aristotle essay contest

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Meet the high school winners of U of T's Aristotle Contest (and read their philosophy essays)

Published: October 18, 2018

By Jovana Jankovic

In an effort to promote interest in philosophical study at all levels of education, the University of Toronto's department of philosophy  runs the  Aristotle Contest , an annual philosophy essay contest for Canadian high school students. 

This year's contest received close to 100 entries from across Canada, an indication of the strong enthusiasm for philosophy among young people and their educators. 

This year’s contest winner is Eric Fishback, a 17-year-old, Grade 12 student at Guelph Collegiate Vocational Institute in Guelph, Ont. His essay,  The Universal Objective Truths of Aesthetics,  was selected as the finest philosophical work by the review panel, made up of faculty members of the department of philosophy and high school philosophy teachers.

Finishing second was Abdullah Farooq, a first-year student in French literature at the University of Ottawa.

“I love music as well as reading and writing, which was a big influence on my choice of program in university,” he says.

“Entering the contest gave me valuable practice writing essays,” says Farooq, “and I’d recommend it to anyone it interests.

"What surprised me about the competition was how important the editing process was. After a day or two of revision, my final draft was totally different – and much better – than the one I’d taken weeks to put together.”

“The Aristotle Contest challenged me to think deeply about such moral consequences,” he says, “and, as a result, I came to a better understanding of the topic of human-like AI as a whole. The Aristotle Contest forced me to think about the moral consequences of advancing technology, something I had not really thought about.”

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Meet the high school winners of Philosophy's Aristotle Contest

The evidence is clear: Canadian high school students do not shy away from the difficult questions.

In collaboration with the Ontario Philosophy Teachers’ Association (OPTA), the Department of Philosophy in the Faculty of Arts & Science called on budding philosophers in Canada to show their intellectual mettle and respond to one of three essay prompts in the 2019 Aristotle Contest .

Almost 100 young thinkers submitted written work tackling the finer points of artificial intelligence and creativity, questions of simulation and genetic modification.

The review panel, composed of philosophy faculty members and high school philosophy teachers from the Greater Toronto Area, was very pleased with the submissions. Professor James John , who leads the contest, described the general quality of the work as “remarkable,” adding that the best 25 essays this year showed even more promise than the top 25 submissions from 2018.

So, who is behind the award-winning essays this year?

Elizabeth Zhu (University of Toronto Schools, Toronto), Ayush Ranjan (The Woodlands Secondary School, Mississauga) and Ritvik Singh (Academy for Gifted Children – P.A.C.E., Richmond Hill) are the three students whose work garnered the top accolades in the 2019 competition.

Sixteen-year-old Zhu impressed the evaluation panel with “ Reality Is a Shared Hallucination ,” the highest-ranked essay this year. The piece demonstrates thorough research skills, superb organization and its author’s ability to carefully anticipate possible counterarguments to her views.

Now in Grade 11, Zhu attributes these skills at least in part to her practice in competitive debate, which she began in Grade 8. Maybe that background is also what makes her comfortable with holding seemingly disparate ideas in her head simultaneously: Zhu admits that while the research for her essay convinced her that our living in a simulation is “actually very likely,” the idea of ourselves as simply brains in a vat still seems “just strange when we consider our physical bodies and sensations.”

Second place in the competition went to an essay titled “ On the Subjectivity of Reality and the Benefits of a Simulated World ,” written by Ayush Ranjan, who submitted the work while still in Grade 12 but who has now begun his degree in accounting and financial management at the University of Waterloo.

Ranjan’s favourite part of the essay-writing experience was taking his ideas and discussing them with his peers to gain an in-depth look at a variety of perspectives. Keeping within the competition’s word limit, however, proved more challenging. “I struggled with discussing complex ideas in a concise manner,” he says. That difficulty did not show in the final product, though: the reviewers felt that Ranjan submitted a finely crafted, forceful essay that successfully wove together the philosophy of Kant with concepts from computer science.

Ritvik Singh placed third in this year’s competition with his “ A Treatise on Creative Artificial Intelligence .” The basketball and AI enthusiast also submitted his work as a Grade 12 student, and is now a first-year student in U of T’s Engineering Science program . 

Singh encourages young people to take up philosophy to hone their critical thinking skills. “Actually thinking about some of the most fundamental concepts allows us to better understand the universe in which we live,” he says. Singh says he enjoyed constructing his own ideas rather than just absorbing those of others for the contest, allowing him the opportunity to think through topics he had paid little attention to before. Reviewers commended the combination of clarity and sophistication in his essay.

Besides awarding cash prizes of $500, $400 and $300 to the contest’s highest-ranked writers, the evaluation committee also granted honourable mentions to Sameer Bapat (A. Y. Jackson Secondary School, North York) for his essay The Creative Capacity of Artificially Intelligent Machines ,” to Kacper Mykietyn (St. Martin Secondary School, Mississauga) for a piece entitled “ Distribution of Genetic Resources and Its Consequences ,” and to Keyer Thyme (Marc Garneau Collegiate Institute, North York) for “ In Defence of the Simulation .”

Read the winning essays:

• Elizabeth Zhu, University of Toronto Schools, Toronto “ Reality Is a Shared Hallucination ,”
• Ayush Ranjan, The Woodlands Secondary School, Mississauga, " On the Subjectivity of Reality and the Benefits of a Simulated World ,”
• Ritvik Singh, Academy for Gifted Children – P.A.C.E., Richmond Hill “ A Treatise on Creative Artificial Intelligence .”
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The Aristotle: A high school philosophy essay contest

Click here for details.

In collaboration with the  Ontario Philosophy Teachers’ Association , the department administers the annual Aristotle Contest, awarding cash prizes for the finest philosophical work by current Canadian high school students. The contest provides high school students interested in philosophy with an opportunity to have their work evaluated and recognized by the largest post-secondary Department of Philosophy in North America.

Instructions

Three questions are posted for this year’s contest;  contestants must choose only one.  The questions for the 2020 contest are:

• According to conventional opinion, we have a duty to obey the laws passed by the Government of Canada, and the government has the right to punish us for failing to obey. The idea is that the Canadian state is a legitimate source of political authority. What is the nature of this authority and do any states really have it? Could the anarchist—the person who holds that  no  government is justified—be right? Defend your answers.
• Some say the good life consists in happiness and enjoying pleasurable experiences. Others say it consists in contemplation (philosophical, religious, or scientific). Yet others say it consists in selfless devotion to helping those in need. Well, what  is  the good life for a human person? And is there just one kind of good life or might there be a plurality of different kinds of good lives? Defend your answers.
• Many pundits argue that recent advances in digital technology constitute a grave threat to our privacy. Governments, corporations, and enterprising hackers now have the capacity to track our phone conversations, internet searches, and electronic payments, and they can use this information to manipulate us in ways both subtle and not so subtle. What, exactly, is this “privacy” that is allegedly at risk? How important should protecting it be to us? And what steps would governments and private citizens be justified in taking to protect it? Defend your answers.

Contestants will write an essay of 1200-1500 words that develops and defends a position taken in response to the chosen question. Essays must be submitted electronically as a Word document in 12-point font, double-spaced and, if using quotations or ideas from the readings or other sources, with complete referencing.

Contestants are not required, encouraged, or expected to do any reading or research beyond reading the chosen question. If contestants choose to use ideas from other sources they will not be penalized for doing so, provided the sources are properly identified. The top ten entries will undergo a plagiarism check.

Submission emails must be  dated May 25, 2020 or earlier.  Late entries will not be accepted. All submissions must be emailed as attachments with the subject line “Aristotle Contest entry” to:

Petra Dreiser , Communications Officer, Department of Philosophy ([email protected] )

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The Aristotle: A high school philosophy essay contest

The University of Toronto Department of Philosophy is relaunching the Aristotle high school philosophy essay contest in partnership with the Ontario Philosophy Teacher's Association . For more information about the 2018 competition, visit  http://philosophy.utoronto.ca/the-aristotle-a-high-school-philosophy-essay-contest/ . The deadline to submit is May 25. First prize is $500. 

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Aristotle’s Ethics

Aristotle conceives of ethical theory as a field distinct from the theoretical sciences. Its methodology must match its subject matter—good action—and must respect the fact that in this field many generalizations hold only for the most part. We study ethics in order to improve our lives, and therefore its principal concern is the nature of human well-being. Aristotle follows Socrates and Plato in taking the virtues to be central to a well-lived life. Like Plato, he regards the ethical virtues (justice, courage, temperance and so on) as complex rational, emotional and social skills. But he rejects Plato’s idea that to be completely virtuous one must acquire, through a training in the sciences, mathematics, and philosophy, an understanding of what goodness is. What we need, in order to live well, is a proper appreciation of the way in which such goods as friendship, pleasure, virtue, honor and wealth fit together as a whole. In order to apply that general understanding to particular cases, we must acquire, through proper upbringing and habits, the ability to see, on each occasion, which course of action is best supported by reasons. Therefore practical wisdom, as he conceives it, cannot be acquired solely by learning general rules. We must also acquire, through practice, those deliberative, emotional, and social skills that enable us to put our general understanding of well-being into practice in ways that are suitable to each occasion.

1. Preliminaries

2. the human good and the function argument, 3.1 traditional virtues and the skeptic, 3.2 differences from and affinities to plato, 4. virtues and deficiencies, continence and incontinence, 5.1 ethical virtue as disposition, 5.2 ethical theory does not offer a decision procedure, 5.3 the starting point for practical reasoning, 6. intellectual virtues, 8. pleasure, 9. friendship, 10. three lives compared, a. single-authored overviews, b. anthologies, c.1 the chronological order of aristotle’s ethical treatises, c.2 the methodology and metaphysics of ethical theory, c.3 the human good and the human function, c.4 the nature of virtue and accounts of particular virtues, c.5 practical reasoning, moral psychology, and action, c.6 pleasure, c.7 friendship, c.8 feminism and aristotle, c.9 aristotle and contemporary ethics, d. bibliographies, primary literature, secondary literature, other internet resources, related entries.

Aristotle wrote two ethical treatises: the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics . He does not himself use either of these titles, although in the Politics (1295a36) he refers back to one of them—probably the Eudemian Ethics —as “ ta êthika ”—his writings about character. The words “ Eudemian ” and “ Nicomachean ” were added later, perhaps because the former was edited by his friend, Eudemus, and the latter by his son, Nicomachus. In any case, these two works cover more or less the same ground: they begin with a discussion of eudaimonia (“happiness”, “flourishing”), and turn to an examination of the nature of aretê (“virtue”, “excellence”) and the character traits that human beings need in order to live life at its best. Both treatises examine the conditions in which praise or blame are appropriate, and the nature of pleasure and friendship; near the end of each work, we find a brief discussion of the proper relationship between human beings and the divine.

Though the general point of view expressed in each work is the same, there are many subtle differences in organization and content as well. Clearly, one is a re-working of the other, and although no single piece of evidence shows conclusively what their order is, it is widely assumed that the Nicomachean Ethics is a later and improved version of the Eudemian Ethics . (Not all of the Eudemian Ethics was revised: its Books IV, V, and VI re-appear as V, VI, VII of the Nicomachean Ethics .) Perhaps the most telling indication of this ordering is that in several instances the Nicomachean Ethics develops a theme about which its Eudemian cousin is silent. Only the Nicomachean Ethics discusses the close relationship between ethical inquiry and politics; only the Nicomachean Ethics critically examines Solon’s paradoxical dictum that no man should be counted happy until he is dead; and only the Nicomachean Ethics gives a series of arguments for the superiority of the philosophical life to the political life. The remainder of this article will therefore focus on this work. [Note: Page and line numbers shall henceforth refer to this treatise.]

A third treatise, called the Magna Moralia (the “Big Ethics”) is included in complete editions of Aristotle’s works, but its authorship is disputed by scholars. It ranges over topics discussed more fully in the other two works and its point of view is similar to theirs. (Why, being briefer, is it named the Magna Moralia ? Because each of the two papyrus rolls into which it is divided is unusually long. Just as a big mouse can be a small animal, two big chapters can make a small book. This work was evidently named “big” with reference to its parts, not the whole.) A few authors in antiquity refer to a work with this name and attribute it to Aristotle, but it is not mentioned by several authorities, such as Cicero and Diogenes Laertius, whom we would expect to have known of it. Some scholars hold that it is Aristotle’s earliest course on ethics—perhaps his own lecture notes or those of a student; others regard it as a post-Aristotelian compilation or adaption of one or both of his genuine ethical treatises.

Although Aristotle is deeply indebted to Plato’s moral philosophy, particularly Plato’s central insight that moral thinking must be integrated with our emotions and appetites, and that the preparation for such unity of character should begin with childhood education, the systematic character of Aristotle’s discussion of these themes was a remarkable innovation. No one had written ethical treatises before Aristotle. Plato’s Republic , for example, does not treat ethics as a distinct subject matter; nor does it offer a systematic examination of the nature of happiness, virtue, voluntariness, pleasure, or friendship. To be sure, we can find in Plato’s works important discussions of these phenomena, but they are not brought together and unified as they are in Aristotle’s ethical writings.

The principal idea with which Aristotle begins is that there are differences of opinion about what is best for human beings, and that to profit from ethical inquiry we must resolve this disagreement. He insists that ethics is not a theoretical discipline: we are asking what the good for human beings is not simply because we want to have knowledge, but because we will be better able to achieve our good if we develop a fuller understanding of what it is to flourish. In raising this question—what is the good?—Aristotle is not looking for a list of items that are good. He assumes that such a list can be compiled rather easily; most would agree, for example, that it is good to have friends, to experience pleasure, to be healthy, to be honored, and to have such virtues as courage at least to some degree. The difficult and controversial question arises when we ask whether certain of these goods are more desirable than others. Aristotle’s search for the good is a search for the highest good, and he assumes that the highest good, whatever it turns out to be, has three characteristics: it is desirable for itself, it is not desirable for the sake of some other good, and all other goods are desirable for its sake.

