organisation argued, “New Zealand, Australia, and America are exporting their problems to us. How does that build trust between our countries?” [77]

Covid-19 and the closure of borders has disrupted the deportation of criminals to the Pacific. In 2021, New Zealand had 32 criminal deportees awaiting removal; the majority for violent offences. [78] What is clear is that criminal deportation policies need reviewing in light of the regional economic impact of the pandemic, and their role in the growth of local actors involved in transnational criminal organisations. [79]

Narco-corruption

Corruption remains a critical challenge to governance and an obstacle to development in the Pacific. [80] The infiltration of key government agencies and departments, corruption of public officials, and tactics from coercion to intimidation and outright violence are integral components of illicit drug markets.

In the Pacific, narco-corruption has compromised institutions and individuals across key agencies such as customs, police, and immigration; and undermined the rule of law. In 2019, for example, Tonga’s “war on drugs” resulted in the arrests of a Tongan senior customs official and a police officer who were facilitating trafficking in methamphetamine, cocaine, and illegal firearms from the United States. [81] It is likely there are far more examples. Family networks and obligations, low wages, and intimidation tactics are all key enablers for corruption. As a young Tongan customs officer stated:

Even if a customs officer is not involved in corrupt activities and does not want to be involved, you have criminals who have shipments coming in and the customs officer is aware of it and wants to stop the shipment coming in, but the criminals will use intimidation tactics, which customs officials can’t counter due to the involvement of extended family. [82]

Another customs officer cited the network of kinship as an enabling dynamic as well as distrust of police: “Everyone knows who is connected to who; they have to ignore [the criminal activity] because they don’t trust that police can help because they [the criminals] know.” [83]

A third officer highlighted the sense of powerlessness: “We are not corrupt, there’s just nothing we can do…we can’t trust our own organisation…and we have to keep our families safe.” [84]

The work of Tonga’s anti-drug taskforce has led to the suspension of 28 police officers, with Tonga’s Police Minister, Mateni Tapueluelu, warning others with status in Tongan society: “Don't think you can sit on some high places and think you're too high for the police to reach, it's just a matter of time. You deal, you pay.” [85]

Papua New Guinea’s Police Commissioner, David Manning, has similarly highlighted the complicity of RPNGC officers, affirming that “there are criminals in uniform” and that he is committed to ridding the force of these elements. [86] Concerns about the infiltration of criminals into security and law enforcement agencies are also shared by the head of Fiji’s Police Drug Intelligence Unit, Anare Masitabua. [87]

Shadow economies and alternative power structures

The drug trade in the Pacific has created shadow economies and contributed to the creation of criminal hierarchies, which undermine the balance of power between traditional authority, church, and state. For example, a family member profiting from crime can supplant the traditional head of the family by exercising economic influence within the family and the village by buying farming equipment, gifting large amounts of money for weddings and funerals, and lending money. [88]

Criminal actors and groups have created sub-cultures and power structures with their own leaders and hierarchies, rules, and regulations, effectively diffusing power away from legitimate sources of authority. This is evident in the laundering of money through local businesses, the use of import and export businesses as fronts for illicit drug trafficking, and the large amounts of money offered as gifts and donations to influential members of communities to start businesses or undertake community projects. [89] Shadow economies create economic possibilities, broker political power, establish cultures, and create new, sometimes hybrid, forms of authority. [90] In the Pacific, the lines can become blurred between the formal, and importantly, informal, and shadow economies.

The effect on the Pacific’s traditional societies is significant. Tongan church leaders believe the decreasing number of young men in church congregations is due to high levels of involvement in drug-related crime and increased usage of illicit drugs in the demographic, all of which leads to a sense of “shame” and “separation within communities”. [91] Criminal power structures, dependent on fear, money, and addiction, have contributed to the erosion of the moral authority of traditional sources of power. As one traditional Tongan leader stated:

Families are angry with young people stealing family mats et cetera to sell or swap for drugs…this shames families within communities…having a child or parent on drugs impacts the family’s status in the community…it’s not just the individual but the family which is impacted and can lead to families pulling away from village life. [92]

Conversely, robust traditional power structures, such as village authorities and the church, can be a frontline against the drug trade. Village councils in Samoa, for example, known for supporting police conducting gun amnesties, have partnered with police to bolster anti-drug campaigning. Then Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa Lupesoliai Sailele Malielegaoi noted in 2015 that “in some villages, they have zero tolerance for these [drug-related] activities and have imposed stiff penalties — including banishment”. [93]

However, there are limits to the effectiveness of community and church organisations in combating drug-related crime. These include moral and religious sensitivities on certain topics, and the patriarchal nature of traditional and church hierarchies that inhibits leaders from engaging with vulnerable women and girls. In other cases, village councils have also been reluctant to become involved where family members were implicated.

Health security is a human security issue

Rising drug addiction in the Pacific has contributed to an increase in mental health issues and risky sexual behaviours. Intravenous drug use has led to a rise in HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases. [94] In Tonga, 30–40 per cent of mental health hospital admissions have been linked to drug addiction. [95] Many Pacific health systems lack the necessary resources to provide appropriate and qualified treatment to combat the addiction and the health complications caused by methamphetamine use. [96]

The Salvation Army in Tonga has seen an increasing number of women seeking drug addiction counselling, noting that rising drug use (particularly methamphetamine) has correlated with a cultural disapproval of women consuming alcohol. [97] A health advocate in Fiji cited increasing numbers of girls and young women prostituting or exchanging sexual favours for drugs. [98] Teachers and parents in Tonga, for example, have reported that “the use of [methamphetamine] in Tonga is rampant — to the point where dealers are encouraging kids to try it because they know they’ll have a client for life”. [99]

Drug awareness, recovery, and rehabilitation programs are either non-existent or ill-equipped to respond to the rapid increase in drug addiction. The Salvation Army Alcohol and Drugs Awareness Centre (ADAC) conducts the only recovery and rehabilitation program in Tonga. In 2018, ADAC reported the average age of people committing alcohol and drug-related crime was 15, compared with 22 in 2000, and 49 in 1950. [100] The Samoan addiction services program, funded by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, has worked with more than 330 clients between 2018 and 2019. [101]

There is also a clear correlation between drug usage and domestic violence; and the incidence of drug-related domestic violence in the Pacific is rising. Survivors and their families are often intimidated into silence — not just by the perpetrators, but also by their affiliates. [102] The rise of methamphetamine use has also increased the severity and brutality of the violence. [103] As Ned Cook, leader at Tonga's Salvation Army ADAC, stated in February 2019: “We are used to dealing with alcohol-related violence; drug-related violence is completely different, we are unprepared.” [104] Ned Cook was murdered in Nuku’alofa, Tonga, on 17 May 2020. As the only trained drug counsellor in Tonga with expertise in methamphetamine abuse and recovery, Cook was on the frontline of Tonga’s war on drugs. As he increasingly confronted the drug trade, the death threats against him multiplied. His murder reflects the scale and complexity of challenges that Tonga confronts in addressing drug crime. [105]

Recognising the growing threat of the Pacific drug trade as well as other transnational crimes, the region has rapidly elevated its response over the past three years. However, limited policing capacity means that those responses are often insufficient. [106] As Fiji’s Commissioner of Police, Brigadier General Sitiveni Qiliho, argues: “Just as crime is borderless, our approach therefore must not be confined to our borders, but aligned to a regional and international level if we are to effectively combat serious and transnational crime.” [107]

Regional security architecture

A range of regional mechanisms have been established to combat transnational crime, including the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security, the Pacific Transnational Crime Network, and the Pacific Methamphetamine Action Plan. The Boe Declaration recognises transnational crime as one of four primary security threats to the region, as did earlier regional security declarations, [108] although their limited success demonstrates the need for corresponding national policies and political will. The Boe Declaration’s Action Plan [109] may prove better at aligning regional and national-level efforts. It identifies eight proposed actions to combat transnational crime in the Pacific, ranging from strengthening national capacities to increasing information sharing. [110]

Tonga’s national-level response is an example. In June 2019, Tonga requested assistance from the PIF Secretariat to draft its national drug policy. This is the first time a Forum member has requested assistance from the PIF to address drug-related issues and is a test case for both PIF leadership and oversight in supporting national-level policy and legislative initiatives.

Regional governance

Governance and implementation of the Boe Declaration Action Plan is overseen by several regional organisations. The Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP) is the umbrella organisation representing 21 Pacific countries and territories with its secretariat based in Wellington, New Zealand. 

The Pacific Transnational Crime Network (PTCN) consists of 28 Transnational Crime Units located across 20 Pacific countries, and leads regional efforts on transnational crime. The PTCN is supported by the Australian Federal Police and New Zealand Police. Its secretariat, the Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre (PTCCC) is based in Apia, Samoa, and performs the central coordination role of managing, enhancing, and disseminating law enforcement intelligence products produced by the PTCCC, PTCN member countries, and other international law enforcement partners. The PTCCC is tasked with producing the annual PTCN Transnational Crime Assessment to provide a broad operational-level overview of transnational crime across the region. The PTCCC also produces a suite of intelligence products to specifically inform the law enforcement community of the current trends in the Pacific. The PTCCC works closely with those law enforcement organisations that also have intelligence networks for information sharing, including the Pacific Immigration Development Community (PIDC) and the Oceania Customs Organisation (OCO). [111]

In a show of solidarity in 2018, these three organisations representing more than 60 national Pacific Islands law enforcement agencies signed a Declaration of Partnership. [112] The Declaration provides a formal foundation for collaboration to combat transnational and organised crime and enhance border security in the Pacific. Citing the Declaration, the former Executive Director of the PICP Secretariat, Superintendent Carl McLennan, emphasised the importance of collaboration:

The Declaration sends a strong and clear message of the intent of the three organisations and provides a roadmap for us to implement going forward. Now we need to ensure that we develop activities and promote a culture of multi-agency collaboration at both national and regional levels. [113]

The PICP’s Pacific Methamphetamine Action Plan sets out several key goals: improving border security by collaborating with Pacific partners and their border enforcement agencies; leveraging existing government programs and resources; and focusing on prevention by delivering training to impede — and in some Pacific Islands countries mitigate — the spread of methamphetamine within the region. [114]

The Action Plan also highlights the importance of holistic public health and community-driven responses to drug crime and addiction. However, such responses are constrained by the anaemic public health systems in the Pacific, which struggle to provide basic health services, let alone address the complex challenges of drug addiction rehabilitation and recovery.

Unlike the PTCCC, which no longer characterises criminal deportees and outlaw motorcycle gangs as rising threats, the Action Plan argues that these two groups may increase the drug trafficking threat in the region. [115] This reveals a critical disconnect in perceptions about the level and nature of threat posed by different criminal actors and a lack of trust in regional law enforcement to effectively curtail drug trafficking. This lack of trust is fuelled by frustration that the Pacific is often treated as the source of “the problem”, [116] instead of focusing on Australian and New Zealand drug markets and criminal deportee policies that enable local and transnational criminal activities.

The Transnational, Serious and Organised Crime (TSOC) Pacific Taskforce, launched in 2019 following discussions at the PICP Meeting in Nauru in August 2018, involves the AFP, New Zealand Police, Fiji Police Force, and Tonga Police. The purpose of the TSOC Pacific Taskforce is to increase targeting capabilities, improve sharing of operational intelligence, and strengthen cooperation to conduct expanded and complex investigations.

Donor responses

Australia, New Zealand, and the United States are the principal donors combating the illicit drug trade in the Pacific and have increased their assistance bilaterally to Pacific states and multilaterally through regional efforts to combat drug trafficking over the past three years.

Australia and New Zealand collectively provide support to the PICP, PTCCC, and the TSOC. Other examples include Australia’s AU$2 billion Pacific Maritime Security Program, the successor to the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, which was created in the 1980s to provide Guardian-class patrol boats to 12 Pacific countries to support maritime and aerial surveillance and interdiction. The US Drug Enforcement Administration has provided training to Fijian police and customs officials, and the US Diplomatic Security Service has provided agents from the US embassy in Suva to run drug awareness sessions with students and parents. [117] In 2019, during Operation Aiga, the US Coast Guard deployed a cutter to Samoa for six months to replace the Guardian-class Nafanua , which included ship rider arrangements and exploration of the prospect of permanent coast guard basing in American Samoa. [118]

There are also significant partners within the Pacific, albeit with a limited footprint. Fiji has a memorandum of understanding with Indonesia’s National Narcotics Board to facilitate intelligence sharing — building on earlier agreements with Indonesia to provide training and information sharing; [119] and since 2018, Fiji has sought counter-narcotics training from Chinese law enforcement. [120] While these initiatives are relatively minor compared to Australian and New Zealand programs, concerns over interoperability have been raised. [121] Chinese initiatives are also likely viewed in the broader context of strategic competition in the Pacific, however to do so potentially accords them with greater success than warranted. The intersection between transnational crime and grey-zone activities is, however, an issue that warrants increased attention.

