i believe in god because essay

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Why Do We Believe in God?

Matthew nelson, march 10, 2020.

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Do we come to belief in God through personal encounter, or arguments, or both? When we ask ourselves ‘Why do we believe in God?’ our faith provides the first response,” offered St. John Paul II during a 1985 General Audience . “We believe in God because God has made himself known to us as the supreme Being, the great ‘Existent.’”

We believe in the unseen Trinity first and foremost because we have been convicted by grace through faith. “Faith comes from what is heard, and what is heard comes through the word of Christ,” affirms St. Paul (Rom. 10:17). Faith comes by the authority and testimony of another; and as recipients of God’s Word—which may come to us orally, in writing, or indeed through a direct encounter with the incarnate Logos, Jesus Christ—we can come to know truths that transcend the humble faculties of reason alone. We believe principally because we trust in what—or who —we have heard and encountered.

But if faith comes to us principally through the authority of another, does reason have a part to play in the acquisition of faith? According to St. Paul the answer is yes. For him it is not only God but that which God has created that can be revelatory. For as the Apostle says in his Letter to the Romans, the physical world can testify and reveal God’s “eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are” (Rom. 1:20).

St. Paul placed great value on the revelatory capabilities of the senses. He believed that through philosophical contemplation that followed upon sense experience, we could come to know the existence of the divine Creator (Rom. 1:20). For St. Paul the senses could indeed reveal to us the real; indeed, by way of the proximately real the senses had the capability of leading us to the really real—the one God who simply and infinitely is .

But St. Paul knew that God might also reveal himself directly, through a person-to-person encounter, by the power of the Holy Spirit: “When we cry, ‘Abba! Father!’ it is that very Spirit bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God” (Rom. 8:15).

Sensing God

We might be moved to believe in God because we have directly experienced him, independently of rational argument. But now here’s a question pertaining the reasonableness of belief based on experience: Would such a religious experience alone , in the absence of other evidence, be adequate to justify religious belief?

From Sigmund Freud to Richard Dawkins, skeptics have often expressed intense discontent towards the justification of faith based on religious experience. This is understandable. We can be tempted to believe many false things if we base our conclusions on feelings alone. But in recent times, Christian philosophers like the (rightly) esteemed Alvin Plantinga—inspired by Calvin’s notion of the sensus divinitatis or “sense of the divine”—have argued that belief in God may be treated as a “properly basic” belief—that is, a fundamental belief that requires no further justification to be rationally held.

On this view, then, belief in God based solely on religious experience may be fully justified if the belief is, 1) true, and 2) undefeated by objections. In such a case then one could be fully justified in believing in God even if they do not have “positive” arguments supporting their belief. Their interior experience of God would be enough.  

Arguments and Belief

But now let’s return to our initial question: Why do we believe in God?

We have already noted that God may reveal himself to us directly through the power of the Holy Spirit. But unless God reveals himself in this way, which is entirely by grace, God’s existence is not immediately evident to us. As St. Thomas tells us, God is self-evident in himself but not self-evident to us. Thus, even the unbaptized know God—but in a “general and confused way.”

And this is where human reason comes in. Indeed, rational arguments have much to add to brute religious experience. First of all, arguments serve to clear the mental debris that prevents us from seeing God more clearly. Second of all, they serve to authenticate our religious experiences and perhaps reveal more to us about the divine person—or persons—we have encountered experientially. Thus, just as religious experience may authenticate in a deeper way what we already know by demonstration, so also may philosophical demonstration authenticate religious experience.

Even if Plantinga is correct that arguments are not necessary to warrant belief in God, it would not follow that arguments have no important part to play in the life of faith. For if belief in God can be warranted by authentic religious experience and we can prove with positive arguments that theism is true, then as William Lane Craig has pointed out, we are doubly warranted to believe in God: first by grace through faith—but also by reason.

In Humani Generis (1950), Pope Pius XII echoed St. Paul’s affirmation of the possibility of natural theology when he wrote, “Human reason by its own natural force and light can arrive at a true and certain knowledge of the one personal God, Who by His providence watches over and governs the world.”

There are many paths by which we may come to philosophical knowledge of God. Such knowledge always begins in wonder —and then diverges. “Instinctively, when we witness certain happenings, we ask ourselves what caused them,” wrote St. John Paul II. “How can we not but ask the same question in regard to the sum total of beings and phenomena which we discover in the world?”

That the world exists unnecessarily—that is to say, that there is something rather nothing—is a fact that has incessantly poked at the minds of the deepest of thinkers. “Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is,” mused Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Tractatus . From St. Thomas Aquinas to G.W. Leibniz, great thinkers through the ages have concluded that that the world exists, despite not having to, points to a deeper metaphysical truth—a necessary being that explains all that is. Indeed, for St. Thomas it was not a necessary being but only (and necessarily) Being itself which could sufficiently explain the universe, who possessed all perfections—love, intelligence, creativity, and the like—without limit.

Many Ways to God

The ways to God by reason are many, and rarely work on the mind in isolation from the others. As St. John Henry Newman reminded us in his  Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent , all of our reasons for belief converge upon one single subject from a variety of angles in a symphony of “converging evidences.” Echoing this insight, St. John Paul II observed :

A myriad of indications impels man, who tries to understand the universe in which he lives, to direct his gaze toward his Creator. The proofs for the existence of God are many and convergent. They contribute to show that faith does not humble human intelligence, but stimulates it to reflection and permits it to understand better all the “whys” posed by the observation of reality.

Indeed, the order, intelligibility, and “finality” (or goal-directedness) of nature also compel the mind, intuitively and discursively, to ponder the Supreme Intellect behind it all. Pope John Paul acknowledged the evidential power of such features of the natural world:

The evolution of living beings, of which science seeks to determine the stages and to discern the mechanism, presents an internal finality which arouses admiration. This finality which directs beings in a direction for which they are not responsible or in charge, obliges one to suppose a Mind which is its inventor, its creator.

Of course—as John Paul carefully notes in the passage above—it is the physical sciences that are best appropriated to investigate the phenomena of nature. But science does not precede nor supersede philosophical contemplation. Rather, science presupposes the philosophical, and at the same time integrates it into its method necessarily when it moves into the process of analysis.

For many, a study of metaphysics—that is, what is beyond ( meta ) the physical—has fallen out of style and into the shadow of the physical sciences. As particle physicist and theologian John Polkinghorne has observed , “Metaphysics is not a word that many scientists feel happy with. It is not uncommon for the concept to be dismissed.” But, he counters, this dismissal is in vain. “In actual fact,” says Polkinghorne, “it is impossible to think seriously without taking a metaphysical stance, since this simply means adopting a world-view. We think metaphysics as naturally and inevitably as we speak prose ” (emphasis added).

Indeed, we do. Granted, our metaphysical thinking is not always concretely discursive; that is to say, we are not always aware of our assumptions, premises, and ways of getting to our conclusions, nor are we always thinking in—or even able to think in—the technical jargon of philosophy. That being said, by the virtue of the fact that we are rational , we are ever in the state of mentally peeling back the layers of reality, always drawing conclusions and making distinctions about what is and what ought to be. That being said, we are not often explicitly cognizant of our mental activities as metaphysical. “All men have a reason,” wrote St. John Henry Newman,” but not every man can give a reason.”

When it comes to the existence of God, then, we cannot help but seek understanding to supplement and fortify our faith. God has created us for himself; and as art reveals something of the artist, so also does the world he has placed us in reveal the nature and divinity of God. Every person by nature desires to know, wrote Aristotle famously. And we might also add that every person—at least in a general and confused way—desires to know God. Our rational nature permits us as human persons to intuit God experientially, but also all-at-once instills within us an irremediable appetite to know God intellectually. Thus, both experience and argument play pivotal roles for belief in God.

Believing in God

Why do we believe in God? We believe in God, first, by faith. Trusting in the authority of the Church, strengthened by the wisdom and witness of the Sacred Scriptures, inspired by the testimony of the saints, and moved interiorly by the Holy Spirit, we believe by grace that God has revealed himself to us.

But we believe also because our minds tell us that God is real and Christianity is true. We believe what we know, we know what we believe, and the coming together of faith and knowledge happens not by force but by a harmonious integration. As grace perfects nature, so faith perfects reason. Or in the words of Pope Benedict XVI: “Faith presupposes reason and perfects it, and reason, enlightened by faith, finds the strength to rise to knowledge of God and spiritual realities.”

Essay on Why Do You Believe In God

Students are often asked to write an essay on Why Do You Believe In God in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Why Do You Believe In God

Personal experience.

I believe in God because of personal experiences that have shown me His presence in my life. I have seen God answer prayers, provide for me in times of need, and give me strength and guidance when I have been weak and lost. These experiences have shown me that God is real and that He cares for me.

The Beauty and Order of Creation

The moral law.

The existence of the moral law also points to the existence of God. The moral law is a set of universal truths that are binding on all people, regardless of their culture or background. These truths include things like justice, fairness, and compassion. The existence of the moral law suggests that there is a higher power who has created these truths and who holds us accountable for following them.

250 Words Essay on Why Do You Believe In God

Why do i believe in god, personal experiences.

I believe in God because of my personal experiences. I have experienced His presence and love in my life in many ways. For example, I have felt His peace during difficult times, and I have seen His guidance in my decisions.

I believe in God because of the design of the human body. The human body is an incredibly complex and intricate system, and it is perfectly adapted to its environment. I believe that this is evidence of a intelligent designer, and that this designer is God.

I believe in God because of my personal experiences, the beauty and complexity of nature, and the design of the human body. I believe that God is real, and that He is a loving and caring God.

500 Words Essay on Why Do You Believe In God

My belief in god.

I believe in God because it gives me comfort and hope. In times of trouble, I can turn to God for strength and guidance. I believe that God is always with me, watching over me and protecting me. This belief gives me a sense of peace and well-being.

The Beauty of Nature

I also believe in God because of the beauty of nature. When I look at a sunset, a flower, or a mountain, I am filled with awe and wonder. I believe that these things are evidence of God’s creativity and artistry.

The Complexity of the Universe

I am also amazed by the complexity of the universe. The laws of physics and chemistry are so finely tuned that they allow for the existence of life. I believe that this is evidence of God’s intelligence and design.

The Human Spirit

I believe in God for many reasons. I believe that God gives me comfort and hope, that the beauty of nature is evidence of God’s creativity, that the complexity of the universe is evidence of God’s intelligence, and that the human spirit is evidence of God’s love. I believe that God is real and that he loves me. This belief gives me meaning and purpose in life.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

Happy studying!

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Why I Believe in God

Genesis 1:1.

September 30, 2009 | Ray Pritchard

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The Bible never argues for the existence of God.

It begins instead with a simple, majestic sentence: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth” (Genesis 1:1). The Bible begins with a declaration, not with an argument.

There is a God who created all things.

If you do not start there, you will miss the central truth of the universe . That’s what Proverbs 1:7 means when it says that “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge.” Note the two beginnings here:

“In the beginning God.” “The beginning of knowledge.”

This leads us in a particular direction:

1. All things begin with God. 2. All knowledge begins with God.

It is in precisely this sense that the Bible proclaims that those who deny God are “fools” (Psalms 14:1). This stands as a moral judgment, not a statement about IQ or educational attainment. A very smart person can drive off a cliff and be smashed on the rocks. That’s the sort of folly the psalmist has in mind . If you leave God out of the calculation, you have missed the central fact of the universe. You are wrong at the very core of life, and therefore life itself will remain a mystery to you.

If you leave God out of the calculation, you have missed the central fact of the universe. </h6 class=”pullquote”>

Did you know that today (September 30, 2009) is the first-ever International Blasphemy Day ? I didn’t either until I read about it on Al Mohler’s weblog. This “celebration” includes an invitation for people to “blaspheme the Holy Spirit” (see Mark 3:29) by making a video renouncing their Christian beliefs and saying, “I deny the Holy Spirit,” thus daring God to punish them. You can find a host of these videos on YouTube where ex-Christians (many of them young people) renounce their faith and invite God to judge them.

There are a number of ways to respond to this, and the least effective would be to get angry . Those of us who believe in God need not be threatened by those who do not believe or by former believers who now are doubters or agnostics or atheists. I do think it is sad to consider young people raised in the church who now find it necessary to publicly renounce a faith that never really took hold.

Consider two simple words. God is. That’s the central fact of the universe . Miss that and you can be right about a lot of other things and still be wrong where it matters most. With that in mind, let’s think together about five facts relating to God’s existence.

1. God has made himself known to every person.

Romans 1:19-20 says it very clearly.

Since what may be known about God is plain to them , because God has made it plain to them . For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities-his eternal power and divine nature-have been clearly seen , being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse.

God has revealed himself so clearly that no one can miss it. Even though men suppress the truth about God (v. 18), they cannot completely obliterate the message. It is “plain” and “clearly seen” both in nature and in conscience. This plainly-seen revelation of God in nature has been available “since the creation of the world.” That means Adam saw it, Cain saw it, Noah saw it, Abraham saw it, Jacob saw it, Moses saw it, David saw it, and every other person who has ever lived since the beginning of time saw it. Don’t miss this point. Everyone knows something about God! No one has ever lived who missed this revelation. It doesn’t matter whether they consciously thought about it or not. The truth was there for all to see, so plainly laid out that no one could miss it. That means it doesn’t matter whether you were a headhunter on some South Pacific island or an upscale yuppie in Miami. No one could miss the truth about God . . . and no one has ever missed it because God made the truth about himself as plain as day.

Everyone knows something about God! </h6 class=”pullquote”>

 2. something about god “gets through” to every person..

In the second half of verse 20 Paul comments that the truth of God in nature has been “clearly seen, being understood from what has been made.” Those two verbs are exceedingly important. “Clearly seen” means that everyone has seen something of God’s handiwork in the world. “Understood” is even stronger. It means that the revelation of God in nature strikes the heart of every man. Paul is not suggesting that nature contains a revelation about God which every man may see. That’s not strong enough. To the contrary, Paul is saying that every man actually sees the revelation and every man actually understands it to some degree.

No one can ever say, “I didn’t know” or “You didn’t make it clear,” because God made it abundantly and overwhelmingly clear.

“Lord, you have made us for yourself. Our hearts are restless until they find rest in you.” </h6 class=”pullquote”>

That explains why every culture on earth has some conception of a Supreme Being-however flawed it might be. Man was made to look for answers outside of himself. He is incurably religious in that sense. The French philosopher Pascal said that inside the heart of every man there is a “God-shaped vacuum.” And Augustine said, “Lord, you have made us for yourself.  Our hearts are restless until they find rest in you.” Ecclesiastes 3:11 says that God has put “eternity in the hearts of men,” meaning that the longing for ultimate answers comes from God himself. God put that longing (the “God-shaped vacuum”) inside the human heart to cause men to look to him.

3. Creation testifies to the Creator.

Psalm 19:1 says that “the heavens declare the glory of God; the skies proclaim the work of his hands.” Now either you see this or you don’t. Some people, brilliant scientists, can study the stars for a lifetime and come away saying, “There is no God.” But others will see the mighty Milky Way and say, “There must be a God!” Psalm 19:1 means that God has not left us any room to doubt. The heavens preach a sermon about the wonders of our great God. “Day after day they pour forth speech; night after night they display knowledge” (Psalm 19:2). God so arranged the universe that light from heaven streams in on every side. You have to cover your face not to see it.

A week ago I flew to Washington state in the Pacific Northwest, to a little town near the Canadian border called Sumas. To my surprise (because I had never been there before), the whole area is a verdant paradise. Because of the abundant rainfall, it is actually a lush rainforest. For two days I spoke to pastors (most of them from British Columbia) at Cedar Springs Conference Center. On my final day there, John Bargen, the founder of the conference center, picked me up in his ATV and took me for a ride so I could see the massive cedar trees that cover the property. At one point we got out of the ATV, and John took out a tape measure and walked all the way around the most massive cedar tree I had ever seen. It turned out to be 18 feet in circumference and towered 130 feet above us, creating a massive green canopy overhead. John said the tree was probably 200 years old. As we made our way back to the main lodge, he showed me the beautiful gardens they had planted over the last 35 years. Then I saw that someone had planted flowers in a certain pattern on the hillside:

God Bless You

Now suppose that someone came hiking up the mountainside and saw “God Bless You” spelled out in beautiful flowers. They might conclude that this was a fantastic freak of nature, that somehow the flowers had come together entirely by chance to spell those three words. It could happen. If 10,000 monkeys typing for 100 million years could produce Shakespeare, then presumably the flowers could randomly spell out “God Bless You.”

You are free to believe that if you like. And you can also presume that millions of years of wind and rain and erosion produced the faces of Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln and Roosevelt on Mount Rushmore.

If 10,000 monkeys typing for 100 million years could produce Shakespeare, then presumably the flowers could randomly spell out “God Bless You.” </h6 class=”pullquote”>

Opinions are free . Think what you want. But I prefer to believe that just as loving hands planted the flowers at Cedars Springs, and wise hands carved the faces on Mount Rushmore, even so the hands of Almighty God carefully crafted the universe.

You either see that or you don’t. That doesn’t prove God. But just as a watch points to a watchmaker, just as Mt. Rushmore points to a dedicated architect, just as The Old Man and the Sea points to Ernest Hemingway, the beauty and order and complexity of the universe points directly to Almighty God, the Ultimate Designer of all things.

Psalm 8:3 says, “When I consider the heavens, the work of your fingers, the moon and the stars, which you have set in place.” God has left his fingerprints on the universe. Every rock, every tree, every river, every ocean, every star in the sky-they all bear the Divine DNA that points back to the God who created all things.

This world is God’s house. He’s left clues everywhere about what kind of God he is . </h6 class=”pullquote”>

This world is God’s house. He’s left clues everywhere about what kind of God he is . When you stand at the Grand Canyon, you can’t help but be overwhelmed at the power of God to create such magnificence. He must have had a mighty hand to scoop out the Royal Gorge in Colorado. He is as infinite as the dark recesses of the mighty Atlantic Ocean. Each snowflake testifies to his uniqueness. The changing colors of the Great Smoky Mountains proclaim his creativity.

The galaxies shout out, “He is there.” The wildflowers sing together, “He is there.” The rippling brooks join in, “He is there.” The birds sing it, the lions roar it, the fish write it in the oceans-“He is there.” All creation joins to sing his praise. The heavens declare it, the earth repeats it and the wind whispers it-“He is there.” Deep cries out to deep, the mighty sequoia tells it to the eagle who soars overhead, the lamb and the wolf agree on this one thing-“He is there.”

No one can miss the message. God has left his fingerprints all over this world . Truly, “This is my Father’s world,” and every rock, every twig, every river and every mountain bears his signature. He signed his name to everything he made. The earth is marked “Made By God” in letters so big that no one fails to see it.

Some people may deny it, but no one fails to see it.

4. Some choose not to believe because they are spiritually blind.

Unbelief is a moral choice not to believe the evidence God has placed all around us . Recently the Wall Street Journal asked Karen Armstrong and Richard Dawkins to independently answer the question, “Where does evolution leave God?” Titled Man vs. God , the discussion starts with the assumption that evolution as an explanation for the universe must in fact be true. If so, where does God fit in? Karen Armstrong says we still need the idea of God even though evolution has demolished any need for the reality of a personal God:

Human beings were not the pinnacle of a purposeful creation; like everything else, they evolved by trial and error and God had no direct hand in their making. No wonder so many fundamentalist Christians find their faith shaken to the core.

The earth is marked “Made By God” in letters so big that no one fails to see it. </h6 class=”pullquote”>

But if that is true, why retain even the idea of God?  Dawkins follows this to its logical conclusion:

Where does that leave God? The kindest thing to say is that it leaves him with nothing to do, and no achievements that might attract our praise, our worship or our fear. Evolution is God’s redundancy notice, his pink slip. But we have to go further. A complex creative intelligence with nothing to do is not just redundant. A divine designer is all but ruled out by the consideration that he must at least as complex as the entities he was wheeled out to explain. God is not dead. He was never alive in the first place.

For the record, I think Dawkins is right. If naturalistic evolution is true, then there really is no room for God, and no need for him either . If science can answer all things, then we hardly even need the idea of God.

But what we really have here are two atheists arguing with each other . I would simply point out that the conclusions here are not driven as much by evidence as by presuppositions. Richard Dawkins has chosen not to believe in God, therefore he has done exactly what Romans 1:18 said he would do. He has suppressed the truth in his own heart.  Atheism is not just a philosophical position. It’s also a moral choice of the heart .  Over the whole exchange one could write the words of Romans 1:22, “Although they claimed to be wise, they became fools.” This is a terrible, damning judgment on those who turn away from the truth.

My point here is not to target Karen Armstrong or Richard Dawkins in any particular way. They merely represent a very popular worldview. One tries to embrace naturalism and leave room for a vague concept of “God” that in reality represents nothing at all. The other rightly says, “That’s nonsense!”

Atheism is not just a philosophical position. It’s also a moral choice of the heart. </h6 class=”pullquote”>

To choose not to believe has enormous moral implications . Because we do not live in true moral neutrality, someone is truly and absolutely and utterly wrong.  And they are wrong at the starting point.

“In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.” “God is not dead. He was never alive in the first place.”

Someone is really, really, really wrong here. And whoever it is has missed the fundamental truth of the universe.

So why does a man like Richard Dawkins not “see” the truth about God? We may say it many ways but finally it comes down to this. He is morally and spiritually blind . 2 Corinthians 4:4 describes the whole human race apart from God’s grace. “The god of this age has blinded the minds of unbelievers, so that they cannot see the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the image of God.”

If you can’t see, you can’t see.

Here is a vast paradox regarding the human race. Light from heaven streams in on every side . God has made himself plainly known so that the truth about himself is “clearly seen” by every person. Yet Satan has blinded the minds of unbelievers so that they cannot see the gospel and believe in Jesus. All of us know the truth about God because it is stamped on our spiritual DNA and yet we are blind to the truth of who God really is . Thus most of the human race instinctively believes in God without knowing who he is. But a tiny minority suppresses even the limited knowledge of God they have so that they end up like Richard Dawkins, denying the God who made them.

All of us know the truth about God because it is stamped on our spiritual DNA and yet we are blind to the truth of who God really is. </h6 class=”pullquote”>

That is the very definition of what it means to be a fool.

5. God has revealed himself to us in Jesus.

When all is said and done, I believe the best argument for the Christian view of God is found in the person of Jesus Christ . God has revealed himself to us in the Person of his Son, the Lord Jesus Christ. The Father sent the Son to the earth in the form of a little baby, conceived through a miracle of the Holy Spirit, born in Bethlehem, born to Mary and Joseph, born in an out-of-the-way corner of the Roman Empire, raised in a carpenter’s home, misunderstood by his own family, rejected by his own people, convicted by the religious leaders, put to death for blasphemy (!), and on the third day God’s Son rose from the dead.

Now we know what God is like. Jesus has made him known to us.

The debate no longer centers around arid scholastic arguments. It’s all about Jesus now. </h6 class=”pullquote”>

Ever since the “Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us” (John 1:14), Jesus has been the great issue between believers and unbelievers. The debate no longer centers around arid scholastic arguments. It’s all about Jesus now.