Aristotle thinks everyone will agree that the terms “ eudaimonia ” (“happiness”) and “ eu zên ” (“living well”) designate such an end. The Greek term “ eudaimon ” is composed of two parts: “ eu ” means “well” and “ daimon ” means “divinity” or “spirit”. To be eudaimon is therefore to be living in a way that is well-favored by a god. But Aristotle never calls attention to this etymology in his ethical writings, and it seems to have little influence on his thinking. He regards “ eudaimon ” as a mere substitute for eu zên (“living well”). These terms play an evaluative role, and are not simply descriptions of someone’s state of mind.

No one tries to live well for the sake of some further goal; rather, being eudaimon is the highest end, and all subordinate goals—health, wealth, and other such resources—are sought because they promote well-being, not because they are what well-being consists in. But unless we can determine which good or goods happiness consists in, it is of little use to acknowledge that it is the highest end. To resolve this issue, Aristotle asks what the ergon (“function”, “task”, “work”) of a human being is, and argues that it consists in activity of the rational part of the soul in accordance with virtue (1097b22–1098a20). One important component of this argument is expressed in terms of distinctions he makes in his psychological and biological works. The soul is analyzed into a connected series of capacities: the nutritive soul is responsible for growth and reproduction, the locomotive soul for motion, the perceptive soul for perception, and so on. The biological fact Aristotle makes use of is that human beings are the only species that has not only these lower capacities but a rational soul as well. The good of a human being must have something to do with being human; and what sets humanity off from other species, giving us the potential to live a better life, is our capacity to guide ourselves by using reason. If we use reason well, we live well as human beings; or, to be more precise, using reason well over the course of a full life is what happiness consists in. Doing anything well requires virtue or excellence, and therefore living well consists in activities caused by the rational soul in accordance with virtue or excellence.

Aristotle’s conclusion about the nature of happiness is in a sense uniquely his own. No other writer or thinker had said precisely what he says about what it is to live well. But at the same time his view is not too distant from a common idea. As he himself points out, one traditional conception of happiness identifies it with virtue (1098b30–1). Aristotle’s theory should be construed as a refinement of this position. He says, not that happiness is virtue, but that it is virtuous activity . Living well consists in doing something, not just being in a certain state or condition. It consists in those lifelong activities that actualize the virtues of the rational part of the soul.

At the same time, Aristotle makes it clear that in order to be happy one must possess others goods as well—such goods as friends, wealth, and power. And one’s happiness is endangered if one is severely lacking in certain advantages—if, for example, one is extremely ugly, or has lost children or good friends through death (1099a31–b6). But why so? If one’s ultimate end should simply be virtuous activity, then why should it make any difference to one’s happiness whether one has or lacks these other types of good? Aristotle’s reply is that one’s virtuous activity will be to some extent diminished or defective, if one lacks an adequate supply of other goods (1153b17–19). Someone who is friendless, childless, powerless, weak, and ugly will simply not be able to find many opportunities for virtuous activity over a long period of time, and what little he can accomplish will not be of great merit. To some extent, then, living well requires good fortune; happenstance can rob even the most excellent human beings of happiness. Nonetheless, Aristotle insists, the highest good, virtuous activity, is not something that comes to us by chance. Although we must be fortunate enough to have parents and fellow citizens who help us become virtuous, we ourselves share much of the responsibility for acquiring and exercising the virtues.

3. Methodology

A common complaint about Aristotle’s attempt to defend his conception of happiness is that his argument is too general to show that it is in one’s interest to possess any of the particular virtues as they are traditionally conceived. Suppose we grant, at least for the sake of argument, that doing anything well, including living well, consists in exercising certain skills; and let us call these skills, whatever they turn out to be, virtues. Even so, that point does not by itself allow us to infer that such qualities as temperance, justice, courage, as they are normally understood, are virtues. They should be counted as virtues only if it can be shown that actualizing precisely these skills is what happiness consists in. What Aristotle owes us, then, is an account of these traditional qualities that explains why they must play a central role in any well-lived life.

But perhaps Aristotle disagrees, and refuses to accept this argumentative burden. In one of several important methodological remarks he makes near the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics , he says that in order to profit from the sort of study he is undertaking, one must already have been brought up in good habits (1095b4–6). The audience he is addressing, in other words, consists of people who are already just, courageous, and generous; or, at any rate, they are well on their way to possessing these virtues. Why such a restricted audience? Why does he not address those who have serious doubts about the value of these traditional qualities, and who therefore have not yet decided to cultivate and embrace them?

Addressing the moral skeptic, after all, is the project Plato undertook in the Republic : in Book I he rehearses an argument to show that justice is not really a virtue, and the remainder of this work is an attempt to rebut this thesis. Aristotle’s project seems, at least on the surface, to be quite different. He does not appear to be addressing someone who has genuine doubts about the value of justice or kindred qualities. Perhaps, then, he realizes how little can be accomplished, in the study of ethics, to provide it with a rational foundation. Perhaps he thinks that no reason can be given for being just, generous, and courageous. These are qualities one learns to love when one is a child, and having been properly habituated, one no longer looks for or needs a reason to exercise them. One can show, as a general point, that happiness consists in exercising some skills or other, but that the moral skills of a virtuous person are what one needs is not a proposition that can be established on the basis of argument.

This is not the only way of reading the Ethics , however. For surely we cannot expect Aristotle to show what it is about the traditional virtues that makes them so worthwhile until he has fully discussed the nature of those virtues. He himself warns us that his initial statement of what happiness is should be treated as a rough outline whose details are to be filled in later (1098a20–22). His intention in Book I of the Ethics is to indicate in a general way why the virtues are important; why particular virtues—courage, justice, and the like—are components of happiness is something we should be able to better understand only at a later point.

In any case, Aristotle’s assertion that his audience must already have begun to cultivate the virtues need not be taken to mean that no reasons can be found for being courageous, just, and generous. His point, rather, may be that in ethics, as in any other study, we cannot make progress towards understanding why things are as they are unless we begin with certain assumptions about what is the case. Neither theoretical nor practical inquiry starts from scratch. Someone who has made no observations of astronomical or biological phenomena is not yet equipped with sufficient data to develop an understanding of these sciences. The parallel point in ethics is that to make progress in this sphere we must already have come to enjoy doing what is just, courageous, generous and the like. We must experience these activities not as burdensome constraints, but as noble, worthwhile, and enjoyable in themselves. Then, when we engage in ethical inquiry, we can ask what it is about these activities that makes them worthwhile. We can also compare these goods with other things that are desirable in themselves—pleasure, friendship, honor, and so on—and ask whether any of them is more desirable than the others. We approach ethical theory with a disorganized bundle of likes and dislikes based on habit and experience; such disorder is an inevitable feature of childhood. But what is not inevitable is that our early experience will be rich enough to provide an adequate basis for worthwhile ethical reflection; that is why we need to have been brought up well. Yet such an upbringing can take us only so far. We seek a deeper understanding of the objects of our childhood enthusiasms, and we must systematize our goals so that as adults we have a coherent plan of life. We need to engage in ethical theory, and to reason well in this field, if we are to move beyond the low-grade form of virtue we acquired as children.

Read in this way, Aristotle is engaged in a project similar in some respects to the one Plato carried out in the Republic . One of Plato’s central points is that it is a great advantage to establish a hierarchical ordering of the elements in one’s soul; and he shows how the traditional virtues can be interpreted to foster or express the proper relation between reason and less rational elements of the psyche. Aristotle’s approach is similar: his “function argument” shows in a general way that our good lies in the dominance of reason, and the detailed studies of the particular virtues reveal how each of them involves the right kind of ordering of the soul. Aristotle’s goal is to arrive at conclusions like Plato’s, but without relying on the Platonic metaphysics that plays a central role in the argument of the Republic . He rejects the existence of Plato’s forms in general and the form of the good in particular; and he rejects the idea that in order to become fully virtuous one must study mathematics and the sciences, and see all branches of knowledge as a unified whole. Even though Aristotle’s ethical theory sometimes relies on philosophical distinctions that are more fully developed in his other works, he never proposes that students of ethics need to engage in a specialized study of the natural world, or mathematics, or eternal and changing objects. His project is to make ethics an autonomous field, and to show why a full understanding of what is good does not require expertise in any other field.

There is another contrast with Plato that should be emphasized: In Book II of the Republic , we are told that the best type of good is one that is desirable both in itself and for the sake of its results (357d–358a). Plato argues that justice should be placed in this category, but since it is generally agreed that it is desirable for its consequences, he devotes most of his time to establishing his more controversial point—that justice is to be sought for its own sake. By contrast, Aristotle assumes that if A is desirable for the sake of B , then B is better than A (1094a14–16); therefore, the highest kind of good must be one that is not desirable for the sake of anything else. To show that A deserves to be our ultimate end, one must show that all other goods are best thought of as instruments that promote A in some way or other. Accordingly, it would not serve Aristotle’s purpose to consider virtuous activity in isolation from all other goods. He needs to discuss honor, wealth, pleasure, and friendship in order to show how these goods, properly understood, can be seen as resources that serve the higher goal of virtuous activity. He vindicates the centrality of virtue in a well-lived life by showing that in the normal course of things a virtuous person will not live a life devoid of friends, honor, wealth, pleasure, and the like. Virtuous activity makes a life happy not by guaranteeing happiness in all circumstances, but by serving as the goal for the sake of which lesser goods are to be pursued. Aristotle’s methodology in ethics therefore pays more attention than does Plato’s to the connections that normally obtain between virtue and other goods. That is why he stresses that in this sort of study one must be satisfied with conclusions that hold only for the most part (1094b11–22). Poverty, isolation, and dishonor are normally impediments to the exercise of virtue and therefore to happiness, although there may be special circumstances in which they are not. The possibility of exceptions does not undermine the point that, as a rule, to live well is to have sufficient resources for the pursuit of virtue over the course of a lifetime.

Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of virtue (1103a1–10): those that pertain to the part of the soul that engages in reasoning (virtues of mind or intellect), and those that pertain to the part of the soul that cannot itself reason but is nonetheless capable of following reason (ethical virtues, virtues of character). Intellectual virtues are in turn divided into two sorts: those that pertain to theoretical reasoning, and those that pertain to practical thinking (1139a3–8). He organizes his material by first studying ethical virtue in general, then moving to a discussion of particular ethical virtues (temperance, courage, and so on), and finally completing his survey by considering the intellectual virtues (practical wisdom, theoretical wisdom, etc.).

All free males are born with the potential to become ethically virtuous and practically wise, but to achieve these goals they must go through two stages: during their childhood, they must develop the proper habits; and then, when their reason is fully developed, they must acquire practical wisdom ( phronêsis ). This does not mean that first we fully acquire the ethical virtues, and then, at a later stage, add on practical wisdom. Ethical virtue is fully developed only when it is combined with practical wisdom (1144b14–17). A low-grade form of ethical virtue emerges in us during childhood as we are repeatedly placed in situations that call for appropriate actions and emotions; but as we rely less on others and become capable of doing more of our own thinking, we learn to develop a larger picture of human life, our deliberative skills improve, and our emotional responses are perfected. Like anyone who has developed a skill in performing a complex and difficult activity, the virtuous person takes pleasure in exercising his intellectual skills. Furthermore, when he has decided what to do, he does not have to contend with internal pressures to act otherwise. He does not long to do something that he regards as shameful; and he is not greatly distressed at having to give up a pleasure that he realizes he should forego.

Aristotle places those who suffer from such internal disorders into one of three categories: (A) Some agents, having reached a decision about what to do on a particular occasion, experience some counter-pressure brought on by an appetite for pleasure, or anger, or some other emotion; and this countervailing influence is not completely under the control of reason. (1) Within this category, some are typically better able to resist these counter-rational pressures than is the average person. Such people are not virtuous, although they generally do what a virtuous person does. Aristotle calls them “continent” ( enkratês ). But (2) others are less successful than the average person in resisting these counter-pressures. They are “incontinent” ( akratês ). (The explanation of akrasia is a topic to which we will return in section 7.) In addition, (B) there is a type of agent who refuses even to try to do what an ethically virtuous agent would do, because he has become convinced that justice, temperance, generosity and the like are of little or no value. Such people Aristotle calls evil ( kakos , phaulos ). He assumes that evil people are driven by desires for domination and luxury, and although they are single-minded in their pursuit of these goals, he portrays them as deeply divided, because their pleonexia —their desire for more and more—leaves them dissatisfied and full of self-hatred.

It should be noticed that all three of these deficiencies—continence, incontinence, vice—involve some lack of internal harmony. (Here Aristotle’s debt to Plato is particularly evident, for one of the central ideas of the Republic is that the life of a good person is harmonious, and all other lives deviate to some degree from this ideal.) The evil person may wholeheartedly endorse some evil plan of action at a particular moment, but over the course of time, Aristotle supposes, he will regret his decision, because whatever he does will prove inadequate for the achievement of his goals (1166b5–29). Aristotle assumes that when someone systematically makes bad decisions about how to live his life, his failures are caused by psychological forces that are less than fully rational. His desires for pleasure, power or some other external goal have become so strong that they make him care too little or not at all about acting ethically. To keep such destructive inner forces at bay, we need to develop the proper habits and emotional responses when we are children, and to reflect intelligently on our aims when we are adults. But some vulnerability to these disruptive forces is present even in more-or-less virtuous people; that is why even a good political community needs laws and the threat of punishment. Clear thinking about the best goals of human life and the proper way to put them into practice is a rare achievement, because the human psyche is not a hospitable environment for the development of these insights.