Gaps and limitations

Despite the regional, subregional, and donor actions that draw on a “criminal justice supply-chain intervention approach” [122] to address drug-related crime, challenges remain. These range from a lack of information sharing, inadequate equipment, and limited resources to issues of local corruption and an increasingly crowded security sector.

The PTCCC has concluded that Pacific Islands law enforcement officers have a limited understanding of the drug trade and its impacts on public health, [123] which is affecting the quality of the policing and health responses.

Differing threat perceptions about the risks posed by illicit drugs among various regional and local institutions are also impairing efforts. Law enforcement and security sector specialists in Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, and Fiji have articulated their frustration about inadequate intelligence sharing between and across agencies, [124] citing lack of reciprocation between the PTCCC and the national-level Transnational Crime Units. [125] One customs official expressed frustration with the lack of intelligence sharing even between his own national agencies, forcing him to rely on intelligence from his customs investigators rather than the police. [126] This issue is common across the region. It is unclear yet whether the addition of facilities such as the Australian-led Pacific Fusion Centre (PFC) will successfully address the challenge.

National agencies cite problems with insufficient equipment, lack of logistical support, and inadequate capacity-building efforts. With new security sector donors such as China providing assistance, interoperability gaps have opened between Australian, New Zealand, and US law enforcement and Pacific law enforcement. [127]  Joint operations with traditional partners are critical for developing capacity and cross-border interoperability, as are culturally appropriate engagement and cultural training for Australian and Pakeha New Zealand police officers.

A further deficiency is the inability to test illicit drugs, which impedes convictions. As a Tongan official stated:

For a long time, drug cases wouldn’t go to court because Pacific Island states had to pay for the drugs to be tested back in New Zealand and the cost was borne by the Pacific Island states, so only drugs from cases which they thought they would get a conviction out of would be sent back to New Zealand. This could also be used as an excuse not to prosecute officials or those with connections. [128]

Moreover, as the PTCN has identified, Pacific law enforcement agencies face systemic challenges in investigating financial crime, including money laundering. Limited resources and capacity have impeded financial investigations, increasing both the vulnerability to and likelihood of financial crime not being properly detected or reported within the region. [129]

The illicit drug trade is proving to be one of the most serious security issues facing the Pacific. The region is now both a trafficking destination and a production site — notably for local markets —as well as a thoroughfare. As a result, indigenous criminal networks have emerged in partnership with transnational criminal organisations. Moreover, the economic fallout of the Covid-19 pandemic is exacerbating existing vulnerabilities in the Pacific, which transnational criminal organisations and local crime actors are exploiting.

In response to this threat, partners, particularly Australia and New Zealand, have stepped up initiatives to counter transnational crime over the past three years. Working closely with Pacific governments and societies, the international collaboration has led to a number of significant drug hauls in the region and a growing awareness of the complexities associated with countering transnational crime in the Pacific.

The consensus among Pacific law enforcement officers, security officials, civil society, and government officials is that successful responses to transnational crime and drugs need to be Pacific-led and partner-supported. As one official argued: “No one knows the Pacific like the Pacific…this concept must be developed and driven by the Pacific with the support and expertise of the Pacific’s traditional partners.” Responses also need to be calibrated to particular circumstances in individual Pacific states. Tonga’s Chief of Defence Staff emphasised that, “the Pacific is not the arc of instability but the arc of diversity, and one solution or one approach will not work in every Pacific island”. [130]

Transnational drug crime is a protracted problem, but not one that is of the Pacific’s own making — rather the region is a casualty of the criminal greed of organised crime and the drug appetite of Australia and New Zealand. The response by Pacific states and traditional partners must be rapid, proactive, and adaptive. Conventional policing initiatives in the Pacific demonstrate that the “one size fits all” response will not work in such a diverse and intricate region. Innovative strategies are required now, or parts of the Pacific run the risk of becoming “semi-narco” regions due to their position between transnational criminal syndicates originating in Asia and the Americas, and the lucrative drug markets of Australia and New Zealand.

Dedicated to Ned Cook, Salvation Army, killed in Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 20 May 2020.

This analysis is informed by a desk-based literature review and interviews with government officials, regional and national law enforcement agencies, civil society, regional organisations, academia, and the private sector. Interviews were conducted in Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, Samoa, Hawai’i, Australia, and New Zealand during the period November 2018 to December 2019. Due to the highly sensitive subject matter and the implications for individuals and communities, some interview participants have not been identified.

Main image: Flags from the Pacific Islands countries fly on the final day of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Nauru-Pacific Summit, 5 September 2018. On this day, PIF members signed a security agreement promoting cooperation on issues such as transnational crime, illegal fishing and cybercrime. The agreement, called the Boe Declaration, also recognised the need for joint action on “non-traditional” threats, primarily climate change (Mike Leyral/AFP via Getty Images)

[1] This analysis uses the term “transnational crime” as distinct from “transnational organised crime” following Bruinsma’s clarification that “transnational crime is not synonymous with organised crime, even when organised crime groups are very active crossing borders with their crimes. States, governments, armies or business corporations, and many entrepreneurial individuals also have a long tradition in committing and facilitating transnational crimes.” See Gerben Bruinsma, Histories of Transnational Crime (New York: Springer, 2015), Chapter 1: Criminology and Transnational Crime, 1.

[2] The Pacific Community (SPC) definition of the Pacific Islands region is used in this paper. See https://cooperation-regionale.gouv.nc/en/cooperation-pacific-cooperation-instances-and-programs/pacific-community-spc .

[3] Transnational Crime in the Pacific: A Threat Assessment, United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, Bangkok, 9 September 2016, 8, https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2016/2016.09.16_TOCTA_Pacific_web.pdf .

[4] Joe McNulty, “Western and Central Pacific Ocean Fisheries and the Opportunities for Transnational Organised Crime: Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance (MCS) Operation Kurukuru”, Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs , Vol. 5, No. 4 (2013), 145–152.

[5] The Secretary-General’s High-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges, and Change, “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility”, (New York: United Nations, 2004), 19, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/gaA.59.565_En.pdf .

[6] Secretary General Dame Meg Taylor’s Opening Remarks to the 2017 Pacific Update, (Suva: University of the South Pacific, 2018), 20 June 2017, https://www.forumsec.org/secretary-general-dame-meg-taylors-opening-remarks-to-the-2017-pacific-update/ .

[7] OECD, States of Fragility 2015, Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015), https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264227699-en .

[8] Synthesis Report of the Secretary-General on the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda: The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming All Lives and Protecting the Planet, United Nations General Assembly, New York, 4 December 2014, A/69/700, https://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/reports/SG_Synthesis_Report_Road_to_Dignity_by_2030.pdf .

[9] United Nations, The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, (New York: United Nations, 2015), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300 .

[11] Simon Mackenzie, Transnational Criminology: Trafficking and Global Criminal Markets , (Bristol University Press, 2021), 21.

[12] Sandeep Chawla and Thomas Pietschmann, “Chapter Nine: Drug Trafficking as a Transnational Crime”, in Handbook of Transnational Crime & Justice , (ed) Philip Reichel, (Sage Publications Inc, 2005), 160.

[13] President Kim Jong Yang, INTERPOL, 48th Pacific Island Chiefs of Police Conference, 25 September 2019, https://www.samoanews.com/opinion/opening-remarks-interpol-president-kim-jong-yang-48th-pacific-islands-chiefs-police .

[14] Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, National Wastewater Drug Monitoring Program , Report 10, 2020, https://www.acic.gov.au/publications/national-wastewater-drug-monitoring-program-reports .

[15] Ministry of Justice, Strengthening New Zealand’s Response to Organised Crime: An All-of-Government Response , August 2001, 12, https://www.justice.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/New-Zealands-response-to-Organised-Crime.pdf .

[16] Interview with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime official, Wellington, 12 August 2019.

[17] Research by the National Wastewater Drug Monitoring Program, Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, Report 11, 30 June 2020, https://www.acic.gov.au/publications/national-wastewater-drug-monitoring-program-reports/report-11-national-wastewater-drug-monitoring-program .

[18] Ibid, 9. For wastewater analysis on the rise in consumption of methamphetamine and cocaine in Australia, see Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, National Wastewater Drug Monitoring Program: Report 9, 10 March 2020, https://www.acic.gov.au/publications/national-wastewater-drug-monitoring-program-reports/national-wastewater-drug-monitoring-program-report-09-2020 ; for similar findings on methamphetamine usage in New Zealand, see New Zealand Police, National Wastewater Testing Programme Quarter 2, 2019, https://www.police.govt.nz/about-us/publication/national-wastewater-testing-programme-quarter-2-2019 ; and New Zealand, Ministry of Health, Annual Update of Key Results 2019/20: New Zealand Health Survey, 14 November 2019, https://www.health.govt.nz/publication/annual-update-key-results-2019-20-new-zealand-health-survey .

[19] Interview with Fijian law enforcement officer, Nadi, March 2020.

[20] Pacific Transnational Crime Network, Transnational Crime Assessment 2017–2018 , 3.

[21] Ibid, 9

[22] “Milne Bay Drug Bust, 7 Jailed”, PNG Report , 6 January 2019, https://www.pngreport.com/community/news/1353711/milne-bay-drug-bust-7-jailed .

[23] Australian Federal Police, “Organised Crime Syndicate Charged and More than 500kg of Cocaine Seized in PNG”, 1 August 2020, https://www.afp.gov.au/news-media/media-releases/organised-crime-syndicate-charged-and-more-500kg-cocaine-seized-png .

[24] Pacific Transnational Crime Network, Transnational Crime Assessment 2017-2018.

[26] Interview with Pacific Islands security sector official, Suva, Fiji, 11 September 2019.

[27] Interview with New Zealand Police officer, Wellington, 20 November 2018. See also “Six in Court over Record Fiji Drug Haul”, New Zealand Herald , 11 June 2004, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=3572070 .

[28] Sue Windybank, “The Illegal Pacific Part 1: Organised Crime”, Policy , Winter 2008, Vol. 24, No.1, 32–38.

[29] “Fijian Drug Taskforce Gets US Help”, Radio New Zealand Pacific, 19 July 2019, https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/394745/fijian-drug-taskforce-gets-us-help .

[30] “A Look inside One of Tonga’s Five Major Drug Syndicates, as P Ravages the Kingdom”, TVNZ, 10 December 2018, https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/world/1-news-exclusive-look-inside-one-tonga-s-five-major-drug-syndicates-p-ravages-kingdom .

[31] “Ghost Boat Carrying 1,400 Pounds of Cocaine Washes up on Remote Pacific Island”, CNN, 17 December 2020, https://kion546.com/news/national-world/2020/12/17/ghost-boat-carrying-1400-pounds-of-cocaine-washes-up-on-remote-pacific-island/ .

[32] Ferdie De La Torre, “DEA: Sablan Admits to Cooking ‘Ice’”, Saipan Tribune , 19 March 2018, https://www.saipantribune.com/index.php/dea-sablan-admits-cooking-ice/ .

[33] “Possible Meth or Ice Labs Operating in PNG”, Post Courier , 6 August 2020, https://postcourier.com.pg/possible-meth-or-ice-labs-operating-in-png/ .

[34] Legislative Assembly of Tonga, Illicit Drugs Control (Amendment) Act 2020, https://ago.gov.to/cms/images/LEGISLATION/AMENDING/2020/2020-0123/IllicitDrugsControlAmendmentAct2020.pdf .

[35] “Tonga Pushes through Tough New Drug Laws”, Radio New Zealand, 27 October 2020, https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/429259/tonga-pushes-through-tough-new-drug-laws .

[36] Pacific Transnational Crime Network, Transnational Crime Assessment 2017–2018 , 6.

[37] Interview with Tongan law enforcement official, Nuku’alofa, 26 February 2019.

[38] Statistics on offences for the period 2016–2019 provided by the Attorney General’s Office, Tonga, 25 February 2019.

[39] Interview with Tongan Attorney General’s Office official, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 25 February 2019.

[41] Barbara Dreaver, “Tonga's Children Targeted by Meth Dealers Looking to Gain 'A Client for Life’”, 1NEWS, 10 December 2018, https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/world/1-news-special-report-tongas-children-targeted-meth-dealers-looking-gain-client-life .

[42] Barbara Dreaver, “Tonga Steps up War on Meth Trade with Multiple Arrests, over 30kg of Drug Seized”, 1NEWS, 22 July 2019, https://www.1news.co.nz/2019/07/22/tonga-steps-up-war-on-meth-trade-with-multiple-arrests-over-30kg-of-drug-seized/ .