Breakfast with an Atheist

A few years ago I had breakfast with an atheist. It turned out to be a most enlightening experience. Although we were meeting for the first time, I immediately came to appreciate his many positive qualities . He was charming, friendly, positive, talkative, and obviously very well-educated. He was raised Catholic and attended a Catholic high school and two excellent Catholic universities. Sometime during his college years, he abandoned not only the Christian faith but his belief in God. He actually converted from Christianity to atheism. He truly believes there is no God. As we talked, he kept emphasizing that only this life has meaning. Since there is no life after death, what we do now becomes vitally important. Heaven for him is just a myth that religious people use to comfort themselves in times of trouble. We had a long talk and I learned a great deal from him. It’s always useful to see yourself as others see you.

I came away from our time together with three fundamental observations:

1. How difficult it is to be an atheist. 2. How hard you must work to keep your faith. 3. How careful you must be lest you start believing in God.

“We’d Have a Problem, Wouldn’t We?”

Toward the end of our time together, I asked him what he thought about Jesus Christ. He seemed a bit surprised by that question, as if it had no relevance to the question of God’s existence. It was my turn to be surprised when he told me that he hadn’t thought about Jesus very much one way or the other . He then ventured to say that Jesus was probably a great man and a learned teacher. But he probably never meant to start a religion. That happened after he died and his followers wanted to honor his memory.

Upon hearing that, I decided to press the point. What about his resurrection? What if he really did rise from the dead? My friend stopped for a moment, thought a bit, and then a smile crossed his face. “Well, we’d have a problem then, wouldn’t we?” Exactly! If Jesus really did rise from the dead, then He really is the Son of God and God really does exist.

“Well, we’d have a problem then, wouldn’t we?” </h6 class=”pullquote”>

That’s what I mean when I say that Jesus is the best proof of God’s existence . In our witnessing we should bring people back again and again to Jesus Christ . He is the ultimate argument for God because he was in fact God in human flesh. “In the beginning was the Word, and Word was with God, and the Word was God. . . . The word became flesh and made his dwelling among us” (John 1:1, 14). In one of his sermons John Piper puts the matter this way:

If someone says, “Why do you believe in God?” you can say, “I believe in God because Jesus believed in God, and all that I know of Jesus makes me trust him more than I trust any philosopher or any scientist or any theologian or any friend I have ever known or read about.” Then you can ask them, “Do you know anyone more trustworthy or better qualified to teach us about the existence of God than Jesus?”

Piper is right. No one is more qualified than Jesus to teach us who God is.

I believe in God because nothing in the universe makes sense without him. I believe in God because he has left his fingerprints everywhere. I believe in God because he revealed himself in Jesus. I believe in God because Jesus died and rose again.

And I believe in God because he revealed himself to me, gave me eyes to see and faith to believe, and drew me by his Spirit to embrace his Son as my Savior. It is not that I “found” God on my own. He drew me to himself, and I gladly came to him.

I close with this simple statement: Not only does it make sense to believe in God, it makes no sense not to! 

-No fact is so obvious as the fact of God’s existence. -You must deny reality itself in order to deny God’s existence. -The atheist must stand on ground God created in order to deny God.

Not only does it make sense to believe in God, it makes no sense not to! </h6 class=”pullquote”>

I submit to you that the evidence for God’s existence is overwhelming for those who have eyes to see . But it still demands a choice! In one of his books Anthony Campolo tells how he shares the gospel with secular-minded university students who ask him why he believes the Bible. “Because I decided to,” he replies. Then he asks the student, “Why is it that you don’t believe the Bible?” The answer is almost always the same: “I guess because I decided not to.”

After all the arguments on both sides are finished, you still have to decide for yourself. You still have to choose. What choice have you made?

I believe in God because nothing in the universe makes sense without him. God exists-he is real and Jesus Christ is his Son. He knows you and he loves you and he gave his only begotten Son that you might be saved. I believe in God! What about you?

Questions to Consider 1. Some people say that belief in God is nothing but superstition. If you disagree, how would you explain your own belief in God? 2. In what sense are people who deny God’s existence fools? 3. What truths about God can be discovered by studying the universe around us? How do unbelievers explain the complexity and evidence of intelligent design in nature? 4. Where have you seen God’s “fingerprints” in your own life? 5. Why is Jesus “the best proof for God’s existence”? 6. “It makes no sense not to believe in God.” Do you agree?

Scriptures to Ponder Psalm 19:1-6 Isaiah 40:21-28 Romans 1:18-21 Romans 11:33-36

Additional Material from the Keep Believing website A Place to Begin         Empty on the Inside What Happens to Those Who Never Hear About Jesus? In the Beginning

Additional Resources The Case for Faith by Lee Strobel The Dawkins Delusion by Alister McGrath Why I Am a Christian , ed. by Norm Geisler Reasons to Believe by R. C. Sproul Does God Exist? ed. by J. P. Moreland

Do you have any thoughts or questions about this post?

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Why I Believe in God

Some of my favorite authors are agnostics, men and women who face life honestly and courageously without faith in a personal God.  They’re stoics mostly, persons who have made peace with the fact that God may not exist and that perhaps death ends everything for us. I see this, for example, in the late James Hillman, a man whom I greatly admire and who has much to teach believers about what it means to listen to and honor the human soul.

But here’s something I don’t admire in these agnostic stoics: While they face with courage what it should mean for us if God doesn’t exist and death ends our personal existence, they don’t, with the same courage ask the question of what it should mean for us if God does exist and death does not end our personal existence. What if God does exist and what if the tenets of our faith are true? They need too to face that question.

I believe that God exists, not because I have never had doubts, or because I was raised in the faith by persons whose lives gave deep witness to its truth, or because perennially the vast majority of people on this planet believe in God. I believe that a personal God exists for more reasons than I can name: the goodness of saints; the hook in my own heart that has never let me go; the interface of faith with my own experience, the courage of religious martyrs throughout history; the stunning depth of Jesus’ teachings; the deep insights contained in other religions, the mystical experience of countless people; our sense of connection inside the communion of saints with loved ones who have died; the convergence of the anecdotal testimony of hundreds of individuals who have been clinically dead and resuscitated back to life; the things we sometimes intuitively know beyond all logical reason; the constant recurrence of resurrection in our lives; the essential triumph of truth and goodness throughout history; the fact that hope never dies, the unyielding imperative we feel inside of ourselves to be reconciled with others before we die; the infinite depth of the human heart; and, yes, even the very ability of atheists and agnostics to intuit that somehow it still all makes sense, points to the existence of a living, personal God.

I believe that God exists because faith works; at least to the extent we work it. The existence of God proves itself true to the extent that we take it seriously and live our lives in face of it.  Simply put, we’re happy and at peace to the exact extent that we risk, explicitly or implicitly, living lives of faith. The happiest people I know are also the most generous, selfless, gracious, and reverent persons I know. That’s no accident.

Leon Bloy once asserted that there’s only one true sadness in life, that of not being a saint. We see that in the story of the rich young man in Gospels who turns down Jesus’ invitation to live his faith more deeply. He goes away sad. Of course, being a saint and being sad are never all or nothing, both have degrees. But there’s a constant: We’re happy or sad in direct proportion to our fidelity or infidelity to what’s one, true, good, and beautiful. I know that existentially: I’m happy and at peace to the exact extent that I take my faith seriously and live it out in fidelity; the more faithful I am, the more at peace I am, and vice versa.

Inherent in all of this too is a certain “law of karma”, namely, the universe gives back to us morally exactly what we give to it. As Jesus worded it,  the measure you measure out is the measure that will be measured back to you.  What we breathe out is what we’re going to inhale.  If I breathe out selfishness, selfishness is what I will inhale; if I breathe out bitterness, that’s what I’ll meet at every turn; conversely, if I breathe out love, gracious, and forgiveness, these will be given back to me in the exact measure that I give them out. Our lives and our universe have a deep, innate, non-negotiable structure of love and justice written into them, one that can only be underwritten by a living, personal, divine mind and heart of love.

None of this, of course, proves God’s existence with the kind of proof we find in science or mathematics; but God isn’t found at the end of an empirical test, a mathematical equation, or a philosophical syllogism. God is found, explicitly or implicitly, in living a good, honest, gracious, selfless, moral life, and this can happen inside of religion or outside of it.

The Belgium Benedictine, Benoit Standaert, submits that  wisdom is three things, and a fourth . Wisdom is a respect for knowledge; wisdom is a respect for honesty and aesthetics; and wisdom is a respect for mystery. But there’s a fourth – wisdom is a respect for Someone.

By Fr. Ron Rolheiser, OMI. This article originally appeared on  ronrolheiser.com .

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21 Reasons Why I Believe in God: Francis Collins

An atheist, according to Merriam-Webster, is a person who does not believe that God exists. One of the tenets of modern atheism is that people only believe in God because that's what they grew up with, what they've been taught. As Richard Dawkins states in the introduction to the 1996 edition of The Blind Watchmaker, "In most cases, they know deep down what to believe because their parents recommended an ancient book that tells them what to believe."

Mr. Dawkins has said he had a typical Anglican upbringing. He was born in Kenya to British parents and moved to England at the age of eight, where he attended a Church of England school. At the age of sixteen he decided that the theory of evolution was a better explanation for the complexity of life than what he had been taught in school, and since the only argument for the existence of God that carried any weight in his mind was that of the apparent design of nature, he discarded his belief in God.

Christopher Hitchens, another of the New Atheists, grew up with parents who did not try to impose any religion on him. He was, however, taught religion at school. In God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything, he tells of his earliest awakening to atheism at the age of nine: His teacher said, "So you see children, how powerful and generous God is. He made all the trees and grass to be green, which is exactly the color which is most restful to our eyes. Imagine if instead, the vegetation was all purple, or orange, how awful that would be." Mr. Hitchens says, he "simply knew" that his teacher had gotten everything the wrong way about, then goes on to rant against God and all religion, which, Mr. Hitchens claims, kills.

If it is true that people only believe in God because that's what they had been taught as children, then how do we explain people who come to Christ in other ways? What should our reaction be when firm atheists – people who are brilliant, well-educated thinkers, even leaders in their fields – turn to God because of a thorough examination of the evidence? Could a reasoned response to the evidence actually be that there is a God?

Below are thumbnail sketches of four such people – atheists who became convinced, dedicated followers of Jesus Christ. These, and others like them, are a reason I believe in God.

Francis Collins

I had some time to kill one day while waiting for a train in Penn Station so I meandered into a bookstore and picked up a book by Francis Collins called The Language of God. A physician/geneticist currently the director of the National Institutes of Health, Mr. Collins was the leader of the International Human Genome Project, the group that worked for decades to map the DNA sequence carrying the blueprint for building a human being.

The book opens in the East Room of the White House, June 2000, with President Bill Clinton's announcement of the working draft of the human genome. As Collins and a colleague stood alongside, Clinton spoke words that grabbed a huge amount of press: "Today we are learning the language in which God created life. We are gaining ever more awe for the complexity, the beauty, and the wonder of God's most divine and sacred gift."

To the surprise of many, Collins, with a doctorate in physical chemistry from Yale and an M.D. from University of North Carolina, chimed in, echoing and expanding upon Clinton's words. As he explains in his book, "For me, the experience of sequencing the human genome, and uncovering this most remarkable of all texts, was both a stunning scientific achievement and an occasion of worship."

How did this rigorously trained scientist come to faith? Had his "parents recommended an ancient book that [told him] what to believe"? Had he been indoctrinated by some religious education at a young age and just drifted into faith?

Quite the contrary. Mr. Collins had been a firm atheist when, as a third-year medical student and challenged as to what he believed, he realized he had never seriously considered the evidence for and against belief.

Mr. Collins had grown up with free-thinking parents, hippies before their time. Faith was not an important part of his childhood. When he was five, his parents sent him to become part of a boys' choir at a local Episcopal church, but cautioned him not to take the theology too seriously. He listened to his parents, and enjoyed the music while ignoring the preaching. At ten his family moved to another city, and for the first time the homeschooler attended public school. Science became his passion, and by the time he was a few months into college at the University of Virginia, he had decided that, while various religions had inspired some good art and culture, they really had no basis in fact.

He became an agnostic, someone who feels it's impossible to know whether or not God exists. He admits that, in his case, it was less "I don't know," than, "I don't want to know." He was a young man, the world had many temptations to offer, and it was inconvenient to need to be accountable to any higher spiritual authority. He was willfully blind.

In graduate school he gradually moved from agnosticism to atheism, concluding that "no thinking scientist could seriously entertain the possibility of God without committing some sort of intellectual suicide" (The Language of God). If anyone happened to bring up their spiritual beliefs, he would shoot them down, asserting such belief was wishful thinking and outmoded superstition.

Then came medical school. Mr. Collins had become disillusioned with the career path he was on. Being a chemistry professor giving the same lectures year after year didn't appeal to him; he wanted to do something that combined his love of science with the possibility of a real contribution to humanity. Ph.D. in hand, he began to study medicine.

A few years into the program, as he started to work with patients more and more, he began to gain a respect for the religious faith of many of the people he would treat, concluding that if faith was a psychological crutch, it was a very powerful one. His was puzzled that these people weren't expressing anger at God for their illness. One particular patient, an elderly woman with severe chronic pain, shared her strong Christian beliefs with him, then asked what he believed. He realized he didn't really know; he had never really seriously investigated the evidence either way. This was the opposite of what a real scientist should do.

Mr. Collins began to fully research the logical basis for faith. He started studying the major religions of the world, but found their sacred texts too confusing. Finally, he asked a neighbor, a Methodist minister, whether faith made any reasonable sense. The minister handed him a copy of the book Mere Christianity by C.S. Lewis. Reading the book, Mr. Collins was stunned by the author's logic, and especially his assertion of a Moral Law set deep within the hearts of people in all places at all times. As a scientist, Mr. Collins knew "it is the awareness of right and wrong, along with the development of language, awareness of self, and the ability to imagine the future, to which scientists generally refer when trying to enumerate the special qualities of Homo sapiens" (The Language of God).

Finally Mr. Collins realized that what he had learned in his investigation left his atheism in tatters. Even agnosticism now "loomed like the great cop-out it often is" (The Language of God). He realized that the tools of science, unquestionably powerful for plumbing the depths of the natural world, were not the right ones to use in settling the question of God. The ultimate decision had to be based on faith, not scientific proof.

At age twenty-six, Mr. Collins took that leap of faith, and became a believer in Jesus Christ.

A child prodigy in the field of cosmology, at seventeen Canadian Hugh Ross became the youngest person ever to serve as director of observations for Vancouver's Royal Astronomical Society. He began his quest in the field of astronomy at the age of seven, reading everything he could find on the subject. He quickly worked his way through his public-school library, then the children's section of the Vancouver Public Library, then the adult section, and finally the library of the University of British Columbia. Though he grew up in a poor neighborhood, he won scholarships that took him through an undergraduate degree in physics, a Ph.D. in astronomy at the University of Toronto, and then post-doc studies in quasars at Caltech in Pasadena, California.

Mr. Ross's parents were upright, moral people, but non-religious. His neighbors were the same, and not only did Mr. Ross not know any Christians while he was growing up, he didn't know any serious followers of any religion. Nevertheless, his studies in physics and astronomy led him to believe that the steady-state theory of the universe didn't make sense, but that the universe must have had some sort of a big bang-type of beginning. A beginning necessitated a Beginner. By age fifteen, Mr. Ross didn't doubt God's existence, but he was a deist: he believed, as Albert Einstein did, that an impersonal God, distant and uncommunicative, invented physics and mathematics and got the universe rolling billions of years ago, and then just left things to work out on their own. "Surely," Mr. Ross reasoned, "a God who built a universe of more than ten-billion-trillion stars would not concern Himself with events on an insignificant speck of dust we call Earth" (The Creator and the Cosmos).

His high school history studies disturbed Mr. Ross, because he could see that people of the world took their religion seriously. He looked for insights from philosophers of the European Enlightenment, who he knew disdained religion. Instead of strong arguments against faith from their works, however, he found circular reasoning and inconsistencies. He decided he needed to do some first-source study, so started reading the holy books of the world's major religions. He reasoned that if God the Creator was communicating through any of these books, the communication would be as consistent as the facts of nature, His supposed creation. In the first few books he tried, his hunch that these religions were man-made were confirmed: he found statements contrary to established history and science, and a vague, esoteric writing style.

Then he opened a Bible. He tells in The Creator and the Cosmos how noticeably different he found it: "It was simple, direct, and specific. I was amazed at the quantity of historical and scientific (i.e., testable) material it included and at the detail of this material." Genesis 1 especially caught his attention: "Instead of another bizarre creation myth, here was a journal-like record of the earth's initial conditions – correctly described from the standpoint of astrophysics and geophysics – followed by a summary of the sequence of changes through which Earth came to be inhabited by living things and ultimately by humans. The account was simple, elegant, and scientifically accurate." Mr. Ross was amazed.

For the next eighteen months Mr. Ross set himself the task of searching for scientific and historical inaccuracies in the Bible, reading it for about an hour every day. At the end of that time he had not found a single provable error and, though he didn't necessarily understand everything, he was impressed with how much of the Bible he could understand.

Though he had proven to himself that the Bible was reliable – even more so statistically than many of the laws of physics, though he believed his only rational option was to trust the Bible's authority, he was afraid of the contempt and mockery he was sure would come if he placed his faith in Christ. For months he struggled with confusion and, for the first time in his life, he had difficulty in his schoolwork.

Finally, Mr. Ross realized that his pride was holding him back. He humbled himself and invited Jesus Christ into his life as his Lord and Savior.

Lee Strobel

The Yale Law School-educated author of The Case for Christ was legal journalist (later, legal editor) for the Chicago Tribune and an avowed atheist. Mr. Strobel's atheism had come in three stages. When he was in junior high he began asking Christians hard questions such as why a loving God could allow so much suffering in the world or send people to hell, and how Jesus could be the only way to God. The Christians he knew only avoided the questions, and Mr. Strobel concluded that there must not be any good answers.

As part of his high school biology studies he was particularly struck by Stanley Miller's 1959 experiment that created some amino acids, the building blocks of life, by simulating a lightning strike in what he assumed was the original atmosphere of the earth. Mr. Strobel concluded that if life could be formed in a completely naturalistic way, there was no need for God. He began to consider himself an atheist.

In college he took a religion course, and was taught, and came to believe, that the New Testament was a completely unreliable document. He read books by prominent atheists, which gave him a more systematic basis for his belief that there was no God. His atheism was confirmed. (Mr. Strobel does admit, however, that his reasons for becoming an atheist were not entirely intellectual. He enjoyed his immoral lifestyle and didn't want to be bothered with any God that might exist.)

Mr. Strobel's work for the Chicago Tribune brought him into the disturbing subculture of the criminal court system and the Cook County Jail. He heard story after story of violent crime, and eventually became hardened to the suffering he saw.

A number of years into his work as a legal writer, he was covering the case of a street thug who at age twenty-one had shot a rival gang member in the back, nearly killing him. What was unusual about the story was that, after successfully eluding capture for two years, the thug turned himself in and pled guilty to attempted murder. While on the run, this man, whose name was Ronnie Bronski, had come to know Jesus Christ. As he grew in his faith, he realized he would never have complete peace of mind until he confessed to the authorities what he had done. He scraped together the cash for a bus ticket and went back to Chicago.

The journalist was intrigued, and couldn't figure out what had caused this man to change. Ronnie Bronski's story stuck in his head, and then, four years later, Mr. Strobel's wife converted to Christianity. Though he was deeply troubled by her decision at first, Mr. Strobel began to see subtle but winsome changes in her. He went to church with her and heard the gospel explained in a very clear way. He realized, if it was true, it would have huge implications for his life.

Mr. Strobel decided to use his journalism experience and legal expertise to investigate the credibility of the Christian claims. For almost two years he delved into science, philosophy, and history. He read literature on both sides of the issue, he interrogated experts, and he studied archaeology. Finally, almost thirty years of age, he realized that in light of the scientific evidence that points toward a Creator and the historical evidence for the resurrection of Jesus, it required more faith for him to remain an atheist than to become a Christian.

Mr. Strobel had investigated the claims of Christianity to disprove it, but ultimately became convinced himself. He later became an ordained pastor and is now one of the great apologists of the Christian faith.

I saved the best for last: C.S. Lewis, considered by many to be the greatest Christian apologist of the twentieth century. Mr. Lewis, born in Belfast, Ireland, in 1898, was a professor of English Literature at Oxford University for nearly thirty years, and served as chair of Medieval and Renaissance Literature at Cambridge University for nine years until his death in 1963. He was a prolific and versatile writer, penning works in multiple genres for varied age groups – from The Chronicles of Narnia to Mere Christianity.

Mr. Lewis was baptized into the Church of Ireland (Anglican), but when he was nine years old he began to question God's goodness: it was that year that, despite his fervent prayers, his mother died of cancer. By the age of twelve, Mr. Lewis abandoned Christianity altogether, and became interested in the occult. His education continued, giving him a love of Greek mythology and literature and training in debate and critical reasoning. As he prepared to start at Oxford University on a full scholarship, he was drafted into the army. His time in the front-line trenches of World War I, and the death of two close friends by friendly fire, only served to entrench him further into atheism.

After the war, Mr. Lewis returned to Oxford, where he received three degrees – in classics, literature and philosophy. Not surprisingly, he was a great reader; to his great shock, the authors he most enjoyed were Christians, with perhaps G.K. Chesterton being the uppermost. He accepted a teaching position at Oxford, where in 1926 he became friends with J.R.R. Tolkien, a believer in Jesus Christ who was later to pen The Lord of the Rings. Mr. Lewis began to reconsider his belief that there was no God.

Slowly Mr. Lewis moved from atheism, through a period of agnosticism, and into simple theism, believing that God was real, but couldn't be known personally. He considered that, though God may have created man, man could no more know God than Hamlet could know Shakespeare. As time went on he realized his analogy could be looked at another way: though Hamlet couldn't break out of the play to get to know Shakespeare, Shakespeare could write himself into the play and be both author and a character within the play. This, he considered, was in essence what had happened in the Incarnation. Finally, "kicking, struggling, resentful, and darting his eyes in every direction for a chance to escape," in his early thirties Mr. Lewis knelt and prayed to receive Christ, "perhaps...the most dejected and reluctant convert in all England" (Surprised by Joy).

Four men, four atheists, looked at the evidence and chose to believe in God. The obvious rebuttal to my argument is to list all the atheists who still don't believe. But that's to miss the point. These four men were willing to look at the evidence in an unbiased fashion and let it lead them on a path to truth.

In a sense, that's all that God asks of each of us.

Ask, and it will be given to you; seek, and you will find; knock, and it will be opened to you. For everyone who asks receives, and he who seeks finds, and to him who knocks it will be opened. (Matthew 7:7-8)

Suggested Reading :

The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief, Francis S. Collins

The Creator and the Cosmos: How the Greatest Scientific Discoveries of the Century Reveal God, Hugh Ross

The Case for Christ: A Journalist's Personal Investigation of the Evidence for Jesus, Lee Strobel

Surprised by Joy: The Shape of My Early Life, C.S. Lewis

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How Do You Explain Why You Believe in God?

By bishop jeffrey monforton  .