5. The Doctrine of the Mean

Aristotle describes ethical virtue as a “ hexis ” (“state” “condition” “disposition”)—a tendency or disposition, induced by our habits, to have appropriate feelings (1105b25–6). Defective states of character are hexeis (plural of hexis ) as well, but they are tendencies to have inappropriate feelings. The significance of Aristotle’s characterization of these states as hexeis is his decisive rejection of the thesis, found throughout Plato’s early dialogues, that virtue is nothing but a kind of knowledge and vice nothing but a lack of knowledge. Although Aristotle frequently draws analogies between the crafts and the virtues (and similarly between physical health and eudaimonia ), he insists that the virtues differ from the crafts and all branches of knowledge in that the former involve appropriate emotional responses and are not purely intellectual conditions.

Furthermore, every ethical virtue is a condition intermediate (a “golden mean” as it is popularly known) between two other states, one involving excess, and the other deficiency (1106a26–b28). In this respect, Aristotle says, the virtues are no different from technical skills: every skilled worker knows how to avoid excess and deficiency, and is in a condition intermediate between two extremes. The courageous person, for example, judges that some dangers are worth facing and others not, and experiences fear to a degree that is appropriate to his circumstances. He lies between the coward, who flees every danger and experiences excessive fear, and the rash person, who judges every danger worth facing and experiences little or no fear. Aristotle holds that this same topography applies to every ethical virtue: all are located on a map that places the virtues between states of excess and deficiency. He is careful to add, however, that the mean is to be determined in a way that takes into account the particular circumstances of the individual (1106a36–b7). The arithmetic mean between 10 and 2 is 6, and this is so invariably, whatever is being counted. But the intermediate point that is chosen by an expert in any of the crafts will vary from one situation to another. There is no universal rule, for example, about how much food an athlete should eat, and it would be absurd to infer from the fact that 10 lbs. is too much and 2 lbs. too little for me that I should eat 6 lbs. Finding the mean in any given situation is not a mechanical or thoughtless procedure, but requires a full and detailed acquaintance with the circumstances.

It should be evident that Aristotle’s treatment of virtues as mean states endorses the idea that we should sometimes have strong feelings—when such feelings are called for by our situation. Sometimes only a small degree of anger is appropriate; but at other times, circumstances call for great anger. The right amount is not some quantity between zero and the highest possible level, but rather the amount, whatever it happens to be, that is proportionate to the seriousness of the situation. Of course, Aristotle is committed to saying that anger should never reach the point at which it undermines reason; and this means that our passion should always fall short of the extreme point at which we would lose control. But it is possible to be very angry without going to this extreme, and Aristotle does not intend to deny this.

The theory of the mean is open to several objections, but before considering them, we should recognize that in fact there are two distinct theses each of which might be called a doctrine of the mean. First, there is the thesis that every virtue is a state that lies between two vices, one of excess and the other of deficiency. Second, there is the idea that whenever a virtuous person chooses to perform a virtuous act, he can be described as aiming at an act that is in some way or other intermediate between alternatives that he rejects. It is this second thesis that is most likely to be found objectionable. A critic might concede that in some cases virtuous acts can be described in Aristotle’s terms. If, for example, one is trying to decide how much to spend on a wedding present, one is looking for an amount that is neither excessive nor deficient. But surely many other problems that confront a virtuous agent are not susceptible to this quantitative analysis. If one must decide whether to attend a wedding or respect a competing obligation instead, it would not be illuminating to describe this as a search for a mean between extremes—unless “aiming at the mean” simply becomes another phrase for trying to make the right decision. The objection, then, is that Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, taken as a doctrine about what the ethical agent does when he deliberates, is in many cases inapplicable or unilluminating.

A defense of Aristotle would have to say that the virtuous person does after all aim at a mean, if we allow for a broad enough notion of what sort of aiming is involved. For example, consider a juror who must determine whether a defendant is guilty as charged. He does not have before his mind a quantitative question; he is trying to decide whether the accused committed the crime, and is not looking for some quantity of action intermediate between extremes. Nonetheless, an excellent juror can be described as someone who, in trying to arrive at the correct decision, seeks to express the right degree of concern for all relevant considerations. He searches for the verdict that results from a deliberative process that is neither overly credulous nor unduly skeptical. Similarly, in facing situations that arouse anger, a virtuous agent must determine what action (if any) to take in response to an insult, and although this is not itself a quantitative question, his attempt to answer it properly requires him to have the right degree of concern for his standing as a member of the community. He aims at a mean in the sense that he looks for a response that avoids too much or too little attention to factors that must be taken into account in making a wise decision.

Perhaps a greater difficulty can be raised if we ask how Aristotle determines which emotions are governed by the doctrine of the mean. Consider someone who loves to wrestle, for example. Is this passion something that must be felt by every human being at appropriate times and to the right degree? Surely someone who never felt this emotion to any degree could still live a perfectly happy life. Why then should we not say the same about at least some of the emotions that Aristotle builds into his analysis of the ethically virtuous agent? Why should we experience anger at all, or fear, or the degree of concern for wealth and honor that Aristotle commends? These are precisely the questions that were asked in antiquity by the Stoics, and they came to the conclusion that such common emotions as anger and fear are always inappropriate. Aristotle assumes, on the contrary, not simply that these common passions are sometimes appropriate, but that it is essential that every human being learn how to master them and experience them in the right way at the right times. A defense of his position would have to show that the emotions that figure in his account of the virtues are valuable components of any well-lived human life, when they are experienced properly. Perhaps such a project could be carried out, but Aristotle himself does not attempt to do so.

He often says, in the course of his discussion, that when the good person chooses to act virtuously, he does so for the sake of the “ kalon ”—a word that can mean “beautiful”, “noble”, or “fine” (see for example 1120a23–4). This term indicates that Aristotle sees in ethical activity an attraction that is comparable to the beauty of well-crafted artifacts, including such artifacts as poetry, music, and drama. He draws this analogy in his discussion of the mean, when he says that every craft tries to produce a work from which nothing should be taken away and to which nothing further should be added (1106b5–14). A craft product, when well designed and produced by a good craftsman, is not merely useful, but also has such elements as balance, proportion and harmony—for these are properties that help make it useful. Similarly, Aristotle holds that a well-executed project that expresses the ethical virtues will not merely be advantageous but kalon as well—for the balance it strikes is part of what makes it advantageous. The young person learning to acquire the virtues must develop a love of doing what is kalon and a strong aversion to its opposite—the aischron , the shameful and ugly. Determining what is kalon is difficult (1106b28–33, 1109a24–30), and the normal human aversion to embracing difficulties helps account for the scarcity of virtue (1104b10–11).

It should be clear that neither the thesis that virtues lie between extremes nor the thesis that the good person aims at what is intermediate is intended as a procedure for making decisions. These doctrines of the mean help show what is attractive about the virtues, and they also help systematize our understanding of which qualities are virtues. Once we see that temperance, courage, and other generally recognized characteristics are mean states, we are in a position to generalize and to identify other mean states as virtues, even though they are not qualities for which we have a name. Aristotle remarks, for example, that the mean state with respect to anger has no name in Greek (1125b26–7). Though he is guided to some degree by distinctions captured by ordinary terms, his methodology allows him to recognize states for which no names exist.

So far from offering a decision procedure, Aristotle insists that this is something that no ethical theory can do. His theory elucidates the nature of virtue, but what must be done on any particular occasion by a virtuous agent depends on the circumstances, and these vary so much from one occasion to another that there is no possibility of stating a series of rules, however complicated, that collectively solve every practical problem. This feature of ethical theory is not unique; Aristotle thinks it applies to many crafts, such as medicine and navigation (1104a7–10). He says that the virtuous person “sees the truth in each case, being as it were a standard and measure of them” (1113a32–3); but this appeal to the good person’s vision should not be taken to mean that he has an inarticulate and incommunicable insight into the truth. Aristotle thinks of the good person as someone who is good at deliberation, and he describes deliberation as a process of rational inquiry. The intermediate point that the good person tries to find is

determined by logos (“reason”, “account”) and in the way that the person of practical reason would determine it. (1107a1–2)

To say that such a person “sees” what to do is simply a way of registering the point that the good person’s reasoning does succeed in discovering what is best in each situation. He is “as it were a standard and measure” in the sense that his views should be regarded as authoritative by other members of the community. A standard or measure is something that settles disputes; and because good people are so skilled at discovering the mean in difficult cases, their advice must be sought and heeded.

Although there is no possibility of writing a book of rules, however long, that will serve as a complete guide to wise decision-making, it would be a mistake to attribute to Aristotle the opposite position, namely that every purported rule admits of exceptions, so that even a small rule-book that applies to a limited number of situations is an impossibility. He makes it clear that certain emotions (spite, shamelessness, envy) and actions (adultery, theft, murder) are always wrong, regardless of the circumstances (1107a8–12). Although he says that the names of these emotions and actions convey their wrongness, he should not be taken to mean that their wrongness derives from linguistic usage. He defends the family as a social institution against the criticisms of Plato ( Politics II.3–4), and so when he says that adultery is always wrong, he is prepared to argue for his point by explaining why marriage is a valuable custom and why extra-marital intercourse undermines the relationship between husband and wife. He is not making the tautological claim that wrongful sexual activity is wrong, but the more specific and contentious point that marriages ought to be governed by a rule of strict fidelity. Similarly, when he says that murder and theft are always wrong, he does not mean that wrongful killing and taking are wrong, but that the current system of laws regarding these matters ought to be strictly enforced. So, although Aristotle holds that ethics cannot be reduced to a system of rules, however complex, he insists that some rules are inviolable.

We have seen that the decisions of a practically wise person are not mere intuitions, but can be justified by a chain of reasoning. (This is why Aristotle often talks in term of a practical syllogism, with a major premise that identifies some good to be achieved, and a minor premise that locates the good in some present-to-hand situation.) At the same time, he is acutely aware of the fact that reasoning can always be traced back to a starting point that is not itself justified by further reasoning. Neither good theoretical reasoning nor good practical reasoning moves in a circle; true thinking always presupposes and progresses in linear fashion from proper starting points. And that leads him to ask for an account of how the proper starting points of reasoning are to be determined. Practical reasoning always presupposes that one has some end, some goal one is trying to achieve; and the task of reasoning is to determine how that goal is to be accomplished. (This need not be means-end reasoning in the conventional sense; if, for example, our goal is the just resolution of a conflict, we must determine what constitutes justice in these particular circumstances. Here we are engaged in ethical inquiry, and are not asking a purely instrumental question.) But if practical reasoning is correct only if it begins from a correct premise, what is it that insures the correctness of its starting point?

Aristotle replies: “Virtue makes the goal right, practical wisdom the things leading to it” (1144a7–8). By this he cannot mean that there is no room for reasoning about our ultimate end. For as we have seen, he gives a reasoned defense of his conception of happiness as virtuous activity. What he must have in mind, when he says that virtue makes the goal right, is that deliberation typically proceeds from a goal that is far more specific than the goal of attaining happiness by acting virtuously. To be sure, there may be occasions when a good person approaches an ethical problem by beginning with the premise that happiness consists in virtuous activity. But more often what happens is that a concrete goal presents itself as his starting point—helping a friend in need, or supporting a worthwhile civic project. Which specific project we set for ourselves is determined by our character. A good person starts from worthwhile concrete ends because his habits and emotional orientation have given him the ability to recognize that such goals are within reach, here and now. Those who are defective in character may have the rational skill needed to achieve their ends—the skill Aristotle calls cleverness (1144a23–8)—but often the ends they seek are worthless. The cause of this deficiency lies not in some impairment in their capacity to reason—for we are assuming that they are normal in this respect—but in the training of their passions.

Since Aristotle often calls attention to the imprecision of ethical theory (see e.g. 1104a1–7), it comes as a surprise to many readers of the Ethics that he begins Book VI with the admission that his earlier statements about the mean need supplementation because they are not yet clear ( saphes ). In every practical discipline, the expert aims at a mark and uses right reason to avoid the twin extremes of excess and deficiency. But what is this right reason, and by what standard ( horos ) is it to be determined? Aristotle says that unless we answer that question, we will be none the wiser—just as a student of medicine will have failed to master his subject if he can only say that the right medicines to administer are the ones that are prescribed by medical expertise, but has no standard other than this (1138b18–34).

It is not easy to understand the point Aristotle is making here. Has he not already told us that there can be no complete theoretical guide to ethics, that the best one can hope for is that in particular situations one’s ethical habits and practical wisdom will help one determine what to do? Furthermore, Aristotle nowhere announces, in the remainder of Book VI, that we have achieved the greater degree of accuracy that he seems to be looking for. The rest of this Book is a discussion of the various kinds of intellectual virtues: theoretical wisdom, science ( epistêmê ), intuitive understanding ( nous ), practical wisdom, and craft expertise. Aristotle explains what each of these states of mind is, draws various contrasts among them, and takes up various questions that can be raised about their usefulness. At no point does he explicitly return to the question he raised at the beginning of Book VI; he never says, “and now we have the standard of right reason that we were looking for”. Nor is it easy to see how his discussion of these five intellectual virtues can bring greater precision to the doctrine of the mean.