[43] Takashi Riku, Ryuichi Shibasaki, and Hironori Kato, “Pacific Islands: Small and Dispersed ‘Sea-locked’ Islands”, in Ryuichi Shibasaki, Hironori Kato, and Cesar Ducruet (eds), Global Logistics Network Modelling and Policy: Quantification and Analysis for International Freight , (Elsevier: 2020), 276.

[45] “Fiji’s High Tide”, SBS Dateline, 2020, Episode 3, 10 March 2020, https://www.sbs.com.au/ondemand/video/1702315075823 .

[46] Anna Leask, “Kiwi at Centre of Huge Sydney Drug Bust: Hundreds of Kilos of Meth Intercepted on Yacht”, New Zealand Herald , 19 April 2020, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12325875 .

[47] Kate Lyons, “Bust in Budi: The Day a Fisherman Hauled in $50m Worth of Cocaine”, The Guardian , 25 June 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/24/bust-in-budi-budi-the-day-a-fisherman-hauled-in-50m-worth-of-cocaine .

[48] Pacific Transnational Crime Network, Transnational Crime Assessment 2017–2018 , 16.

[49] Ibid, 15.

[50] Interview with regional security sector official, 2019.

[51] Pacific Transnational Crime Network, Transnational Crime Assessment 2017–2018 , 16.

[52] Stephen Drill and David Hurley, “Bikie Drug Lords’ Deadly Network Expands Overseas”, Herald Sun , 16 November 2014, https://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/law-order/bikie-drug-lords-deadly-network-expands-overseas/news-story/3e0b37a19d489fc85e6e3fb03c9133b2 .

[53] Pacific Transnational Crime Network, Transnational Crime Assessment 2017–2018 , 16.

[54] Katrina Tanirau, “Cook Islands Stops NZ Leader because of Gang Connections”, New Zealand Herald , 8 December, 2019, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/cook-islands-stops-nz-leader-because-of-gang-connections/UB4B757KFHRFQDAA7D5S2PMEJE/ .

[55] Pacific Transnational Crime Network, Transnational Crime Assessment 2017–2018.

[56] Government of Samoa, Samoa National Security Policy: Building a Secure and Resilient Nation (2018), Ministry of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Apia, 21, https://pacificsecurity.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2018-Samoa-National-Security-Policy-2018.pdf .

[57] ABC News ‘Mexican drug cartel infiltrates Australia’, 15 September 2019. Available at https://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-09-15/mexican-drug-cartel-infiltrates-australia/2260782 .

[58] R Evan Ellis, “Chinese Organized Crime in Latin America”, Prism , Volume 4. No. 1, 2012, https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_4-1/prism64-77_ellis.pdf .

[59] Pacific Transnational Crime Network, Transnational Crime Assessment 2017–2018, 17.

[60] Natalia Pereira, “Pacific Island Nations, Criminal Deportees, and Reintegration Challenges”, Migration Policy Institute, 7 November 2014, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/pacific-island-nations-criminal-deportees-and-reintegration-challenges .

[61] Australian Department of Home Affairs, Key Visa Cancellation Statistics, https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/research-and-statistics/statistics/visa-statistics/visa-cancellation .

[62] American Samoa, Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

[63] New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Response to OIA request, (Wellington. New Zealand, 2018), 15 August 2018, https://fyi.org.nz/request/8355/response/27359/attach/4/DOIA%201819%200100%20FINAL%20Response%20Letter.pdf .

[64] US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2013 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (Washington, DC: DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, 2014), www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2013-enforcement-actions .

[65] US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2018 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (Washington, DC: DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2018/yearbook_immigration_statistics_2018.pdf .

[66] Pacific Transnational Crime Network, Transnational Crime Assessment 2017–2018 , 17.

[67] Interviews, Apia, Samoa, 22 August 2019; Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 27 February 2019.

[68] “Missing Man Believed to be Australian Deportee”, Matangi Tonga Online , 28 December 2016, https://matangitonga.to/2016/12/28/missing-man-bellieved-be-australian-deportee .

[69] Interview with Tongan deportee, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 27 February 2019.

[70] Leanne Weber and Rebecca Powell, “Ripples across the Pacific: Cycles of Risk and Exclusion Following Criminal Deportation to Samoa”, in Shahram Khosravi (ed), After Deportation: Ethnographic Perspectives , (Global Ethics Series, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

[71] For example, from the United States alone, street gangs such as the Tongan Crip Gang (TCG), the Sons of Samoa (SOS), Tongan Style Gangsters (TSG), Salt Lake Posse (Tongans and Samoans), Park Village Crip (PVC), Samoan Pride Gangsters (SPG), the Baby Regulators, and Park Village Compton Crips have all had members deported back to the Pacific.

[72] Pacific Transnational Crime Network, Transnational Crime Assessment 2017–2018 , 17 ; Interview with Tongan police officer, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 27 February 2019.

[73] Tim Fadgen, Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand’s Deportation Policy and Practice in Regional Context, Australian Outlook, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 20 April 2021, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/australia-and-aotearoa-new-zealands-deportation-policy-and-practice-in-regional-context/ ; Henrietta McNeill, “Oceania’s ‘Crimmigration Creep’: Are Deportation and Reintegration Norms being Diffused?”, Journal of Criminology , Vol. 54, No. 3, 305–322.

[74] Natalie Pereira, Return[ed] to Paradise. The Deportation Experience in Samoa and Tonga, Policy Papers 21, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation.

[75] Pacific Transnational Crime Network, Transnational Crime Assessment 2017–2018 , 17.

[76] Interview with Pacific Islands official, Suva, 2019.

[77] Interview with Tongan civil society member, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 27 February 2019.

[78] “Immigration New Zealand Loses Track of Someone Due to be Deported to Pacific”, 1NEWS, 30 July 2021 https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/immigration-new-zealand-loses-track-someone-due-deported-pacific .

[79] Jose Sousa-Santos, “Profiteering from the Pandemic: COVID-19, Crime and Vulnerability in the Pacific”, Asia & the Pacific Policy Society, Policy Forum, 30 July 2020, https://www.policyforum.net/profiteering-from-the-pandemic/ .

[80] Danielle Watson and Sinclair Dinnen, “History, Adaptation and Adoption Problematised”, in Sara N Amin, Danielle Watson, and Christian Girard (eds), Mapping Security in the Pacific: A Focus on Context, Gender and Organisational Culture , (Routledge: New York, 2020).

[81] “Tongan Police Arrest Customs Official after Drug Bust”, Radio New Zealand International Pacific, 27 April 2019, https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/387885/tongan-police-arrest-customs-official-after-drug-bust .

[82] Interview with Tongan customs officer, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 28 February 2019.

[85] Barbara Dreaver, “Tonga Steps up War on Meth Trade with Multiple Arrests, over 30kg of Drug Seized, 1NEWS, 22 July 2019, https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/world/tonga-steps-up-war-meth-trade-multiple-arrests-over-30kg-drug-seized .

[86] “Manning to Rid Constabulary of ‘Criminals in Uniform’”, Post Courier , 10 September 2020, https://postcourier.com.pg/manning-to-rid-constabulary-of-criminals-in-uniform/ .

[87] “Fiji’s High Tide”, SBS Dateline, 2020, Episode 3, 10 March 2020, https://www.sbs.com.au/ondemand/video/1702315075823 .

[88] Interview with senior Tongan health official, Ministry of Health, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 27 February 2019.

[89] Interviews with law enforcement officials in Suva and Nadi, Fiji, Port Moresby Papua New Guinea, and Nuku’alofa, Tonga.

[90] Carolyn Nordstrom, Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-first Century , (University of California Press: 2004).

[91] Interview with Tongan church leader, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 28 February 2019.

[92] Interview with Tongan community leader, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 28 February 2019.

[93] Nanai Laveitiga Tuiletufuga, “Police Urged to Remain Vigilant in Anti-drug Crusade”, Inini Samoa , 25 September 2015, [no longer available online], http://www.ininisamoa.com/2015/09/25/police-urged-to-remain-vigilant-in-anti-drug-crusade/ .

[94] Interview with Ned Cook, Salvation Army, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 28 February 2019.

[95] Interview with senior Tongan health official, Ministry of Health, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 27 February 2019 .

[96] Pacific Transnational Crime Network, Transnational Crime Assessment 2017–2018 , 7.

[97] Email communication with Ned Cook, Salvation Army, 28 April 2019.

[98] Interview with health advocate, Suva, Fiji, 2019.

[99] Barbara Dreaver, “Tonga's Children Targeted by Meth Dealers”.

[100] Email communication with Ned Cook, Salvation Army, 28 April 2019. In 2018, 92 per cent of clients were male and eight per cent female. The youngest client was 13 years and the oldest 63.

[101] Interview with health advocate, Apia, Samoa, 20 August 2019.

[102] Women and Children Crisis Centre Director Ofa Guttenbeil-Likikiliki talking on Radio New Zealand International Pacific, Koroi Hawkins, “Drug-related Domestic Violence on the Rise in Tonga”, Radio New Zealand, 29 January 2020, https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/408403/drug-related-domestic-violence-on-the-rise-in-tonga .

[103] Interview with health advocate, Suva, 10 September 2019.

[104] Interview with Ned Cook, Salvation Army, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 28 February 2019.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Danielle Watson, Jose Sousa-Santos, and Loene M Howes, “Transnational and Organised Crime in Pacific Island Countries and Territories: Police Capacity to Respond to the Emerging Security Threat”, in Pamela Thomas and Meg Keen (eds), Perspectives on Pacific Security: Future Currents , Development Bulletin 82, Australian National University, February 2021, 151–155.

[107] Waisea Nasokia, “Qiliho: Pacific to Combine Resources to Fight Drug Cartels”, Fiji Sun , 19 September 2018, https://fijisun.com.fj/2018/09/19/qiliho-pacific-to-combine-resources-to-fight-drug-cartels/ .

[108] The Honiara Declaration (1992) on Law Enforcement Cooperation; the Aitutaki Declaration (1997) on Regional Security Cooperation; and the Nasonini Declaration (2002) on Regional Security.

[109] Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Boe Declaration Action Plan , Suva, 2019, https://www.forumsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/BOE-document-Action-Plan.pdf .

[110] Ibid, 13–15.

[111] Joanne Wallis et al, Mapping Security Cooperation in the Pacific Islands , Research Report, (Canberra: Australian National University, 2021), http://dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2021-06/mapping_security_cooperation_in_pacific_islands_dpa_research_report_2021_joanne_wallis_henrietta_mcneill_james_batley_anna_powles_updated.pdf .

[112] Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police, Declaration of Partnership, 2018, Our Blue Pacific: Safer Together , https://picp.co.nz/2018/09/07/picp-sign-declaration-of-partnership/ .

[113] Ibid.

[114] Pacific Transnational Crime Network, Transnational Crime Assessment 2017–2018.

[115] Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police, Pacific Methamphetamine Action Plan , 2018.

[116] Interview with Tongan official, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 29 February 2019.

[117] “Fijian Drug Taskforce Gets US Help”, 19 July 2019, Radio New Zealand, https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/394745/fijian-drug-taskforce-gets-us-help ; and “US Embassy in Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu, “US Sponsoring Methamphetamine Drug Enforcement Training”, 10 September 2018, https://fj.usembassy.gov/slide/u-s-sponsoring-methamphetamine-drug-enforcement-training/ .

[118] “US Wants Cutters in Territories to Counter Chinese Activity”, Radio New Zealand, 27 October 2020, https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/429235/us-wants-cutters-in-territories-to-counter-chinese-activity .

[119] A Kumar, China’s Alternate Indo–Pacific Policy , (Delhi: Prashant Publishing House, 2018).

[120] “Fiji Police Turn to China for Drones and Narcotics Training”, Radio New Zealand, 1 May 2018, https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/356337/fiji-police-turn-to-china-for-drones-and-narcotics-training .

[121] Interviews with officials, Suva and Apia.

[122] Mackenzie, Transnational Criminology , 21.

[123] Pacific Transnational Crime Network, Transnational Crime Assessment 2017–2018.

[124] Interviews with law enforcement officers, Port Moresby, Apia, and Nuku’alofa.

[125] Ibid.

[126] Interview with Papua New Guinean customs officer, Port Moresby, 23 September 2019.

[127] Interviews with law enforcement officers, Port Moresby, Apia, and Nuku’alofa.

[128] Interview with Tongan official, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 29 February 2019

[129] Pacific Transnational Crime Network, Transnational Crime Assessment 2017–2018.