Bishop Jeffrey M. Monforton is the bishop of Steubenville, Ohio. He is the former rector of Sacred Heart Major Seminary in Detroit.  Ask the Bishop  began as an initiative in Bishop Monforton’s diocesan newspaper, where children of all ages could write in questions about the faith and receive a response from the Bishop.

That is a question that has been asked throughout the ages. We know that faith is a gift from God. And that very gift of God is meant to be nurtured in our lives, especially through prayer and the reception of the sacraments.   

From the moment I was very small I believed in God, but it was necessary for my faith in God to grow. Moreover, my love for Jesus deepened as I continued to progress in my knowledge that Jesus is always with me and has given his life for me in order that I may be one with him.   

I believe in God because I lovingly respond to God’s invitation to believe in him. There is nothing magical about this, for it is completely real. I love God dearly and I wish to learn more about him each and every day, and I do so by doing my very best, through God’s grace, to imitate him. My belief in God is not governed by “have to,” but instead, “I want to.” Jesus invites, and I respond.   

We all are aware of our family members and friends who possess varying degrees of faith, from what may seem to be very little to an extraordinary amount. I believe in God, of course, as he has invited me into his life, and I respond with inviting God into mine.   

As you and I have learned from our relationships with family and friends, we want to have faith in them as well. And at times, it takes much work to foster or grow those relationships. In the end it is that love and friendship that governs our belief in one another and, most importantly, our belief in God. As we read in the Gospel according to John, “God so loved the world that he gave his only Son”  (Jn  3:16).   

How can you and I not wish to learn more about our best friend, Jesus, who gave his entire life in order that you and I may spend all eternity with him? I believe in God because I love God. I believe in God because I want to learn more about God. I believe in God because God wants me to dwell with him forever, and it begins with you and me allowing God into our lives now.  

We live in an era where secularism has become a religion to some. Even worse, secular relativism has compromised the very fabric of our culture. However, before I get further onto my preaching pedestal, I will designate that subject to another time.   

What I have done is set the stage, recognizing that we live in a world where people have lost or at the very least dampened their belief in a loving God. In your question, I suspect you are referring mostly to atheists, as well as agnostics—those who either believe there is no God or believe in a disinterested God who cares little about our destiny. As Christians, we recognize the fact that God created the world and that Jesus Christ, Son of God the Father, came to us and, as a result, suffered, died, and rose from the dead for you and for me. In other words, God does care.   

As one who enjoyed science as a youth, I am edified to see the workings of God, especially through our scientific knowledge. We have among us priests and religious who, prior to entering the convent, friary, monastery, or seminary, worked in scientific fields such as in medicine, astrophysics, and engineering. When these individuals recognized their sacred vocation, they did not simply devalue or renounce their scientific background, but actually have fortified the Church with the appreciation of the created world.  

 You ask how we may prove to a realist that God is real. While faith is the beginning of our spiritual pilgrimage, some people may possess little or no faith in the living God. Loving compassion (and not pity) should rule our response to their inquiry about God. Perhaps we can begin by referring to certain stories in the Bible, beginning with the Good News of Jesus and his love for us. The Bible is more than a story about us. The Bible is the living Word of God. We encounter God. You may ask the person what keeps them from believing in God or, better yet, you may live your faith for all to see. Not in a boastful way, but live in a manner that others see you would like to share the Good News, while respecting where others may be in their journey here on Earth. As Pope Francis mentions time and time again, our encounter with others must begin with compassion and mercy.   

We all are invited to be realists, for the reality is Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, today, and forever. The reality is God so loved the world that he sent us his only Son. God loves us more than you and I can imagine.  

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Questions about the Catholic faith deserve serious answers—especially when they are posed by children. In  Ask the Bishop , Bishop Jeffrey Monforton thoughtfully responds to important questions asked by kindergarteners through high schoolers.

By BGEA Admin   •   July 13, 2021   •   Topics: Faith , God

There is a lot said about people of faith, yet I have many friends who say they have faith but they cannot identify “faith in what or in whom.” Some say it is just believing that there is a greater power than mankind. What is the truth?

From the writings of the Rev. Billy Graham

Having faith in God the Creator of the world is not simply education or experience. The Bible begins with the simple words: “In the beginning God … ”  These four words are the cornerstone of all existence and of all human history. God is not just “a power.” He is the source of all things. He is the beginning and the end.

Without God, there could have been no beginning and no continuing. God indeed was the creating power. By divine fiat, He brought form out of shapelessness, order out of disorder, and light out of darkness.

God cannot be rationalized—to try is to fail. There are mysteries about God that we will never understand in this life. We should not think it strange that it is impossible to comprehend God intellectually, when it is equally impossible to explain many mysteries in the realm of matter. Who can fathom the law of gravity? Newton discovered it, but he could not explain it.

There are many arguments we could marshal to give evidence of the existence of God. We see objects that have no intellect, such as stars and planets, moving in a consistent pattern, cooperating with one another. Hence, it is evident that they achieve their movements not by accident, but by design. If God can be fully proved by the human mind, then He is no greater than the mind that proves Him. Cry out to God, “Lord … help my unbelief!” (Mark 9:24). There is only one God, and He wants everyone to come to Him and be saved.

(This column is based on the words and writings of the late Rev. Billy Graham.)

Ask God to be your Lord and Savior. Pray now.

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Apologetics

Why i believe in god by cornelius van til.

You have noticed, haven’t you, that in recent times certain scientists like Dr. James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington, as well as some outstanding philosophers like Dr. C.E.M. Joad, have had a good deal to say about religion and God? Scientists Jeans and Eddington are ready to admit that there may be something to the claims of men who say they have had an experience of God, while Philosopher Joad says that the “obtrusiveness of evil” has virtually compelled him to look into the argument for God’s existence afresh. Much like modernist theologian Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr who talks about original sin, Philosopher Joad speaks about evil as being ineradicable from the human mind.

Then, too, you have on occasion asked yourself whether death ends all. You have recalled, perhaps, how Socrates the great Greek philosopher, struggled with that problem the day before he drank the hemlock cup. Is there anything at all, you ask yourself, to the idea of a judgement after death? Am I quite sure, you say, that there is not? How do I know that there is no God?

In short, as a person of intelligence, having a sense of responsibility, you have from time to time asked yourself some questions about the foundation of your thought and action. You have looked into, or at least been concerned about, what the philosophers call your theory of reality . So when I suggest that you spend a Sunday afternoon with me discussing my reasons for believing in God, I have the feeling that you are basically interested in what I am proposing for discussion.

To make our conversation more interesting, let’s start by comparing notes on our past. That will fit in well with our plan, for the debate concerning heredity and environment is prominent in our day. Perhaps you think that the only real reason I have for believing in God is the fact that I was taught to do so in my early days. Of course I don’t think that is really so. I don’t deny that I was taught to believe in God when I was a child, but I do affirm that since I have grown up I have heard a pretty full statement of the argument against belief in God. And it is after having heard that argument that I am more than ever ready to believe in God. Now, in fact, I feel that the whole of history and civilization would be unintelligible to me if it were not for my belief in God. So true is this, that I propose to argue that unless God is back of everything, you cannot find meaning in anything. I cannot even argue for belief in Him, without already having taken Him for granted. And similarly I contend that you cannot argue against belief in Him unless you also first take Him for granted. Arguing about God’s existence, I hold, is like arguing about air. You may affirm that air exists, and I that it does not. But as we debate the point, we are both breathing air all the time. Or to use another illustration, God is like the emplacement on which must stand the very guns that are supposed to shoot Him out of existence. However if, after hearing my story briefly, you still think it is all a matter of heredity and environment, I shall not disagree too violently. My whole point will be that there is perfect harmony between my belief as a child and my belief as a man, simply because God is Himself the environment by which my early life was directed and my later life made intelligible to myself.

The “Accident of Birth”

We are frequently told that much in our life depends on “the accident of birth”. In ancient time some men were said to spring full-grown from the foreheads of the gods. That, at any rate, is not true today. Yet I understand the next best thing happened to you. You were born, I am told, in Washington, D.C., under the shadow of the White House. Well, I was born in a little thatched roof house with a cow barn attached, in Holland. You wore “silver slippers” and I wore wooden shoes.

Is this really important for our purpose? Not particularly, but it is important that neither of us was born in Guadalcanal or Timbuktu. Both of us, I mean, were born in the midst and under the influence of “Christian civilization.” We shall limit our discussion, then, to the “God of Christianity.” I believe, while you do not believe or are not sure that you do believe, in this particular kind of God. That will give point to our discussion. For surely there is no sense in talking about the existence of God, without knowing what kind of God it is who may or may not exist.

So much then we have gained. We at least know in general what sort of God we are going to make the subject for our conversation. If now we can come to a similar preliminary agreement as to the standard or test by which to prove or disprove God’s existence, we can proceed. You, of course, do not expect me to bring God into the room here so that you may see Him. If I were able to do that, He would not be the God of Christianity. All that you expect me to do is to make it reasonable for you to believe in God. And I should like to respond quickly by saying that that is just what I am trying to do. But a moment’s thought makes me hesitate. If you really do not believe in God, then you naturally do not believe that you are his creature. I, on the other hand, who do believe in God also believe, naturally, that it is reasonable for God’s creature to believe in God. So I can only undertake to show that, even if it does not appear reasonable to you, it is reasonable for you, to believe in God.

I see you are getting excited. You feel a little like a man who is about to undergo a major operation. You realize that if you are to change your belief about God, you will also have to change your belief about yourself. And you are not quite ready for that. Well, you may leave if you desire. I certainly do not wish to be impolite. I only thought that as an intelligent person you would be willing to hear the “other side” of the question. And after all I am not asking you to agree with what I say. We have not really agreed on what we mean by God more than in a general and formal way. So also we need not at this point agree on the standard or test in more than a general or formal way. You might follow my argument, just for argument’s sake.

To go on, then, I can recall playing as a child in a sandbox built into a corner of the hay-barn. From the hay-barn I would go through the cow-barn to the house. Built into the hay- barn too, but with doors opening into the cow-barn, was a bed for the working-man. How badly I wanted permission to sleep in that bed for a night! Permission was finally given. Freud was still utterly unknown to me, but I had heard about ghosts and “forerunners of death.” That night I heard the cows jingle their chains. I knew there were cows and that they did a lot of jingling with their chains, but after a while I was not quite certain that it was only the cows that made all the noises I heard. Wasn’t there someone walking down the aisle back of the cows, and wasn’t he approaching my bed? Already I had been taught to say my evening prayers. Some of the words of that prayer were to this effect: “Lord, convert me, that I may be converted.” Unmindful of the paradox, I prayed that prayer that night as I had never prayed before.

I do not recall speaking either to my father or mother about my distress. They would have been unable to provide the modern remedy. Psychology did not come to their library table — not even The Ladies Home Journal ! Yet I know what they would have said. Of course there were no ghosts, and certainly I should not be afraid anyway, since with body and soul I belonged to my Savior who died for me on the Cross and rose again that His people might be saved from hell and go to heaven! I should pray earnestly and often that the Holy Spirit might give me a new heart so that I might truly love God instead of sin and myself.

How do I know that this is the sort of thing they would have told me? Well, that was the sort of thing they spoke about from time to time. Or rather, that was the sort of thing that constituted the atmosphere of our daily life. Ours was not in any sense a pietistic family. There were not any great emotional outbursts on any occasion that I recall. There was much ado about making hay in the summer and about caring for the cows and sheep in the winter, but round about it all there was a deep conditioning atmosphere. Though there were no tropical showers of revivals, the relative humidity was always very high. At every meal the whole family was present. There was a closing as well as an opening prayer, and a chapter of the Bible was read each time. The Bible was read through from Genesis to Revelation. At breakfast or at dinner, as the case might be, we would hear of the New Testament, or of “the children of Gad after their families, of Zephon and Haggi and Shuni and Ozni, of Eri and Areli.” I do not claim that I always fully understood the meaning of it all. Yet of the total effect there can be no doubt. The Bible became for me, in all its parts, in every syllable, the very Word of God. I learned that I must believe the Scripture story, and that “faith” was a gift of God. What had happened in the past, and particularly what had happened in the past in Palestine, was of the greatest moment to me. In short, I was brought up in what Dr. Joad would call “topographical and temporal parochialism.” I was “conditioned” in the most thorough fashion. I could not help believing in God — in the God of Christianity — in the God of the whole Bible!

Living next to the Library of Congress, you were not so restricted. Your parents were very much enlightened in their religious views. They read to you from some Bible of the World instead of from the Bible of Palestine. No, indeed, you correct me, they did no such thing. They did not want to trouble you about religious matters in your early days. They sought to cultivate the “open mind” in their children.

Shall we say then that in my early life I was conditioned to believe in God, while you were left free to develop your own judgment as you pleased? But that will hardly do. You know as well as I that every child is conditioned by its environment. You were as thoroughly conditioned not to believe in God as I was to believe in God. So let us not call each other names. If you want to say that belief was poured down my throat, I shall retort by saying that unbelief was poured down your throat. That will get us set for our argument.

Early Schooling

To the argument we must now shortly come. Just another word, however, about my schooling. That will bring all the factors into the picture.

I was not quite five when somebody — fortunately I cannot recall who — took me to school. On the first day I was vaccinated and it hurt. I can still feel it. I had already been to church. I recall that definitely because I would sometimes wear my nicely polished leather shoes. A formula was read over me at my baptism which solemnly asserted that I had been conceived and born in sin, the idea being that my parents, like all men, had inherited sin from Adam, the first man and the representative of the human race. The formula further asserted that though thus conditioned by inescapable sin I was, as a child of the Covenant, redeemed in Christ. And at the ceremony my parents solemnly promised that as soon as I should be able to understand they would instruct me in all these matters by all the means at their disposal.

It was in pursuance of this vow that they sent me to a Christian grade school. In it I learned that my being saved from sin and my belonging to God made a difference for all that I knew or did. I saw the power of God in nature and His providence in the course of history. That gave the proper setting for my salvation, which I had in Christ. In short, the whole wide world that gradually opened up for me through my schooling was regarded as operating in its every aspect under the direction of the all-powerful and all-wise God whose child I was through Christ. I was to learn to think God’s thoughts after him in every field of endeavor.

Naturally there were fights on the “campus” of the school and I was engaged in some — though not in all — of them. Wooden shoes were wonderful weapons of war. Yet we were strictly forbidden to use them, even for defensive purposes. There were always lectures both by teachers and by parents on sin and evil in connection with our martial exploits. This was especially the case when a regiment of us went out to do battle with the pupils of the public school. The children of the public school did not like us. They had an extensive vocabulary of vituperation. Who did we think we were anyway? We were goody goodies — too good to go to the public school! “There! take that and like it!” We replied in kind. Meanwhile our sense of distinction grew by leaps and wounds. We were told in the evening that we must learn to bear with patience the ridicule of the “world.” Had not the world hated the church, since Cain’s time?

How different your early schooling was! You went to a “neutral” school. As your parents had done at home, so your teachers now did at school. They taught you to be “open-minded.” God was not brought into connection with your study of nature or history. You were trained without bias all along the line.

Of course, you know better now. You realize that all that was purely imaginary. To be “without bias” is only to have a particular kind of bias. The idea of “neutrality” is simply a colorless suit that covers a negative attitude toward God. At least it ought to be plain that he who is not for the God of Christianity is against Him. You see, the world belongs to Him, and that you are His creature, and as such are to own up to that fact by honoring Him whether you eat or drink or do anything else. God says that you live, as it were, on His estate. And His estate has large ownership signs placed everywhere, so that he who goes by even at seventy miles an hour cannot but read them. Every fact in this world, the God of the Bible claims, has His stamp indelibly engraved upon it. How then could you be neutral with respect to such a God? Do you walk about leisurely on a Fourth of July in Washington wondering whether the Lincoln Memorial belongs to anyone? Do you look at “Old Glory” waving from a high flagpole and wonder whether she stands for anything? Does she require anything of you, born an American citizen as you are? You would deserve to suffer the fate of the “man without a country” if as an American you were neutral to America. Well, in a much deeper sense you deserve to live forever without God if you do not own and glorify Him as your Creator. You dare not manipulate God’s world and least of all yourself as His image-bearer, for you own final purposes. When Eve became neutral as between God and the Devil, weighing the contentions of each as though they were inherently on the face of them of equal value, she was in reality already on the side of the devil!

There you go again getting excited once more. Sit down and calm yourself. You are open-minded and neutral are you not? And you have learned to think that any hypothesis has, as a theory of life, an equal right to be heard with any other, have you not? After all I am only asking you to see what is involved in the Christian conception of God. If the God of Christianity exists, the evidence for His existence is abundant and plain so that it is both unscientific and sinful not to believe in Him. When Dr. Joad, for example says: “The evidence for God is far from plain,” on the ground that if it were plain everybody would believe in Him, he is begging the question. If the God of Christianity does exist, the evidence for Him must be plain. And the reason, therefore, why “everybody” does not believe in Him must be that “everybody” is blinded by sin. Everybody wears colored glasses. You have heard the story of the valley of the blind. A young man who was out hunting fell over a precipice into the valley of the blind. There was no escape. The blind men did not understand him when he spoke of seeing the sun and the colors of the rainbow, but a fine young lady did understand him when he spoke the language of love. The father of the girl would not consent to the marriage of his daughter to a lunatic who spoke so often of things that did not exist. But the great psychologists of the blind men’s university offered to cure him of his lunacy by sewing up his eyelids. Then, they assured him, he would be normal like “everybody” else. But the simple seer went on protesting that he did see the sun.

So, as we have our tea, I propose not only to operate on your heart so as to change your will, but also on your eyes so as to change your outlook. But wait a minute. No, I do not propose to operate at all. I myself cannot do anything of the sort. I am just mildly suggesting that you are perhaps dead, and perhaps blind, leaving you to think the matter over for yourself. If an operation is to be performed it must be performed by God Himself.

Later Schooling

Meanwhile let us finish our story. At ten I came to this country and after some years decided to study for the ministry. This involved preliminary training at a Christian preparatory school and college. All my teachers were pledged to teach their subjects from the Christian point of view. Imagine teaching not only religion but algebra from the Christian point of view! But it was done. We were told that all facts in all their relations, numerical as well as others, are what they are because of God’s all comprehensive plan with respect to them. Thus the very definitions of things would not merely be incomplete but basically wrong if God were left out of the picture. Were we not informed about the views of others? Did we not hear about evolution and about Immanuel Kant, the great modern philosopher who had conclusively shown that all the arguments for the existence of God were invalid? Oh, yes, we heard about all these things, but there were refutations given and these refutations seemed adequate to meet the case.

In the Seminaries I attended, namely Calvin, and Princeton before its reorganization along semi-modernist lines in 1929, the situation was much the same. So for instance Dr. Robert Dick Wilson used to tell us, and, as far as we could understand the languages, show us from the documents, that the “higher critics” had done nothing that should rightfully damage our child-like faith in the Old Testament as the Word of God. Similarly Dr. J. Gresham Machen and others made good their claim that New Testament Christianity is intellectually defensible and that the Bible is right in its claims. You may judge of their arguments by reading them for yourself. In short, I heard the story of historic Christianity and the doctrine of God on which it is built over and over from every angle by those who believed it and were best able to interpret its meaning.

The telling of this story has helped, I trust, to make the basic question simple and plain. You know pretty clearly now what sort of God it is of which I am speaking to you. If my God exists it was He who was back of my parents and teachers. It was He who conditioned all that conditioned me in my early life. But then it was He also who conditioned everything that conditioned you in your early life. God, the God of Christianity, is the All-Conditioner!

As the All-Conditioner, God is the All-Conscious One. A God Who is to control all things must control them “by the counsel of His will.” If He did not do this, He would himself be conditioned. So then I hold that my belief in Him and your disbelief in Him are alike meaningless except for Him.

Objections Raised

By this time you are probably wondering whether I have really ever heard the objections which are raised against belief in such a God. Well, I think I have. I heard them from my teachers who sought to answer them. I also heard them from teachers who believed they could not be answered. While a student at Princeton Seminary I attended summer courses in the Chicago Divinity School. Naturally I heard the modern or liberal view of Scripture set forth fully there. And after graduation from the Seminary I spent two years at Princeton University for graduate work in philosophy. There the theories of modern philosophy were both expounded and defended by very able men. In short I was presented with as full a statement of the reasons for disbelief as I had been with the reasons for belief. I heard both sides fully from those who believed what they taught.

You have compelled me to say this by the look on your face. Your very gestures suggest that you cannot understand how any one acquainted with the facts and arguments presented by modern science and philosophy can believe in a God who really created the world, who really directs all things in the world by a plan to the ends He has in view for them. Well, I am only one of many who hold to the old faith in full view of what is said by modern science, modern philosophy, and modern Biblical criticism.

Obviously I cannot enter into a discussion of all the facts and all the reasons urged against belief in God. There are those who have made the Old Testament, as there are those who have made the New Testament, their life-long study. It is their works you must read for a detailed refutation of points of Biblical criticism. Others have specialized in physics and biology. To them I must refer you for a discussion of the many points connected with such matters as evolution. But there is something that underlies all these discussions. And it is with that something that I now wish to deal.

You may think I have exposed myself terribly. Instead of talking about God as something vague and indefinite, after the fashion of the modernist, the Barthians, and the mystic, a god so empty of content and remote from experience as to make no demands upon men, I have loaded down the idea of God with “antiquated” science and “contradictory” logic. It seems as though I have heaped insult upon injury by presenting the most objectionable sort of God I could find. It ought to be very easy for you to prick my bubble. I see you are ready to read over my head bushels of facts taken from the standard college texts on physics, biology, anthropology, and psychology, or to crush me with your sixty-ton tanks taken from Kant’s famous book, The Critique of Pure Reason . But I have been under these hot showers now a good many times. Before you take the trouble to open the faucet again there is a preliminary point I want to bring up. I have already referred to it when we were discussing the matter of test or standard.

The point is this. Not believing in God, we have seen , you do not think yourself to be God’s creature. And not believing in God you do not think the universe has been created by God. That is to say, you think of yourself and the world as just being there. Now if you actually are God’s creature, then your present attitude is very unfair to Him. In that case it is even an insult to Him. And having insulted God, His displeasure rests upon you. God and you are not on “speaking terms.” And you have very good reasons for trying to prove that He does not exist. If He does exist, He will punish you for your disregard of Him. You are therefore wearing colored glasses. And this determines everything you say about the facts and reasons for not believing in Him. You have had your picnics and hunting parties there without asking His permission. You have taken the grapes of God’s vineyard without paying Him any rent and you have insulted His representatives who asked you for it.

I must make an apology to you at this point. We who believe in God have not always made this position plain. Often enough we have talked with you about facts and sound reasons as though we agreed with you on what these really are. In our arguments for the existence of God we have frequently assumed that you and we together have an area of knowledge on which we agree. But we really do not grant that you see any fact in any dimension of life truly. We really think you have colored glasses on your nose when you talk about chickens and cows, as well as when you talk about the life hereafter. We should have told you this more plainly than we did. But we were really a little ashamed of what would appear to you as a very odd or extreme position. We were so anxious not to offend you that we offended our own God. But we dare no longer present our God to you as smaller or less exacting than He really is. He wants to be presented as the All-Conditioner, as the emplacement on which even those who deny Him must stand.