We can make some progress towards solving this problem if we remind ourselves that at the beginning of the Ethics , Aristotle describes his inquiry as an attempt to develop a better understanding of what our ultimate aim should be. The sketchy answer he gives in Book I is that happiness consists in virtuous activity. In Books II through V, he describes the virtues of the part of the soul that is rational in that it can be attentive to reason, even though it is not capable of deliberating. But precisely because these virtues are rational only in this derivative way, they are a less important component of our ultimate end than is the intellectual virtue—practical wisdom—with which they are integrated. If what we know about virtue is only what is said in Books II through V, then our grasp of our ultimate end is radically incomplete, because we still have not studied the intellectual virtue that enables us to reason well in any given situation. One of the things, at least, towards which Aristotle is gesturing, as he begins Book VI, is practical wisdom. This state of mind has not yet been analyzed, and that is one reason why he complains that his account of our ultimate end is not yet clear enough.

But is practical wisdom the only ingredient of our ultimate end that has not yet been sufficiently discussed? Book VI discusses five intellectual virtues, not just practical wisdom, but it is clear that at least one of these—craft knowledge—is considered only in order to provide a contrast with the others. Aristotle is not recommending that his readers make this intellectual virtue part of their ultimate aim. But what of the remaining three: science, intuitive understanding, and the virtue that combines them, theoretical wisdom? Are these present in Book VI only in order to provide a contrast with practical wisdom, or is Aristotle saying that these too must be components of our goal? He does not fully address this issue, but it is evident from several of his remarks in Book VI that he takes theoretical wisdom to be a more valuable state of mind than practical wisdom.

It is strange if someone thinks that politics or practical wisdom is the most excellent kind of knowledge, unless man is the best thing in the cosmos. (1141a20–22)

He says that theoretical wisdom produces happiness by being a part of virtue (1144a3–6), and that practical wisdom looks to the development of theoretical wisdom, and issues commands for its sake (1145a8–11). So it is clear that exercising theoretical wisdom is a more important component of our ultimate goal than practical wisdom.

Even so, it may still seem perplexing that these two intellectual virtues, either separately or collectively, should somehow fill a gap in the doctrine of the mean. Having read Book VI and completed our study of what these two forms of wisdom are, how are we better able to succeed in finding the mean in particular situations?

The answer to this question may be that Aristotle does not intend Book VI to provide a full answer to that question, but rather to serve as a prolegomenon to an answer. For it is only near the end of Book X that he presents a full discussion of the relative merits of these two kinds of intellectual virtue, and comments on the different degrees to which each needs to be provided with resources. In X.7–8, he argues that the happiest kind of life is that of a philosopher—someone who exercises, over a long period of time, the virtue of theoretical wisdom, and has sufficient resources for doing so. (We will discuss these chapters more fully in section 10 below.) One of his reasons for thinking that such a life is superior to the second-best kind of life—that of a political leader, someone who devotes himself to the exercise of practical rather than theoretical wisdom—is that it requires less external equipment (1178a23–b7). Aristotle has already made it clear in his discussion of the ethical virtues that someone who is greatly honored by his community and commands large financial resources is in a position to exercise a higher order of ethical virtue than is someone who receives few honors and has little property. The virtue of magnificence is superior to mere liberality, and similarly greatness of soul is a higher excellence than the ordinary virtue that has to do with honor. (These qualities are discussed in IV.1–4.) The grandest expression of ethical virtue requires great political power, because it is the political leader who is in a position to do the greatest amount of good for the community. The person who chooses to lead a political life, and who aims at the fullest expression of practical wisdom, has a standard for deciding what level of resources he needs: he should have friends, property, and honors in sufficient quantities to allow his practical wisdom to express itself without impediment. But if one chooses instead the life of a philosopher, then one will look to a different standard—the fullest expression of theoretical wisdom—and one will need a smaller supply of these resources.

This enables us to see how Aristotle’s treatment of the intellectual virtues does give greater content and precision to the doctrine of the mean. The best standard is the one adopted by the philosopher; the second-best is the one adopted by the political leader. In either case, it is the exercise of an intellectual virtue that provides a guideline for making important quantitative decisions. This supplement to the doctrine of the mean is fully compatible with Aristotle’s thesis that no set of rules, no matter how long and detailed, obviates the need for deliberative and ethical virtue. If one chooses the life of a philosopher, one should keep the level of one’s resources high enough to secure the leisure necessary for such a life, but not so high that one’s external equipment becomes a burden and a distraction rather than an aid to living well. That gives one a firmer idea of how to hit the mean, but it still leaves the details to be worked out. The philosopher will need to determine, in particular situations, where justice lies, how to spend wisely, when to meet or avoid a danger, and so on. All of the normal difficulties of ethical life remain, and they can be solved only by means of a detailed understanding of the particulars of each situation. Having philosophy as one’s ultimate aim does not put an end to the need for developing and exercising practical wisdom and the ethical virtues.

In VII.1–10 Aristotle investigates character traits—continence and incontinence—that are not as blameworthy as the vices but not as praiseworthy as the virtues. (We began our discussion of these qualities in section 4.) The Greek terms are akrasia (“incontinence”; literally: “lack of mastery”) and enkrateia (“continence”; literally “mastery”). An akratic person goes against reason as a result of some pathos (“emotion”, “feeling”). Like the akratic, an enkratic person experiences a feeling that is contrary to reason; but unlike the akratic, he acts in accordance with reason. His defect consists solely in the fact that, more than most people, he experiences passions that conflict with his rational choice. The akratic person has not only this defect, but has the further flaw that he gives in to feeling rather than reason more often than the average person.

Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of akrasia: impetuosity ( propeteia ) and weakness ( astheneia ). The person who is weak goes through a process of deliberation and makes a choice; but rather than act in accordance with his reasoned choice, he acts under the influence of a passion. By contrast, the impetuous person does not go through a process of deliberation and does not make a reasoned choice; he simply acts under the influence of a passion. At the time of action, the impetuous person experiences no internal conflict. But once his act has been completed, he regrets what he has done. One could say that he deliberates, if deliberation were something that post-dated rather than preceded action; but the thought process he goes through after he acts comes too late to save him from error.

It is important to bear in mind that when Aristotle talks about impetuosity and weakness, he is discussing chronic conditions. The impetuous person is someone who acts emotionally and fails to deliberate not just once or twice but with some frequency; he makes this error more than most people do. Because of this pattern in his actions, we would be justified in saying of the impetuous person that had his passions not prevented him from doing so, he would have deliberated and chosen an action different from the one he did perform.

The two kinds of passions that Aristotle focuses on, in his treatment of akrasia , are the appetite for pleasure and anger. Either can lead to impetuosity and weakness. But Aristotle gives pride of place to the appetite for pleasure as the passion that undermines reason. He calls the kind of akrasia caused by an appetite for pleasure “unqualified akrasia ”—or, as we might say, akrasia “full stop”; akrasia caused by anger he considers a qualified form of akrasia and calls it akrasia “with respect to anger”. We thus have these four forms of akrasia : (A) impetuosity caused by pleasure, (B) impetuosity caused by anger, (C) weakness caused by pleasure (D) weakness caused by anger. It should be noticed that Aristotle’s treatment of akrasia is heavily influenced by Plato’s tripartite division of the soul in the Republic . Plato holds that either the spirited part (which houses anger, as well as other emotions) or the appetitive part (which houses the desire for physical pleasures) can disrupt the dictates of reason and result in action contrary to reason. The same threefold division of the soul can be seen in Aristotle’s approach to this topic.

Although Aristotle characterizes akrasia and enkrateia in terms of a conflict between reason and feeling, his detailed analysis of these states of mind shows that what takes place is best described in a more complicated way. For the feeling that undermines reason contains some thought, which may be implicitly general. As Aristotle says, anger “reasoning as it were that one must fight against such a thing, is immediately provoked” (1149a33–4). And although in the next sentence he denies that our appetite for pleasure works in this way, he earlier had said that there can be a syllogism that favors pursuing enjoyment: “Everything sweet is pleasant, and this is sweet” leads to the pursuit of a particular pleasure (1147a31–30). Perhaps what he has in mind is that pleasure can operate in either way: it can prompt action unmediated by a general premise, or it can prompt us to act on such a syllogism. By contrast, anger always moves us by presenting itself as a bit of general, although hasty, reasoning.

But of course Aristotle does not mean that a conflicted person has more than one faculty of reason. Rather his idea seems to be that in addition to our full-fledged reasoning capacity, we also have psychological mechanisms that are capable of a limited range of reasoning. When feeling conflicts with reason, what occurs is better described as a fight between feeling-allied-with-limited-reasoning and full-fledged reason. Part of us—reason—can remove itself from the distorting influence of feeling and consider all relevant factors, positive and negative. But another part of us—feeling or emotion—has a more limited field of reasoning—and sometimes it does not even make use of it.

Although “passion” is sometimes used as a translation of Aristotle’s word pathos (other alternatives are “emotion” and “feeling”), it is important to bear in mind that his term does not necessarily designate a strong psychological force. Anger is a pathos whether it is weak or strong; so too is the appetite for bodily pleasures. And he clearly indicates that it is possible for an akratic person to be defeated by a weak pathos —the kind that most people would easily be able to control (1150a9–b16). So the general explanation for the occurrence of akrasia cannot be that the strength of a passion overwhelms reason. Aristotle should therefore be acquitted of an accusation made against him by J.L. Austin in a well-known footnote to his paper, “A Plea For Excuses”. Plato and Aristotle, he says, collapsed all succumbing to temptation into losing control of ourselves—a mistake illustrated by this example:

I am very partial to ice cream, and a bombe is served divided into segments corresponding one to one with the persons at High Table: I am tempted to help myself to two segments and do so, thus succumbing to temptation and even conceivably (but why necessarily?) going against my principles. But do I lose control of myself? Do I raven, do I snatch the morsels from the dish and wolf them down, impervious to the consternation of my colleagues? Not a bit of it. We often succumb to temptation with calm and even with finesse. (1957: 24, fn 13 [1961: 146])

With this, Aristotle can agree: the pathos for the bombe can be a weak one, and in some people that will be enough to get them to act in a way that is disapproved by their reason at the very time of action.

What is most remarkable about Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia is that he defends a position close to that of Socrates. When he first introduces the topic of akrasia , and surveys some of the problems involved in understanding this phenomenon, he says (1145b25–8) that Socrates held that there is no akrasia , and he describes this as a thesis that clearly conflicts with the appearances ( phainomena ). Since he says that his goal is to preserve as many of the appearances as possible (1145b2–7), it may come as a surprise that when he analyzes the conflict between reason and feeling, he arrives at the conclusion that in a way Socrates was right after all (1147b13–17). For, he says, the person who acts against reason does not have what is thought to be unqualified knowledge; in a way he has knowledge, but in a way does not.

Aristotle explains what he has in mind by comparing akrasia to the condition of other people who might be described as knowing in a way, but not in an unqualified way. His examples are people who are asleep, mad, or drunk; he also compares the akratic to a student who has just begun to learn a subject, or an actor on the stage (1147a10–24). All of these people, he says, can utter the very words used by those who have knowledge; but their talk does not prove that they really have knowledge, strictly speaking.

These analogies can be taken to mean that the form of akrasia that Aristotle calls weakness rather than impetuosity always results from some diminution of cognitive or intellectual acuity at the moment of action. The akratic says, at the time of action, that he ought not to indulge in this particular pleasure at this time. But does he know or even believe that he should refrain? Aristotle might be taken to reply: yes and no. He has some degree of recognition that he must not do this now, but not full recognition. His feeling, even if it is weak, has to some degree prevented him from completely grasping or affirming the point that he should not do this. And so in a way Socrates was right. When reason remains unimpaired and unclouded, its dictates will carry us all the way to action, so long as we are able to act.

But Aristotle’s agreement with Socrates is only partial, because he insists on the power of the emotions to rival, weaken or bypass reason. Emotion challenges reason in all three of these ways. In both the akratic and the enkratic, it competes with reason for control over action; even when reason wins, it faces the difficult task of having to struggle with an internal rival. Second, in the akratic, it temporarily robs reason of its full acuity, thus handicapping it as a competitor. It is not merely a rival force, in these cases; it is a force that keeps reason from fully exercising its power. And third, passion can make someone impetuous; here its victory over reason is so powerful that the latter does not even enter into the arena of conscious reflection until it is too late to influence action.

Supplementary Document: Alternate Readings of Aristotle on Akrasia

Aristotle frequently emphasizes the importance of pleasure to human life and therefore to his study of how we should live (see for example 1099a7–20 and 1104b3–1105a16), but his full-scale examination of the nature and value of pleasure is found in two places: VII.11–14 and X.1–5. It is odd that pleasure receives two lengthy treatments; no other topic in the Ethics is revisited in this way. Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics is identical to Book VI of the Eudemian Ethics ; for unknown reasons, the editor of the former decided to include within it both the treatment of pleasure that is unique to that work (X.1–5) and the study that is common to both treatises (VII.11–14). The two accounts are broadly similar. They agree about the value of pleasure, defend a theory about its nature, and oppose competing theories. Aristotle holds that a happy life must include pleasure, and he therefore opposes those who argue that pleasure is by its nature bad. He insists that there are other pleasures besides those of the senses, and that the best pleasures are the ones experienced by virtuous people who have sufficient resources for excellent activity.

Book VII offers a brief account of what pleasure is and is not. It is not a process but an unimpeded activity of a natural state (1153a7–17). Aristotle does not elaborate on what a natural state is, but he obviously has in mind the healthy condition of the body, especially its sense faculties, and the virtuous condition of the soul. Little is said about what it is for an activity to be unimpeded, but Aristotle does remind us that virtuous activity is impeded by the absence of a sufficient supply of external goods (1153b17–19). One might object that people who are sick or who have moral deficiencies can experience pleasure, even though Aristotle does not take them to be in a natural state. He has two strategies for responding. First, when a sick person experiences some degree of pleasure as he is being restored to health, the pleasure he is feeling is caused by the fact that he is no longer completely ill. Some small part of him is in a natural state and is acting without impediment (1152b35–6). Second, Aristotle is willing to say that what seems pleasant to some people may in fact not be pleasant (1152b31–2), just as what tastes bitter to an unhealthy palate may not be bitter. To call something a pleasure is not only to report a state of mind but also to endorse it to others. Aristotle’s analysis of the nature of pleasure is not meant to apply to every case in which something seems pleasant to someone, but only to activities that really are pleasures. All of these are unimpeded activities of a natural state.