[130] Interview with Brigadier General Lord Fielakepa, Chief of Defence Staff, His Majesty’s Armed Forces, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 28 February 2019

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Interdicting International Drug Trafficking: a Network Approach for Coordinated and Targeted Interventions

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• Published: 08 February 2021
• Volume 28 , pages 545–572, ( 2022 )

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• Luca Giommoni   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-3127-654X 1 ,
• Giulia Berlusconi   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-4654-1059 2 &
• Alberto Aziani   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-4745-7337 3  

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There is a relative dearth of literature on both the effects of cross-border interdictions and the impact of different types of interventions on international drug trafficking. This study identifies the main trafficking routes for cocaine and heroin, along with comparing the disruptive effects induced by targeted and non-coordinated interventions. It adopts a social network approach to identify the routes along which cocaine and heroin are trafficked, and then simulates the impact of different interdiction strategies on these two trafficking networks. The findings indicate that targeting countries based on their respective positions in the networks, as opposed to on the basis of the quantity of drugs exchanged, is more likely to disrupt drug flows. More specifically, concentrating law enforcement resources on countries with several incoming or outgoing trafficking connections, or those countries that mediate between producer, transit and consumer countries, would appear to be particularly effective in this regard. Interventions focused on specific trafficking routes are also likely to be effective if these routes have high edge betweenness centrality scores. This study contributes to extant understanding on the vulnerability of cocaine and heroin international trafficking networks, and, moreover, demonstrates that empirically-driven strategies are potentially more effective at interdicting international trafficking than non-strategic and non-coordinated interventions.

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Introduction

Drug law enforcement is the primary method for controlling illicit drugs across the globe (Collins 2014 ; Mejía and Restrepo 2016 ). Indeed, even countries with a notably lenient approach towards illicit drugs, such as the Netherlands, spend much more on enforcement than they do on prevention, treatment and harm reduction combined (Rigter 2006 ). In 2018, the US government allocated five billion USD to interdiction efforts—a 10% increase compared to 2017—and one billion USD in an attempt to disrupt drug flows into the country (Executive Office of the President of the United States 2017 ). Reducing the supply of illicit drugs is also a key priority of the European Union (EU). The EU Drugs Strategy 2013–20 and Action Plan (2013–16) aim to ‘contribute a measurable reduction of the availability of illicit drugs, through the disruption of illicit drug trafficking, the dismantling of organised crime groups […], efficient use of the criminal justice system, effective intelligence-led law enforcement and increased intelligence sharing’ (Council of the European Union 2012 , 15).

Despite the popularity and the significant investment in drug law enforcement, several studies have questioned the outcomes of these interventions (e.g. Toth and Mitchell 2018 ), while others argue that a key reason for the lack of effectiveness of drug law enforcement is the dearth of research in this area (Caulkins 2017 ; Reuter 2017 ). This study builds on the scarce literature on international drug interdiction by simulating the potential impact of different strategies on international drug trafficking. More specifically, it takes advantage of publicly available data on cocaine and heroin flows to assess the disruptive effects produced by targeted interventions compared to non-coordinated ones.

The article is structured as follows. The next section discusses extant literature on both the efficiency and effectiveness of international drug interdictions, before delineating the aim of the current study. The proceeding sections present the methodology and the results of the analysis, respectively. The final section considers the implications of this study for law enforcement and policy. Technical details about the construction of the network are provided in the appendices.

Drug Law Enforcement

As Reuter notes, ‘[drug law enforcement] literature is slight in volume and not yet very insightful’ (2017, 160). More specifically, interdiction—including interventions aimed at dismantling transnational drug trafficking—is an area in which empirical research is particularly scarce (Reuter 2014 ). Indeed, there are only a handful of studies that seek to inform counter-drug interdiction policy (Crane, Rivolo, and Comfort 1997 ; Magliocca et al. 2019 ; Reuter et al. 1988 ; Toth and Mitchell 2018 ). Even then, these studies are, firstly, primarily focused on the US context and cocaine, and secondly, invariably lack consistent evidence (Crane, Rivolo, and Comfort 1997 ; Reuter et al. 1988 ). Moreover, with a few exceptions (e.g. Magliocca et al. 2019 ; Toth and Mitchell 2018 ), most of these studies are dated.

Reuter et al. ( 1988 ) provided one of the first attempts to empirically investigate the impact of interdiction events. They simulated the impact of increased military resources on disrupting international drug trafficking flows, demonstrating that increasing counter-drug interdiction efforts was unlikely to have an impact on either the availability of cocaine or its consumption in the US. Indeed, the use of military assets has been found to have more of an impact on the levels of importation of cannabis from other countries (with the exception of Mexico) (Caulkins, Crawford, and Reuter 1993 ).

Crane et al.’s ( 1997 ) study is perhaps one of the most cited and debated in this area. The authors examined data on cocaine prices and purity, concluding that interdiction efforts external to the US were a cost-effective strategy for increasing the price of cocaine, which, in turn, reduced cocaine usage. However, their study has been heavily criticised. For instance, a review by Manski et al. ( 2001 ) raised several concerns regarding the causal relationship between interdiction events and increases in the cocaine price, highlighting flaws in the method and data that were employed, and concluding that the study ‘does not yield useful empirical findings on the cost-effectiveness of interdiction policies to reduce cocaine consumption’ (Manski, Pepper, and Petrie 2001 , 43).

Two more recent contributions focused on the US and cocaine, and suggested that the impact of counter-drug interdictions was likely to only be temporary, if not wholly counterproductive. Toth and Mitchell ( 2018 ) conducted interviews with high-level informants from the US Drug Enforcement Administration. They showed that interdiction events produce only temporary effects within international drug trafficking, and that traffickers adapt to drug law enforcement by displacing their activities tactically, geographically or temporarily. Magliocca et al. ( 2019 ) utilised a geographical agent-based model to predict traffickers’ adaptation to interdiction initiatives. They found that traffickers adapt to interdictions by displacing to new areas, which, in turn, makes international drug trafficking more widespread and resilient in the aftermath of law enforcement interventions.

A growing area of research examines at micro-level how drug trafficking organisations respond to disruption (e.g. Morselli and Petit 2007 ; Bright et al. 2017 ; Wood 2017 ). Based on the analysis of criminal networks’ structure and features, most studies in this line of research have focused on evaluating the immediate structural effects of interdiction strategies targeting key actors along the drug supply chain (e.g. Morselli and Petit 2007 ; Malm and Bichler 2011 ; Duxbury and Haynie 2018 ). By combining computational modelling and social network analysis, a few authors (Duxbury and Haynie 2019 ; Duijn, Kashirin, and Sloot 2014 ) have provided a further insight into how criminal groups can recover and adapt to network disruptions. For instance, Duijn et al. ( 2014 ) discovered that criminal networks may even become more resilient after targeted attacks. Although these studies offer valuable insights for law enforcement authorities, they suffer from two main limitations for counter-drug interdiction policies: (1) with the sole exception of Morselli and Petit ( 2007 ), they focus on domestic rather than international drug trafficking organisations; (2) while pointing out the effect of an intervention on a single group, they do not inform us on the overall impact of the intervention on trafficking flows.

Both Reuter ( 2014 , 2017 ) and Caulkins ( 2017 ) identified several reasons for the lack of a thriving drug law enforcement research agenda. First, there is a lack of funding in this specific area of drug policy. This is because, while drug law enforcement absorbs most of the spending on drug control, prevention and treatment receive the lion’s share of drug research funding (Caulkins 2017 ; Reuter 2017 ). This contributes to the poor quality of data and estimates on both interdiction intensity and drug trafficking routes, which makes it even more challenging to produce sound policy analysis (Reuter 2014 ).

Second, drug law enforcement is a broad term which is used to designate a range of interventions that lie on a continuum from eradication in source countries to arresting drug users (Babor et al. 2010 ; Collins 2014 ), and whose assessment should therefore consider different outcomes, locations, and research designs. For example, a successful intervention for targeting cocaine trafficking may not be successful for cannabis, while what works for coastal countries, such as Australia, might not work for land-locked countries, such as Austria. To further complicate matters, drug law enforcement can also have different goals. While reducing drug use is often the primary objective, law enforcement agencies may also seek to reduce drug-related violence or weaken criminal organisations’ territorial control (Reuter 2017 ).

Caulkins ( 2017 ) pinpoints academics’ antagonism towards drug law enforcement as a further reason for the limited research on the topic. Given that they are often ideologically opposed to drug law enforcement agencies, researchers thus aim to discredit their work by drawing attention to their poor performance and various side-effects. Perhaps it is not a surprise, then, that enforcement agencies and governments are not inclined to fund academic research on drug law enforcement.

The scarcity of research in this area goes some way to explain why both so little has changed over the years in terms of how Western drug enforcement agencies respond to international drug trafficking, and why counter-drug interdictions have proven to be so ineffective (Balbirnie et al. 2016 ; Caulkins and Reuter 2016 ; Collins 2014 ). A recent evaluative study on the implementation and impact of the EU Drugs Strategy and related Action Plan for the period 2013–2016 found that, although the latter has been implemented and considerable progress has undoubtedly been made, there remains no evidence that the current supply-side strategies have reduced the availability of illicit drugs in the EU (Balbirnie et al. 2016 ). In the US context, Marshall ( 1988 ) stressed the need for empirically-driven drug law enforcement strategies more than 30 years ago, warning that ‘we are flying blind in the war on drugs’ (Marshall 1988 , 1605), and that greater resources should be invested in drug policy analysis and strategy. Similarly, the European Council emphasised the need for more empirical work in this important policy area, while the EU Drugs Strategy 2013–20 has called for more research-driven action, arguing that drug law enforcement, among other things, should be evidence-based and scientifically sound. Despite this, there remains a dearth of research on this important security, policy, and strategic issue.

The Current Study

This study contributes to extant drug law enforcement literature by identifying which interdiction strategies are likely to impact on the international trafficking of cocaine and heroin. Effective drug interdiction requires a high-level of coordination and information sharing between the various law enforcement agencies involved in such interventions. This is especially relevant in the EU context, where ineffective interdiction strategies in a member state can have knock-on effects on other states due to the free movement of goods, persons, and capital across the region. In this respect, a shipment of cocaine entering Spain, or heroin crossing the Greek border, can have implications for the entire EU, while, conversely, effective interdictions in key countries can have impacts that extend to all member states.

Nonetheless, simply increasing the available resources for, and the intensity of, border controls does not in itself ensure higher interdiction rates (Collins 2014 ; Kleiman 2011 ). Moreover, drug law enforcement agencies should also avoid evenly allocating resources across potential targets, which has proven to have limited effects in multiple fields. Instead, they should focus their attention on countermeasures whose efficacy and efficiency has been proven by solid evidence (Felbab-Brown 2014 ; Kleiman 1999 ). The current study shows that targeted interventions, whose design is grounded in empirical data on drug trafficking between countries, have greater potential to disrupt trafficking flows than non-coordinated interventions.

This study focuses on the two primary targets of international counter-drug interventions: cocaine and heroin. These two drugs are produced in specific geographical areas—cocaine in the Andean region, and heroin in Southwest Asia—and typically need to cross multiple borders before reaching consumer markets (Caulkins 2015 ). This makes interdiction a key drug supply reduction strategy. Interdiction is of less relevance in the enforcement of the supply of other drugs such as cannabis and synthetic drugs, which are often produced domestically and, thus, are close to consumer markets (EMCDDA 2019 ; UNODC 2019a ).

This paper contributes to extant drug law enforcement literature in three ways: (1) it provides the first simulation of the impact of different interdiction strategies on cocaine and heroin trafficking outside of the US; (2) it provides a tool through which to inform drug law enforcement agencies’ decisions and enhance the efficiency of their interventions; (3) it identifies key countries that, given their respective positions in the international drug trafficking network, should mobilise and lead counter-drug interdictions.

Methodology

Cocaine and heroin trafficking networks.

This study conceives of cocaine and heroin trafficking as two weighted and directed networks, in which nodes represent countries and edges identify drug trafficking between any two countries. We used the methodology developed by the UNODC ( 2015b ) to estimate the presence and weight of the edges in the cocaine and heroin networks. This methodology is based on five main steps (Fig.  1 ): (1) identification of connections between any two countries; (2) estimation of the relative weight of each connection with respect to each country’s other incoming flows; (3) estimation of the quantity of drug consumed and seized in each country; (4) estimation of the total quantity of drug imported by each country; (5) estimation of the quantity of drug exchanged between any two countries. We produced year-by-year estimates of both cocaine and heroin trafficking flows (2011–2016) and calculated their mean over the entire period.

Steps taken to construct the cocaine and heroin trafficking networks

Step 1 identified connections—i.e. drug trafficking flows—between any two countries. To do this, we drew on the UNODC Individual Drug Seizure (IDS) dataset for the period 2011–2016. Seizure data often includes information on the quantity of drugs intercepted by law enforcement agencies, the country where the seizure occurred, and the origin, transit, and—occasionally—destination country. For the years 2011–2016, the IDS dataset contains 13,021 records of seizures of coca derivatives and 8052 records of seizures of opium and its derivatives providing indications of 19,155 and 11,652 connections in the cocaine and heroin trafficking networks, respectively. The resulting cocaine network comprised 147 countries and 817 edges while the heroin network included 137 countries and 437 edges.