Now in presenting all your facts and reasons to me, you have assumed that such a God does not exist. You have taken for granted that you need no emplacement of any sort outside of yourself. You have assumed the autonomy of your own experience. Consequently you are unable — that is, unwilling — to accept as a fact any fact that would challenge your self-sufficiency. And you are bound to call that contradictory which does not fit into the reach of your intellectual powers. You remember what old Procrustes did. If his visitors were too long, he cut off a few slices at each end; if they were too short, he used the curtain stretcher on them. It is that sort of thing I feel that you have done with every fact of human experience. And I am asking you to be critical of this your own most basic assumption. Will you not go into the basement of your own experience to see what has been gathering there while you were busy here and there with the surface inspection of life? You may be greatly surprised at what you find there.

To make my meaning clearer, I shall illustrate what I have said by pointing out how modern philosophers and scientists handle the facts and doctrines of Christianity.

Basic to all the facts and doctrines of Christianity and therefore involved in the belief in God, is the creation doctrine. Now modern philosophers and scientists as a whole claim that to hold such a doctrine or to believe in such a fact is to deny our own experience. They mean this not merely in the sense that no one was there to see it done, but in the more basic sense that it is logically impossible. They assert that it would break the fundamental laws of logic.

The current argument against the creation doctrine derives from Kant. It may fitly be expressed in the words of a more recent philosopher, James Ward: “If we attempt to conceive of God apart from the world, there is nothing to lead us on to creation” ( Realm of Ends , p. 397). That is to say, if God is to be connected to the universe at all, he must be subject to its conditions. Here is the old creation doctrine. It says that God has caused the world to come into existence. But what do we mean by the word “cause”? In our experience, it is that which is logically correlative to the word “effect”. If you have an effect you must have a cause and if you have a cause you must have an effect. If God caused the world, it must therefore have been because God couldn’t help producing an effect. And so the effect may really be said to be the cause of the cause. Our experience can therefore allow for no God other than one that is dependent upon the world as much as the world is dependent upon Him.

The God of Christianity cannot meet these requirements of the autonomous man. He claims to be all-sufficient. He claims to have created the world, not from necessity but from His free will. He claims not to have changed in Himself when He created the world. His existence must therefore be said to be impossible and the creation doctrine must be said to be an absurdity.

The doctrine of providence is also said to be at variance with experience. This is but natural. One who rejects creation must logically also reject providence. If all things are controlled by God’s providence, we are told, there can be nothing new and history is but a puppet dance.

You see then that I might present to you great numbers of facts to prove the existence of God. I might say that every effect needs a cause. I might point to the wonderful structure of the eye as evidence of God’s purpose in nature. I might call in the story of mankind through the past to show that it has been directed and controlled by God. All these evidences would leave you unaffected. You would simply say that however else we may explain reality, we cannot bring in God. Cause and purpose, you keep repeating, are words that we human beings use with respect to things around us because they seem to act as we ourselves act, but that is as far as we can go.

And when the evidence for Christianity proper is presented to you the procedure is the same. If I point out to you that the prophecies of Scripture have been fulfilled, you will simply reply that it quite naturally appears that way to me and to others, but that in reality it is not possible for any mind to predict the future from the past. If it were, all would again be fixed and history would be without newness and freedom.

Then if I point to the many miracles, the story is once more the same. To illustrate this point I quote from the late Dr. William Adams Brown, an outstanding modernist theologian. “Take any of the miracles of the past,” says Brown, “The virgin birth, the raising of Lazarus, the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Suppose that you can prove that these events happened just as they are claimed to have happened. What have you accomplished? You have shown that our previous view of the limits of the possible needs to be enlarged; that our former generalizations were too narrow and need revision; that problems cluster about the origin of life and its renewal of which we had hitherto been unaware. But the one thing which you have not shown, which indeed you cannot show, is that a miracle has happened; for that is to confess that these problems are inherently insoluble, which cannot be determined until all possible tests have been made” ( God at Work , New York, 1933, p. 169). You see with what confidence Brown uses this weapon of logical impossibility against the idea of a miracle. Many of the older critics of Scripture challenged the evidence for miracle at this point or at that. They made as it were a slow, piece-meal land invasion of the island of Christianity. Brown, on the other hand, settles the matter at once by a host of stukas from the sky. Any pill boxes that he cannot destroy immediately, he will mop up later. He wants to get rapid control of the whole field first. And this he does by directly applying the law of non-contradiction. Only that is possible, says Brown, in effect, which I can show to be logically related according to my laws of logic. So then if miracles want to have scientific standing, that is be recognized as genuine facts, they must sue for admittance at the port of entry to the mainland of scientific endeavor. And admission will be given as soon as they submit to the little process of generalization which deprives them of their uniqueness. Miracles must take out naturalization papers if they wish to vote in the republic of science and have any influence there.

Take now the four points I have mentioned — creation, providence, prophecy, and miracle. Together they represent the whole of Christian theism. Together they include what is involved in the idea of God and what He has done round about and for us. Many times over and in many ways the evidence for all these has been presented. But you have an always available and effective answer at hand. It is impossible! It is impossible! You act like a postmaster who has received a great many letters addressed in foreign languages. He says he will deliver them as soon as they are addressed in the King’s English by the people who sent them. Till then they must wait in the dead letter department. Basic to all the objections the average philosopher and scientist raises against the evidence for the existence of God is the assertion or the assumption that to accept such evidence would be to break the rules of logic.

I see you are yawning. Let us stop to eat supper now. For there is one more point in this connection that I must make. You have no doubt at some time in your life been to a dentist. A dentist drills a little deeper and then a little deeper and at last comes to the nerve of the matter.

Now before I drill into the nerve of the matter, I must again make apologies. The fact that so many people are placed before a full exposition of the evidence for God’s existence and yet do not believe in Him has greatly discouraged us. We have therefore adopted measures of despair. Anxious to win your good will, we have again compromised our God. Noting the fact that men do not see, we have conceded that what they ought to see is hard to see. In our great concern to win men we have allowed that the evidence for God’s existence is only probably compelling. And from that fatal confession we have gone one step further down to the point where we have admitted or virtually admitted that it is not really compelling at all. And so we fall back upon testimony instead of argument. After all, we say, God is not found at the end of an argument; He is found in our hearts. So we simply testify to men that once we were dead, and now we are alive, that once we were blind and that now we see, and give up all intellectual argument.

Do you suppose that our God approves of this attitude of His followers? I do not think so. The God who claims to have made all facts and to have placed His stamp upon them will not grant that there is really some excuse for those who refuse to see. Besides, such a procedure is self-defeating. If someone in your home town of Washington denied that there was any such thing as a United States Government would you take him some distance down the Potomac and testify to him that there is? So your experience and testimony of regeneration would be meaningless except for the objective truth of the objective facts that are presupposed by it. A testimony that is not an argument is not a testimony either, just as an argument that is not a testimony is not even an argument.

Waiving all this for the moment, let us see what the modern psychologist of religion, who stands on the same foundation with the philosopher, will do to our testimony. He makes a distinction between the raw datum and its cause, giving me the raw datum and keeping for himself the explanation of the cause. Professor James H. Leuba, a great psychologist of Bryn Mawr, has a procedure that is typical. He says, “The reality of any given datum — of an immediate experience in the sense in which the term is used here, may not be impugned: When I feel cold or warm, sad or gay, discouraged or confident, I am cold, sad, discouraged, etc., and every argument which might be advanced to prove to me that I am not cold is, in the nature of the case, preposterous; an immediate experience may not be controverted; it cannot be wrong.” All this seems on the surface to be very encouraging. The immigrant is hopeful of a ready and speedy admittance. However, Ellis Island must still be passed. “But if the raw data of experience are not subject to criticism, the causes ascribed to them are. If I say that my feeling of cold is due to an open window, or my state of exultation to a drug, or my renewed courage to God, my affirmation goes beyond my immediate experience; I have ascribed a cause to it, and that cause may be the right or the wrong one.” ( God or Man , New York, 1933, p. 243.) And thus the immigrant must wait at Ellis Island a million years. That is to say, I as a believer in God through Christ, assert that I am born again through the Holy Spirit. The Psychologist says that is a raw datum of experience and as such incontrovertible. We do not, he says, deny it. But it means nothing to us. If you want it to mean something to us you must ascribe a cause to your experience. We shall then examine the cause. Was your experience caused by opium or God? You say by God. Well, that is impossible since as philosophers we have shown that it is logically contradictory to believe in God. You may come back at any time when you have changed your mind about the cause of your regeneration. We shall be glad to have you and welcome you as a citizen of our realm, if only you take out your naturalization papers!

We seem now to have come to a pretty pass. We agreed at the outset to tell each other the whole truth. If I have offended you it has been because I dare not, even in the interest of winning you, offend my God. And if I have not offended you I have not spoken of my God. For what you have really done in your handling of the evidence for belief in God, is to set yourself up as God. You have made the reach of your intellect, the standard of what is possible or not possible. You have thereby virtually determined that you intend never to meet a fact that points to God. Facts, to be facts at all — facts, that is, with decent scientific and philosophic standing — must have your stamp instead of that of God upon them as their virtual creator.

Of course I realize full well that you do not pretend to create redwood trees and elephants. But you do virtually assert that redwood trees and elephants cannot be created by God. You have heard of the man who never wanted to see or be a purple cow. Well, you have virtually determined that you never will see or be a created fact. With Sir Arthur Eddington you say as it were, “What my net can’t catch isn’t fish.”

Nor do I pretend, of course, that once you have been brought face to face with this condition, you can change your attitude. No more than the Ethiopian can change his skin or the leopard his spots can you change your attitude. You have cemented your colored glasses to your face so firmly that you cannot even take them off when you sleep. Freud has not even had a glimpse of the sinfulness of sin as it controls the human heart. Only the great Physician through His blood atonement on the Cross and by the gift of His Spirit can take those colored glasses off and make you see facts as they are, facts as evidence, as inherently compelling evidence, for the existence of God.

It ought to be pretty plain now what sort of God I believe in. It is God, the All-Conditioner. It is the God who created all things, Who by His providence conditioned my youth, making me believe in Him, and who in my later life by His grace still makes me want to believe in Him. It is the God who also controlled your youth and so far has apparently not given you His grace that you might believe in Him.

You may reply to this: “Then what’s the use of arguing and reasoning with me?” Well, there is a great deal of use in it. You see, if you are really a creature of God, you are always accessible to Him. When Lazarus was in the tomb he was still accessible to Christ who called him back to life. It is this on which true preachers depend. The prodigal [son] thought he had clean escaped from the father’s influence. In reality the father controlled the “far country” to which the prodigal had gone. So it is in reasoning. True reasoning about God is such as stands upon God as upon the emplacement that alone gives meaning to any sort of human argument. And such reasoning, we have a right to expect, will be used of God to break down the one-horse chaise of human autonomy.

But now I see you want to go home. And I do not blame you; the last bus leaves at twelve. I should like to talk again another time. I invite you to come to dinner next Sunday. But I have pricked your bubble, so perhaps you will not come back. And yet perhaps you will. That depends upon the Father’s pleasure. Deep down in your heart you know very well that what I have said about you is true. You know there is no unity in your life. You want no God who by His counsel provides for the unity you need. Such a God, you say, would allow for nothing new. So you provide your own unity. But this unity must, by your own definition, not kill that which is wholly new. Therefore it must stand over against the wholly new and never touch it at all. Thus by your logic you talk about possibles and impossibles, but all this talk is in the air. By your own standards it can never have anything to do with reality. Your logic claims to deal with eternal and changeless matters; and your facts are wholly changing things; and “never the twain shall meet.” So you have made nonsense of your own experience. With the prodigal you are at the swine-trough, but it may be that, unlike the prodigal, you will refuse to return to the father’s house.

On the other hand by my belief in God I do have unity in my experience. Not of course the sort of unity that you want. Not a unity that is the result of my own autonomous determination of what is possible. But a unity that is higher than mine and prior to mine. On the basis of God’s counsel I can look for facts and find them without destroying them in advance. On the basis of God’s counsel I can be a good physicist, a good biologist, a good psychologist, or a good philosopher. In all these fields I use my powers of logical arrangement in order to see as much order in God’s universe as it may be given a creature to see. The unities, or systems that I make are true because [they are] genuine pointers toward the basic or original unity that is found in the counsel of God.

Looking about me I see both order and disorder in every dimension of life. But I look at both of them in the light of the Great Orderer Who is back of them. I need not deny either of them in the interest of optimism or in the interest of pessimism. I see the strong men of biology searching diligently through hill and dale to prove that the creation doctrine is not true with respect to the human body, only to return and admit that the missing link is missing still. I see the strong men of psychology search deep and far into the sub-consciousness, child and animal consciousness, in order to prove that the creation and providence doctrines are not true with respect to the human soul, only to return and admit that the gulf between human and animal intelligence is as great as ever. I see the strong men of logic and scientific methodology search deep into the transcendental for a validity that will not be swept away by the ever-changing tide of the wholly new, only to return and say that they can find no bridge from logic to reality, or from reality to logic. And yet I find all these, though standing on their heads, reporting much that is true. I need only to turn their reports right side up, making God instead of man the center of it all, and I have a marvelous display of the facts as God has intended me to see them.

And if my unity is comprehensive enough to include the efforts of those who reject it, it is large enough even to include that which those who have been set upright by regeneration cannot see. My unity is that of a child who walks with its father through the woods. The child is not afraid because its father knows it all and is capable of handling every situation. So I readily grant that there are some “difficulties” with respect to belief in God and His revelation in nature and Scripture that I cannot solve. In fact there is mystery in every relationship with respect to every fact that faces me, for the reason that all facts have their final explanation in God Whose thoughts are higher than my thoughts, and Whose ways are higher than my ways. And it is exactly that sort of God that I need. Without such a God, without the God of the Bible, the God of authority, the God who is self-contained and therefore incomprehensible to men, there would be no reason in anything. No human being can explain in the sense of seeing through all things, but only he who believes in God has the right to hold that there is an explanation at all.

So you see when I was young I was conditioned on every side; I could not help believing in God. Now that I am older I still cannot help believing in God. I believe in God now because unless I have Him as the All-Conditioner, life is Chaos.

I shall not convert you at the end of my argument. I think the argument is sound. I hold that belief in God is not merely as reasonable as other belief, or even a little or infinitely more probably true than other belief; I hold rather that unless you believe in God you can logically believe in nothing else. But since I believe in such a God, a God who has conditioned you as well as me, I know that you can to your own satisfaction, by the help of the biologists, the psychologists, the logicians, and the Bible critics reduce everything I have said this afternoon and evening to the circular meanderings of a hopeless authoritarian. Well, my meanderings have, to be sure, been circular; they have made everything turn on God. So now I shall leave you with Him, and with His mercy.

Copyright © 1996 Jonathan Barlow All Rights Reserved

Converted to the electronic domain and into html format by Jonathan Barlow. Some typographical corrections have been made. The original citation for this essay, published as a pamphlet, was:

Van Til, Cornelius. Why I Believe in God. Philadelphia: Committe on Christian Education, Orthodox Presbyterian Church, n.d.

Refer to this version as:

Van Til, Cornelius. Why I Believe in God. Reformed.org, 1996, Barlow, Jonathan ed.

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1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology

Philosophy, One Thousand Words at a Time

Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God

Author: Liz Jackson Categories: Philosophy of Religion , Epistemology , Historical Philosophy , Logic and Reasoning Word Count: 996

Should you believe there’s a God?

To answer this, we might examine arguments for theism—like first-cause and design arguments—and arguments for atheism—like arguments from evil. These arguments offer evidence for and against God’s existence. [1]

Pascal’s wager , originally proposed by Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), takes a more pragmatic approach. Pascal thought that evidence cannot settle the question of whether God exists, so he proposes that you should bet, or wager , on God because of what’s at stake: you have lots to gain and not much to lose . [2]

1.The Basic Argument

The basic form of the wager goes like this:

If God exists and I believe in God, I’ll go to heaven, which is infinitely good. If God exists and I don’t believe in God, I may go to hell, which is infinitely bad. If God does not exist, then whether I believe in God or not, whatever I’d gain or lose would be finite. So, I should believe in God.

The argument depends on the expected value of believing in God, which we use to make a decision if we’re not certain whether God exists. [3] This decision matrix illustrates the argument:

Even if the chance of God existing is small, as long as it is greater than zero, the expected value of believing is infinite. Combining the chart’s values with the assumption that we should pick the action with the highest expected value yields Pascal’s Wager.

While the Wager has its advocates, there are many objections. Let’s review some of the most important.

2. The Many-Gods Objection

An initial objection is that Pascal’s wager is too simplistic. There are many religions, and believing in the God of one religion might prevent gaining the infinite rewards of another religion.

To see this, let’s consider just adding two religions—Christianity and Islam—to our decision matrix. Assuming the probabilities of Christianity, Islam, and atheism are greater than zero, we get confusing expected values. This is called the “many-gods” objection, illustrated by this decision matrix:

Apparently, Pascal’s wager doesn’t give us a reason to pick one religion over another, since Christianity and Islam both have the same expected value.

You might think the decision matrix tells us that believing either religion is a better bet than believing atheism. However, there’s a possibility—even if unlikely—that atheists go to heaven and theists go to hell. As long as we don’t assign this probability 0, then atheism isn’t a worse bet than believing a religion. Thus, all options seem to have the same expected value. [4]

A common response to the many-gods objection can be summarized in two words: probability matters . It matters even when dealing with infinite values.

To see why, imagine you’re given the choice between a 90% chance at an infinite good or a 10% chance at the same good. You should clearly take the 90% chance. When we apply this to Pascal’s wager, the result is that you should wager for the religion you think is most likely to be true . Christianity and Islam actually do not have the same expected value—wagering on the more probable religion gives you a higher chance at an infinite good, and so has a higher expected value. Further, since it’s unlikely that atheists and agnostics (agnostics suspend judgment on whether God exists) go to heaven and theists go to hell, Pascal’s wager implies it’s irrational to be an atheist or agnostic . [5]

3. The Impossibility Objection

A second objection is that wagering is impossible, because we can’t form beliefs simply for their benefits: if I offer you $1,000,000 to believe that 1+1=3, you probably still can’t believe it. Most philosophers reject doxastic voluntarism , the view that we can directly control our beliefs. [6]

In response, whether God exists isn’t obviously true or false (unlike 1+1=3), so some argue that you have more control over your religious beliefs. This might be indirect control, like the control you could exercise over your political beliefs by changing the news sources you read.

A second response—which Pascal himself favored—frames the wager in terms of action , rather than belief. The wager gives you a reason to commit to God—by going to church, praying, and immersing yourself in a religious community—rather than trying to directly believe in God. [7]

4. The Irrationality Objection

Even if it’s possible to take Pascal’s wager, that doesn’t guarantee that the beliefs formed from wagering would be rational , at least from an evidential point of view. It seems like forming a belief on the basis of a wager would violate evidentialism , the view that we should proportion our beliefs to the evidence. We should believe because of evidence, not because a belief is beneficial. [8]

In response, if your evidence for theism is permissive —meaning you could be rational as a theist, atheist, or agnostic—you can take Pascal’s wager and still respect evidentialism. This is because more than one belief-attitude fits your evidence. [9]

Also, we can again make the wager about a commitment to God, rather than about belief. Since evidentialism applies to belief and not action, you could then take the wager without violating evidentialism.

5. Conclusion

We’ve discussed the basic version of Pascal’s wager and examined three objections. The wager is unique because it leads us to consider many kinds of reasons for belief, including evidence, arguments, risks, and rewards. More specifically, even if the arguments that God exists aren’t successful, it’s interesting to consider whether we’d have a reason to believe in God anyway. [10]

[1] For an introduction to some of these arguments see Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason by Marc Bobro, The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God by Thomas Metcalf and The Problem of Evil by Thomas Metcalf, as well as other arguments for and against the existence of God in the Philosophy of Religion essay category. There are also other potential sources of evidence for God that don’t come in the form of arguments , e.g. evidence from religious experiences.

Pascal’s Wager differs from these approaches. Instead of focusing on whether it is true or false that God exists, the wager concerns whether belief in God is beneficial, or pragmatic, for the believer. Thus, the Wager is called a “pragmatic” argument, in contrast to what might be called an “evidential” argument. For comparison of these types of reasons to believe, see Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief? by Todd R. Long. 

[2] For the original version of the wager, see Pascal (1662). Pascal’s Wager generally presumes a common concept of God that is reviewed in Attributes of God by Bailie Peterson.

[3] Generally, we appeal to the expected value of actions when we don’t have certainty about the relevant probabilities. If we had certainty, we could calculate the actual value of each action; this approach tells us how to act rationally in the face of uncertainty. Therefore, Pascal’s expected value reasoning applies to anyone who is not 100% certain that God exists or 100% certain that God doesn’t exist. For an application of the concept of expected value to voting, see Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting by Thomas Metcalf.

[4] For more on this objection, see Mougin and Sober (1994).

[5] See Jackson and Rogers (2019) for development of this argument.

[6] See Alston (1988) for an argument against doxastic voluntarism.

[7] See Rota (2016) for a contemporary version of the wager that focuses on making a commitment to God.

[8] See Conee and Feldman (2004) for an explanation and defense of evidentialism .

[9] For more on permissivism, the view that one more than attitude can be rational, given a body of evidence, see Titelbaum and Kopec (2016). Permissivism doesn’t mean that more than one attitude fits your evidence in every case. Sometimes attitudes (like believing 1+1=2) are rationally required by our evidence; however, our evidence for some matters (like God’s existence) is harder to assess. See James (1896) for a pragmatic argument for belief in God that appeals to permissivism.

[10] For more on Pascal’s Wager, see Hájek (2018).

Alston, W. (1988). “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification.” Philosophical Perspectives 2: 257–299.

Conee, E. & R. Feldman. (2004). Evidentialism . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hájek, Alan, “Pascal’s Wager”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/pascal-wager/>.

Jackson, E. and A. Rogers. (2019). “Salvaging Pascal’s Wager.” Philosophia Christi 21 (1): 59–84.

James, W. (1896/1979). “The Will to Believe.” In The Will to Believe and Other Essays (F. Burkhardt et al., eds.), pp. 2–32. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kopec, M. and M. Titelbaum. (2016). “The Uniqueness Thesis.” Philosophy Compass 11(4): 189–200.

Mougin, G., and E. Sober. (1994). “Betting Against Pascal’s Wager.” Noûs 28: 382–95.

Pascal, B. (1662/1958). Pensees, trans. William Trotter. New York: J. M. Dent Co., fragments 233–241.

Rota, M. (2016). Taking Pascal’s Wager . Intervarsity Press.

For Further Exploration

Jordan, Jeff, “Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/pragmatic-belief-god/>.

Jackson, Liz (video), “Answering the Most Challenging Objections to Pascal’s Wager”.

Jackson, Liz (video), “Philosophers on Pascal’s Wager” .

Jackson, Liz (video), “Evidentialism: What Should We Believe?” .

Jackson, Liz (video), “Pascal’s Wager: A Very Basic Introduction” .