It follows from this conception of pleasure that every instance of pleasure must be good to some extent. For how could an unimpeded activity of a natural state be bad or a matter of indifference? On the other hand, Aristotle does not mean to imply that every pleasure should be chosen. He briefly mentions the point that pleasures compete with each other, so that the enjoyment of one kind of activity impedes other activities that cannot be carried out at the same time (1153a20–22). His point is simply that although some pleasures may be good, they are not worth choosing when they interfere with other activities that are far better. This point is developed more fully in Ethics X.5.

Furthermore, Aristotle’s analysis allows him to speak of certain pleasures as “bad without qualification” (1152b26–33), even though pleasure is the unimpeded activity of a natural state. To call a pleasure “bad without qualification” is to insist that it should be avoided, but allow that nonetheless it should be chosen in constraining circumstances. The pleasure of recovering from an illness, for example, is bad without qualification—meaning that it is not one of the pleasures one would ideally choose, if one could completely control one’s circumstances. Although it really is a pleasure and so something can be said in its favor, it is so inferior to other goods that ideally one ought to forego it. Nonetheless, it is a pleasure worth having—if one adds the qualification that it is only worth having in undesirable circumstances. The pleasure of recovering from an illness is good, because some small part of oneself is in a natural state and is acting without impediment; but it can also be called bad, if what one means by this is that one should avoid getting into a situation in which one experiences that pleasure.

Aristotle indicates several times in VII.11–14 that merely to say that pleasure is a good does not do it enough justice; he also wants to say that the highest good is a pleasure. Here he is influenced by an idea expressed in the opening line of the Ethics : the good is that at which all things aim. In VII.13, he hints at the idea that all living things imitate the contemplative activity of god (1153b31–2). Plants and non-human animals seek to reproduce themselves because that is their way of participating in an unending series, and this is the closest they can come to the ceaseless thinking of the unmoved mover. Aristotle makes this point in several of his works (see for example De Anima 415a23–b7), and in Ethics X.7–8 he gives a full defense of the idea that the happiest human life resembles the life of a divine being. He conceives of god as a being who continually enjoys a “single and simple pleasure” (1154b26)—the pleasure of pure thought—whereas human beings, because of their complexity, grow weary of whatever they do. He will elaborate on these points in X.8; in VII.11–14, he appeals to his conception of divine activity only in order to defend the thesis that our highest good consists in a certain kind of pleasure. Human happiness does not consist in every kind of pleasure, but it does consist in one kind of pleasure—the pleasure felt by a human being who engages in theoretical activity and thereby imitates the pleasurable thinking of god.

Book X offers a much more elaborate account of what pleasure is and what it is not. It is not a process, because processes go through developmental stages: building a temple is a process because the temple is not present all at once, but only comes into being through stages that unfold over time. By contrast, pleasure, like seeing and many other activities, is not something that comes into existence through a developmental process. If I am enjoying a conversation, for example, I do not need to wait until it is finished in order to feel pleased; I take pleasure in the activity all along the way. The defining nature of pleasure is that it is an activity that accompanies other activities, and in some sense brings them to completion. Pleasure occurs when something within us, having been brought into good condition, is activated in relation to an external object that is also in good condition. The pleasure of drawing, for example, requires both the development of drawing ability and an object of attention that is worth drawing.

The conception of pleasure that Aristotle develops in Book X is obviously closely related to the analysis he gives in Book VII. But the theory proposed in the later Book brings out a point that had received too little attention earlier: pleasure is by its nature something that accompanies something else. It is not enough to say that it is what happens when we are in good condition and are active in unimpeded circumstances; one must add to that point the further idea that pleasure plays a certain role in complementing something other than itself. Drawing well and the pleasure of drawing well always occur together, and so they are easy to confuse, but Aristotle’s analysis in Book X emphasizes the importance of making this distinction.

He says that pleasure completes the activity that it accompanies, but then adds, mysteriously, that it completes the activity in the manner of an end that is added on. In the translation of W.D. Ross, it “supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age” (1174b33). It is unclear what thought is being expressed here, but perhaps Aristotle is merely trying to avoid a possible misunderstanding: when he says that pleasure completes an activity, he does not mean that the activity it accompanies is in some way defective, and that the pleasure improves the activity by removing this defect. Aristotle’s language is open to that misinterpretation because the verb that is translated “complete” ( teleein ) can also mean “perfect”. The latter might be taken to mean that the activity accompanied by pleasure has not yet reached a sufficiently high level of excellence, and that the role of pleasure is to bring it to the point of perfection. Aristotle does not deny that when we take pleasure in an activity we get better at it, but when he says that pleasure completes an activity by supervening on it, like the bloom that accompanies those who have achieved the highest point of physical beauty, his point is that the activity complemented by pleasure is already perfect, and the pleasure that accompanies it is a bonus that serves no further purpose. Taking pleasure in an activity does help us improve at it, but enjoyment does not cease when perfection is achieved—on the contrary, that is when pleasure is at its peak. That is when it reveals most fully what it is: an added bonus that crowns our achievement.

It is clear, at any rate, that in Book X Aristotle gives a fuller account of what pleasure is than he had in Book VII. We should take note of a further difference between these two discussions: In Book X, he makes the point that pleasure is a good but not the good. He cites and endorses an argument given by Plato in the Philebus : If we imagine a life filled with pleasure and then mentally add wisdom to it, the result is made more desirable. But the good is something that cannot be improved upon in this way. Therefore pleasure is not the good (1172b23–35). By contrast, in Book VII Aristotle strongly implies that the pleasure of contemplation is the good, because in one way or another all living beings aim at this sort of pleasure. Aristotle observes in Book X that what all things aim at is good (1172b35–1173a1); significantly, he falls short of endorsing the argument that since all aim at pleasure, it must be the good.

Book VII makes the point that pleasures interfere with each other, and so even if all kinds of pleasures are good, it does not follow that all of them are worth choosing. One must make a selection among pleasures by determining which are better. But how is one to make this choice? Book VII does not say, but in Book X, Aristotle holds that the selection of pleasures is not to be made with reference to pleasure itself, but with reference to the activities they accompany.

Since activities differ with respect to goodness and badness, some being worth choosing, others worth avoiding, and others neither, the same is true of pleasures as well. (1175b24–6)

Aristotle’s statement implies that in order to determine whether (for example) the pleasure of virtuous activity is more desirable than that of eating, we are not to attend to the pleasures themselves but to the activities with which we are pleased. A pleasure’s goodness derives from the goodness of its associated activity. And surely the reason why pleasure is not the criterion to which we should look in making these decisions is that it is not the good. The standard we should use in making comparisons between rival options is virtuous activity, because that has been shown to be identical to happiness.

That is why Aristotle says that what is judged pleasant by a good man really is pleasant, because the good man is the measure of things (1176a15–19). He does not mean that the way to lead our lives is to search for a good man and continually rely on him to tell us what is pleasurable. Rather, his point is that there is no way of telling what is genuinely pleasurable (and therefore what is most pleasurable) unless we already have some other standard of value. Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure thus helps confirm his initial hypothesis that to live our lives well we must focus on one sort of good above all others: virtuous activity. It is the good in terms of which all other goods must be understood. Aristotle’s analysis of friendship supports the same conclusion.

The topic of Books VIII and IX of the Ethics is friendship. Although it is difficult to avoid the term “friendship” as a translation of “ philia ”, and this is an accurate term for the kind of relationship he is most interested in, we should bear in mind that he is discussing a wider range of phenomena than this translation might lead us to expect, for the Greeks use the term, “ philia ”, to name the relationship that holds among family members, and do not reserve it for voluntary relationships. Although Aristotle is interested in classifying the different forms that friendship takes, his main theme in Books VIII and IX is to show the close relationship between virtuous activity and friendship. He is vindicating his conception of happiness as virtuous activity by showing how satisfying are the relationships that a virtuous person can normally expect to have.

His taxonomy begins with the premise that there are three main reasons why one person might like someone else. (The verb, “ philein ”, which is cognate to the noun “ philia ”, can sometimes be translated “like” or even “love”—though in other cases philia involves very little in the way of feeling.) One might like someone because he is good, or because he is useful, or because he is pleasant. And so there are three bases for friendships, depending on which of these qualities binds friends together. When two individuals recognize that the other person is someone of good character, and they spend time with each other, engaged in activities that exercise their virtues, then they form one kind of friendship. If they are equally virtuous, their friendship is perfect. If, however, there is a large gap in their moral development (as between a parent and a small child, or between a husband and a wife), then although their relationship may be based on the other person’s good character, it will be imperfect precisely because of their inequality.

The imperfect friendships that Aristotle focuses on, however, are not unequal relationships based on good character. Rather, they are relationships held together because each individual regards the other as the source of some advantage to himself or some pleasure he receives. When Aristotle calls these relationships “imperfect”, he is tacitly relying on widely accepted assumptions about what makes a relationship satisfying. These friendships are defective, and have a smaller claim to be called “friendships”, because the individuals involved have little trust in each other, quarrel frequently, and are ready to break off their association abruptly. Aristotle does not mean to suggest that unequal relations based on the mutual recognition of good character are defective in these same ways. Rather, when he says that unequal relationships based on character are imperfect, his point is that people are friends in the fullest sense when they gladly spend their days together in shared activities, and this close and constant interaction is less available to those who are not equal in their moral development.

When Aristotle begins his discussion of friendship, he introduces a notion that is central to his understanding of this phenomenon: a genuine friend is someone who loves or likes another person for the sake of that other person. Wanting what is good for the sake of another he calls “good will” ( eunoia ), and friendship is reciprocal good will, provided that each recognizes the presence of this attitude in the other. Does such good will exist in all three kinds of friendship, or is it confined to relationships based on virtue? At first, Aristotle leaves open the first of these two possibilities. He says:

it is necessary that friends bear good will to each other and wish good things for each other, without this escaping their notice, because of one of the reasons mentioned. (1156a4–5)

The reasons mentioned are goodness, pleasure, and advantage; and so it seems that Aristotle is leaving room for the idea that in all three kinds of friendships, even those based on advantage and pleasure alone, the individuals wish each other well for the sake of the other.

But in fact, as Aristotle continues to develop his taxonomy, he does not choose to exploit this possibility. He speaks as though it is only in friendships based on character that one finds a desire to benefit the other person for the sake of the other person.

Those who wish good things to their friends for the sake of the latter are friends most of all, because they do so because of their friends themselves, and not coincidentally. (1156b9–11)

When one benefits someone not because of the kind of person he is, but only because of the advantages to oneself, then, Aristotle says, one is not a friend towards the other person, but only towards the profit that comes one’s way (1157a15–16).

In such statements as these, Aristotle comes rather close to saying that relationships based on profit or pleasure should not be called friendships at all. But he decides to stay close to common parlance and to use the term “friend” loosely. Friendships based on character are the ones in which each person benefits the other for the sake of other; and these are friendships most of all. Because each party benefits the other, it is advantageous to form such friendships. And since each enjoys the trust and companionship of the other, there is considerable pleasure in these relationships as well. Because these perfect friendships produce advantages and pleasures for each of the parties, there is some basis for going along with common usage and calling any relationship entered into for the sake of just one of these goods a friendship. Friendships based on advantage alone or pleasure alone deserve to be called friendships because in full-fledged friendships these two properties, advantage and pleasure, are present. It is striking that in the Ethics Aristotle never thinks of saying that the uniting factor in all friendships is the desire each friend has for the good of the other.

Aristotle does not raise questions about what it is to desire good for the sake of another person. He treats this as an easily understood phenomenon, and has no doubts about its existence. But it is also clear that he takes this motive to be compatible with a love of one’s own good and a desire for one’s own happiness. Someone who has practical wisdom will recognize that he needs friends and other resources in order to exercise his virtues over a long period of time. When he makes friends, and benefits friends he has made, he will be aware of the fact that such a relationship is good for him. And yet to have a friend is to want to benefit someone for that other person’s sake; it is not a merely self-interested strategy. Aristotle sees no difficulty here, and rightly so. For there is no reason why acts of friendship should not be undertaken partly for the good of one’s friend and partly for one’s own good. Acting for the sake of another does not in itself demand self-sacrifice. It requires caring about someone other than oneself, but does not demand some loss of care for oneself. For when we know how to benefit a friend for his sake, we exercise the ethical virtues, and this is precisely what our happiness consists in.

Aristotle makes it clear that the number of people with whom one can sustain the kind of relationship he calls a perfect friendship is quite small (IX.10). Even if one lived in a city populated entirely by perfectly virtuous citizens, the number with whom one could carry on a friendship of the perfect type would be at most a handful. For he thinks that this kind of friendship can exist only when one spends a great deal of time with the other person, participating in joint activities and engaging in mutually beneficial behavior; and one cannot cooperate on these close terms with every member of the political community. One may well ask why this kind of close friendship is necessary for happiness. If one lived in a community filled with good people, and cooperated on an occasional basis with each of them, in a spirit of good will and admiration, would that not provide sufficient scope for virtuous activity and a well-lived life? Admittedly, close friends are often in a better position to benefit each other than are fellow citizens, who generally have little knowledge of one’s individual circumstances. But this only shows that it is advantageous to be on the receiving end of a friend’s help. The more important question for Aristotle is why one needs to be on the giving end of this relationship. And obviously the answer cannot be that one needs to give in order to receive; that would turn active love for one’s friend into a mere means to the benefits received.