Step 2 involved estimating the relative weight (%) of each connection with respect to each country’s other incoming flows. We used information on the quantity of drug intercepted along the identified connections to obtain these estimates. We adjusted each seizure case for its estimated purity, which was calculated as the average purity of the drug at wholesale level in the importing and exporting countries. Footnote 1 Finally, we estimated the relevance of each edge with respect to the total seizures performed by importing countries:

where S dt is the quantity of drug d seized in year t , j is the importing country, and k is the exporting country. Figure 1 shows an example where 60% of the drugs seized by country A were smuggled from country D, while 40% was coming from country C. See Appendix 2 for further details.

A first limitation of this approach is that out of scale seizures may distort the estimates as particularly large seizures may reflect either an increase in shipments or luckier law enforcement operations (MacCoun and Reuter 2001 ; Kilmer and Hoorens 2010 ; Aziani 2018 ). Footnote 2 This is rarely the case for land and air routes because loads tend to be limited in scale; it may however be more likely in the case of sea connections, whose shipments are possibly larger. We used three-year moving averages to mitigate possible distortions driven by bulky seizures or limited data reporting in any given year. Footnote 3

Step 3 comprised estimating the total quantity of drug consumed and seized in each country, i.e. the quantity of drug that a country needs to import in order to satisfy its internal demand. To estimate the quantity of drug consumed in each country, we used a combination of demand- and supply-based approaches. First, we estimated the total quantities of cocaine and heroin available for consumption, starting from the UNODC ( 2019b ) estimates of the global production of the two drugs. Second, we divided these quantities by the global estimates of the number of users of the two substances, thus obtaining estimates of the annual consumption per user. Third, for each country, we multiplied the estimated number of users by purity-adjusted estimated quantities of cocaine and heroin consumed by each user (Kilmer et al. 2013 , 2011 ; Legleye, Lakhdar, and Spilka 2008 ; Wilkins, Bhatta, and Casswell 2002 ). Finally, we adjusted seizures for purity to make them comparable across countries before adding them to the total quantity of cocaine and heroin consumed (Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter 2009 ). See Appendix 3 for further details.

Step 4 estimated the total quantity of drug imported by each country. For non-producing countries, this was equivalent to the sum of the quantity of drug consumed and seized (Step 3) and the quantity of drug imported and then exported to other countries. In the toy model proposed in Fig. 1 , country C imported one ton of drug to meet its internal demand and an additional 40% to export to country A, for a total of 1.4 tons.

Step 5 involved estimating the quantity of drug exchanged by any two countries. As Fig. 1 shows, country B required a total of two tons to satisfy its internal demand. Given that 100% of the seized drugs came from country D, we assumed that country B imported the two tons from country D. 60% of country A’s imports came from country D, while the remaining 40% came from country C, which led to an estimate of 0.6 tons having been exchanged between country D and country A, and 0.4 tons between country C and country A. See Appendix 4 for further details on the algebra behind step 5. Finally, we calculated the average of all annual estimates (2011–2016) to alleviate possible distortions due to exceptional events and episodic issues in data reporting.

Producing, Transit, and Consumer Countries

We classified the countries in the cocaine and heroin networks into three groups—‘producer’, ‘transit’, and ‘consumer’ countries—according to the role that they play in international drug trafficking. These labels identify the main role of countries, as only a few are exclusively consumers (i.e. they do not export drugs), while none are exclusively a transit country (i.e. they do not have any internal consumption). This classification will be used subsequently to identify the most effective interception strategies.

‘Producer’ countries were identified based on data on coca and poppy cultivation published by the UNODC ( 2019a ). The main cocaine producers were Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, while the main heroin producers included Afghanistan, Colombia, Laos, and Myanmar. We used information on drug imports and exports to classify countries as ‘transit’ or ‘consumer’. The natural logarithm of the ratio between total exports and consumption in each country was taken as a measure of countries’ main role in transnational drug trafficking. That is to say, the higher the ratio, the more pronounced the transiting role played by a country; the lower the ratio, the more a country is a destination market. We then classified the countries by partitioning them into two non-overlapping clusters through the use of a k-medians method, as any threshold to discriminate between ‘transit and ‘consumer’ countries would introduce an element of arbitrariness in the absence of further information. A list of the countries that make up the cocaine and heroin networks and their cluster is available on the authors’ Open Science Framework project profile, while Table 1 provides a summary of the clusters. Footnote 4

Network Statistics and Simulations

The first part of our analysis focused on providing descriptive statistics of the two networks. Footnote 5 We quantified network parameters by using social network analysis measures. More specifically, we used density (i.e. the proportion of edges in the network) and mean degree (i.e. the average number of edges for the countries in the network) to assess the degree of network cohesion (Wasserman and Faust 1994 ). We also used centralisation measures to assess whether the networks were characterised by the presence of a few trafficking hubs, or whether most of the countries had similar levels of involvement in trafficking activities (Giommoni, Aziani, and Berlusconi 2017 ).

We also calculated statistics for every country within the two networks, namely, degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and Gould and Fernandez’s ( 1989 ) brokerage measures. Degree centrality measures the number of countries that a country imports drugs from (in-degree) or exports drugs to (out-degree). Betweenness centrality measures the number of times that a country is located along the shortest path between any other two countries in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994 ).

Gould and Fernandez’s ( 1989 ) brokerage measures afford the identification of the different brokerage roles that countries perform in the cocaine and heroin networks, respectively. They are based on the idea that ‘flows within groups should in general be distinguished from flows between groups’ (1989, 91). While betweenness centrality is expedient for identifying the countries that are located along drug trafficking routes, Gould and Fernandez’s brokerage roles are valuable in terms of identifying the countries that liaise between ‘producer’, ‘transit’, and ‘consumer’ countries.

Gould and Fernandez ( 1989 ) identified five brokerage roles (Fig.  2 ):

Coordinators mediate between two countries in the same cluster, such as in the case of a ‘transit’ country which lies along a drug trafficking route between two countries that are also primarily involved in transit activities (Fig. 2A ).

Itinerants mediate between two countries from the same cluster, while belonging to a different cluster (Fig. 2B ). A ‘transit’ country connecting two ‘producer’ countries is an example of this type of mediating role.

Representatives and gatekeepers mediate between two countries from different clusters. However, representatives share the same cluster as the country exporting drugs, whereas gatekeepers share the same cluster as the country importing drugs (Fig. 2 C and D, respectively).

Liaisons mediate between two countries in two different clusters, while, simultaneously, belonging to a third cluster. This relates to the case of a ‘transit’ country that lies on a drug trafficking route between a ‘producer’ and ‘consumer’ country.

Examples of Gould and Fernandez brokerage roles in the cocaine and heroin networks

The inclusion of Gould and Fernandez’s brokerage roles allowed us to consider not only the position of countries within the entire network—as indicated by betweenness centrality—but also their capacity to connect different clusters. This is valuable information for developing targeted interdiction strategies, given the different clusters that countries belong to in the international trafficking of cocaine and heroin (i.e. producer, transit, and consumer). For instance, intervening in a transit country that plays a coordinating role may produce a very different impact on drug trafficking flows than intervening in the same country if it acts as a liaison between ‘producer’ and ‘consumer’ countries, even if the betweenness centrality score for that country is the same.

The second part of the analysis tested the impact of different interdiction strategies on the level of connectivity within the networks, and on countries’ closeness to all other countries in the network, in order to identify those strategies that were more likely to have a disruptive effect on cocaine and heroin flows between countries. Specifically, we measured network connectivity by producing the reachability matrix—i.e. the matrix that identifies whether any two nodes are connected by one or more directed paths—and calculating its density to obtain the fraction of all dyads (i.e. pairs of countries) that are connected through a directed path (Wasserman and Faust 1994 ). We measured countries’ closeness by calculating the average closeness centrality score for all countries in the network using Opsahl et al.’s ( 2010 ) approach, which can be used for fully connected networks and networks with disconnected components alike. We simulated two types of interdiction strategies.

The first strategy focused on countries. It was based on the removal of nodes (i.e. countries) from the networks, and tested the disruptive effect of concentrating interdiction resources within specific countries. Vertices were removed: (1) randomly; based on (2) unweighted and (3) weighted in-degree centrality scores; based on (4) unweighted and (5) weighted out-degree centrality scores; (6) based on betweenness centrality scores; and (7) based on the five brokerage roles identified by Gould and Fernandez ( 1989 ). With respect to both random removal and those cases in which more than one country had the same score, we simulated node removal 100 times, and reported the average connectivity and closeness scores for the 100 replications.

The second strategy focused on drug routes. It was based on the removal of edges from the networks, and tested the effect of concentrating interdiction resources on specific trafficking routes between countries. Edges were removed: (1) randomly; (2) based on their weight, i.e. the estimated quantity of drugs exchanged between any two countries; (3) based on their edge betweenness, i.e. the number of times an edge occurred on the shortest path between any two countries (Freeman 1979 ); (4) based on whether they connected two countries in the same cluster (e.g. two ‘transit’ countries); (5) and based on whether they connected two countries in different clusters (e.g. a ‘transit’ and a ‘consumer’ country). Similar to above, for the purposes of both random removal and those cases in which more than one edge had the same score or fell within the same category, we simulated edge removal 100 times, and reported the average connectivity and closeness scores for the 100 replications.

Supply-side reduction policies in producing countries have thus far been proven to have only a marginal impact on the availability of drugs, if not actually being wholly detrimental (Angrist and Kugler 2008 ; Collins 2014 ; Mejía and Restrepo 2016 ; Veillette 2005 ). In consideration of previous literature which has already addressed the limitations of supply-side interventions in producer countries, we excluded these countries from node removal, and instead solely focused on ‘transit’ and ‘consumer’ countries. It should also be acknowledged that there is a cost factor associated with removing nodes or edges that must be considered in the development of drug interdictions strategies. For instance, although enforcing the border between Mexico and the United States is likely to be more disruptive than interdiction strategies targeting the connection between Belize and Mexico, the former also involves higher costs. This paper focuses exclusively on the benefits that targeted interventions may produce but overlooks their costs. This kind of cost-benefit analysis is outside the scope of this paper but should be further investigated by future research.

Finally, it is worth emphasising here that the aim of our simulations is not to literally remove a country or a trafficking route, as sealing borders and impeding illicit drugs from penetrating a country has been found to not be practically achievable. Rather, our analysis aims to inform drug law enforcement by showing where interdiction efforts are more likely to have the most disruptive effects on the entire drug trafficking network. At a historical juncture characterised by reduced public expenditure, our analysis can both inform how scarce resources are allocated and increase the effectiveness of drug law enforcement.

Limitations

Our approach is not without its drawbacks. Specifically, seizures might not be fully representative of actual drug flows. First, it is reasonable to expect a degree of heterogeneity in the effectiveness of different agencies’ enforcement activities, as drug policies vary across countries, and air and sea routes are easier to enforce than land routes (Reuter, 2014 ). Therefore, seizure data are likely to over-estimate the relevance of drug trafficking within more aggressive countries, and along sea and air routes.

Second, while seizures account for a large share of inflows in several countries, they are limited and only account for a small fraction of total inflows in other countries—see Appendix 5 for the share of cocaine and heroin seized, consumed and exported by each country. Moreover, some countries do not report information on drug seizures to the UNODC every year, while others report only certain cases or avoid sharing any information at all (UNODC 2019b ). Certain trafficking connections thus emerged from limited evidence. Finally, as already discussed, particularly large seizures might introduce an upward bias in the estimate of the relative relevance of a specific connection between two countries.

The combined use of information from multiple countries in multiple years helps mitigate the consequences stemming from countries’ differences in counter-drug efforts and seizure reporting, changes in countries’ border control activities, and exceptionally large seizures that might skew our estimates (Berlusconi, Aziani, and Giommoni 2017 ). Moreover, while working on the 1998–2014 UNODC cocaine IDS, Aziani ( 2018 ) noted that importing countries provide the vast majority of information actually usable to build a network. Since the relevance of each connection is estimated with respect to the importing country—i.e. through a comparison of incoming flows—this fact further reduces the biases due to different law enforcement and reporting systems, as these differences are likely to be more severe between countries than within countries. Nonetheless, the extent to which seizures represent actual flows or enforcement capacity remains unknown (MacCoun and Reuter 2001 ; Kilmer and Hoorens 2010 ); therefore, the resulting networks are an approximation of the drug trafficking activities taking place worldwide rather than their faithful reconstruction.