Related Essays

Attributes of God by Bailie Peterson

Agnosticism about God’s Existence by Sylwia Wilczewska

Is Immortality Desirable? by Felipe Pereira

Hell and Universalism by A.G. Holdier

Theories of Punishment  by Travis Joseph Rodgers

Hope by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale

Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief” by Spencer Case

Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?  by Todd R. Long

Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem by Kaj André Zeller

Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason by Marc Bobro

The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God by Thomas Metcalf

The Problem of Evil by Thomas Metcalf

Introduction to the Probability Calculus by Thomas Metcalf

Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge by Thomas Metcalf

The Epistemology of Disagreement by Jonathan Matheson

Bayesianism by Thomas Metcalf

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About the Author

Liz Jackson is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Ryerson University. She completed her PhD in philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. Her main philosophical interests are in epistemology and philosophy of religion. Liz-Jackson.com and youtube.com/user/lizjackson111

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The Existence of God

Other essays.

The existence and attributes of God are evident from the creation itself, even though sinful human beings suppress and distort their natural knowledge of God.

The existence of God is foundational to the study of theology. The Bible does not seek to prove God’s existence, but rather takes it for granted. Scripture expresses a strong doctrine of natural revelation: the existence and attributes of God are evident from the creation itself, even though sinful human beings suppress and distort their natural knowledge of God. The dominant question in the Old and New Testaments is not whether God is, but rather who God is. Philosophers both Christian and non-Christian have offered a wide range of arguments for God’s existence, and the discipline of natural theology (what can be known or proven about God from nature alone) is flourishing today. Some philosophers, however, have proposed that belief in God is rationally justified even without theistic arguments or evidences. Meanwhile, professing atheists have offered arguments against God’s existence; the most popular is the argument from evil, which contends that the existence and extent of evil in the world gives us good reason not to believe in God. In response, Christian thinkers have developed various theodicies, which seek to explain why God is morally justified in permitting the evils we observe.

If theology is the study of God and his works, then the existence of God is as foundational to theology as the existence of rocks is to geology. Two basic questions have been raised regarding belief in God’s existence: (1) Is it true ? (2) Is it rationally justified (and if so, on what grounds)? The second is distinct from the first because a belief can be true without being rationally justified (e.g., someone might irrationally believe that he’ll die on a Thursday, a belief that turns out by chance to be true). Philosophers have grappled with both questions for millennia. In this essay, we will consider what the Bible says in answer to these questions, before sampling the answers of some influential Christian thinkers.

Scripture and the Existence of God

The Bible opens not with a proof of God’s existence, but with a pronouncement of God’s works: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.” This foundational assertion of Scripture assumes that the reader not only knows already that God exists, but also has a basic grasp of who this God is. Throughout the Old Testament, belief in a creator God is treated as normal and natural for all human beings, even though the pagan nations have fallen into confusions about the true identity of this God. Psalm 19 vividly expresses a doctrine of natural revelation: the entire created universe ‘declares’ and ‘proclaims’ the glorious works of God. Proverbs tells us that “the fear of the Lord” is the starting point for knowledge and wisdom (Prov. 1:7; 9:10; cf. Psa. 111:10). Denying God’s existence is therefore intellectually and morally perverse (Psa. 14:1; 53:1). Indeed, the dominant concern throughout the Old Testament is not whether God is, but who God is. Is Yahweh the one true God or not (Deut. 4:35; 1Kgs. 18:21, 37, 39; Jer. 10:10)? The worldview that provides the foil for Hebrew monotheism is pagan polytheism rather than secular atheism.

This stance on the existence of God continues into the New Testament, which builds on the foundation of the uncompromising monotheism of the Old. In his epistle to the Romans, the apostle Paul insists that God’s “eternal power and divine nature” are clearly perceived from the created order itself. Objectively speaking, there can be no rational basis for doubt about the existence of a transcendent personal creator, and thus there can be no excuse for unbelief (Rom. 1:20). Endued with a natural knowledge of our creator we owe God our honor and thanks, and our failure to do so serves as the primary basis for the manifestation of God’s wrath and judgment. The apostle’s robust doctrine of natural revelation has raised the question of whether anyone can truly be an atheist. The answer will depend, first, on how “atheist” is defined, and second, on what precisely Paul means when he speaks of people “knowing” God. If the idea is that all men retain some genuine knowledge of God, despite their sinful suppression of natural revelation, it’s hard to maintain that anyone could completely lack any cognitive awareness of God’s existence. But if “atheist” is defined as someone who denies the existence of God or professes not to believe in God, Romans 1 not only allows for the existence of atheists – it effectively predicts it. Atheism might then be understood as a form of culpable self-deception.

Paul’s convictions about natural revelation are put to work in his preaching to Gentile audiences in Lystra and Athens (Acts 14:15–17; 17:22–31). Paul assumes not only that his hearers know certain things about God from the created order but also that they have sinfully suppressed and distorted these revealed truths, turning instead to idolatrous worship of the creation (cf. Rom. 1:22–25). Even so, his appeals to general revelation are never offered in isolation from special revelation: the Old Testament Scriptures, the person of Jesus Christ, and the testimony of Christ’s apostles.

Elsewhere in the New Testament, the question of the existence of God is almost never explicitly raised, but rather serves as a foundational presupposition, an unquestionable background assumption. One exception would be the writer to the Hebrews, who remarks that “whoever would draw near to God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him” (11:6). In general, the New Testament is concerned less with philosophical questions about the existence of God than with practical questions about how sinners can have a saving relationship with the God whose existence is obvious. As in the Old Testament, the pressing question is never whether God is, but who God is. Is Jesus Christ the revelation of God in human flesh or not? That’s the crux of the issue.

Arguments for the Existence of God

Consider again the two questions mentioned at the outset. (1) Is belief in God true ? (2) Is it rationally justified ? One appealing way to answer both questions affirmatively is to offer a theistic argument that seeks to infer God’s existence from other things we know, observe, or take for granted. A cogent theistic argument, one assumes, would not only demonstrate the truth of God’s existence but also provide rational justification for believing it. There is a vast literature on theistic arguments, so only a sampling of highlights can be given here.

The first generation of Christian apologists felt little need to argue for God’s existence for the same reason one finds no such arguments in the New Testament: the main challenges to Christian theism came not from atheism, but from non-Christian theism (Judaism) and pagan polytheism. Not until the medieval period do we find formal arguments for the existence of God offered, and even then the arguments do not function primarily as refutations of atheism but as philosophical meditations on the nature of God and the relationship between faith and reason.

One of the most famous and controversial is the ontological argument of St. Anselm (1033–1109) according to which God’s existence can be deduced merely from the definition of God, such that atheism leads inevitably to self-contradiction. One distinctive of the argument is that it relies on pure reason alone with no dependence on empirical premises. Various versions of the ontological argument have been developed and defended, and opinion is sharply divided even among Christian philosophers over whether there are, or even could be, any sound versions.

Cosmological arguments seek to demonstrate that that the existence of the universe, or some phenomenon within the universe, demands a causal explanation originating in a necessary first cause beyond the universe. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) famously offered “Five Ways” of demonstrating God’s existence, each of which can be understood as kind of cosmological argument. For example, one of the Five Ways argues that any motion (change) has to be explained by some mover (cause).  If that mover itself exhibits motion, there must be a prior mover to explain it, and because there cannot be an infinite regress of moved movers, there must be an original unmoved mover : an eternal, immutable, and self-existent first cause. Other notable defenders of cosmological arguments include G. W. Leibniz (1646–1716) and Samuel Clarke (1675–1729), and more recently Richard Swinburne and William Lane Craig.

Teleological arguments , which along with cosmological arguments can be traced back to the ancient Greeks, contend that God is the best explanation for apparent design or order in the universe. Simply put, design requires a designer, and thus the appearance of design in the natural world is evidence of a supernatural designer. William Paley (1743–1805) is best known for his argument from analogy which compares functional arrangements in natural organisms to those in human artifacts such as pocket watches. While design arguments suffered a setback with the rise of the Darwinian theory of evolution, which purports to explain the apparent design of organisms in terms of undirected adaptive processes, the so-called Intelligent Design Movement has reinvigorated teleological arguments with insights from contemporary cosmology and molecular biology while exposing serious shortcomings in naturalistic Darwinian explanations.

In the twentieth century, the moral argument gained considerable popularity, not least due to its deployment by C. S. Lewis (1898–1963) in his bestseller Mere Christianity . The argument typically aims to show that only a theistic worldview can account for objective moral laws and values. As with the other theistic arguments there are many different versions of the moral argument, trading on various aspects of our moral intuitions and assumptions. Since such arguments are typically premised on moral realism —the view that there are objective moral truths that cannot be reduced to mere human preferences or conventions—extra work is often required to defend such arguments in a culture where moral sensibilities have been eroded by subjectivism, relativism, and nihilism.

Cornelius Van Til (1895–1987) gained some notoriety for his forceful criticisms of the “traditional method” of Christian apologetics which capitulated to “autonomous human reason.” Van Til held that any respectable theistic argument ought to disclose the undeniability of the triune God revealed in Scripture, not merely a First Cause or Intelligent Designer. He therefore advocated an alternative approach, centered on a transcendental argument for the existence of God, whereby the Christian seeks to show that human reason, far from being autonomous and self-sufficient, presupposes the God of Christianity, the “All-Conditioner” who created, sustains, and directs all things according to the counsel of his will. As Van Til put it, we should argue “from the impossibility of the contrary”: if we deny the God of the Bible, we jettison the very grounds for assuming that our minds have the capacity for rational thought and for reliable knowledge of the world.

Since the renaissance of Christian philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century, there has been renewed interest and enthusiasm for the project of developing and defending theistic arguments. New and improved versions of the classical arguments have been offered, while developments in contemporary analytic philosophy have opened up new avenues for natural theology. In his 1986 lecture, “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments,” Alvin Plantinga sketched out an entire A to Z of arguments for God, most of which had never been previously explored. Plantinga’s suggestions have since been expanded into a book-length treatment by other philosophers. The discipline of Christian natural theology is thriving as never before.

Basic Belief in the Existence of God

Still, are any of these arguments actually needed? Does confidence about God’s existence have to be funded by philosophical proofs? Since the Enlightenment, it has often been held that belief in God is rationally justified only if it can be supported by philosophical proofs or scientific evidences. While Romans 1:18–21 has sometimes been taken as a mandate for theistic arguments, Paul’s language in that passage suggests that our knowledge of God from natural revelation is far more immediate, intuitive, and universally accessible.

In the opening chapters of his Institutes of the Christian Religion , John Calvin (1509–1564) considers what can be known of God apart from special revelation and asserts that a natural knowledge has been universally implanted in mankind by the Creator: “There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity” ( Institutes , I.3.1). Calvin speaks of a sensus divinitatis , “a sense of deity,” possessed by every single person in virtue of being created in God’s image. This internal awareness of the Creator “can never be effaced,” even though sinful men “struggle furiously” to escape it. Our implanted natural knowledge of God can be likened in some respects to our natural knowledge of the moral law through the God-given faculty of conscience (Rom. 2:14-15). We know instinctively that it’s wrong to lie and steal; no philosophical argument is needed to prove such things. Similarly, we know instinctively that there is a God who made us and to whom we owe honor and thanks.

In the 1980s, a number of Protestant philosophers led by Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and William Alston developed a sophisticated defense of Calvin’s notion of the sensus divinitatis . Dubbed the “Reformed epistemologists,” they argued that theistic beliefs can be (and normally should be) properly basic : rationally justified even without empirical evidences or philosophical proofs. On this view, believing that God exists is comparable to believing that the world of our experience really exists; it’s entirely rational, even if we can’t philosophically demonstrate it. Indeed, it would be quite dysfunctional to believe otherwise.

Arguments Against the Existence of God

Even granting that there is a universal natural knowledge of God, there are unquestionably people who deny God’s existence and offer arguments in their defense. Some have attempted to exposed contradictions within the concept of God (e.g., between omniscience and divine freedom) thereby likening God to a “square circle” whose existence is logically impossible. At most such arguments only rule out certain conceptions of God, conceptions that are often at odds with the biblical view of God in any case.

A less ambitious approach is to place the burden of proof on the theist: in the absence of good arguments for God’s existence, one ought to adopt the “default” position of atheism (or at least agnosticism). This stance is hard to maintain given the many impressive theistic arguments championed by Christian philosophers today, not to mention the Reformed epistemologists’ argument that belief in God is properly basic.

The most popular atheistic argument is undoubtedly the argument from evil. The strong version of the argument maintains that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God. The more modest version contends that particularly horrifying and seemingly gratuitous instances of evil, such as the Holocaust, provide strong evidence against God’s existence. The problem of evil has invited various theodicies : attempts to explain how God can be morally justified in permitting the evils we encounter in the world. While such explanations can be useful, they aren’t strictly necessary for rebutting the argument from evil. It is enough to point out that given the complexities of the world and the considerable limitations of human knowledge, we are in no position to conclude that God couldn’t have morally justifying reasons for allowing the evils we observe. Indeed, if we already have grounds for believing in God, we can reasonably conclude that God must have such reasons, whether or not we can discern them.

Further Reading

• James N. Anderson, “Can We Prove the Existence of God?” The Gospel Coalition , April 16, 2012.
• Greg L. Bahnsen, “ The Crucial Concept of Self-Deception in Presuppositional Apologetics ,” Westminster Theological Journal 57 (1995): 1–32.
• John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion , Book I, Chapters 1-5.
• William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, eds, The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
• John M. Frame, Nature’s Case for God (Lexham Press, 2018).
• C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (Fontana Books, 1955).
• Alvin Plantinga, Knowledge and Christian Belief (Eerdmans, 2015).
• Cornelius Van Til, Why I Believe in God (Committee on Christian Education, Orthodox Presbyterian Church, 1966).
• Jerry L. Walls and Trent Dougherty, eds, Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford University Press, 2018).
• Greg Welty, Why Is There Evil in the World (And So Much Of It)? (Christian Focus, 2018).

This essay is part of the Concise Theology series. All views expressed in this essay are those of the author. This essay is freely available under Creative Commons License with Attribution-ShareAlike, allowing users to share it in other mediums/formats and adapt/translate the content as long as an attribution link, indication of changes, and the same Creative Commons License applies to that material.

Ethics and Practical Advantage to Believe in God Essay

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Blaise Pascal, a 17th-century French mathematician, physicist, and philosopher, presents a compelling argument for belief in God. According to Pascal, faith in God is not only morally permissible, but it is also to our practical advantage (Vaughn, 2018). In the Pensées, the author presents the idea that betting on the existence of God is a beneficial choice, regardless of whether God exists or not. He suggests that believing in God can bring positive benefits if God does not exist. However, if God does exist, those who have faith in God will be rewarded with eternal happiness, while those who do not believe will endure eternal punishment. The morality of faith in God depends on personal beliefs and values, and it is up to each individual to weigh the potential benefits and drawbacks of such a belief.

The writings of Augustine, a prominent early Christian philosopher and theologian, deeply influenced Pascal. Moreover, he was familiar with skeptical philosophers such as Michel de Montaigne and Pierre Charron, who emphasized the limits of human reason and the importance of doubt (Vaughn, 2018). Pascal was influenced by the Stoic philosophy, which stresses the importance of personal ethics and cultivating a virtuous life. However, he was associated with the Jansenist movement, a religious and philosophical tradition that emphasized the importance of grace and predestination in the Christian faith.

The strengths of other thinkers are that Augustine’s emphasis on the role of faith and grace in our relationship with God helped to shape Pascal’s view that belief in God is necessary for salvation. The Stoic philosophy focused primarily on personal ethics and may not be directly connected to religious beliefs, which can be seen as a weakness in Pascal’s reasoning for faith in God (Vaughn, 2018). Another weakness is that the Jansenist movement was controversial within the Christian faith, and its emphasis on grace and predestination may not be acceptable to all religious traditions.

The argument that challenges accepting the existence of God without concrete proof is rooted in the notion of rationality. According to this argument, belief in God is not rational unless supported by adequate evidence (Vaughn, 2018). Those who hold this view argue that it is not morally permissible to believe in God simply because it is to our practical advantage. Instead, belief in God should be based on evidence, such as scientific evidence or personal experience. In addition to the argument from rationality, some also argue that belief in God without sufficient evidence is not morally permissible because it is intellectually dishonest (Vaughn, 2018). Moreover, belief in God without sufficient evidence can lead to harmful consequences, such as rejecting scientific knowledge or persecuting those with different ideas. Conversely, some argue that God may favor those who identify as atheists or agnostics, as they only reject the belief without sufficient proof. After all, they use God’s gift of reason to decide (Vaughn, 2018). This argument is based on the idea that God values honesty and integrity and would, therefore look favorably upon those who use their sense to arrive at their beliefs.

In conclusion, the question of whether it is morally permissible to believe in God just because it is to our practical advantage is complex. Pascal argues that belief in God is not only ethically acceptable but is also to our practical advantage, while critics of Pascal’s argument point out that his reasoning is flawed in several ways. The fight against believing in God without sufficient evidence is based on the principle of rationality and the idea that belief should be based on evidence. However, some argue that God would look kindly at those who use their reason to arrive at their opinions, even if those beliefs are not in line with religious doctrine. Ultimately, the morality of faith in God is subjective and depends on an individual’s personal beliefs and values. It is up to each person to decide whether it is morally permissible to believe in God just because it is to their practical advantage and to weigh the potential benefits and drawbacks of such a belief.

Vaughn, L. (2018). Philosophy Here and Now: Powerful Ideas in Everyday Life . Oxford University Press, Incorporated.

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Bibliography

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Why Do People Believe in God?

The evolution of religious belief..

Posted August 21, 2018 | Reviewed by Lybi Ma

• Early in the history of humans, nobody believed in a god of any sort.
• Religious belief is considerably lower in developed countries compared with the underdeveloped world.
• Believing that God has a plan helps people regain some sense of control, or at least acceptance.

Why do people believe in God? For most people in the world, the answer seems obvious: Because it’s self-evident that God exists. From the point of view of the believer, the really puzzling question is how anyone could not believe.

And yet, as University of California at Irvine psychologist Brett Mercier and his colleagues point out in a recent article, there was once a time in the prehistory of our species when nobody believed in a god of any sort. Our evolutionary ancestors were all atheists, but somewhere along the way they found religion. So we’re back to our original question: Why do people believe in God?

As is common practice in evolutionary science, Mercier and his colleagues distinguish between ultimate and proximate causes. An ultimate cause explains how a behavior evolved in the first place, while a proximate cause outlines the conditions in which that evolved behavior will be performed. Consider, for example, birds flying south for the winter. The ultimate cause of bird migration is the increase in survival and reproduction experienced by those who seasonally moved to warmer climates where food was plentiful. In contrast, the proximate cause is the decrease in daylight hours, serving as a trigger that it’s time to head south.

Religious belief of some sort is a nearly universal feature of humanity, so there’s quite likely some ultimate evolutionary cause that explains it. At the same time, not all people are religious, and furthermore the forms of belief among the religious range widely, so we need to understand the proximate causes for this variation. In their article, Mercier and colleagues outline several ultimate and proximate causes for religious belief.

Fully modern humans arrived on the scene about a quarter-million years ago, and until quite recently they all lived hunter-gatherer lifestyles. In these primitive societies, the men hunted, fished, or scavenged for meat, while the women gathered fruits, roots, and vegetables. They lived in small groups of around 100 to 150 people because this was the largest population that the surrounding terrain could support.

Still, these groups were considerably larger than the societies of primate species, which tend to number in the few dozen range. Furthermore, humans are far more capable of cooperation than other primates, enabled by certain evolved cognitive mechanisms. Chief among these is a sense of agency . As tool users, humans quickly developed an understanding that they can intentionally cause things to happen. The nut cracked open because I smashed it with a rock. The apple fell because I shook the tree.

Humans then apply this sense of agency to interpreting social interactions. That is to say, we not only believe we have agency, we also believe others have agency as well. Thus, we judge the actions of others depending on whether we deem them to be intentional or not. We can easily forgive the person who accidentally steps on our foot, but we really need an explanation and an apology if someone purposely treads on our toes.

In fact, we’re rather hypersensitive about other people’s agency, inferring intention where none existed. For example, when someone cuts us off in traffic, we generally assume they did it on purpose—that is, knowing full well how dangerously they’re driving—rather than supposing they looked but just didn’t see us. We’re quick to assume that people act purposefully and discount the extent to which people’s behaviors are shaped by their current circumstances and limitations.

Because of hypersensitive agency detection, we also have a tendency to infer intentionality in natural processes or inanimate objects. Beliefs in water sprites and woodland spirits, specters and spooks, ghosts and demons, are ancient and observed in every culture around the world. Because the natural world is complex and acts in mysterious ways, we detect agency all around us.

By the way, if you think that you—an intelligent human being living in modern society—are free of such superstitious nonsense, you need to ask yourself: Have you ever begged your car to start on a cold winter morning? Or have you ever complained that your computer has a mind of its own because it doesn’t behave the way you want it to? We tend to automatically detect agency in inanimate objects whenever the situation is unpredictable and out of our control.

This kind of animistic thinking —that is, the belief that supernatural agency inhabits the world and can influence events—is a universal human trait. Such thinking is common in children, and as adults our animistic thinking is shaped by the norms of our culture. Animistic beliefs are also common in hunter-gatherer societies, but what they don’t have is organized religion.

Some 15,000 years ago, humans gradually began adopting agriculture. At first, humans domesticated a few animals and tended gardens to supplement their hunting and gathering, but eventually, all but a few societies around the world shifted solely to farming and herding. Agriculture can support many more people per acre of land compared with hunting and gathering, but this came with a cost.

As long as our group sizes were small, we had the psychological mechanisms to deal effectively with the members of our community. If you live day in and day out with the same 150 people, you get to know them really well. But if your numbers are in the thousands or tens of thousands, most of the people you interact with on a daily basis are strangers. Thus was life in the first cities that arose thanks to the food surpluses that agriculture yielded.

At this point, we see cultural evolution taking place. Human existence depends on cooperation. When we live in small groups, cheaters are punished by other members, and they quickly learn that they have to get along. But in anonymous societies, it’s easy to take advantage of others, as there’s no way for the rest of the group to punish those who take advantage of the system. The solution was to invent ever-watchful gods who’ll punish cheaters for us. Thus, organized religion grew hand-in-hand with the rise of the city-state.

Fast forward a dozen millennia, and here we are living in a technologically advanced society driven by science that tells us the world moves according to the laws of physics and not the whims of spirits or deities. Nevertheless, religious belief in one or more gods that watch over our actions and judge us accordingly is quite common. At the same time, religious belief has dropped precipitously over the last century, and here we need to look at its proximate causes.

Mercier and colleagues divide the proximate causes of religious belief into three types: cognitive, motivational, and societal. One cognitive factor is an analytical thinking style. People who tend to act according to reason rather than intuition are also less likely to believe in God. Perhaps relatedly, we also see a tendency for people who are higher in intelligence to hold agnostic or atheistic beliefs. In contrast, people who are high in what’s commonly called “ emotional intelligence ”—that is, the ability to easily discern the emotions and motives of others—also tend to be more religious. Of course, it’s exactly this ability to read others’ minds that led to the rise of religious belief in the first place, hundreds of thousands of years ago on the African savanna.