Aristotle attempts to answer this question in IX.11, but his treatment is disappointing. His fullest argument depends crucially on the notion that a friend is “another self”, someone, in other words, with whom one has a relationship very similar to the relationship one has with oneself. A virtuous person loves the recognition of himself as virtuous; to have a close friend is to possess yet another person, besides oneself, whose virtue one can recognize at extremely close quarters; and so, it must be desirable to have someone very much like oneself whose virtuous activity one can perceive. The argument is unconvincing because it does not explain why the perception of virtuous activity in fellow citizens would not be an adequate substitute for the perception of virtue in one’s friends.

Aristotle would be on stronger grounds if he could show that in the absence of close friends one would be severely restricted in the kinds of virtuous activities one could undertake. But he cannot present such an argument, because he does not believe it. He says that it is “finer and more godlike” to bring about the well being of a whole city than to sustain the happiness of just one person (1094b7–10). He refuses to regard private life—the realm of the household and the small circle of one’s friends—as the best or most favorable location for the exercise of virtue. He is convinced that the loss of this private sphere would greatly detract from a well-lived life, but he is hard put to explain why. He might have done better to focus on the benefits of being the object of a close friend’s solicitude. Just as property is ill cared for when it is owned by all, and just as a child would be poorly nurtured were he to receive no special parental care—points Aristotle makes in Politics II.2–5—so in the absence of friendship we would lose a benefit that could not be replaced by the care of the larger community. But Aristotle is not looking for a defense of this sort, because he conceives of friendship as lying primarily in activity rather than receptivity. It is difficult, within his framework, to show that virtuous activity towards a friend is a uniquely important good.

Since Aristotle thinks that the pursuit of one’s own happiness, properly understood, requires ethically virtuous activity and will therefore be of great value not only to one’s friends but to the larger political community as well, he argues that self-love is an entirely proper emotion—provided it is expressed in the love of virtue (IX.8). Self-love is rightly condemned when it consists in the pursuit of as large a share of external goods—particularly wealth and power—as one can acquire, because such self-love inevitably brings one into conflict with others and undermines the stability of the political community. It may be tempting to cast Aristotle’s defense of self-love into modern terms by calling him an egoist, and “egoism” is a broad enough term so that, properly defined, it can be made to fit Aristotle’s ethical outlook. If egoism is the thesis that one will always act rightly if one consults one’s self-interest, properly understood, then nothing would be amiss in identifying him as an egoist.

But egoism is sometimes understood in a stronger sense. Just as consequentialism is the thesis that one should maximize the general good, whatever the good turns out to be, so egoism can be defined as the parallel thesis that one should maximize one’s own good, whatever the good turns out to be. Egoism, in other words, can be treated as a purely formal thesis: it holds that whether the good is pleasure, or virtue, or the satisfaction of desires, one should not attempt to maximize the total amount of good in the world, but only one’s own. When egoism takes this abstract form, it is an expression of the idea that the claims of others are never worth attending to, unless in some way or other their good can be shown to serve one’s own. The only underived reason for action is self-interest; that an act helps another does not by itself provide a reason for performing it, unless some connection can be made between the good of that other and one’s own.

There is no reason to attribute this extreme form of egoism to Aristotle. On the contrary, his defense of self-love makes it clear that he is not willing to defend the bare idea that one ought to love oneself alone or above others; he defends self-love only when this emotion is tied to the correct theory of where one’s good lies, for it is only in this way that he can show that self-love need not be a destructive passion. He takes it for granted that self-love is properly condemned whenever it can be shown to be harmful to the community. It is praiseworthy only if it can be shown that a self-lover will be an admirable citizen. In making this assumption, Aristotle reveals that he thinks that the claims of other members of the community to proper treatment are intrinsically valid. This is precisely what a strong form of egoism cannot accept.

We should also keep in mind Aristotle’s statement in the Politics that the political community is prior to the individual citizen—just as the whole body is prior to any of its parts (1253a18–29). Aristotle makes use of this claim when he proposes that in the ideal community each child should receive the same education, and that the responsibility for providing such an education should be taken out of the hands of private individuals and made a matter of common concern (1337a21–7). No citizen, he says, belongs to himself; all belong to the city (1337a28–9). What he means is that when it comes to such matters as education, which affect the good of all, each individual should be guided by the collective decisions of the whole community. An individual citizen does not belong to himself, in the sense that it is not up to him alone to determine how he should act; he should subordinate his individual decision-making powers to those of the whole. The strong form of egoism we have been discussing cannot accept Aristotle’s doctrine of the priority of the city to the individual. It tells the individual that the good of others has, in itself, no valid claim on him, but that he should serve other members of the community only to the extent that he can connect their interests to his own. Such a doctrine leaves no room for the thought that the individual citizen does not belong to himself but to the whole.

In Book I Aristotle says that three kinds of lives are thought to be especially attractive: one is devoted to pleasure, a second to politics, and a third to knowledge and understanding (1095b17–19). In X.6–9 he returns to these three alternatives, and explores them more fully than he had in Book I. The life of pleasure is construed in Book I as a life devoted to physical pleasure, and is quickly dismissed because of its vulgarity. In X.6, Aristotle concedes that physical pleasures, and more generally, amusements of all sorts, are desirable in themselves, and therefore have some claim to be our ultimate end. But his discussion of happiness in Book X does not start from scratch; he builds on his thesis that pleasure cannot be our ultimate target, because what counts as pleasant must be judged by some standard other than pleasure itself, namely the judgment of the virtuous person. Amusements will not be absent from a happy life, since everyone needs relaxation, and amusements fill this need. But they play a subordinate role, because we seek relaxation in order to return to more important activities.

Aristotle turns therefore, in X.7–8, to the two remaining alternatives—politics and philosophy—and presents a series of arguments to show that the philosophical life, a life devoted to theoria (contemplation, study), is best. Theoria is not the process of learning that leads to understanding; that process is not a candidate for our ultimate end, because it is undertaken for the sake of a further goal. What Aristotle has in mind when he talks about theoria is the activity of someone who has already achieved theoretical wisdom. The happiest life is lived by someone who has a full understanding of the basic causal principles that govern the operation of the universe, and who has the resources needed for living a life devoted to the exercise of that understanding. Evidently Aristotle believes that his own life and that of his philosophical friends was the best available to a human being. He compares it to the life of a god: god thinks without interruption and endlessly, and a philosopher enjoys something similar for a limited period of time.

It may seem odd that after devoting so much attention to the practical virtues, Aristotle should conclude his treatise with the thesis that the best activity of the best life is not ethical. In fact, some scholars have held that X.7–8 are deeply at odds with the rest of the Ethics ; they take Aristotle to be saying that we should be prepared to act unethically, if need be, in order to devote ourselves as much as possible to contemplation. But it is difficult to believe that he intends to reverse himself so abruptly, and there are many indications that he intends the arguments of X.7–8 to be continuous with the themes he emphasizes throughout the rest of the Ethics . The best way to understand him is to take him to be assuming that one will need the ethical virtues in order to live the life of a philosopher, even though exercising those virtues is not the philosopher’s ultimate end. To be adequately equipped to live a life of thought and discussion, one will need practical wisdom, temperance, justice, and the other ethical virtues. To say that there is something better even than ethical activity, and that ethical activity promotes this higher goal, is entirely compatible with everything else that we find in the Ethics .

Although Aristotle’s principal goal in X.7–8 is to show the superiority of philosophy to politics, he does not deny that a political life is happy. Perfect happiness, he says, consists in contemplation; but he indicates that the life devoted to practical thought and ethical virtue is happy in a secondary way. He thinks of this second-best life as that of a political leader, because he assumes that the person who most fully exercises such qualities as justice and greatness of soul is the man who has the large resources needed to promote the common good of the city. The political life has a major defect, despite the fact that it consists in fully exercising the ethical virtues, because it is a life devoid of philosophical understanding and activity. Were someone to combine both careers, practicing politics at certain times and engaged in philosophical discussion at other times (as Plato’s philosopher-kings do), he would lead a life better than that of Aristotle’s politician, but worse than that of Aristotle’s philosopher.

But his complaint about the political life is not simply that it is devoid of philosophical activity. The points he makes against it reveal drawbacks inherent in ethical and political activity. Perhaps the most telling of these defects is that the life of the political leader is in a certain sense unleisurely (1177b4–15). What Aristotle has in mind when he makes this complaint is that ethical activities are remedial: they are needed when something has gone wrong, or threatens to do so. Courage, for example, is exercised in war, and war remedies an evil; it is not something we should wish for. Aristotle implies that all other political activities have the same feature, although perhaps to a smaller degree. Corrective justice would provide him with further evidence for his thesis—but what of justice in the distribution of goods? Perhaps Aristotle would reply that in existing political communities a virtuous person must accommodate himself to the least bad method of distribution, because, human nature being what it is, a certain amount of injustice must be tolerated. As the courageous person cannot be completely satisfied with his courageous action, no matter how much self-mastery it shows, because he is a peace-lover and not a killer, so the just person living in the real world must experience some degree of dissatisfaction with his attempts to give each person his due. The pleasures of exercising the ethical virtues are, in normal circumstances, mixed with pain. Unalloyed pleasure is available to us only when we remove ourselves from the all-too-human world and contemplate the rational order of the cosmos. No human life can consist solely in these pure pleasures; and in certain circumstances one may owe it to one’s community to forego a philosophical life and devote oneself to the good of the city. But the paradigms of human happiness are those people who are lucky enough to devote much of their time to the study of a world more orderly than the human world we inhabit.

Although Aristotle argues for the superiority of the philosophical life in X.7–8, he says in X.9, the final chapter of the Ethics , that his project is not yet complete, because we can make human beings virtuous, or good even to some small degree, only if we undertake a study of the art of legislation. The final section of the Ethics is therefore intended as a prolegomenon to Aristotle’s political writings. We must investigate the kinds of political systems exhibited by existing Greek cities, the forces that destroy or preserve cities, and the best sort of political order. Although the study of virtue Aristotle has just completed is meant to be helpful to all human beings who have been brought up well—even those who have no intention of pursuing a political career—it is also designed to serve a larger purpose. Human beings cannot achieve happiness, or even something that approximates happiness, unless they live in communities that foster good habits and provide the basic equipment of a well-lived life.

The study of the human good has therefore led to two conclusions: The best life is not to be found in the practice of politics. But the well being of whole communities depends on the willingness of some to lead a second-best life—a life devoted to the study and practice of the art of politics, and to the expression of those qualities of thought and passion that exhibit our rational self-mastery.

• appearances: phainomena
• beautiful: kalon
• clear: saphes
• complete (verb, also: to perfect): telein
• condition: hexis
• continence (literally: mastery): enkrateia
• continent: enkratês
• disposition: hexis
• emotion: pathos
• evil: kakos , phaulos
• excellence: aretê
• feeling: pathos
• fine: kalon
• flourishing: eudaimonia
• friendship: philia ; philein (the verb cognate to the noun “ philia ”, can sometimes be translated “like” or even “love”)
• function: ergon
• good will: eunoia
• happiness: eudaimonia
• happy: eudaimon
• impetuosity: propeteia
• incontinence (literally: lack of mastery): akrasia
• incontinent: akratês
• intuitive understanding: nous
• live well: eu zên
• practical wisdom: phronêsis
• science: epistêmê
• standard: horos
• state: hexis
• task: ergon
• virtue: aretê
• weakness: astheneia
• work: ergon

Further Reading

Broadie 1991; Bostock 2000; Burger 2008; Gauthier & Jolif 1958–59; Hall 2019; Hardie 1980; Pakaluk 2005; Price 2011; Reeve 2012a; Urmson 1987.

Anton & Preus (eds.) 1991; Barnes, Schofield, & Sorabji (eds.) 1977; Bartlett & Collins (eds.) 1999; Engstrom & Whiting (eds.) 1996; Heinaman (ed.) 1995; Kraut (ed.) 2006b; Miller (ed.) 2011; Natali (ed.) 2009; Pakaluk & Pearson (eds.) 2010; Polansky (ed.) 2014; Roche (ed.) 1988c; Rorty (ed.) 1980; Sherman (ed.) 1999; Sim (ed.) 1995.

C. Studies of Particular Topics

Kenny 1978, 1979, 1992; Rowe 1971.

Barnes 1980; Berryman 2019; J.M. Cooper 1999 (ch. 12); Frede 2012; Heinaman (ed.) 1995; Irwin 1988b; Karbowski 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2019; Kontos 2011; Kraut 1998; McDowell 1995; Nussbaum 1985, 1986 (chs 8–9); Reeve 1992 (ch. 1), 2012b; Roche 1988b, 1992; Scott 2015; Segvic 2002; Shields 2012a; Zingano 2007b.

Annas 1993 (ch. 18); Barney 2008; Broadie 2005, 2007a; Charles 1999; Clark 1975 (14–27, 145–63); J.M. Cooper 1986 (chs 1, 3), 1999 (chs 9, 13); Curzer 1991; Gadamer 1986; Gerson 2004; Gomez-Lobo 1989; Heinaman 2002, 2007; Irwin 2012; Keyt 1978; Korsgaard 1986a, 1986b; Kraut 1979a, 1979b, 1989, 2002 (ch. 3); Lawrence 1993, 1997, 2001; G.R. Lear 2000; J. Lear 2000; MacDonald 1989; Natali 2010; Nussbaum 1986 (chs 11, 12); Purinton 1998; Reeve 1992 (chs 3, 4); Roche 1988a; Santas 2001 (chs 6–7); Scott 1999, 2000; Segvic 2004; Suits 1974; Van Cleemput 2006; Wedin 1981; N. White 2002, 2006; S. White 1992; Whiting 1986, 1988; Wielenberg 2004; Williams 1985 (ch. 3).