There are further uncertainties pertaining to our assumptions about users and their consumption, along with drug purity. The heterogeneity of data available across countries forces us to rely, from time to time, on linear interpolations and eventually on regional values. The lack of estimates is particularly severe with respect to quantities of drug consumed by the average user, which has thus been estimated starting from drug production data (see Appendix 3 for details). A series of inconsistent reports by government agencies and international organizations, together with the impossibility to state the exact time lag between drug production and consumption, led several authors to be sceptical about supply-side estimations (Reuter and Greenfield 2001 ; Kilmer, Reuter, and Giommoni 2015 ). While we do agree with this position, in the context of the current study, the limits of this strategy primarily concern the lack of adjustments for national consumption values per user and eventually a bias in the relative weight of consumption and seizures. Uncertainties about the time lag between production and consumption are instead likely to affect only marginally our analyses because we combine estimates referring to multiple years, and because the analysis of law enforcement interventions is not performed on a dynamic network.

Despite these aforesaid limitations, the approach adopted in this study has been extensively applied in other studies because of its unique capacity to produce new information on the existence of trafficking activities from available data (Dugato and Aziani 2020 ). Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter ( 2009 ) were the first to conceive of international drug trafficking as a series of trading relations across countries. Boivin ( 2013 , 2014a , 2014b ) utilised information from seizures to study the network structure of international drug trafficking, while Chandra et al. ( 2011 , 2014 , 2015 ) used a similar approach to analyse drug trafficking flows across countries, albeit they constructed their networks with price-based data rather than seizure data. The UNODC ( 2015b ) developed a model to estimate heroin trafficking flows along the Balkan route, with the same methodology subsequently being used in academic articles on cocaine and heroin trafficking (Aziani, Berlusconi, and Giommoni 2019 ; Berlusconi, Aziani, and Giommoni 2017 ; Giommoni, Aziani, and Berlusconi 2017 ). Hence, this is an established method through which to estimate drug trafficking across countries.

The Structure of Cocaine and Heroin Trafficking Networks

The cocaine and heroin trafficking networks comprise 147 and 137 nodes, respectively (Table 2 ). While both networks show a low density, countries involved in heroin trafficking have, on average, fewer direct connections than those within the cocaine network, thus suggesting that heroin tends to be concentrated along fewer routes than cocaine, which is trafficked along several alternative routes. The production of heroin takes place in three distinct areas—Afghanistan, South-East Asia, and Latin America— and with respect to heroin trafficking, specific source and trafficking countries serve specific consumer countries (Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter 2009 ; Meylakhs 2017 ). Conversely, cocaine is produced exclusively in few Andean countries; from there cocaine reaches its final markets located in all continents. These differences between the two illicit markets might explain the lower number of direct connections in the heroin trafficking network in comparison to the cocaine network.

Centralisation measures indicate that incoming and outcoming edges are not equally distributed in the two networks. This is particularly true for the latter, suggesting that most countries export to only one or a few other countries, while a small number of exporters have several outgoing edges. This is reinforced by Fig.  3 , which shows some differences in the distribution of edges between the countries in the two networks, and with respect to the analysis of countries’ centrality scores. Centrality scores for the countries in the two networks are available on the authors’ Open Science Framework project profile. Footnote 6

The cocaine (left) and heroin (right) networks. The chord diagrams for cocaine and heroin flows were created using the ‘chorddiag’ package (Flor, 2019) for R (R Core Team, 2019 ). Interactive versions of the diagrams are available at http://rpubs.com/gberlu/cocaineflows and http://rpubs.com/gberlu/heroinflows , respectively

The countries with the highest centrality scores in the cocaine network are Spain (121), Ecuador (72), Venezuela (72), Italy (70) and Portugal (67). Almost all the connections for Ecuador and Venezuela are outgoing, thus indicating that these countries are mainly exporters, while Spain has a similar number of incoming and outgoing edges. Pakistan (67), Spain (43), Bulgaria (31), Italy (30) and Germany (26) are the countries with the highest centrality scores within the heroin network. While for Pakistan most of these connections are outgoing, Italy primarily has incoming edges, which suggests that the country imports heroin from several exporters. It is important to stress here that a high centrality score in and of itself does not necessarily indicate that a country exchanges large quantities of drugs, while, conversely, a low centrality score does not necessarily indicate a low-volume of imports or exports. Indeed, a single connection may be enough to either satisfy a country’s demand for drugs, or exchange large quantities of drugs. The analysis of betweenness centrality scores suggests that Spain, Portugal, Germany, Italy and France are the countries that most regularly are located along the shortest path between any other two countries in the cocaine network, thus indicating that these countries are important trafficking hubs. Spain, who has the highest betweenness centrality score, also plays a key role in the heroin trafficking network, while Pakistan, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria and Russia are also located along several trafficking routes. The high betweenness centrality score for Spain in the cocaine network has a partial explanation in the fact that Spain is a fundamental point of entry of shipments coming from Latin America. The increase in production of heroin in Latin America, which has been taking place in the last years, might give Spain a more central role in the heroin network, too.

Gould and Fernandez’s brokerage measures offer a more nuanced analysis of countries’ brokerage roles. While some countries have relatively high scores for all brokerage measures (e.g. Spain in the cocaine network), many others have high scores for only one or two measures, which suggests that their brokerage role is limited to facilitating exchanges between or within clusters. For instance, in the cocaine network, Italy is the main coordinator, insofar that it is a ‘consumer’ country that mediates between several pairs of ‘consumer’ countries. Portugal is second only to Spain in its liaison and representative role, which suggests that it either regularly liaises between producer and consumer countries, or mediates between another country that is primarily involved in trafficking activities and a country from a different cluster. The brokerage measures also highlight the role of Venezuela—mainly in a liaison role—and Nigeria—mainly in terms of a gatekeeper—in facilitating the exchange of cocaine between countries. Nigeria also ranks as the third highest coordinator within the heroin network, while the Netherlands, a well-known redistribution centre for heroin in Europe, is one of the leading countries in terms of playing an itinerant and representative role.

Simulation of Drug Interdiction Strategies

Figure 4 shows the impact of different interdiction strategies on the level of connectivity within the cocaine network. The initial network connectivity was 0.52, i.e. 52% of pairs of countries were connected through a directed path. The network connectivity decreased as we removed vertices randomly, as well as based on countries’ degree, betweenness, and brokerage scores. Of the eleven node removal strategies tested, random removal proved to be the least effective, while targeted interventions were found to have a differential impact depending on the number of nodes that were removed. After the removal of five nodes, several strategies—based on unweighted in-degree, betweenness, and coordinator roles—appeared to have a similar impact. When ten nodes were removed, targeting coordinators, i.e. those that mediate between two countries in the same cluster, appeared to be the most effective strategy, followed by targeting gatekeepers and nodes with the highest betweenness scores. Targeting countries that operate in a gatekeeper role became especially valuable after the removal of approximately twenty nodes, and remained one of the most disruptive strategies when half of the nodes were removed together with countries with the highest betweenness scores. Targeting countries based on their position in the network, rather than, say, based on the quantity of cocaine exchanged, would thus appear to be an effective interdiction strategy. Indeed, targeting countries that import or export large quantities of cocaine did not appear to be as disruptive as targeting countries that played a key role in the trafficking network, and whose removal had a considerable impact on the overall network structure.

Impact of different node removal strategies on the level of connectivity of the cocaine network

The simulation of interdiction strategies that targeted countries involved in heroin trafficking produced similar results (Fig.  5 ). The initial network connectivity was 0.56, i.e. 56% of pairs of countries were connected through a directed path. Random strategies were found to be the least efficient, while targeting countries with the highest betweenness scores proved to be particularly effective after the removal of five nodes and, allied with the targeting of coordinators and gatekeepers, ten nodes. As the number of nodes removed increased, targeting gatekeepers remained a valuable strategy, albeit interdiction strategies based on in-degree and out-degree centrality also became relevant.

Impact of different node removal strategies on the level of connectivity of the heroin network

Figure 6 reports the impact of edge removal on the connectivity of the cocaine and heroin networks. Overall, node removal had a greater impact on connectivity than edge removal, as the removal of a node was likely to disrupt several drug routes at once. The simulation demonstrated that the removal of up to ten edges had little impact on the connectivity of the network, while there was little difference between random and targeted interventions. However, the removal of edges with high betweenness scores slightly outperformed the other strategies, and became the most effective approach as the number of edges removed from the network increased. Targeting edges that connected countries in different clusters was among the most effective approaches through which to disrupt the heroin network, whereas removing edges that connected countries in the same cluster was a particularly effective strategy for reducing the supply of cocaine. An interesting feature of interdiction strategies that target specific drug routes rather than countries is that targeted interventions are not necessarily more efficient than random interventions, particularly when interdiction focuses on a limited number of edges. Indeed, random interventions can be more disruptive than interventions that target edges based on their weight, i.e. the estimated quantity of drugs exchanged between any two countries.

Impact of different edge removal strategies on the level of connectivity of the cocaine (left) and heroin (right) networks

Figures  7 , 8 , and 9 report the impact of node and edge removal on countries’ mean closeness in the cocaine and heroin networks. The results corroborate those already observed for network connectivity. Among the node removal strategies tested, random removal was always the least effective, while targeted interventions were found to have a differential impact according to the number of nodes that were removed. Here as well targeting countries based on the role they played in the network was more disruptive than removing countries based on the quantity of drug exported or imported.

Impact of different node removal strategies on the mean closeness of countries in the cocaine network

Impact of different node removal strategies on the mean closeness of countries in the heroin network

Impact of different edge removal strategies on the mean closeness of countries in the cocaine (left) and heroin (right) networks

The results of the edge removal show some similarities but also an important difference. Edge removal had a smaller impact on closeness than node removal, as already observed for connectivity. The removal of edges based on their betweenness scores had a greater impact than the other strategies, and was found to be the most effective approach. Perhaps more importantly, the results show that the removal of edges based on the quantity of drug exchanged (i.e. the edge weight) is not necessarily an effective strategy at increasing the distance between countries in the two networks, i.e. increasing the number of steps needed to move the drug along the transnational supply chain.

The density and mean degree of the two networks suggest that heroin tends to be concentrated along fewer routes than cocaine, although in both cases traffickers exploit only a limited number of selected routes, which is in accordance with the findings of previous studies (Boivin 2014b ; Chandra and Joba 2015 ; Giommoni, Aziani, and Berlusconi 2017 ). This draws attention to the non-random nature of drug trafficking routes. Rather, social, economic, and geographical drivers—e.g. geographical proximity, levels of corruption, migration flows, size of the market—all strongly influence the formation of drug trafficking flows (Aziani, Berlusconi, and Giommoni 2019 ; Giommoni, Aziani, and Berlusconi 2017 ; Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter 2009 ; Reuter 2014 ).

The results also confirm the notable role played by specific countries in international drug trafficking. For instance, the integral role played by Spain, Ecuador and Venezuela in cocaine trafficking should not come as a surprise considering their geographical and social proximity to producer countries in the Andes (Aziani, Berlusconi, and Giommoni 2019 ). Likewise, the study confirms the important role played by Pakistan and Bulgaria in the trafficking of heroin. Pakistan borders Afghanistan, which means that it is located at the very beginning of transnational supply chains of heroin. Bulgaria plays a crucial role in the Balkan route—the largest heroin trafficking route in the world—as it is one of the main entry points for Afghan opioids to Europe (UNODC 2015b ).

However, some of our findings on the structure of the two networks have hitherto not been consolidated in extant literature on transnational drug trafficking. For instance, Spain had one of the highest degree and betweenness centrality scores, which signals its role as both an importer and exporter of cocaine and heroin. While its role in heroin trafficking is perhaps unexpected, this pattern may indicate the increased relevance of the Southern route (EMCDDA 2015 , 2019 ; UNODC 2015a ). Through the Southern route, heroin shipments from Iran and Pakistan are trafficked through African countries on their way to entering Europe, especially via Spain. For many years, the Balkan route has been the principal route through which heroin makes its way to Europe (UNODC 2015b ). In recent years, instability within many African countries has presented new smuggling opportunities characterised by a lower risk of arrest for traffickers (Shaw and Tuesday 2019 ).

This study is the first to apply Gould and Fernandez’s ( 1989 ) brokerage measures to international drug trafficking. While brokerage and betweenness centrality measures are highly correlated, the former provides a more precise indication of the specific roles that countries play in connecting different clusters. More specifically, brokerage measures reveal the nodes that connect producer, transit and consumer countries, which, in turn, make it possible for drug shipments to move along the transnational supply chain. For instance, the Netherlands often perform a representative role, along with playing a crucial role in connecting trafficking countries with consumer countries.