There are also motivational reasons for religious belief. People who are socially isolated tend to have more religious faith, perhaps allowing them to feel they’re not truly alone. Likewise, people facing death are more likely to express faith in God and an afterlife. The old saying that there are no atheists on the battlefield is no doubt true to a large extent. Furthermore, faith in God increases when situations become uncontrollable, as in the case of natural disasters. Believing that God has a plan helps people regain some sense of control, or at least acceptance.

Another motivational factor is self-enhancement. If you live in a society where religion is prized, it’s in your best interest to say you believe, whether you truly do or not. I’m sure there are plenty of doubters in the pews at Sunday services, though none will admit it. (I was one of those for most of my teenage years.) And it’s not uncommon to hear stories of priests or pastors who’ve lost their faith but continue to preach because it’s the only way they can make a living.

Finally, there are societal factors that influence the degree of religious belief within societies. As a general rule, religious belief is considerably lower in developed countries compared with the underdeveloped world. For instance, Japan has one of the highest standards of living in the world, but only 4 percent of its population claims to be religious. Traditionally, Japan was a Buddhist country, and religion played an important role in the daily lives of the Japanese until after World War II. A similar trend has occurred in Western Europe, which many social scientists now characterize as “post-Christian.”

The United States, with its high standard of living and high religiosity , is the glaring exception. However, as Mercier and his colleagues point out, Japan and Western European have universal health care and extensive social safety nets, as opposed to the U.S. The Japanese and the Europeans know their governments will come to their aid in their hour of need. But the laissez-faire attitudes of American society make people’s futures less certain and the belief in a benevolent God more attractive.

Although many people in industrialized societies have abandoned traditional organized religion, many of them still confess to some sort of spiritual belief, such as a life force or divine spirit that pervades nature and humanity. As societies become affluent and egalitarian, perhaps people perceive less need for a benevolent God to keep watch over us. Organized religion may no longer be needed in such societies, but it’s still human nature to perceive agency in the complexity and unpredictability of the world, even when there is none.

Mercier, B., Kramer, S. R., and Shariff, A. F. (2018). Belief in god: Why people believe, and why they don’t. Current Directions in Psychological Science. Advance online publication. DOI: 10.1177/0963721418754491

David Ludden, Ph.D. , is a professor of psychology at Georgia Gwinnett College.

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Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God

Unlike the Cosmological Argument or the Design Argument, theistic pragmatic arguments are not arguments for the proposition that God exists; they are arguments that believing that God exists is rational. The most famous theistic pragmatic argument is Pascal’s Wager . Though we touch on this argument briefly, this entry focuses primarily on the theistic pragmatic arguments found in William James, J.S. Mill, and others. It also explores the logic of pragmatic arguments in general, and the pragmatic use of moral arguments, and arguments predicated on the idea of final meaning in life. This entry looks at an important objection to the employment of pragmatic arguments in belief formation – the objection that evidence alone should regulate belief. It also explores a few pragmatic arguments that have been offered against Theism. 

1. Pragmatic Arguments

2. moral arguments as pragmatic arguments, 3. william james’s will to believe argument, 4. j.s. mill’s license to hope, 5. consolation and needs-based arguments, 6. pragmatic arguments and meaning in life, 7. the ethics of belief, 8. pragmatic arguments and belief, 9. atheistic pragmatic arguments, other internet resources, related entries.

As with so much in philosophy, the first recorded employment of a pragmatic argument is found in Plato. At Meno 86b-c, Socrates tells Meno that believing in the value of inquiry is justified because of the positive impact upon one’s character:

Meno: Somehow or other I believe you are right. Socrates: I think I am. I shouldn’t like to take my oath on the whole story, but one thing I am ready to fight for as long as I can, in word and act – that is, that we shall be better, braver, and more active men if we believe it right to look for what we don’t know than if we believe there is no point in looking because what we don’t know we can never discover. Meno: There too I am sure you are. [ 1 ]

Paraphrased, Socrates’ point is if being better, braver, and more active are among our desires, and if believing that inquiry is worthwhile facilitates our becoming better, braver, and more active, then we have reason, pragmatic reason, to believe that inquiry is worthwhile. Socrates’ argument is an argument for the permissibility of a certain belief, based on the benefits of believing that certain belief. Pragmatic arguments are practical in orientation, justifying actions that are thought to facilitate the achievement of our goals, or the satisfaction of our desires. If among your goals is A , and if doing such and such results in your achieving A , then, all else being equal, you have reason to do such and such:

• Doing α brings about, or contributes in bringing about, β, and
• It is in your interest that β obtain. So,
• You have reason to do α.

As presented this is a particular kind of pragmatic argument, a prudential argument. Prudential pragmatic arguments are predicated upon one’s preferences or goals or self-interest. As we will see, there are pragmatic arguments that are not narrowly prudential but are moral in nature.

Pragmatic arguments are relevant to belief-formation, since inculcating a belief is an action. There are, broadly speaking, two kinds of pragmatic arguments that have to do with belief-formation. The first is an argument that recommends taking steps to believe a proposition because, if it should turn out to be true, the benefits gained from believing that proposition will be impressive. This first kind of pragmatic argument we can call a “truth-dependent” pragmatic argument, or more conveniently a “dependent-argument,” since the benefits are obtained only if the relevant state of affairs occurs. The prime example of a dependent-argument is a pragmatic argument that uses a calculation of expected utility and employs the Expectation Rule to recommend belief:

whenever both probability and utility values are known, one should choose to do an act which has the greatest expected utility.

Among the various versions of his wager argument, Pascal employs this Rule in a version which states that no matter how small the probability that God exists, as long as it is a positive, non-zero probability, the expected utility of theistic belief will dominate the expected utility of disbelief. Given the distinction between (A) having reason to think a certain proposition is true, and (B) having reason to induce belief in that proposition, taking steps to generate belief in a certain proposition may be the rational thing to do, even if that proposition lacks sufficient evidential support. The benefits of believing a proposition can rationally take precedence over the evidential strength enjoyed by a contrary proposition; and so, given an infinite expected utility, Pascal’s Wager contends that forming the belief that God exists is the rational thing to do, no matter how small the likelihood that God exists.

The second kind of pragmatic argument, which can be called a “truth-independent” pragmatic argument, or more conveniently, an “independent-argument,” is one which recommends taking steps to believe a certain proposition simply because of the benefits gained by believing it, whether or not the believed proposition is true. This is an argument that recommends belief cultivation because of the psychological, or moral, or religious, or social, or even the prudential benefits gained by virtue of believing it. In David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion , for example, Cleanthes employs an independent argument, “religion, however corrupted, is still better than no religion at all. The doctrine of a future state is so strong and necessary a security to morals that we never ought to abandon or neglect it” (Hume 1776, 87). Perhaps the best-known example of an independent-argument is found in William James’s celebrated “Will to Believe” essay in which he argues that, in certain circumstances, it is rationally and morally permissible to believe a proposition because of the benefits thereby generated. [ 2 ]

Unlike independent pragmatic arguments, dependent ones are, in an important sense, truth-sensitive. Of course, being pragmatic arguments, dependent-arguments are not truth-sensitive in an evidential sense; nevertheless they are dependent on truth since the benefits are had only if the recommended belief is true. In contrast, independent pragmatic arguments, yielding benefits whether or not the recommended beliefs are true, are insensitive to truth. Independent-arguments, we might say, are belief-dependent and not truth-dependent.

Theism is the proposition that God exists . A theist is anyone who accepts or believes that proposition. In this entry we limit ourselves to pragmatic arguments concerning Theism – whether pro or con – and skip over pragmatic arguments for non-theistic religions. A theistic pragmatic argument contends that there are practical, prudential, or moral reasons for inculcating theistic belief. An atheistic pragmatic argument holds that there are practical, prudential, or moral reasons for denying Theism.

Pragmatic arguments in support of theistic belief can either be predicated on prudence or on morality. By pragmatic arguments predicated on morality I mean arguments that contend that morality, or some proper part of morality, presupposes, or is facilitated by theistic belief. And if morality, or the proper part of morality, is rational, then so too is theistic belief. Put generally: [ 3 ]

• Doing α helps to bring about β, and
• It is morally desirable that β. So,
• It is prima facie morally desirable to do α.

Since (4) specifies actions, we should understand accepting theistic propositions as actions, even if believing is not an action (for more on the distinction between acceptance and belief, see the section, “Pragmatic Arguments and Belief,” below).

It is important to recognize the distinction between theoretical moral arguments for theism (arguments intended to show that God exists), and pragmatic moral arguments for the rationality of theistic belief. George Mavrodes, for instance, constructs a theoretical moral argument by contending that it would be extremely odd that we would have moral obligations the fulfillment of which results in a net loss to the agent. Such a world seems absurd (Mavrodes, 1986). His argument is built upon the idea of a Russellian world, a universe in which mental events are products of non-mental events, and in which there’s no human post-mortem survival, and extinction is the final end of every biological species. A Russellian world implies atheism. Summarized, Mavrodes’ argument is that there are real moral obligations in the actual world. But, real moral obligations would be absurd in a Russellian world, since fulfilling moral obligations often cause a net loss to the moral agent and there is no deep explanation of real moral obligation in a Russellian world (the deep features of a Russellian world would be things like forces and atoms and chance). But, fulfilling moral obligation is not absurd. So, in this respect, there is reason to think that the actual world is not a Russellian world.

Two examples of pragmatic moral arguments are Adams (1979) and Zagzebski (1987). Adams builds his argument on the concept of demoralization – weakening of moral motivation – and the concept of a moral order – roughly, the idea that to achieve a balance of good over evil in the universe requires something more than human effort, yet human effort can add or detract from the total value of the universe. While we cannot do it all on our own, the idea is, we can make a significant difference for better or worse. In short, Adam’s argument is that it is demoralizing not to believe that there is a moral order in the universe, and demoralization is morally undesirable. So, there is moral advantage in accepting that there is a moral order, and theism provides the best account of why that is. Hence, there’s moral advantage in accepting theism.

Zagzebski builds her argument upon the ideas of moral skepticism and moral efficacy, and, though she does not employ the term, moral order. Morality is efficacious if we can make significant contributions to the production of good in the universe and to the elimination of evil. Moral skepticism is a doubting of our ability to acquire moral knowledge, and a doubting of moral efficacy. Zagzebski argues that it is rational to try to be moral only if it is rational to believe that the probability that the attempt will succeed and will produce a great good is not outweighed by the probability that one will have to sacrifice goods in the course of the attempt. But given what we know of human abilities and history, it is not rational to believe that the attempt to be moral is likely to succeed if there is no moral order. Since it is rational to try to be moral, it is rational to believe that there is moral order in the universe, and Christian doctrine is, in part, an account of there being a moral order in the universe. So, accepting Christian theism is more rational than accepting that there’s no moral order in the universe.

Theistic moral pragmatic arguments may face an objection similar to the many-gods objection to Pascal’s wager. The many-gods objection contends that the betting options of the wager are not limited to Christianity and atheism alone, since one could formulate a Pascalian Wager for Islam, certain sects of Buddhism, or for any of the competing sects found within Christianity itself. [ 4 ] A similar problem arises for theistic moral pragmatic arguments, at least insofar as those arguments are intended to provide strong support for theistic belief. Let’s say that a pragmatic argument provides strong support for theism just in case it provides reason for thinking that theism alone provides the benefit; and let’s say that a pragmatic argument provides weak support for theism just in case it provides reason for thinking that theism is just one of several alternatives in providing the benefit. Pascal’s Wager, for instance, is intended to provide strong support for theism; while James’s Will to Believe argument is intended to provide weak support. Pragmatic moral arguments, if they are to provide strong support for theism, must provide reason to think that theistic belief alone is necessary for morality, or that theistic belief best facilitates moral practice. But it’s far from clear that theistic belief exceeds its competitors in facilitating moral practice. Until reason for thinking that is forthcoming, it would be premature to hold that theistic moral pragmatic arguments provide strong support.

The argument presented by William James (1842–1910) in his 1896 essay, “The Will to Believe”, extends far beyond the issue of the rationality of theistic belief to include various philosophical issues (for instance, whether to embrace determinism or indeterminism), and even matters of practical life. James’s argument, in its attack on the agnostic imperative (withhold belief whenever the evidence is insufficient), makes the general epistemological point that:

a rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there, would be an irrational rule. (James 1896, 28)

We might understand the agnostic imperative more fully as follows:

for all persons S and propositions p , if S believes that p is just as likely as not- p , then it is impermissible for S to believe either p or not- p .

If James is correct, then the agnostic imperative is false.

The foil of James’s essay was W.K. Clifford (1845–79). Clifford argued that:

…if I let myself believe anything on insufficient evidence, there may be no great harm done by the mere belief; it may be true after all, or I may never have occasion to exhibit it in outward acts. But I cannot help doing this great wrong towards Man, that I make myself credulous. The danger to society is not merely that it should believe wrong things, though that is great enough; but that it should become credulous, and lose the habit of testing things and inquiring into them; for then it must sink back into savagery. (Clifford 1879, 185–6)

Clifford presented evidentialism as a rule of morality: “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for any one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (Clifford 1879, 186). If Clifford’s Rule of morality is correct, then any one who believes a proposition that she does not take to be more likely than not, is, thereby, immoral. It may be worthwhile to note that Clifford’s argument here is itself a moral pragmatic argument.

James has two main concerns in the “Will To Believe” essay. The first is to argue that Clifford’s Rule is irrational (James 1896: 28). The second is that a theistic commitment is permissible. James contends that Clifford’s Rule is but one intellectual strategy open to us. A proponent of Clifford’s Rule advises, in effect, that one should avoid error at all costs, and thereby risk the loss of certain truths. But another strategy is to seek truth by any means available, even at the risk of error. James champions the latter via the main argument of the “Will to Believe” essay. To facilitate matters eight definitions employed by James are paraphrased:

• Hypothesis : something that may be believed.
• Option : a decision between two hypotheses.
• Living option : a decision between two live hypotheses.
• Live hypothesis : something that is a real candidate for belief. A hypothesis is live, we might say, for a person just in case that person lacks compelling evidence disconfirming that hypothesis, and the hypothesis has an intuitive appeal for that person.
• Momentous option : the option may never again present itself, or the decision cannot be easily reversed, or something of importance hangs on the choice. It is not a trivial matter.
• Forced option : the decision cannot be avoided.
• Genuine option : one that’s living, momentous, and forced.
• Intellectually open : neither the evidence nor arguments conclusively decide the issue.

The first main argument might be sketched as follows:

• Strategy A: Risk a loss of truth and a loss of a vital good for the certainty of avoiding error.
• Strategy B: Risk error for a chance at truth and a vital good.
• Clifford’s Rule embodies Strategy A. But,
• Strategy B is preferable to Strategy A because Strategy A would deny us access to certain possible kinds of truth. And,
• Any intellectual strategy that denies access to possible truths is an inadequate strategy. Therefore,
• Clifford’s Rule is unacceptable.

James asserts that “there are…cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming” (James 1896, 25). Among other examples James provides of this particular kind of truth is that of social cooperation:

a social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs. Wherever a desired result is achieved by the co-operation of many independent persons, its existence as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another of those immediately concerned. (James 1896, 24)

And if James is right that there is a kind of proposition that has as a truth-maker its being believed, what we might call “dependent truths,” then proposition (9) looks well supported.

Of course, accepting proposition (11), and advancing an alternative strategy of seeking truth by any available means, even at the risk of error, does not entail that anything goes. And an important part of James’s essay restricts what legitimately might be believed in the absence of adequate evidence. Among the requirements suggested by James the most important is:

Only genuine options that are intellectually open are decidable on passional grounds.

James is not arguing against conforming one’s belief to the evidence, whenever there’s a preponderance of evidence. Nor is he arguing against the importance of evidence. His is an argument contra the prohibition of believing whenever the evidence is silent, a prohibition implied by Clifford’s Rule.

The requirement that an option is intellectually open may be redundant. If the evidence were compelling, or even strongly supportive of, say, hypothesis a , and you recognized this, it may be that you would find only a alive. Since you’re aware that the evidence strongly supports it, you would not find not- a living. In other words, to say that an option is living may imply that it is intellectually open. Nonetheless, let’s proceed as if aliveness and openness are logically distinct notions. Additionally, we might ask whether the property of intellectual openness is to be understood as the evidence is lacking, or as the evidence is in principle lacking. That is, is an option intellectually open when the evidence is indeterminate, or when it is essentially indeterminate? James’s argument requires only the former. The lack of adequate evidence is sufficient to render an option intellectually open. If more evidence appears so that one hypothesis is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, then a commitment to abide by the evidence is triggered.

The relevance of all of this to theistic belief, according to James, is that:

Religion says essentially two things. …the best things are the more eternal things, the overlapping things, the things in the universe that throw the last stone, so to speak, and say the final word…. The second affirmation of religion is that we are better off even now if we believe [religion’s] first affirmation to be true… The more perfect and more eternal aspect of the universe is represented in our religions as having personal form. The universe is no longer a mere It to us, but a Thou …. We feel, too, as if the appeal of religion to us were made to our own active good-will, as if evidence might be forever withheld from us unless we met the hypothesis half-way. (James 1896, 25–7)

James asserts that there are two affirmations of religion. By affirmation James means something like an abstract claim, devoid of much doctrinal content, and found in the major religions. The first affirmation is that the best things are the more eternal things, while the second is that we are better off even now if we believe the first affirmation. The first affirmation is particularly puzzling, since James does not assert that the best things are the eternal things; he says that the best things are the more eternal things. He explicates this affirmation with three metaphors and a slogan: “the overlapping things, the things in the universe that throw the last stone, so to speak, and say the final word. ‘Perfection is eternal,’ – this phrase of Charles Secrétan seems a good way of putting this first affirmation of religion” (James 1896, 25). Two ideas are suggested by James’s explication: sovereignty and perfection. If we understand “more eternal” as a kind of necessity, or non-contingency, then perhaps the first affirmation may be understood as asserting that the best things are those things that cannot fail to be sovereign and perfect. This interpretation resolves much of the first affirmation’s puzzle. The plurality though is still puzzling. We can resolve this puzzle by recognizing that, although he does not explicitly call it a third affirmation, James asserts that “the more perfect and more eternal aspect of the universe is represented in our religions as having personal form. The universe is no longer a mere It to us, but a Thou ” (James 1896, 26). If we take this as a third affirmation of religion (perhaps at the risk a charge of theistic parochialism), the possibility that the more eternal things are plural is foreclosed. Monotheism, in other words, and not polytheism is established by the third affirmation. Taken together, then, the first and the third affirmations of religion suggest that the supreme good in the universe is the existence of a personal being that is essentially perfect and sovereign. The second affirmation is that we are better off now by believing in the existence of this perfect being. At least in part, we would be better off now by believing the first affirmation because by doing so the possibility of a relationship with this being is established.

According to James, just as one is not likely to make friends if one is aloof, likewise one is not likely to become acquainted with the perfect being, if there is such, if one seeks that acquaintance only after sufficient evidence has been gathered. There are possible truths, James claims, belief of which is a necessary condition of obtaining evidence for them. Let’s call the class of propositions whose evidence is restricted to those who first believe “restricted propositions.” Dependent propositions and restricted propositions are James’s counterexamples to Clifford’s Rule. They are two examples of the kinds of truths that Clifford’s Rule would keep one from acknowledging. That is, Clifford’s Rule is problematic because following it would preclude access to restricted propositions and dependent propositions. The Cliffordian may be forever cut off from certain kinds of truth.

One might object that James has at best shown that theistic belief is momentous only if God exists. If God does not exist, and, as a consequence, the vital good of eternal life does not obtain, then no vital good is at stake. To answer this objection a Jamesian might focus on what James calls the second affirmation of religion – we are better off even now if we believe – and take that affirmation to include benefits that are available, via pro-belief, even if God does not exist. In The Varieties of Religious Experience James suggests that religious belief produces certain psychological benefits:

A new zest which adds itself like a gift to life, and takes the form either of lyrical enchantment or of appeal to earnestness and heroism…. An assurance of safety and a temper of peace, and, in relation to others, a preponderance of loving affections. (James 1902, 475)

In any case, given that theism is intellectually open and that it’s part of a genuine option, and given that there are vital goods attached to theistic belief, James says, the hope that it is true is a sufficient reason to believe. In addition this objection is easily evaded if we revise the notion of a genuine option by removing the requirement that an option is genuine only if momentous, although James himself may have been loath to drop that requirement.

James’s second main argument proceeds:

• The decision whether to accept theism is a genuine option. And,
• Theism is intellectually open. And,
• There are vital goods at stake in accepting theism. And,
• No one is irrational or immoral in risking error for a chance at truth and a vital good. So,
• One may accept theism.

With this argument, James seeks to support the second of his two primary concerns of his essay, that a religious commitment is permissible.

An objection commonly leveled against James’s argument is that “it constitutes an unrestricted license for wishful thinking… if our aim is to believe what is true, and not necessarily what we like, James’s universal permissiveness will not help us” (Hick 1990, 60). That is, hoping that a proposition is true is no reason to think that it is . A Jamesian might contend that this objection is unfair. As we have noted, James does not hold that the falsity of Clifford’s Rule implies that anything goes. Restricting the relevant permissibility class to propositions that are intellectually open and part of a genuine option provides ample protection against wishful thinking.

A more significant objection contends that James’s argument fails “to show that one can have a sufficient moral reason for self-inducing an epistemically unsupported belief” (Gale 1990, 283). This objection contends that there is a weighty moral duty to proportion one’s beliefs to the evidence, and that this duty flows from moral personhood – to be a morally responsible person requires that one have good reasons for each of one’s beliefs. But to believe an epistemically unsupported proposition is to violate this duty and is thus, in effect, a denial of one’s own personhood. [ 5 ] Or think of it another way, as intellectual beings, we have the dual goal of maximizing our stock of (significant) true beliefs and minimizing our stock of false ones. Clifford’s Rule derives its moral validity, one might contend, from that intellectual goal. And from Clifford’s Rule flows our duty to believe only those propositions that enjoy adequate evidential support. James’s argument would, if operative, thwart our intellectual goal by permitting us to violate Clifford’s Rule. Can a morally and intellectually responsible person ever have a moral duty to believe a proposition that lacks adequate evidence, a duty that outweighs the alleged Cliffordian duty of believing only those propositions that enjoy adequate support? To answer this, let’s employ what we might call the “ET” thought experiment. Suppose Clifford is abducted by very powerful and very smart extraterrestrials, which offer him a single chance of salvation for humankind – that he acquire and maintain belief in a proposition that lacks adequate evidential support, otherwise the destruction of humankind will result. Clifford adroitly points out that no one can just will belief. The ETs, devilish in their anticipation as well as their technology, provide Clifford with a supply of doxastic-producing pills, which when ingested produce the requisite belief for 24 hours. It’s obvious that Clifford would do no wrong by swallowing the pills and bringing about a belief lacking adequate evidential support. [ 6 ] Moreover, since one is never irrational in doing one’s moral duty, not only would Clifford not be immoral, he would not even be irrational in bringing about and maintaining belief in a proposition lacking adequate evidential support. As we mentioned earlier, given the distinction between (A) having reason to think a certain proposition is true, and (B) having reason to induce a belief in that proposition, it may be that a particular proposition lacks sufficient evidential support, but that forming a belief in that proposition is the rational action to perform.