Brickhouse 2003; Brown 1997; Brunschwig 1996; Clark 1975 (84–97); N. Cooper 1989; Curzer 1990, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2005, 2012; Di Muzio 2000; Gardiner 2001; Gottlieb 1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 2009; Halper 1999; Hardie 1978; Hursthouse 1988; Hutchinson 1986; Irwin 1988a; Jimenez 2020; Kraut 2002 (ch. 4), 2012, 2013; Leunissen 2012, 2013, 2017; Lorenz 2009; McKerlie 2001; Pakaluk 2004; Pearson 2006, 2007; Peterson 1988; Russell 2012a; Santas 2001 (ch. 8); Scaltsas 1995; Schütrumpf 1989; Sherman 1989, 1997; Sim 2007; Taylor 2004; Telfer 1989–90; Tuozzo 1995; Whiting 1996; Young 1988; Yu 2007.

Broadie 1998; Charles 1984, 2007; Coope 2012; J. Cooper 1986 (ch. 1), 1999 (chs 10, 11, 19); Dahl 1984; Destrée 2007; Engberg-Pedersen 1983; Fortenbaugh 1975; Gottlieb, 2021; Gröngross 2007; Hursthouse 1984; Kontos 2018; Kontos 2021; Kraut 2006a; Lorenz 2006; McDowell 1996a, 1996b, 1998; McKerlie 1998; Meyer 1993; Milo 1966; Moss 2011, 2012; Natali (ed.) 2009; Nussbaum 1986 (ch. 10); Olfert 2017; Pakaluk & Pearson (eds.) 2010; Pickavé & Whiting 2008; Politis 1998; Reeve 1992 (ch. 2), 2013; Segvic 2009a; Sherman 2000; Taylor 2003b; Walsh 1963; Zingano 2007a.

Gosling &Taylor 1982 (chs 11–17); Gottlieb 1993; Natali (ed.) 2009; Owen 1971; Pearson 2012; Rorty 1974; Taylor 2003a, 2003b; Urmson 1967; Warren 2009; Wolfsdorf 2013 (ch. 6).

Annas 1977, 1993 (ch. 12); Brewer 2005; J.M. Cooper 1999 (chs 14, 15); Hitz 2011; Kahn 1981; Milgram 1987; Nehamas 2010; Pakaluk 1998; Pangle 2003; Price 1989 (chs 4–7); Rogers 1994; Schollmeier 1994; Sherman 1987; Stern-Gillet 1995; Walker 2014; Whiting 1991.

Freeland 1998; Karbowski 2014a; Modrak 1994; Ward (ed.) 1996.

Bielskis 2020; Broadie 2006; Chappell (ed.) 2006; Garver 2006; Gill (ed.) 2005; Kraut 2018; LeBar 2013; MacIntyre 1999; Peters 2014; Russell 2012b; Stohr 2003, 2009; Wiggins 2009.

Lockwood 2005.

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• –––, 2009a, “Deliberation and Choice in Aristotle”, in Segvic 2009b: 144–171. Also appeared in Pakaluk and Pearson 2010: 159–186. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546541.003.0008
• –––, 2009b, From Protagoras to Aristotle: Essays in Ancient Moral Philosophy , Myles Burnyeat (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Sherman, Nancy, 1987, “Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 47(4): 589–613. doi:10.2307/2107230
• –––, 1989, The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue , Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0198239173.001.0001
• –––, 1997, Making a Virtue of Necessity: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511624865
• ––– (ed.), 1999, Aristotle’s Ethics: Critical Essays , Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
• –––, 2000, “Is the Ghost of Aristotle Haunting Freud’s House?” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy , 16(1): 63–81. doi:10.1163/2213441700X00079
• Shields, Christopher, 2012a, “Goodness is Meant in Many Ways”, in G. Rudebusch and J. Hardy (eds.) Grundlagen der Antiken Ethik / Foundations of Ancient Ethics , Goettingen: Vanderhoek & Ruprecht, pp. 185–199.
• Shields, Christopher (ed.), 2012b, The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195187489.001.0001
• Sim, May (ed.), 1995, The Crossroads of Norm and Nature , Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
• –––, 2007, Remastering Morals with Aristotle and Confucius , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511497841
• Stern-Gillet, Suzanne, 1995, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship , Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
• Stohr, Karen, 2003, “Moral Cacophony: When Continence is a Virtue”, Journal of Ethics , 7(4): 339–363. doi:10.1023/A:1026111711649
• –––, 2009, “Minding Others’ Business”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 90(1): 116–139. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01331.x
• Suits, Bernard, 1974, “Aristotle on the Function of Man: Fallacies, Heresies and other Entertainments”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 4(1): 23–40. doi:10.1080/00455091.1974.10716919
• Taylor, C.C.W., 1988, “Urmson on Aristotle on Pleasure”, in J. Dancy, J. M. E. Moravcsik, and C. C. W. Taylor (eds.), Human Agency: Language, Duty, and Value. Philosophical Essays in Honor of J. O. Urmson , Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 120–132. Reprinted in Taylor 2008: 107–120 (ch. 7).
• –––, 2003a, “Pleasure: Aristotle’s Response to Plato”, in Robert Heinaman (ed.), Plato and Aristotle’s Ethics , Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 1–20.
• –––, 2003b, “Aristotle on the Practical Intellect”, (in German, trans. R. May, with the assistance of A. W. Müller), in T. Buchheim, H. Flashar, and R. A. H. King (eds.), Kann man heute noch etwas anfangen mit Aristoteles? , Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, pp. 142–162. Reprinted (in English) in Taylor 2008: 204–222 (ch. 12).
• –––, 2004, “Wisdom and Courage in the Protagoras and the Nicomachean Ethics”, (in Italian, trans. S. Casertano), in G. Casertano (ed.), Il Protagora di Platone: struttura e problematiche , Naples: Loffredo Editore, Naples, pp. 716–728. Reprinted (in English) in Taylor 2008: 281–294 (ch. 16).
• –––, 2008, Pleasure, Mind, and Soul: Selected Papers in Ancient Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226399.001.0001
• Telfer, Elizabeth, 1989–90, “The Unity of Moral Virtues in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics ”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 91: 35–48.
• Tuozzo, Thomas M., 1995, “Contemplation, the Noble, and the Mean: The Standard of Moral Virtue in Aristotle’s Ethics”, Apeiron , special issue Aristotle, Virtue and the Mean , 28(4): 129–154. doi:10.1515/APEIRON.1995.28.4.129.
• Urmson, J.O., 1967, “Aristotle on Pleasure”, in J.M.E. Moravcsik (ed.), Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays , Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, pp. 323–33.
• –––, 1987, Aristotle’s Ethics , Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
• Van Cleemput, 2006, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia in Nicomachean Ethics I”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 30(Summer): 127–158.
• Walker, Matthew D., 2014, “Aristotle on the Utility and Choiceworthiness of Friends”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie , 96(2): 151–182. doi:10.1515/agph-2014-0008
• Walsh, James, 1963, Aristotle’s Conception of Moral Weakness , New York: Columbia University Press.
• Ward, Julie K. (ed.), 1996, Feminism and Ancient Philosophy , New York: Routledge.
• Warren, James, 2009, “Aristotle on Speusippus on Eudoxus on Pleasure”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 36(Summer): 249–282.
• Wedin, Michael V., 1981, “Aristotle on the Good for Man”, Mind , 90(358): 243–62. doi:10.1093/mind/XC.358.243
• White, Nicholas P., 2002, Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0198250592.001.0001
• –––, 2006, A Brief History of Happiness , Malden, ME: Blackwell.
• White, Stephen. A., 1992, Sovereign Virtue , Stanford: Stanford University Press.
• Whiting, Jennifer, 1986, “Human Nature and Intellectualism in Aristotle”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie , 68(1): 70–95. doi:10.1515/agph.1986.68.1.70
• –––, 1988, “Aristotle’s Function Argument: A Defense”, Ancient Philosophy , 8(1): 33–48. doi:10.5840/ancientphil19888119
• –––, 1991, “Impersonal Friends”, Monist , 74(1): 3–29. doi:10.5840/monist19917414
• –––, 1996, “Self-Love and Authoritative Virtue: Prolegomenon to a Kantian Reading of Eudemian Ethics VIII.3”, in Engstrom & Whiting 1996: 162–99.
• Wielenberg, Erik J., 2004, “Egoism and Eudaimonia -Maximization in the Nicomachean Ethics ”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 26: 277–295.
• Wiggins, David, 2009, “What is the Order Among the Varieties of Goodness? A Question Posed by von Wright; and a Conjecture Made by Aristotle”, Philosophy , 84(2): 175–200. doi:10.1017/S0031819109000308
• Williams, Bernard, 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Chapter 3.
• Wolfsdorf, David, 2013, Pleasure in Ancient Greek Philosophy , Chapter 6. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511667510
• Young, Charles M., 1988, “Aristotle on Temperance” Philosophical Review , 97(4): 521–542. doi:10.2307/2185414
• Yu, Jiyuan, 2007, The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle: Mirrors of Virtue , New York: Routledge.
• Zingano Marco, 2007a, “Akrasia and the Method of Ethics”, in Bobonich and Destree 2007: 167–192
• –––, 2007b, “Aristotle and the Problems of Method in Ethics”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 32(Summer): 297–330.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Athenian Constitution , ed. Kenyon. (Greek)
• Athenian Constitution , ed. H. Rackham. (English)
• Economics , (Greek)
• Economics , (English)
• Eudemian Ethics , (Greek)
• Eudemian Ethics , (English)
• Metaphysics , (Greek)
• Metaphysics , (English)
• Nicomachean Ethics , ed. J. Bywater. (Greek)
• Nicomachean Ethics , ed. H. Rackham. (English)
• Poetics , (English)
• Politics , (Greek)
• Politics , (English)
• Rhetoric , ed. W. D. Ross. (Greek)
• Rhetoric , ed. J. H. Freese. (English)
• Virtues and Vices , ed. I. Bekker. (Greek)
• Virtues and Vices , ed. H. Rackham. (English)
• Nikomachische Ethik , in German, translated by Eugen Rolfes, Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1911, at the Projekt Gutenberg-DE

Aristotle | character, moral | egoism | ethics: virtue | friendship | Plato | pleasure | wisdom

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Winners of Outstanding Philosophy Essay Prize Announced

May 9, 2022

The Philosophy Program has announced that two undergraduate students, and one alumnus, are winners of the inaugural Outstanding Essay in Philosophy prize. The winners are Maya Peters-Greño, Alec Lepisto, and Ailie Maclean.

Peters-Greño was recognized for her essay on Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia (happiness or flourishing). She wrote the essay for Philosophy 4450 – Ethical Theory, taught by Jim Skidmore. In the essay, Peters-Greño sets out the details of Aristotle’s account before developing a challenging criticism of his reliance on the existence of an objective human ergon (function). Maya is pursuing a B.A. in History, with a Minor in Philosophy, at ISU.

Lepisto was honored for his essay on the desirability of immortality. The essay was written for Philosophy 2260 – Life and Death, taught by Evan Rodriguez. Would human immortality be desirable? Shelly Kagan and others argue that the answer is no, due to the fundamental problem of boredom . Transhumanists have recently attempted to offer alternative accounts of immortality that avoid this problem, but Alec argues that these accounts ultimately fail for the same reason. Alec graduated in 2021 with B.S. degrees in Physics and Mathematics, with a Minor in Philosophy, from ISU.

Mclean was recognized for her essay on the meaning of life. The essay was written for Philosophy 1101 – Introduction to Philosophy, taught by Mike Roche. One fundamental question concerning meaningfulness in life is whether we should regard such meaning as objectively grounded or instead subjectively created by each individual. Ailie’s essay outlines these basic alternatives, and she goes on to defend subjective accounts. In particular, she argues that even if our lives have objective meaning, such meaning would only matter to us if it connected with our own subjective sense of meaning. Ailie will graduate from ISU this spring with a B.A. in Political Science and Global Studies.

The Outstanding Essay in Philosophy prize was created to recognize annually the best undergraduate student work in philosophy at ISU. 

Categories:

University News

2022-23 Perse Aristotelian Award essay competition launched

Following the success of the inaugural Aristotelian Award competition, The Perse is once again inviting youngsters nationwide to display their intellectual curiosity.

The Aristotelian Award research essay competition is aimed at Year 9 pupils across the UK.

The competition is divided into two sections – arts/humanities and sciences – with a choice of five essay titles in each category ready to be tackled. Cash prizes are on offer with the winners of each category receiving £70. Four pupils in each category will be highly commended and receive £20 each. Perse Head of Research Matt Fox said: “We are really excited to launch this year’s Aristotelian Award research essay competition for Year 9 students across the UK.

“We hope that amongst the 10 questions, there is a title that interests everyone and this opportunity will help students develop their research skills.

“Do check out the resources page on our brand new Perse Research Website over the coming weeks where we will keep adding advice and information to help students with their research.”

You can find details of the competition on our Perse Research Website here .

Entries should be submitted via our online form by the closing date of 5pm on Monday 20 February 2023 .

Hear more about the Aristotelian Award in a Perse podcast with Mr Fox here .

Published 4 November 2022

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Department of Greek & Latin

Essay Competition

UCL Greek & Latin run an essay competition for secondary school students

The essay competition is not running in 2024. Please see here for other outreach activities.