These results offer suggestions for developing targeted interventions aimed towards disrupting cocaine and heroin international trafficking. The study has shown that concentrating interdiction resources within the ten countries identified in this research as being integral to the cocaine trafficking network may prove to be more effective than the non-coordinated enforcement of cocaine flows within fifty countries. Similar indications emerge from the simulations conducted in relation to the heroin trafficking network. Enforcement strategies that focused on as few as three countries, which were selected according to their betweenness centrality, produced better results than the non-coordinated allocation of resources across thirty countries. Similarly, strategies that target drug routes, rather than countries, also showed some differences with respect to strategic and non-strategic interventions. Targeted interventions that were either driven by edge betweenness or focusing on the connections between countries in either different or similar clusters were found to be systematically more effective than random interventions, when at least twenty edges were targeted. Hence, while coordinating countermeasures at an international level is anything but straightforward, the improvements in terms of efficiency alone could be hugely substantial.

Given that countries have multiple connections in trafficking networks, targeting a limited number of countries is likely to reduce network connectivity more quickly than concentrating interdiction efforts on specific connections between countries. In fact, our analysis appears to suggest that targeting nodes is, from a network perspective, altogether more efficient. However, in practice, targeting specific connections—especially along land and air routes—may simply be easier for law enforcement agencies.

The aim of our simulations is to provide a support tool for drug interdiction, rather than putting forward a one-size-fits-all solution. Counter-drug strategies should thus be adjusted according to the number of countries or drug routes that law enforcement agencies can and want to focus their attention on, as well as the type of drugs. If the amount of allocated resources is limited, then the results from our simulations suggest that law enforcement authorities should base their interventions on countries with high betweenness scores or on those that play a coordinator or gatekeeper role. Conversely, if drug law enforcement authorities have a greater available budget—or face more difficulties in effectively coordinating between each other—, then degree-based interventions are also effective for disrupting international drug trafficking.

The results of our analysis could also be used to identify the set of countries that would cause the maximum amount of disruption within the two networks. Although cocaine and heroin are produced in different geographical areas, and are often trafficked by distinct criminal groups via different routes, this study identifies the points at which cocaine and heroin networks overlap. For instance, Spain emerges as the country where the allocation of proper resources could cause the greatest amount of disruption to both cocaine and heroin trafficking. Similarly, if we were to focus on only a single connection, then targeting drug flows between Portugal and Spain would likely have a disruptive effect on both cocaine and heroin cross-border trafficking. Indeed, the connection between the two countries was in the top ten for edge betweenness within both networks.

Transnational drug trafficking operates as a complex ecosystem. What happens, or does not happen, in one country can influence the entire trafficking network. For instance, the extent of cocaine or heroin trafficking in Ireland may have more to do with interventions in other key trafficking countries than it does with enforcement of the Irish borders. This predicate especially applies to countries within regional communities (e.g. European Union), where internal borders are minimal in order to facilitate trade between member states. Hence, even if Irish drug law enforcement were to heavily invest in counter-drug interdiction efforts, this would have little impact if the trafficking of cocaine and heroin continued to flow easily via Spain and other key countries within the EU. Conversely, countries like Ireland may achieve better results vis-à-vis disrupting trafficking flows by joining or financing interdiction activities in countries that play a key role in the cocaine and heroin networks.

Finally, it is worthwhile to discuss the main limitation of our simulations, i.e. the fact that they do not consider the fact that traffickers adapt to interdiction activities. For instance, drug traffickers can respond to law enforcement interventions by shifting to alternative routes, a phenomenon which is known as the ‘balloon effect’, or by resorting to alternative modes of transportation and/or hiding techniques (Friesendorf 2005 ; Guerette 2009 ; Magliocca et al. 2019 ; Reuter 2014 ; Toth and Mitchell 2018 ). Future research should thus seek to include a dynamic component within their simulations, in order to account for how trafficking activities can be displaced as a consequence of law enforcement interventions. Research in this area has hitherto been particularly scarce, in part because this kind of studies requires greater information about both traffickers’ decision-making and the intensity of the interdiction.

Conclusions

The national and international drug control agenda is marked by a sharp misalliance, which pertains to the fact that the enforcement of illicit drugs receives the majority of the available funding, while the majority of drug control research focuses on treatment and interventions (Caulkins 2017 ). Moreover, research on drug treatment and prevention is far more voluminous and, generally, of a better scientific standard than research on drug enforcement (Caulkins 2017 ; Reuter 2017 ). These studies continuously develop new interventions aimed at determining what works best, for whom, and under which circumstances (Fischer et al. 2015 ; Stockings et al. 2016 ; Wu, Zhu, and Swartz 2016 ). In comparison, this kind of refined analysis is almost completely absent in the drug law enforcement literature (Reuter 2014 ).

This study provides a tool through which to help drug law enforcement agencies become more effective in their attempts to dismantle international drug trafficking. This study does not question the validity of supply-side policies per se. Rather, it provides empirical evidence about the vulnerability of cocaine and heroin international trafficking networks, in conjunction with identifying where drug law enforcement agencies interventions are most likely to cause the maximum amount of disruption. More importantly, the study demonstrates that empirically-driven strategies can be twice as effective as non-strategic and non-coordinated interventions, while, simultaneously, using half of the resources. Consequently, this research does not simply indicate strategic interventions, but can also help to reduce costs, and, in turn, improve the overall cost-effectiveness of interdiction interventions.

The corollary of this study, and of a more active drug law enforcement research agenda generally, is that it can free up funding while, simultaneously, reducing the burden of countering strategies for the involved populations. Simply put, drug law enforcement interventions can achieve more with less, if they are informed by empirical evidence. Hence, the additional funding that would be made available as a consequence of designing more cost-effective interventions could be reinvested in other under-resourced areas, such as drug enforcement research or treatment and prevention interventions. Research into drug law enforcement can thus be beneficial for the entire drug policy agenda.

Data Availability

The data that support the findings of this study are available on the UNODC website at https://dataunodc.un.org/ids .

Not accounting for purity levels might inflate the relevance of flows occurring between downstream countries, where drug might be more cut (Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter 2009 ). Since the UNODC ( 2019a ) does not provide data on purities for all countries in the two networks, regional data on purity was used whenever national data was not available, and macro-regional data was used in a few cases where regional data was also missing.

See Appendix 1 for further details on the distribution of cocaine and heroin seizure cases across countries. Summary statistics on seizures cases by importing country are available on the authors’ Open Science Framework project profile at https://osf.io/cbdqa/?view_only=ef82eec308b0403e99a753ace4cac690 .

In any given year, the estimate of the seizures along each route ( S ma , t ) is a function of the seizures performed along the route in the given year ( S t ) as well as the seizures performed in the previous ( S t  − 1 ) and following year ( S t  + 1 ). Seizures for the previous and following year enter in the calculus with a weight, which is half the weight of the year under consideration: \( {S}_{ma,t}=\frac{S_t+\left({S}_{t-1}/2\right)+\left({S}_{t+1}/2\right)}{2} \) .

https://osf.io/cbdqa/?view_only=ef82eec308b0403e99a753ace4cac690 .

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Acknowledgements

This article is dedicated to Professor Carlo Morselli. Carlo was unlike any other who worked in the field of criminal networks. This article would not exist without his prior work on networks and crime. The authors would like to thank Brenda Bastos Campos (University of Surrey) for her help with managing and cleaning the UNODC data on individual drug seizures. We also would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.

This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council under Grant ES/S008853/1.

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All authors contributed to the study conception and design. Material preparation, data collection, and analysis were performed by Luca Giommoni, Giulia Berlusconi, and Alberto Aziani. The first draft of the manuscript was written by Luca Giommoni and all authors commented on previous versions of the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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Appendix 1. Distribution of Cocaine (Top) and Heroin (Bottom) Seizure Cases by Importing Country (2011–2016)

Appendix 2. Identification of Drug Connections Among Countries

We can represent the trafficking network of drug d in year t by N d , t  = ( I d , t ,  F d , t ), such that { i d , t , 1 ,  i d , t , 2 , …,  i d , t , n } are the nodes, and F d , t  = {( j ,  k )} are the weighted edges. The structure of F d , t was estimated based on information retrieved from the UNODC IDS dataset, as done in previous studies (e.g. Berlusconi, Aziani, and Giommoni 2017 ; Boivin 2013 ; Giommoni, Aziani, and Berlusconi 2017 ).

First, opium poppy derivatives (29,559 seizures) were transformed to heroin-equivalent quantities according to conversion rates retrieved from the literature (Sanzharovskaya et al. 2013 ; UNODC 2019b ). Similarly, quantities of coca derivatives (237,000 seizures) were converted to cocaine (UNODC 2010 ).

Second, we matched importing ( i d , t , j ) and exporting ( i d , t , k ) countries exploiting information on countries of production, departure, and destination of the seized drug loads, whenever available. After several checks (e.g. that i d , t , j is not equal to i d , t , k ), we were left with 13,021 seizure cases that provided information on edges in the cocaine trafficking network and 8052 seizure cases with information on edges in the heroin network. As certain seizure cases provided information on multiple connections, records of seizures of coca derivatives helped us identify 19,155 connections, while the connections emerging from the records of seizures of opium were 11,652.

Appendix 3. Consumption and Purity Adjusted Seizures

The study combined a demand- and a supply-side approach to the estimate of the size of the national markets for illicit drugs ( M d , t , i ). The size of a national market was given by the sum of total consumption, \( {C}_{d,t,i}^{p\_ adj} \) —expressed in pure quantity of consumed drug—and purity-adjusted seizures, \( {S}_{d,t,i}^{p\_ adj} \) . Annual estimates were produced for the years ( t ) 2011–2016:

The consumption was given by the product of the prevalence of consumption in the 15–64 population ( pr d , t , i ) multiplied by the 15–64 population ( Pop t , i ), and by the estimated consumption per user at the global level (c d , t ):

The UNODC ( 2019a ) provides time-series data on the prevalence of use of cocaine and heroin. Missing years were imputed through linear interpolation and extrapolation; whenever data for a country were missing for the entire 2011–2016 period, regional values were used to impute missing values. Population data were retrieved from the UNDESA ( 2019 ). Having estimates on prevalence and population size, it was possible to obtain the number of consumers per country. Data on consumption of drug per user are currently unavailable for most of the countries of the world. Therefore, the estimate of the consumption per user was obtained by adopting a supply-side approach. In particular, the estimates of the global productions of opium poppy and coca leaves gathered from the UNODC ( 2019b ) were converted in equivalent masses of pure cocaine and heroin by adopting the conversion rates provided by the UNODC ( 2010 ). The total masses of available cocaine and heroin were then divided by the overall number of consumers, which was obtained by multiplying the prevalence of use by the population size in each country, and then summing the national estimates. This gave us an average consumption per user, which does not vary neither across countries nor by user type—i.e. light and heavy users. The estimate of the annual average consumption of cocaine per user ranges between 4.7 g of perfectly pure cocaine in 2013 and 7.8 pure grams in 2016. The annual consumption of heroin per user is between 3.6 pure grams in 2012 and 6.0 pure grams in 2014. Data on the global production of cocaine and heroin came from the UNODC ( 2019a ).

To obtain purity-adjusted seizures, the registered volume of seizures S d , i was multiplied by the typical purity pu d , i of drug at the wholesale level in the country:

Both data on total seizures and typical purity were retrieved from the UNODC ( 2019a ). Missing observations on the purity level were estimated through linear interpolation and extrapolation. When no data on purity were available, regional and macro-regional averages were used to impute missing data.

Appendix 4. Algebra Behind Import and Export Flows

Except for producing countries, in year t , each country i belonging to the global trafficking network of the drug d imports from K different countries a quantity of drug apt to satisfy its own internal demand—i.e. consumption ( C ) and seizures ( S ). The actual flow of drug entering the i country is larger because of drug loads ( E ) that are transiting through the country to reach other markets ( l ). All these flows are bilateral so that exports from a given country are mirrored by imports from all other countries, and vice versa. As discussed in Appendix 2, it is possible to estimate consumption ( \( \dot{C} \) ) and seizures ( \( \dot{S} \) ) separately. Therefore, by solving a system of equations describing the relationship between internal demand and international flows for all the countries that are part of the trafficking network, it is possible to estimate the size of incoming and outgoing flows of drug:

Appendix 5. Share of Imports of Cocaine (Top) and Heroin (Bottom) Which Are Seized, Consumed, and Exported by Importing Country (Average 2011-2016)

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Giommoni, L., Berlusconi, G. & Aziani, A. Interdicting International Drug Trafficking: a Network Approach for Coordinated and Targeted Interventions. Eur J Crim Policy Res 28 , 545–572 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-020-09473-0

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Drug trafficking essay

Drug trafficking is one of the most serious problems for most countries all over the world. Unfortunately, this type of business is rather profitable, if not to consider that it is constantly related to murders, kidnapping, prostitution and other crimes. Certainly drug trafficking contributes to better distribution of drugs, thus involving more and more people, making them addicted. Taking into consideration all the possible dangers, drugs are able to bring to any society, most countries are working constantly in order to prevent use and distribution of drugs which are not legal. The rage of responsibility varies in different countries, from fines and several years in prison to death punishment in China for example. Generally, “drug trafficking” means production, distribution and sale of illegal drugs. (Syal, 2009, p. 2). In this paper we are going to stop at some historical information, related to drugs and drug trafficking, the effects drug trafficking has upon people and societies, we will use some concrete examples of illegal drugs and finally discuss possible ways of limiting distribution of drugs or banning it on the basis of the Obama’s National Drug Control Strategy.