A very interesting objection to James’s argument is that it falls prey to the very principle it invokes against Clifford:

James writes: “A rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there would be an irrational rule”. This may sound like sweet reason itself, but a moment’s reflection should convince us that it is nothing of the kind. Any rule whatever that restricts belief in any way might conceivably shut us off from some truths. (Wood 2002, 24)

According to James, Clifford’s Rule is problematic because, if followed, it would preclude access to restricted propositions and dependent propositions. According to this objection, this alleged flaw of Clifford’s Rule is true of any epistemic principle. Every epistemic principle that divides beliefs into those that are permissible and those that are not runs the risk of shutting off access to certain possible kinds of truth. James’s restriction of the permissible use of the passional nature only to when one faces a genuine option that’s intellectually open is just as guilty of the alleged flaw as is Clifford’s Rule. But an alleged flaw found in every possibility is no flaw. Hence, James’s objection to Clifford fails.

This objection is interesting since it is in one sense true. It’s obvious that any rule that restricts belief in any way might shut us off from certain truths. Still, while interesting, this objection is irrelevant. James’s argument is not predicated on the abstract proposition that “any rule whatever that restricts belief in any way might conceivably shut us off from some truths.” It is predicated on the principle that there are dependent propositions, and there are restricted propositions. His examples of social trust, and acquiring friends, and of social cooperation are intended to make that clear. If theism were true, then it is very likely that there would be dependent propositions and restricted propositions in that realm as well. Clifford’s Rule would preclude access to any restricted or dependent proposition, whether religious or not. James is not arguing against conforming one’s belief to the evidence, whenever there’s a preponderance of evidence. He is arguing against the prohibition of believing whenever the evidence is silent. Since James’s argument specifies the irrationality of Clifford’s Rule’s exclusion of dependent and restricted propositions, and not just the abstract possibility of some kind of true belief or other being excluded, it escapes this objection.

William Wainwright has argued that James’s argument properly fits within an old Christian tradition, which asserts that:

Mature religious belief can, and perhaps should, be based on evidence but… the evidence can be accurately assessed only by men and women who possess the proper moral and spiritual qualifications. This view was once a Christian commonplace; reason is capable of knowing God on the basis of evidence – but only when one’s cognitive faculties are rightly disposed. (Wainwright 1995, 3).

If Wainwright is correct, then James’s argument is not just a pragmatic argument, but also an epistemic argument, since he is arguing that one of the pragmatic benefits is a more reliable access to reality (see also the explication of James’ argument via contemporary epistemic utility theory in Pettigrew 2016). So, the chasm between the epistemic and the pragmatic is not unbridgeable, since James’s Will to Believe argument spans the gulf between the pragmatic and the epistemic. Importantly, we should keep in mind that whatever else it is, James’s argument is, at least in part, a pragmatic argument, and, moreover, James probably saw his argument as having a similar status as Pascal’s Wager, since he offers a positive evaluation of the Wager, very often overlooked by commentators, “Pascal’s argument, instead of being powerless, then seems a regular clincher, and is the last stroke needed to make our faith…complete” (James 1896, 11).

The posthumous publication of Mill’s Three Essays on Religion (1874) drew criticism from the faithful, but it also drew a surprising disappointment from those who expected the “saint of rationalism” to argue for agnosticism. The cause of this consternation is found in the third of the three essays, “Theism,” a short work begun in 1868 and unfinished when Mill died in 1870. The faithful found “Theism” objectionable because of Mill’s criticism of several of the standard arguments of natural theology. The disappointment of the other side flowed from Mill’s endorsement of a position that can be summed up by the principle that where probabilities fail, hope can properly flourish. As Mill expressed this principle when discussing immortality, “…to any one who feels it conducive either to his satisfaction or to his usefulness to hope for a future state as a possibility, there is no hindrance to his indulging that hope” (Mill 1874, 210). Mill thought that belief in a creator of great but limited power was supported by the design argument, and one could certainly erect the superstructure of hope upon the base of a belief in a creator who would extend human existence beyond the grave:

Appearances point to the existence of a Being who has great power over us – all the power implied in the creation of the Kosmos, or of its organized beings at least – and of whose goodness we have evidence though not of its being his predominant attribute; and as we do not know the limits either of his power or of his goodness, there is room to hope that both the one and the other may extend to granting us this gift provided that it would really be beneficial to us. (Mill 1874, 210)

Since we do not know that granting postmortem existence to humans is beyond the capability of the creator, hope is possible. As Mill puts it:

…in the regulation of the imagination literal truth of facts is not the only thing to be considered. Truth is the province of reason, and it is by the cultivation of the rational faculty that provision is made for its being known always, and thought of as often as is required by duty and the circumstances of human life. But when reason is strongly cultivated, the imagination may safely follow its own end, and do its best to make life pleasant and lovely… On these principles it appears to me that the indulgence of hope with regard to the government of the universe and the destiny of man after death, while we recognize as a clear truth that we have no ground for more than a hope, is legitimate and philosophically defensible. The beneficial effect of such a hope is far from trifling. (Mill 1874, 248–9)

For our purposes the item of interest is Mill’s claim that “any one who feels it conducive either to his satisfaction or to his usefulness to hope for a future state as a possibility, there is no hindrance to his indulging that hope” (Mill 1874, 210). Mill’s license to hope is issued on pragmatic grounds: it is permissible to hope if and only if:

The second condition (L2) is straightforwardly pragmatic and restricts hope to those who have goals either of personal happiness, or of contributing to the well-being of others. Believing that hope will result in the increase of happiness or well-being is a necessary condition of permissible hope.

There’s little doubt that Mill agreed with Clifford’s Rule. Mill was no subjectivist or fideist. But hope and belief are not the same; and the standards for the permissibility of the latter are considerably higher. Mill thought that (L1) and (L2) were the relevant standards for permissible hope. If one believes that Clifford’s Rule should govern any and all propositional attitudes and not just belief, then it is easy to see why Mill’s liberal treatment of hope would disappoint.

Mill held that one may hope that God exists, but one may not believe that God exists, as the evidence is lacking. Suppose one agrees with Mill, that faith can subsist on hope, trust, or some other non-doxastic attitude other than belief. Suppose further that one seeks to build a theistic commitment on hope. The acceptance of theistic hope provides reason to act as if theism were true, not because one believes that it is true, but because one hopes that it is. What is it to act as if theism is true? It is to put into practice behaviors characteristic of a particular religious tradition, such as Judaism, Christianity, or Islam. Acting as if a certain religious tradition were true would include reorienting one’s values, priorities, and life-projects in order to reflect a commitment to a particular tradition. It would also involve engaging in the rituals and behaviors associated with the particular tradition; and investing a significant portion of one’s time and money in support of causes associated with the tradition.

A problem arises however. Social psychology, with its theories of biased scanning, social-perception theory, and cognitive dissonance theory, advances the idea that behavior can alter, influence, and generate attitudes, including beliefs (see Jordan 2016). By regularly engaging in behaviors and practices characteristic of a particular religious tradition, one engages in actions that tend to inculcate religious belief. Belief is catching, as associating with and imitating the faithful is an effective way of self-inducing the beliefs of the faithful. Those who seek to replace belief with hope will find themselves taking steps to build a theistic commitment on hope, while holding that they ought to avoid theistic belief. Yet, the very steps involved in fostering a commitment on hope – immersive role-playing as a theist, or acting as if theism were true – tend to generate theistic belief. Those who habitually or chronically imitate the actions and rituals of theists find eventually that those are not just tasks they perform, but are at the heart of who they are and what they believe. Yet, theistic belief is off-limits.

One would have to take steps that inoculate against the contagious theistic belief. Yet, the reasons one has to build a theistic commitment on hope and not belief, would conflict with one’s reasons to inoculate against catching belief. One is pushed to act as if theism were true, yet pulled to act to ensure that one does not come to believe that it is. Whatever commitment might emerge out of this dynamic is not likely one characteristic of a mature or wholeheartedly committed theist.

This problem of catching belief flows out of the fact that chronically acting as if something is true is an effective way of inculcating the belief that it is true. Any non-doxastic account of faith put into regular practice, coupled with Clifford’s Rule, is exposed to the problem of catching belief. Religious Fictionalism, for example, which holds that faith that p does not require belief that p , has to deal with the problem. For more discussion, see Malcolm and Scott 2017, and Jordan 2016.

In 1770 James Beattie (1735–1803) published a long response to Hume entitled An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism . The essay was a 300 page best seller, which, most commentators agree, was unfair in many respects to Hume. As was his practice, Hume never made an effort to answer Beattie in public; in correspondence, however, Hume referred to Beattie as that “bigoted silly fellow.” [ 7 ]

Despite the general weakness of many of his arguments Beattie does offer an interesting pragmatic moral objection to Hume’s attack on religious belief:

…they perhaps have little need, and little relish, for the consolations of religion. But let them know that, in the solitary scenes of life, there is many an honest and tender heart pining with incurable anguish, pierced with the sharpest sting of disappointment, bereft of friends, chilled with poverty, racked with disease, scourged by the oppressor; whom nothing but trust in Providence, and the hope of a future retribution, could preserve from the agonies of despair. And do they, with sacrilegious hands, attempt to violate this last refuge of the miserable, and to rob them of the only comfort that had survived the ravages of the misfortune, malice, and tyranny! Did it ever happen, that the influence of their execrable tenets disturbed the tranquility of virtuous retirement, deepened the gloom of human distress, or aggravated the horrors of the grave? Is it possible that this may have happened in many instances? Is it probable that this hath happened, or may happen, in one single instance? – ye traitors to human kind, how can ye answer for it to your own hearts? (Beattie 1776, 322–23).

Beattie argues that Hume’s clear cutting of the theistic forest in his attack on the credibility of miracle reports, his criticism of the design argument, and his attack on the cosmological argument resulted in a desolated landscape that does a serious disservice to humankind. Since in some cases, Beattie contends, despair flows from the loss of faith. And he assumes that no justifying good exists for Hume to risk causing despair.

Let’s understand desolation as a profound sense of hopelessness and purposelessness. Beattie believed that Christian belief provided consolation, especially to those suffering or oppressed. His argument might be reconstructed as there exists a person S , such that:

• Theistic belief provides the great good of consolation for S . And,
• S cannot receive a comparable good from any other source. And,
• The deprivation of this good is a significant loss for S . So,
• Depriving S of the great good of theistic belief renders S significantly worse-off. And,
• It is wrong to render someone worse-off without compensation. And,
• Public atheistic attacks provide S with no sufficient compensation. Therefore,
• Public atheistic attacks are wrong.

While Hume never directly responded to Beattie’s Consolation Argument, Mill had it (or something very much like it in mind) when he wrote:

That what is called the consoling nature of an opinion, that is, the pleasure we should have in believing it to be true, can be a ground for believing it, is a doctrine irrational in itself and which would sanction half the mischievous illusions recorded in history or which mislead individual life. (Mill 1874, 204)

This is an odd objection coming from one who argued in Utilitarianism “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.” If the sole criterion of action is the production of happiness, and if forming a belief is an action, then it is hard to see what answer could be lodged against Beattie’s Consolation Argument (or at least some argument very much like it). [ 8 ] If happiness and consolation are irrelevant, and if Clifford’s Rule that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for any one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” is correct, then Beattie’s consolation argument can be rejected as being itself an immoral subornation. [ 9 ]

An argument similar to Beattie’s consolation argument is found in a suggestive passage of John Henry Newman’s 1870 An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent , famously known as the “factory girl” argument. Newman (1801–1890) did not formulate the “factory girl” argument as a pragmatic argument, but the argument certainly lends itself to such a formulation:

Montaigne was endowed with a good estate, health, leisure and an easy temper, literary tastes, and a sufficiency of books; he could afford thus to play with life, and the abysses into which it leads us. Let us take a case in contrast. “I think”, says the poor dying factory-girl in the tale, “if this should be the end of all, and if all I have been born for is just to work my heart and life away, and to sicken in this dree place, with those mill-stones in my ears forever, until I could scream out for them to stop and let me have a little piece of quiet, and with the fluff filling my lungs, until I thirst to death for one long deep breath of the clear air, and my mother gone, and I never able to tell her again how I loved her, and of all my troubles, – I think, if this life is the end, and that there is no God to wipe away all tears from all eyes, I could go mad!”

Here is an argument for the immortality of the soul (Newman 1870, 299–300).

This argument lends itself easily to a pragmatic cast since it places great weight on the idea that certain human needs support the rational and moral legitimacy of religious belief:

• We have existential needs – a need for a deep meaning in life, a need for hope, a need for cosmic security, a need for consolation from despair – which are necessary for our well-being. And,
• Belief in God satisfies these existential needs. So,
• Belief in God is overall justified.

This sort of argument faces many questions and issues that we cannot explore here. Among these issues and questions are: suppose that one, morally and rationally, may satisfy a need, it does not follow that one can satisfy that need in any old way. Some ways of satisfying a need are permissible while others are not. Is belief in God a permissible way? Do humans in fact have the alleged needs? Is belief in God the only feasible way to satisfy those needs? See Williams 2011 for further discussion.

A popular pragmatic argument in support of theistic belief is built upon a saying erroneously attributed to Pascal that humans have a god-shaped hole in their hearts that can be filled only by committing to God. Any finite filler will prove futile, pernicious or hollow. While Pascal nowhere mentions a god-shaped hole, in fragment 148 of the Pensées , he argues that,

All men seek happiness. There are no exceptions. … Yet for very many years no one without faith has ever reached the goal at which everyone is continually aiming. … A test which has gone on so long, without pause or change, really ought to convince us that we are incapable of attaining the good by own efforts. … What else does this craving, and this helplessness, proclaim but that there was once in man a true happiness, of which all that now remains is the empty print and trace? This he tries in vain to fill with everything around him, seeking in things that are not there the help he cannot find in those that are, though none can help, since this infinite abyss can be filled only with an infinite and immutable object; in other words by God himself. (Pascal)

The argument suggested in fragment #148 is that faith in God alone provides happiness, as theistic commitment alone results in happiness; while all other causes and commitments are chimera too small to fill the hole in our lives. While Pascal wrote of happiness, his argument might be re-focused toward meaning in life, perhaps by arguing that a genuinely or truly happy life will be a meaningful life. Would the existence of God make our lives meaningful? In this context “meaning in life” is a life that makes a positive objective difference in the world. As we have seen, a pragmatic argument in support of doing a particular action conforms to the general scheme that:

Some have contended that inculcating a theistic commitment plays a vital role in bringing about meaning in one’s life, whether as a sufficient condition or as an enhancement (for discussion see Metz, 2019, and see Mawson, 2019). The view that a theistic commitment is required for meaning in life is voiced by W.L. Craig with his claim that:

If God does not exist, then both man and the universe are inevitably doomed to death. Man, like all biological organisms, must die. With no hope of immortality, man’s life leads only to the grave. His life is but a spark in the infinite darkness, a spark that appears, flickers, and dies forever… If God exists, then there is hope for man. But if God does not exist, then all we are left with is despair. …if God does not exist, then life is objectively meaningless; but man cannot live consistently and happily knowing that life is meaningless… If God does not exist, then life is futile. If the God of the Bible does exist, then life is meaningful. Only the second of these two alternatives enables us to live happily and consistently. Therefore, it seems to me that even if the evidence for these two options were absolutely equal, a rational person ought to choose biblical Christianity. It seems to me positively irrational to prefer death, futility, and destruction to life, meaningfulness, and happiness. As Pascal said, we have nothing to lose and infinity to gain. (Craig 2013)

An argument hinted at in the passage above might be reconstructed as:

• A human life has objective meaning only if that life is unending. And,
• An unending human life – immortality – is meaningful only if God provides a purpose or point to that life. And,
• Immortality would not be surprising if God exists. So,
• Human life has objective meaning only if God exists. And,
• There are no dispositive reasons to deny Theism. And,
• The value associated with one’s life being meaningful is very great. So,
• One has pragmatic reason to cultivate a theistic commitment.

This argument rests on several controversial assumptions. For one, the argument assumes that a divine conferral of purpose is necessary for one’s life to have meaning and purpose. Presumably, the idea is that a self-conferral of purpose would be arbitrary and limited by human ignorance or uncertainty as to what is genuinely worthwhile. A conferral by God, however, would not be arbitrary as God would confer only a purpose that is objectively worthwhile. Another assumption is that objective meaning in life requires immorality. One might respond that this assumption neglects that increasing the balance of objective value (good) to disvalue (evil) can make a real difference in the world, even if one lacks immortality. The actions of Lincoln made the world better than it would have been absent those actions. Arguably, then, Lincoln’s life had meaning. More generally, the achievement of good works, or the mitigation of suffering and pain, might be ways that an objective positive difference results from one’s actions. Here is where the stipulation of immortality is supposed to play a role – if one knows that one’s achievements are like footprints on a beach, which the tides of time will eventually sweep away, a sense of futility is, one might argue, unavoidable, whether we admit this or not. Immortality is supposed to ensure, along with the divine conferral of purpose, a permanence which evades futility. Finally, note that premise (31) is particularly contentious, as some would argue that the problem of evil, the problem of divine hiddenness, or the lack of evidence supporting Theism, for examples, puts Theism beyond the rational pale.

While Craig holds that God and immortality are required for meaning in life, one could argue that even if not strictly necessary, immortality and God would enhance the value and meaning of one’s life and that prospective enhancement is reason sufficient to hope that God exists and for human immortality. All else being equal, if one’s achievements were to have an eternal positive effect that does seem more valuable than if they had a limited effect. Is hope motivated by pragmatic reasons a sufficient basis upon which to erect the superstructure of theistic commitment? With this question, we are back to issues concerning the permissibility of hope. There are those who argue that the existence of God would render the world worse-off than if God did not exist. That we should hope that this is not a God created universe. For example, see Kahane 2011, and the last section of this entry for a discussion.

Clifford’s Rule is a vivid presentation of an influential and long tradition in philosophy that carries the name of Evidentialism. We can understand Evidentialism as the thesis that:

Clearly enough, pragmatic arguments run afoul of (E), since pragmatic arguments are employed either when the evidence is inconclusive, or it is conclusively adverse. Consider the latter case first. Earlier it was mentioned that Pascal’s Wager is the most famous example of a theistic pragmatic argument. Pascal in fact has not one version of the Wager in his Pensées (1660) but four. The third version of the Wager is what Ian Hacking (1972) entitles the “Argument from Dominating Expectation,” and it employs the Expectation rule. We can represent it by letting p stand for a positive probability greater than zero and less than one-half, and letting EU stand for “expected utility,” and employing F2–F4 as finite values:

No matter how unlikely it is that God exists, as long as there is some positive non-zero probability that he does, believing is one’s best bet:

• For any person S , and alternatives α and β available to S , if the expected utility of α exceeds that of β, S should choose α. And,
• Believing in God carries more expected utility than does not believing. Therefore,
• One should believe in God.

Because of its ingenious employment of infinite utility, the third version has become what most philosophers think of as Pascal’s Wager. The appeal of the third version for theistic apologists is its ready employment as a worst-case device. Suppose there were a strong improbability argument for atheism. With the third version the theist has an escape: it can still be rational to believe, even if the belief is itself unreasonable, since inculcating theistic belief is an action with an infinite expected utility. This use as a worst-case device is something like a trump card that can be thrown down defeating what had appeared as a stronger hand. Pascal’s third version clearly violates (E).

Now consider James’s Will to Believe argument. As we saw, James’s contention is that any hypothesis that’s part of a genuine option, and that’s intellectually open, may be believed, even in the absence of sufficient evidence. No rule of morality or rationality, James argues, is violated if one accepts a hypothesis that’s genuine and open. If James is correct, then (E) should be replaced with:

According to (E′) if the evidence is adequate, then the question is settled. If there’s a preponderance of support for p , then one is required to believe p . Where the evidence speaks, one must listen and obey. (E′) differs from (E) in part since it says nothing about those occasions in which the evidence is silent, or is inadequate. If one assigns p a probability of one-half, then there’s not a preponderance of evidence in support of p . (E′) says nothing about believing p in that case. Principle (E), on the other hand, forbids believing p in that case. While a proponent of theistic pragmatic arguments cannot swear allegiance to (E), she can, clearly enough, adhere to (E′). Let’s call (E) Strong Evidentialism, and (E′) Weak Evidentialism. So, an employer of theistic pragmatic arguments can conform to Weak Evidentialism, but not Strong Evidentialism.

Is there a good reason to prefer Weak Evidentialism to Strong (in addition to James’s argument)? A promising argument in support of the moral and rational permissibility of employing pragmatic reasons in belief-formation is erected upon the base of what we might call the Duty Argument (or perhaps more precisely, the Duty Argument scheme):

• It is necessary that (no one is (overall) irrational in doing what he’s morally obligated to do). And,
• It is possible that (doing α is a moral obligation). So,
• It is possible that (doing α is (overall) rational).

The Duty Argument employs the box and diamond in the standard fashion as operators for, respectively, conceptual necessity and possibility. The alpha is just a placeholder for actions, or kinds of actions. The locution “(overall) rational” or “(overall) irrational” presupposes that there are various kinds of rationality, including moral rationality, epistemic rationality, and prudential rationality. [ 10 ] The idea that there are various kinds of rationality, or put any way, that one can be under conflicting obligations at a particular time, recognizes that dilemmas are possible. One can be obligated to do various things even when it’s not possible to do all of them. Overall rationality is the all-things-considered perspective. It is what one ultimately should do, having taken into account the various obligations one is under at a particular time. Overall rationality, or all-things-considered rationality (ATC rationality), is, in W.D. Ross’s terms, one’s actual duty in the particular circumstances, even if one has other conflicting prima facie duties. The Duty Argument can be formulated without presupposing that there are various kinds of rationality, by replacing the principle that no one is ever irrational in doing her moral duty , with the principle that moral obligations take precedence whenever a dilemma of obligations occurs . In any case the Duty Argument assumes that if in doing something one is not ATC irrational, then it follows that one is ATC rational in doing it.

The relevance of the Duty Argument is this. The action of forming and sustaining a belief upon pragmatic grounds can replace α. That is, pragmatic belief formation could be one’s moral duty. Consider the following four cases in which pragmatic belief formation is, arguably, morally required:

Devious ETs : Suppose you are abducted by very powerful and advanced extraterrestrials, who demonstrate their intent and power to destroy the Earth. Moreover, these fiendish ETs offer but one chance of salvation for humankind – you acquire and maintain a belief for which you lack adequate evidence. You adroitly point out that you cannot just will such a belief, especially since you know of no good reason to think it true. Devilish in their anticipation and in their technology, the ETs produce a device that can directly produce the requisite belief in willing subjects, a serum, say, or a supply of one-a-day doxastic-producing pills. It is clear that you would do no wrong by swallowing a pill or injecting the serum, and, hence, bringing about and maintaining belief in a proposition for which you lack adequate evidence, done to save humankind. Indeed, it is clear that you are in fact obligated to bring about the requisite belief, even though you lack adequate evidence for it. Pain case : Jones knows that expecting an event to be painful is strongly correlated with an increase in the intensity of felt pain (as opposed to having no expectation, or expecting the event to be relatively painless). Jones is about to have a boil lanced, and believing that she is obligated to minimize pain, she forms the belief that the procedure will be painless. She does so even though she lacks evidence that such procedures are in fact typically painless. Because of her action, the event is in fact less painful than it would otherwise have been. Small child : Suppose you are the parent or custodian of a small child, who has been hurt. You know that studies support the thesis that the felt pain reported by patients is typically higher in cases in which the patient expected the event to be painful than in cases where the patient did not have that expectation. You have no idea about the relative pain associated with a particular medical procedure that the child is about undergo. The child asks you if the procedure will be painful. Desiring to lower the pain the child will feel, you tell the child that the procedure will not hurt, hoping that the child will form a belief not supported by the evidence, but thereby lowering the child’s felt pain. Doctor case : Dr. Jones knows that the prognosis for Smith’s recovery is poor, but if she acts on that knowledge by telling Smith of his poor prognosis, she may well strip Smith of hope. Jones believes that maintaining hope is vital for quality of life. Overall, Jones decides it is better not to inform Smith just how poor the prognosis is and she does not disabuse Smith of her evidentially unsupported belief.

These four cases provide possible scenarios in which pragmatic belief formation, or suborning pragmatic belief formation in others, is morally required.

Although controversial, the Duty Argument, if sound, would provide good reason for thinking that there are occasions in which it is permissible, both rationally and morally, to form beliefs based upon pragmatic reasons even in the absence of adequate evidence. If the Duty Argument is sound, then (E) is false.

The Duty Argument presupposes that there are various kinds of rationality. Many Evidentialists, as well as many opponents of Evidentialism, also assume that there are various kinds of rationality. What if however there is only one kind or standard of rationality? What impact would that have on the debate? Susanna Rinard argues that it is best to reject the idea that there are various kinds or standards of rationality, and replace that idea with an equal treatment idea that all states – whether doxastic or not – face a single standard of rationality (Rinard 2017). Equal treatment of states – states like carrying an umbrella, or walking the dog, or voting for this candidate over that, or forming a belief in God – provides greater theoretical simplicity than does the idea that there are various standards or kinds of rationality. Equal Treatment also better explains the methodological attraction of simplicity in science than does the idea that there are various kinds of rationality, Rinard argues. If the equal treatment of all states idea is correct, then doxastic states would face the same standard of rationality as states of action. The Equal Treatment idea provides an additional objection to Evidentialism insofar as Evidentialism implies that beliefs are subject to one standard, while other states are subject to another standard.

Whether it is via Rinard’s Equal Treatment argument, or the Duty Argument, there is, arguably, good reason to reject Evidentialism.

The idea that persons can voluntarily and directly choose what to believe is called “Doxastic Voluntarism”. According to Doxastic Voluntarism, believing is a direct act of the will, with many of the propositions we believe under our immediate control. A basic action is an action that a person intentionally does, without doing any other action. Jones’ moving of her finger is a basic action, since she need not perform any other action to accomplish it. Her handing the book from Smith to Brown is not basic, since she must intentionally do several things to accomplish it. According to Doxastic Voluntarism, some of our belief acquisitions are basic actions. We can will, directly and voluntarily, what to believe and the beliefs thereby acquired are freely obtained and are not forced upon us. In short, one can believe at will. The proponent of Doxastic Voluntarism need not hold that every proposition is a candidate for direct acquisition, as long as she holds that there are some propositions belief in which is under our direct control.

It is widely thought that Doxastic Voluntarism is implausible. Opponents of Doxastic Voluntarism can present a simple experiment against it: survey various propositions that you do not currently believe, and see if any lend themselves, directly and immediately, by a basic act of the will, to belief. Certainly there are some beliefs that one can easily cause oneself to have. Consider the proposition that I am now holding a pencil. I can cause myself to believe that by simply picking up a pencil. Or more generally, any proposition about my own basic actions I can easily enough believe by performing the action. But my coming to believe is by means of some other basic action. Since I lack direct control over what I believe, and there’s no reason to think that my lacking in this regard is singular, Doxastic Voluntarism is implausible. Does the implausibility of Doxastic Voluntarism show that pragmatic belief-formation is also implausible?

Not at all: think of Pascal’s advice to act as if one already believes (by going to masses and by imitating the faithful) as a way of inculcating belief. Pragmatic belief-formation neither entails nor presupposes Doxastic Voluntarism. As long as there is indirect control, or roundabout control, over the acquisition and maintenance of beliefs, pragmatic belief-formation is possible. What constitutes indirect control over the acquisition of beliefs? Consider actions such as entertaining a proposition, or ignoring a proposition, or critically inquiring into the plausibility of this idea or that, or accepting a proposition. Each of these involves a propositional attitude, the adoption of which is under our direct control. Indirect control occurs since accepting a proposition, say, or acting as if a proposition were true, very often results in believing that proposition. Insofar as there is a causal connection between the propositional attitudes we adopt, and the beliefs that are thereby generated, we can be said to have exercised indirect, or roundabout, control over belief-formation.

One objection to the foregoing is that pragmatic arguments are, by and large, pointless because beliefs are, by their very nature, psychological states that aim for truth. That is, whenever one believes a proposition, one is disposed to feel that that proposition is probably the case. A person ordinarily cannot believe a proposition that she takes to have a probability of less than one-half or whose probability is uncertain since such propositional attitudes do not aim for truth. The upshot of this objection is that strong evidentialism is unavoidable.

If it is true, as this objection holds, that believing a proposition ordinarily involves being disposed to feel that the proposition is the case then it does appear at first blush that pragmatic belief-formation, as such, is ineffectual. But all that follows from this fact, if such it be, is that some sort of belief-inducing technology will be necessary in order to facilitate the acquisition of a proposition that is pragmatically supported. Now it is true that the most readily available belief-inducing technologies – selectively using the evidence for instance – all involve a degree of self-deception, since one ordinarily cannot attend only to the favorable evidence in support of a particular proposition while neglecting the adverse evidence arrayed against it and, being conscious of all this, expect that one will acquire that belief. The fact that self-deception is a vital feature of the readily available belief-formation technologies leads to another objection.

This second objection is that willfully engaging in self-deception renders pragmatic belief-formation morally problematic and rationally suspect, since willfully engaging in self-deception is the deliberate worsening of one’s epistemic situation. It is morally and rationally problematic to engage in pragmatic belief-formation, insofar as belief-formation involves self-deception.

This second objection is powerful if sound, but we must be careful here. First, while self-deception may be a serious problem with regard to inculcating a belief which one takes to be false, it does not seem to be a serious threat involving the inculcation of a belief which one thinks has as much evidence in its favor as against it, nor does it seem to be a threat when one takes the probability of the proposition to be indeterminate, since one could form the belief knowing full well the evidential situation. Even if it is true that believing that p is being disposed to feel that p is the case , it does not follow that believing that p involves being disposed to feel that p is the case based on the evidence at hand . Second, this is an objection not to pragmatic belief-formation per se , but an objection to pragmatic belief-formation that involves self-deception. Although it may be true that the employment of self-deceptive belief-inducing technologies is morally and rationally problematic, this objection says nothing about those belief-inducing technologies that do not involve self-deception. If there are belief-inducing technologies which are free of self-deception and which could generate a belief on the basis of a pragmatic reason, then this objection fails. [ 11 ]

Is there a belief-inducing technology available that does not involve self-deception? There is. Notice first there are two sorts of belief-inducing technologies distinguishable: “low-tech” technologies and “high-tech” ones. Low-tech technologies consist of propositional attitudes only, while high-tech ones employ nonpropositional techniques along with various propositional attitudes. The nonpropositional techniques could include actions like acting as if a certain proposition were true, and morally questionable ones like hypnosis, or indoctrination, or subliminal suggestion. Consider a technology consisting of two components, the first of which is the acceptance of a proposition, while the second is a behavioral regimen of acting on that acceptance. Accepting a proposition, unlike believing, is an action that is characterized, in part, by one’s assenting to the proposition, whether one believes it or not. One accepts a proposition, when she assents to its truth and employs it as a premise in her deliberations. One can accept a proposition that one does not believe. Indeed, we do this much of the time. For example, think of the gambler’s fallacy. One might be disposed to believe that the next toss of the fair coin must come up Tails, since it has been Heads on the previous seven tosses. Nevertheless, one ought not to accept that the next toss of a fair coin must come up Tails, or that the probability that it will is greater than one-half. Acceptance, we should remember, unlike believing, is an action that is under our direct control.

If one accepts a proposition, then one can also act upon the proposition. Acting upon a proposition is behaving as though it were true. The two-step regimen of accepting a proposition and then acting upon it is a common way of generating belief in that proposition. And, importantly, there is no hint of self-deception tainting the process.

One might object that employing a belief-inducing technology at all, whether low or high tech, is enough to entangle one in issues implicating the rationality of the belief induced (see, for instance, Garber 2009). A friend of the pragmatic, however, might argue that that this objection presupposes Strong Evidentialism, and arguments found in William James, the Duty argument, the Equal Treatment argument, have already provided a dispositive ruling on that issue.

While not as common as theistic arguments, there have been atheistic pragmatic arguments offered from time to time. These arguments often arise within the context of a purported naturalistic explanation of the occurrence of religious belief and practice. Perhaps the earliest proponent of an atheistic pragmatic argument was David Hume (1711–1776). In chapter X of his 1757 The Natural History of Religion , Hume wrote:

Where the deity is presented as infinitely superior to mankind, this belief … is apt, when joined with superstitious terrors, to sink the human mind into the lowest submission and abasement …

The idea of Hume’s argument here and elsewhere in his writings (see for instance Dialogue XII of his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion , and appendix IV of the second Enquiry) is that theism, or at least theism of the popular sort – that conjoined with “superstitious terrors,” degrades individual morality, thereby devaluing human existence. Theistic belief, Hume contended, inculcates the “monkish virtues of mortification, penance, humility, and passive suffering, as the only qualities which are acceptable…” But not only does theistic belief harm individual morality, according to Hume, it also harms public morality. In chapter IX, Hume suggested that theism (again he qualifies by writing of the “corruptions of theism”) leads to intolerance and persecution.

Another atheistic pragmatic argument is that of Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), who in The Future of an Illusion (1927) contends that religious belief perpetuates psychological immaturity among individuals, and cultural immaturity on the social level. To make sense of Freud’s argument requires knowing that he employed the term “illusion” in an idiosyncratic way. An illusion in the Freudian sense is a belief that is caused by and in turn satisfies a deep psychological need or longing. Illusions are not held rationally. Illusions stick even in the absence of any supporting evidence. Indeed, according to Freud, they stick even in the face of strong contra-evidence. An illusion could be true, but often they are not. Delusions are false illusions. Religious belief Freud thought was an illusion. While it may have been a beneficial illusion at an earlier time, it no longer is. The religious illusion now, Freud asserted, inhibits scientific progress, and causes psychological neuroses, among its other pernicious effects.

Another atheistic pragmatic argument is Richard Dawkins’s contention that religious belief is a “virus of the mind” (Dawkins 1993). One is religious, according to Dawkins, because one has been infected by a faith meme. A meme is Dawkins’s imaginative construct, which he describes as a bit of information, manifested in behavior, and which can be copied from one person to another. Like genes, memes are self-replicating vehicles, jumping from mind to mind. One catches a meme by exposure to another who is infected. Dawkins claims that the faith meme has the following traits:

Dawkins’s meme idea, and his dismissal of faith as a virus of the mind, is both a purported naturalistic explanation of religious belief and a pragmatic dismissal of it as a harmful phenomenon.

A contemporary atheistic pragmatic argument is that the existence of God would make the world far worse in some respects than would be the case if God did not exist, even if it did not make the world worse overall (Kahane 2011). As Kahane notes, if God were to exist, then a full understanding of reality by humans, may in-principle be unachievable. Additionally, if God were to exist, moral autonomy may be limited, since humans, as creatures, might be subordinate to God’s demands, including demands for worship, obedience, and allegiance. Finally, if God were to exist, complete privacy may be lost, as an omniscient being could, presumably, know one’s thoughts and attitudes.

Kahane’s intricate argument is counter to the conventional view that God’s existence is something that all should hope for, since this world would, arguably, be the best or among the best of all possible worlds if God were to exist. Even so, Kahane argues that one could rationally prefer that God not exist. The argument involves a distinction between evaluations from an impersonal viewpoint, and from a personal viewpoint. It is the latter, which proves the most promising for the argument as Kahane contends that the existence of God could undermine the meaning generating life-projects of some. If his argument is sound, Kahane has provided a kind of atheistic pragmatic argument that one could prefer that God not exist, even if God’s existence would render the world better overall than it otherwise would be.

Much of Kahane’s argument consists of comparisons between possible worlds in which God exists (“Godly worlds”), and those in which God does not exist (“Godless worlds”). The modal reliability of these comparisons is far from obvious, since God is standardly seen as a necessarily existing being. For a critical examination of Kahane’s arguments, see Kraay 2013.

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How to go to Heaven

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This I Believe

Monday, october 15, 2012, this i beleive essay god.

4 comments:

Your article is very true. God is good and faithful and he will not let you be tempted beyond what you can bear. But when you are tempted he will provide a way for you to stand up under it. And thats what seemed to be the case with your grandpa. To me God is like a big teddy bear that I can go to with any of lifes troubles and I know he will love me no matter what, but he also will correct me when I am doing wrong. Youre essay is a good testimony. I like it alot!

I love this essay. You did such a great job. God will always be there to guide you. No matter what decisions you have made, God will forgive you and be there for you through your trouble. Great job!

Your essay really can hit the hearts of many people. It shows that God has funny ways of getting you through tough situations and you will always come out stronger. He will show you to never loose your faith. Good job on your story, it's very good!

Dear Blake, I really liked reading your essay. I am very into my beliefs of God as well. Im sorry about your grandpa, I know how you feel. That feeling that you cant go on without them, like there is nothing left becasue they are gone. Its one of the worst feelings I have ever felt but im glad you got through it! God is always looking out for you and always has a plan for you, remember that! (:

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• When You Say You Believe In God, What Do You Mean?

It seems a simple question: five words inviting a plain yes-or-no answer: "Do you believe in God?"

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And yet year after year, the question still surfaces, not only in Gallup polls but in Harris and Barna Group polls, the Baylor Religion Survey, the American Religious Identification Survey, the General Social Survey, and many others.

"Just 27 percent of adults in Western Europe believe in the God described in the bible."

Now, after a decade of conducting its own wide-ranging, in-depth religious attitude surveys in the United States and abroad, the Pew Research Center recently concluded that the time had come for an expansive new approach to the age-old, and maybe not-so-simple, question of transcendent belief.

The result is two major surveys, published separately in the spring of 2018, that explore contemporary understandings of what it means when Americans and Western Europeans say they believe in God—or don’t.

“We wanted to dig deeper,” explains Greg Smith, associate director of religion research at the center, “which required a whole new set of questions. In the past, we asked people if they believed in God or a universal spirit. But this time we asked follow-up questions based on the way people responded.”

Pew’s domestic survey—“When Americans Say They Believe in God, What Do They Mean?”—found that although 9 in 10 Americans say they believe in a higher power , only a slim majority believe in the God of the Bible.

Pew’s massive Religious Landscape Surveys published in 2007 and 2014 had already shown that the share of Americans who believe in God with absolute certainty has trended downward in recent years to about 63 percent, while those voicing doubts about God’s existence has grown.

“These trends raise a series of questions,” notes the new survey report. “When respondents say they don’t believe in God, what are they rejecting?” Just as important: What do respondents mean when they say they do believe in God?

The survey of 4,729 adults, conducted online in December 2017 via Pew’s American Trends Panel, began by asking respondents, “Do you believe in God, or not?” Although 80 percent of respondents answered “yes,” subsequent questions revealed that just 56 percent believe in the divine being described in the Bible. Roughly a quarter (23 percent) of all the “yes” respondents said they believed instead in a “higher power or spiritual force.”

And although 19 percent of respondents said they did not believe in “God,” half of them said they believe in a higher force or power. Just 10 percent of those surveyed said they believed in no transcendent force, power, or being.

Self-identified believers were next asked whether their image of the divine was loving, all-knowing and/or all-powerful; whether they felt God had rewarded or punished them; whether they talk or pray to God; and whether they feel God talks to them. Still more questions correlated these responses with income, education, and religious and political affiliations. 

“There are so many different ways to ask this interesting question about belief in God,” says Frank Newport, editor-in-chief of Gallup Inc. “Our core is still `Do you believe in God, question mark,’” although Gallup added “God or a universal spirit” to some of its polls in 1976.

What Newport says he appreciates about the Pew belief-in-God survey is that it “colored in the details of what people mean when they say they believe.”

“It’s interesting,” he says, “because belief in God is such a subjective area, and asking people to retrieve aspects of it from their brains is tricky. So I think it’s great they did this. It extends our understanding of religion in this country.”

The findings appear to pose challenges for traditional denominations. Charles Zech, director emeritus of Villanova University’s Center for Church Management, calls the survey “fascinating” and “scary news for any organized religion.”

“It’s one thing to see the growing number of ‘nones’” who identify with no religious denomination, says Zech. “It’s another thing to have your members not believing the very things you’re preaching. Quite honestly, this trend really caught me off-guard. This is brand-new information for me.”

Zech, the co-author of Catholic Parishes in the 21st Century, adds that the survey’s finding that highly educated Americans are the least likely to believe in God “has serious implications for the finances of religious institutions,” because churches have long relied on the wealthier and better-educated for their financial support.

Pew’s survey questions referencing the biblical deity did not cite any Scripture, leaving respondents to reference their own image or conception. But the great majority of Americans who believe in “God as described in the Bible” envision “an all-powerful, all-knowing, loving deity who determines most or all of what happens in their lives,” the survey found.

By contrast, the report noted, those who said they believe instead in a “higher power or spiritual force” are “much less likely to believe in a deity who is omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent and active in human affairs.” 

Pew was motivated to “dig deeper” into the God question not by a sense that previous polls had fallen short, says Smith. Rather, “it was a matter of our wanting to know more.” 

That curiosity had already impelled another belief-in-God survey that the Pew Research Center conducted across 15 Western European countries in mid-2017 as part of its large “Being Christian in Western Europe” study. The results were published in May, a month after the U.S. report. 

With large pluralities of Western Europeans identifying themselves as either nonpracticing Christians or having no religious affiliation whatsoever, “we felt this was a good time to test out people’s nuanced concepts of God,” says Neha Sahgal, associate director of research at the center, who oversees international polling, particularly on topics related to interreligious relations.

With support from the John Templeton Foundation, the Pew Research Center had already studied Pentecostalism in 10 countries, the rise of Protestantism in Latin America, religious identity in the former Soviet Union, and Christianity’s modern interaction with Islam in Africa and—with funding from the Neubauer Family Foundation—had conducted a religious attitudes survey in Israel. The “Being Christian in Western Europe” survey, which included the belief-in-God poll, is Pew’s first religion study in that region.

All 15 nations surveyed are historically Christian, and nearly all claim Christian majorities. Yet the poll found that a median of just 27 percent of adults in Western Europe believe in the God described in the Bible. 

And although 38 percent of Western Europeans said they believe in a “spiritual force or higher power,” another 26 percent said they held no belief in any divine being or higher power—2½ times the proportion of Americans who profess the same.

The survey also found that people in predominantly Catholic countries—especially Italy (46 percent), Ireland (39 percent), and Portugal (36 percent)—tend to have higher levels of belief in a biblical God than those in historically Protestant countries. “Still,” the report notes, “belief in the God of the Bible is lower in all of these countries than in the United States.”

The U.S. and European surveys asked the same questions, and both are nationally representative, according to Sahgal, who notes that the surveys differ chiefly in how they were administered. The U.S. poll was self-administered, while the European survey of 24,599 adults was conducted by telephone.

“There is some research to suggest that when respondents take surveys over the phone, they may temper their responses toward what they think is socially desirable, because they’re talking to another person,” she says. “So in the U.S. you may say you go to church when you don’t, because it’s thought you’re ‘supposed to.’ But in a secular culture, the socially desirable answer may be not being religious. So we have to be careful comparing the two surveys.” 

The nuances of beliefs become sharper in an examination of the findings in the American survey. It found, for example, that nearly all of the respondents who believe in the biblical deity—97 percent—hold that God “loves all people regardless of their faults.” But a smaller percentage of those who believe in a spiritual force or power—69 percent—believe in a God who is loving without regard to fault.

There are other differences in the view of God between those groups. Nearly all of those who believe in the God of the Bible—94 percent—hold that God “knows everything.” Eighty-six percent say God has the power to “direct or change everything,” 70 percent say God determines all or most of what happens in their lives, half say God has punished them, and 40 percent say God talks to them.

By contrast, those who view God as a force or power, rather than as the God of the Bible, view the divinity as markedly more impersonal and less involved in their lives. Although 53 percent of them believe that God knows everything, just one-quarter believe that God determines what happens in their lives, and only 16 percent say that God talks to them.

There are further differences among U.S. respondents by denomination, age, and political affiliation . More than 90 percent of evangelicals and those in the historically black Protestant tradition say they believe in the God of the Bible, while 72 percent of mainline Protestants and 69 percent of Catholics do. Nine out of 10 people in the historically black Protestant tradition believe God to be all-loving, all-knowing, and all-powerful, whereas just 6 in 10 Catholics ascribe all three attributes to God.

Sixteen percent of Americans ages 18 to 29 say they believe in no God or higher power —more than double the proportion of those over 50. And Republicans are far more likely, at 70 percent, to believe in the God of the Bible than are Democrats, at 45 percent. Only one-third of white Democrats believe in the biblical God, and 21 percent do not believe in a higher power of any kind.

“The Pew data totally fits with the data we looked at,” says Baylor University sociologist Paul Froese, director of the Baylor Religion Surveys. He is co-author, with Christopher Bader, of the 2010 book America’s Four Gods: What We Say About God & What That Says About Us .

“When you ask somebody about God,” Froese says, “my thought is that you’re tapping into their deep sense of what is moral authority in the world.”

America’s Four Gods , which Pew’s belief-in-God report cites as a predecessor to its own survey, proposes that most Americans’ notions of God fit into four distinct categories.

There is, Froese and Bader argue, the Authoritative God, who is engaged in human affairs but punishes; Benevolent God, who rescues or provides alternatives in crises; Critical God, who does not intervene in human affairs but will judge us in the afterlife; and the unengaged Distant God, belief in whom is found more among the college-educated, who favor a more scientific view of how the world works.

Those who see the deity as an Authoritative God tend to believe that divine laws are immutable and must be obeyed, Froese says, while those who envision a Benevolent God “feel they can talk to Him and work things out.” 

Froese says Pew’s multiple-question approach is useful in helping to understand people’s beliefs, because “when you push them [respondents] hard, things start to unwind. It gives you insight into their mental processes.”

And that, says Smith, is what the Pew Research Center’s religious surveys aspire to do: seek insights that “present good, nuanced information on complicated subjects—objective information that people of all kinds can use to better understand the world and the society in which they live.”

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