Historically, it is possible to talk about appearance of illegal drug trade around the beginning of the 19 th century. “China retaliated by enforcing the ban on imports of opium that led to the First Opium War (1839–1842) between Great Britain and Qing dynasty China” (Berridge, 1981, p. 5). The highest authorities in China struggled against free sales of opium, whereas United Kingdom pushed China to let the merchants from China bring opium without any bans. However the volumes of opium trade continued to grow, because smoking opium turned into a habit among usual people. No wonder that the number of opium addicts grew immensely in the 19 th century. The Second Opium War took place in 1856, the result of the two wars was that “the British Crown, via the treaties of Nanking and Tianjin , took large sums of money from the Chinese government through this illegal trade, which were referred to as “reparations” (Berridge, 1981, p. 10).

In the year 1868, the government of the UK took the decision to restrict sale of opium in the Pharmacy Act. In 1914 Harrison Act followed in the United States. Thus, it is clear, that even taking into consideration the fact, that opium sale brought good profits, sooner or later, governments had to restrict and take under control illegal drugs, in order not to worsen the situation with addicted people.

Further, it is necessary to study the effects of the illegal drug trade upon usual people, as well as societies in generally, in detail. This is evident, that those countries, where drugs transit and distribution was widely developed, had to face the problems with drug addicted individuals.

Most researches confirm the fact that illegal drug trade is closely related to crimes’ rate, namely such violent crimes, as murders. In this case we are unfortunately talking not only about developing, but about developed countries as well. For example, “In the late 1990s in the United States the Federal Bureau of Investigation estimated that 5% of murders were drug-related” (Berridge, 1981, p 3).

The UK government’s surveys also underlined, that because of high cost of the illegal drugs and strong addiction, people are likely to commit serious crimes, including robberies, burglaries, murders and so on. “The cost of crime committed to support illegal cocaine and heroin habits amounts to £16 billion a year in the UK” (Epstein, 1989, p. 13). The fact, that drugs were illegal, unfortunately could not restrict the actual sale and distribution, on the contrary this field of criminal activity was able to bring such high profits and the system was so well-built, that drugs became integrated into the American culture. “This high price is caused by a combination of factors that include the potential legal ramifications that exist for suppliers of illicit drugs and their high demand. (Limited supply can be caused by a range of factors) (Epstein, 1989, p.14).There appeared certain layers of society, where the high cost could not be an obstacle and drugs were used as a type of recreational activity. Irrespective of constant attempts to seize control over this problem by the authorities, it is still remaining actual for the USA as well as other countries all over the world. The 1940s brought prohibition of opiates, the 1960s – of marijuana and the 1970s – of heroin, however cocaine and other drugs continued to arrive to the U.S. through the Mexican border. “An estimated $10 billion of the Mexican drug cartel’s profits come from the United States, not only supplying the Mexican drug cartels with the profit necessary for survival, but also furthering Americans’ economic dependence on drugs.” (Epstein, 1989, p 16). The results were that first of all the number of drug-addicted people constantly grew and secondly, illegal drugs’ trade proved to be a business of very high profits and in fact a lot of businessmen invested exactly into this industry.

Demographic was also in a way under influence of illegal drugs. Starting from the 1960s a lot of immigrants arrived to America and the diversity of public was evident. As several decades pasted, more and more criminal records, related to murders and other criminal acts on the basis of drug addiction, were created. Certainly the situation was different in different cities, however generally it really caused a great concern. “An example of this could be seen in Miami, a city with a host of ethnic enclaves. [44] Between 1985 and 1995, the homicide rate in Miami was one of the highest in the nation and rated four times the national homicide average” (Epstein, 1989, p. 22). The decades between 1960s and 1980s also revealed the effects of drug trade upon the baby boomer generation. The demand for marijuana and other drugs was getting higher and higher during this period, resulting in its turn in increase of criminal cases, including suicide, murders, substance abuse. Thus, the insufficient control and restriction of illegal drugs had really serious impact upon individuals as well as societies in general.

Political impact, which illegal drug trade had, could not be underestimated as well. The above-mentioned generation of the baby boomers was used to confront laws on various issues, including illegal drugs. The government was taking specific steps in order to restrict drug trafficking and trade, but with poor results. Marijuana was imported from the Latin America, whereas cocaine was received from Mexico and Colombia. “Due to the influence of this development on the U.S. economy, the Reagan Administration began “certifying” countries for their attempts at controlling drug trafficking” (Syal, 2009, p. 10). During the 1980s America pushed more for restriction of drug transit. The result was that more drugs arrived from Mexico: in the beginning of the 1990s – these were around 50 % of cocaine and by the middle of the 1990s – the percentage increased up to 90 %. Some researches state that between the years 1996 and 2000 the total consumption of cocaine on the territory of the U.S. decreased by 11 %.

The Merida Initiative was a state program, which was initiated in 2008, with the major aim to stop drug trafficking from Mexico. The financial assistance from America, along with possibility to buy the necessary equipment was supposed to produce their positive effect. Unfortunately, the drug trade continued. Thus it is evident, that illegal drug trade has its impact upon internal political situation in any country as well as upon international relations in general.

Cannabis is one of the most popular drugs, the legalization of which till the moment remains a rather controversial issue. Most countries all over the world defined this drug as an illegal one. There are countries, as Canada for example, which made cannabis legal for recreational use, with restriction of its import and distribution. In the year 2014 Uruguay considered legalization of cultivation and sale of cannabis for adult individuals with recreational purposes. In the Netherlands possession and licensed sale of cannabis are not prohibited, however cultivation of the drug is against the law.

Heroin is another wide-spread illegal drug, initially cultivated in the Golden Triangle – Southeast Asia. In addition, opiate was transported from Afghanistan and Mexico. “According to the United States Drug Enforcement Administration , the price of heroin is typically valued 8 to 10 times that of cocaine on American streets, making it a high-profit substance for smugglers and dealers” (Syal, 2009, p. 10). The price of heroin, which is up to 10 times higher than that of cocaine, guarantees dealers and distributors good profits. High costs also contribute to easier transportation, as small doses are easier to hide. One the other hand, penalties for smuggling and heroin sale are rather serious in most countries, including life sentence or even death sentences.

Methamphetamine is also rather popular under such names as “ice”, “meth”. It is often produced at some rolling meth labs, which makes it rather difficult to detect. This drug is very dangerous due to its injectable form, which might be the source of such infections as HIV or hepatitis C. Usually it is inhaled through some kind of tube.

Temazepam, another example of wide-spread illegal drugs, is “a strong hypnotic benzodiazepine , is illicitly manufactured in clandestine laboratories to supply the increasingly high demand for the hypnotic drug internationally (Syal, 2009, p. 8). Eastern Europe is the place of concentration of such labs. In the United Kingdom temazepam belongs to legal drugs and is very often abused. In Sweden it was banned after numerous deaths caused by the drug.

Thus in this section we have briefly studied some examples of the widely –spread illegal drugs, countries of their origin and application, possible negative effects and risks of the most famous illegal drugs.

It is evident, that the problems of drug abuse, drug distribution and drug trafficking need complex solutions from the authorities. A lot of politic leaders and government representatives contributed their efforts into solving of the illegal drugs problems. President Obama is not an exception, in May 2010 he released the National Drug Control Strategy. “ The press release states that the report “establishes five-year goals for reducing drug use and its consequences through a balanced policy of prevention, treatment, enforcement, and international cooperation ( Syal, 2009, p. 13 ). This Strategy suggests five-year goals aiming at reduction of drug abuse, namely:

“ • Reduce the rate of youth drug use by 15 percent; • Decrease drug use among young adults by 10 percent; • Reduce the number of chronic drug users by 15 percent; • Reduce the incidence of drug-induced deaths by 15 percent; and • Reduce the prevalence of drugged driving by 10 percent” (Syal, 2009, p. 13).

The three main challenges, described in this strategy include prevention of drug use, of driving under drug impact and prescription drug abuse. A separate place in the strategy is devoted to the problem of recovery of the people, who already became addicted and need urgent and concrete help. Addiction is not the final sentence, there are many case, where the situation might be returned under control with the help of special community addiction centers, development of new medications and so on.

Overall, in this paper we have studied the notion of drug trafficking, its historical development and various approaches, applied in different countries towards this problem; we have pointed out some concrete spheres of illegal drug abuse influences, including political, social spheres; we have listed the most popular and wide-spread drugs, their major qualities, places of cultivation and ways of transportation and distribution. All this information is vitally important for understanding the necessity of better international along with internal control of illegal drugs and their trafficking, as well as possible means and strategies, which would positively contribute to restriction and control of drug trafficking for the sake of future healthy generations.

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Record seizures in interpol operation against drug trafficking.

LYON, France – More than 615 tonnes of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals worth USD 1.6 billion have been seized in 31 countries, in an operation coordinated by INTERPOL.

Operation Lionfish Hurricane, undertaken in April and May 2024, led to 206 arrests after targeting drug trafficking networks spanning South America, Africa and Europe.

The operation’s unprecedented seizure of 505 tonnes of precursor chemicals, used for manufacturing both drugs and explosives, highlights the significant growth of transnational organized crime groups, and their ability to make weapons.

Additionally, authorities confiscated more than 56 tonnes of cocaine and 52 tonnes of other drugs, including marijuana, ketamine, and tramadol.

‘Narco-sub’ seized in jungle

The operation's range of seizures underscores the intricate links between various forms of transnational organized crime:

-    In Guyana, authorities seized a semi-submersible vessel in the jungle, highlighting the use of homemade 'narco-subs' to transport up to 3 tonnes of cocaine via South American riverways and then across the Atlantic to Western Europe.

-    Brazilian authorities arrested 17 members of a drug mule ring traveling separately from Brazil to France, including an individual who had ingested 120 packages of cocaine.

-    30,000 commercial-grade detonators diverted from military or commercial mining use were confiscated across South America, as well as 280 firearms and grenades.

-    Colombian police seized 2.1 tonnes of hydrochloric acid and destroyed a jungle factory producing sulfuric acid. Both are used to produce cocaine and homemade explosives.

-    In Ghana, a trafficking ring exploiting postal shipments was dismantled after authorities seized 18.8 kg of marijuana in parcels bound for the UK.

-    Six tonnes of cocaine hydrochloride that passed through Sierra Leone were seized in Antwerp, Belgium, while another 1.1 tonnes of the same drug concealed in a truck bound for Europe were seized in Senegal. Cocaine hydrochloride is produced as a white powder and is the most common form of cocaine.

-    65 stolen motor vehicles were intercepted in South America and West Africa, including a car recovered in Benin four months after it was stolen in Canada.

INTERPOL’s Secretary General Jürgen Stock said:

“The value of drugs seized in this two-month operation is higher than the GDP of some countries, which clearly shows the scale of the problem facing law enforcement.

“Organized crime networks continue to expand their reach and the devastating consequences their activities bring. We will, and must, unite our efforts to combat this national security threat which threatens every country."

INTERPOL’s response against illicit drugs

With traffickers evolving from single-drug operations to more complex and diversified poly-crime networks, Lionfish Hurricane involved a multidisciplinary operational support team of experts from different crime areas to boost the overall intelligence picture.

The operation fell under INTERPOL’s new I-RAID programme (INTERPOL Response Against Illicit Drugs), a six-year initiative that combats drug trafficking through operations and analysis, capacity building and training, partnerships and outreach, and by targeting crime proceeds.

A dedicated secure drugs analysis platform enables INTERPOL’s criminal intelligence analysts to systematically capture, control, analyze, and disseminate drug trafficking information.

Furthermore, the RELIEF database provides advanced tool-mark examination of seized drug packages, detailed analysis including chemical composition, and automated comparisons of logos and marks from pressing plates and cartridges.

The UK Home Office funded the operation which also involved the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre (Narcotics), WCO, UNODC, and Expertise France.

Since 2013, Lionfish operations have netted seizures worth USD 3.6 billion and 5,617 arrests in 108 countries.

Participating countries in Lionfish Hurricane: Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Ireland, Netherlands, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Togo, United Kingdom, Uruguay and Venezuela.

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