2023 WINNERS HERE

To inspire students to explore the ancient world, the UCL Department of Greek and Latin is advertising an essay competition, for the 2022/23 academic year, with two categories:

• school students in years 10 and 11 in the UK (or equivalent)
• school students in years 12 and 13 in the UK (or equivalent)

Engaging with the essay topics and the suggested bibliography is a great way for students to get a taste of university-level research and to challenge their understanding of the ancient world.

The word limit is 2,000 words, including any footnotes, but not the bibliography. Each student can choose one of the five essay titles, posted below.

The essay competition is open to all school students in the respective years of study, and it does not require previous knowledge of the subject. Students from under-represented backgrounds are particularly encouraged to apply, and we invite students to let us know if they are applying from a 'Widening Participation' background as defined by the Access UCL scheme .

The winning students in each category will receive a prize of £50 for the purchase of books. Two runners-up in each category will receive a prize of £30 for the purchase of books. All participants will receive a certificate of achievement from the UCL Department of Greek and Latin.

We hope to announce winners by the end of October 2023. Due to the large number of submissions received, we will not be able to provide feedback on individual entries.

Students in their penultimate year of school who attend the outreach summer school and complete an essay to a satisfactory standard will be eligible for a lower-tariff contextual offer (ABB) for admission to our undergraduate degree programmes (Ancient World, Classics) under the terms of the Access UCL scheme .

A special free workshop, with useful advice about researching and writing your essay, will be held on 26 April at 15-16.00 on Zoom. Please register here if you would like to attend. 

Instructions

Essay Questions and Bibliography

Some bibliographical references can be found in the questions below. You can also rely on the resources of your local and school libraries. A lot of information can be found online: the website JSTOR in particular, which contains articles published in academic journals, gives you the right to download 100 items for free per month if you register .   You will also be able to ask your teachers for help with the research. (JSTOR has a useful introduction to basic research skills that you may find interesting. Websites containing texts and translations of classical sources are suggested below and there is a very useful list of Classical online resources from John Cabot University. The UCL Library webpage is always available and you may also find encyclopaedias like the Oxford Classical Dictionary useful; in fact, Wikipedia often has very useful reading lists.

The Poetics of Aristotle represents the first systematic philosophical theory of literature and drama and their genres in the history of Western culture, and it has profoundly influenced literary criticism and theory, especially from the Renaissance onward. For Aristotle, literary or ‘poetic’ genres constitute a system, which the philosopher justifies and explains with a psychology and an anthropology based around the central concept of mimesis or ‘imitation’. In fourth-century BCE Greece, you cannot construct a theory of poetry without reckoning with the seismic influence and authority of Homer’s epics, which for Classical Greeks formed one of the stable foundations of their culture. Aristotle’s theories are in many ways foreshadowed in the writings of the philosopher’s master, Plato, particularly in those famous passages of the Republic , Ion and Laws where he considers the power of mimetic poetry as a medium of social communication before, at least in principle, banishing it from the City. This essay topic calls on you to read some of the primary texts of early Greek aesthetic theory and to think about the relation, in particular, of tragic drama to Homeric epic: a relationship which, for both Plato and Aristotle, is rooted in central cultural facts about the making and consumption of poetry in ancient Greek society.

Primary sources (any translation; or, if you can, in Greek):   Plato’s Republic ( books 2-3 and 10) and Ion ; Aristotle’s Poetics .  Texts can easily be found online if you lack access to a library: I particularly recommend the Perseus Digital Library website ( http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/ ), which is easy to use and very rich.

Secondary sources:

1) Bibliographies: http://www.bunpeiris.org/greek-literature/ancient-literary-criticism/ and https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-aesthetics/ (on Plato) and https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle/ and https://iep.utm.edu/aris-poe/ .

2) Some selected reading: Ford, A. The origins of criticism: Literary culture and poetic theory in classical Greece (Princeton, NJ, 2002). Grube, G. M. A. 1965.  The Greek and Roman critics . Toronto E. Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge, MA: 1963): https://monoskop.org/images/0/0d/Havelock_Eric_A_Preface_to_Plato.pdf M. Heath, Greek Philosophical Poetics (Cambridge, 2012). R. Hunter, ‘Homer and Greek Literature’, in R. Fowler, ed . Cambridge Companion to Homer (Cambridge, 2004): 235-53. Kennedy, G. A., ed. 1989.  The Cambridge history of literary criticism . Vol. 1,  Classical criticism (Cambridge, 2000).

Over the last half-century, Classical scholarship has begun to recognise that the ancient world was in many ways nothing like the world in which we live today. If ours is what we can call a ‘literate civilisation’, in which ideas of truth, authority and law are centred on written texts, the society of ancient Greece and Rome was in many ways an ‘oral civilisation’. According to one influential estimate, in the democratic Athens of the fifth century BCE, perhaps only 10% of the total population could actually read; and the proportion may have been lower in the Roman Empire. In early Greece, poetry was ‘song’, and the vast majority of people interacted with it and with other forms of literature in performance, and since the fieldwork of Milman Parry and Albert Lord, who compared the songs of Homer to the living South Slavic Muslim tradition of oral epic song in the former Yugoslavia, it has been clear that the texts of ancient Greek epic poets, including Homer, originated in oral compositions that were later written down and transmitted in manuscript.

We recommend that you tackle this question in one of two ways: 1) you can evaluate the evidence for the Homeric songs as oral compositions; or 2) you can analyze what you think the effects of literacy were on ancient culture and society.  

Primary sources : Homer, Iliad or Odyssey (any translation).

1) Bibliographies: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orality ; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oral_tradition ; https://journal.oraltradition.org/ .

2) Some selected readings: K. Barber, The Anthropology of Texts, Persons and Publics (Cambridge, 2007). R. Finnegan Oral Poetry (Cambridge, 1977). J. Miles Foley, How to Read an Oral Poem (Urbana and Chicago: 2002). E. Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge, MA: 1963): https://monoskop.org/images/0/0d/Havelock_Eric_A_Preface_to_Plato.pdf A.B. Lord, The Singer of Tales (Cambridge, MA: 1960): https://chs.harvard.edu/book/lord-albert-bates-the-singer-of-tales/ W.J. Ong, S.J. Orality and Literacy (New York, 1982): https://monoskop.org/images/d/db/Ong_Walter_J_Orality_and_Literacy_2nd_e... . R. Thomas, Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece (Cambridge, 1993).

The Achaemenid Persian Empire, with its polyglot, multicultural state presided over by a Great King with almost godlike power and sway, was for the Greeks – from the late 6 th century onwards – the ultimate opposite, against which they could define their own emerging political and cultural identity as Hellenes; and a model of empire that they could compare with their own city-state culture. Their defeat of the second Persian invasion of Greece under Xerxes I in 480-479 BCE was a crucial stage in this process of cultural self-definition, by which the Greeks, until that time essentially a Western offshoot of the older, more sophisticated cultures of the Ancient Near East, defined themselves as Western and European. In the Greek poetry and prose literature of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, we find an increasing focus on what constitutes ‘Hellenism’ or ‘Panhellenism’ in opposition to an East defined increasingly by Persia. The Orientalising stereotypes (to use a term pioneered by the Palestinian-American intellectual Edward Said) which emerged in the course of this process of exclusionary self-definition still exercise a harmful influence in the world today, as the basis of the theory according to which a unified ‘West’ faces non-Western cultures in a potentially-violent ‘clash of civilisations’. Of course, the ancient Achaemenid world was the cultural basis both of the Zoroastrian religion and the culture of modern Iran. In Persians (472 BCE), a rare example of an Attic tragedy on a real historical event, the Athenian playwright Aeschylus (525/4-456 BCE), who fought in the Battle of Marathon, presents a view of the disastrous Persian invasion of Greece from the Persian side, in a way that both emphasises the Hellenes’ courage in defence of their country and what they saw as its liberty, and shows a very deep understanding of the underlying common humanity and tragic loss that links them to their enemies. The Ionian Greek historian Herodotus (484-425 BCE), born more or less around the time of Xerxes I’s war in Greece in the Persian-dominated areas of the Anatolian coast, presents a complex and fascinating anthropological portrait of the Persians, which both makes them the Hellenes’ opposites in almost everything, but at the same time emphasises the common ground of civilised, urban culture shared between them that distinguishes both cultures, as cultures of the Mediterranean ‘centre’, from the more peripheral, nomadic cultures to the East, North and South. Writing in the fourth century BCE, Socrates’ Athenian pupil Xenophon (c. 430-354 BCE), an adventurer, soldier and political theorist of strikingly anti-democratic opinions, used his Cyropaedia , a fictionalised biography of the founder-king of the Persian Empire that is in many ways the first prose novel in the Western tradition, presents an idealised view of Persian culture and empire, as a kind of fictional textbook for the education and training of rulers. Finally, writing in the late first/early 2 nd century CE, Plutarch (46-119 CE), a scholar and antiquarian writing from the perspective of the Hellenised and then Romanised oikoumene which emerged in the aftermath of Alexander III of Macedon’s conquest of the Achaemenid Empire in the late fourth century BCE, presents a highly prejudiced account of the life and actions of the Persian King Artaxerxes II, producing one of Western culture’s great standard go-to anatomies of Oriental luxury, softness and despotism which influenced modern colonial powers’ interactions with the peoples of what we have learned to call the Middle East. In this assignment, you are asked to take one of these four sources, read it with whatever commentary or scholarship you can find online or in your available libraries, and analyse what the author’s view of Persian culture is and why and how he represents that attitude. The bibliography below is intended to give you a few basic and interesting readings on the reality, as opposed to the representation, of Achaemenid Persia.

Primary Sources: Aeschylus’ Persians , or Herodotus, Histories (esp. Books 1, 3 and 9), or Xenophon’s Cyropaedia , or Plutarch’s Life of Artaxerxes .

1) Bibliography: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Achaemenid_Empire .

2) Some selected readings: P. Briant , From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire (University Park, PA, 2003). M. Brosius, The Persians: An Introduction (London, 2007). E. Hall, Inventing the Barbarian (Oxford, 1989). T. Harrison. ‘Herodotus’ Conception of Foreign Languages’, in Histos 2 (1998): 1-45. T. Harrison, Writing Ancient Persia. Classical Essays (London and New York, 2011). https://histos.org/documents/1998.01HarrisonHerodotusConceptionForeignLa... A. Kuhrt ,  The Persian Empire: A Corpus of Sources from the Achaemenid Period (Routledge, 2013).  C. Lenfant, ‘Ctesias and His Eunuchs: A Challenge for Modern Historians’, in Histos 6 (2012): 257-97 ( https://histos.org/documents/2012A12LenfantCtesiasandhisEunuchs.pdf ). C. Pelling, ‘East is East and West is West – Or Are They? National Stereotypes in Herodotus’, in Histos 1 (1997): 51-66 ( https://histos.org/documents/1997.04PellingEastIsEast5166.pdf ). J Curtis and St. John Simpson, eds. The World of Achaemenid Persia . History, Art and Society in Iran and the Ancient Near East (Bloomsbury, 2021). M. Waters, Ancient Persia. A Concise History of the Achaemenid Empire, 550-330 BCE (Cambridge and New York, 2014).

Podcast: https://historyofpersiapodcast.com/bibliography/

The perception of the ‘Body Beautiful’ in Western/Euro-American society is in many ways bound up with Classicist aesthetics and with the ways in which ancient canons of beauty, particularly as mediated through Greek and Roman sculpture, were perceived as models for artists and as standards for living women and men. Only over the past century, and – with the rise of feminism – particularly in recent decades, has it become completely clear for most people just how much these standards of beauty and body-image, like our very notions of humanity and civilisation, are culturally-constructed, and how dangerous and destructive these constructions can sometimes be. This essay asks you to think about Classical sculptures in these terms, historically and in relation to their cultural context and use, examining how they have influenced the modern beauty-ideal and where that ideal misinterprets them.

Primary sources: Greek sculpture collection in the British Museum (see the website: https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection ); https://www.theacropolismuseum.gr/en ; other Museum websites and Perseus website.

1) Bibliographies: ‘Beauty’ (article on philosophical theories of beauty from the online Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/beauty ; on Greek sculpture: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ancient_Greek_sculpture .

2) Some selected reading: I. Jenkins, Defining Beauty: The Body in Ancient Greek Art (London, 2015). R. Neer, The Emergence of the Classical Style In Greek Sculpture (Chicago, 2010). J.J. Pollitt, The Ancient View of Greek Art: Criticism, History, and Terminology (New Haven, 1974). N.J. Spivey, Understanding Greek Sculpture: Ancient Meanings, Modern Readings (New York, 1996). Stewart, Andrew F.  Greek Sculpture: An Exploration (New Haven, 1990). Wolf, Naomi, The Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty are Used Against Women (New York, 1990). 

Podcast: Melvyn Bragg on Beauty: https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p003k9hf ; Ian Jenkins on ‘The Human Body in Ancient Greek Thought and Society (filmed lecture): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NfWd9QZfils .

You can compare ancient and modern works, or discuss one reception or use of a particular mythical figure or story, whether in a literary text, a work of art, a drama, a film or any other genre.

The assignment here is to investigate a myth of your choice, examining its ancient sources or its modern receptions. You are completely free to choose the subject of your analysis, and your methods and research question. You can focus on the scholarship, on a particular work, or on your own impressions of a mythical figure and why s/he was or is important. The resources below are intended to provide some general background; brief specific reading suggestions on three topics (Medea, Heracles and Iphigeneia) are given below.

Some recommended topics: Medea, Heracles, Iphigeneia.

Some resources to help your research: Beazley Archive (Oxford University Classical Art Resource Centre’s searchable database of ancient painted vases and art, with special focus on Archaic and Classical Athenian pottery): https://www.beazley.ox.ac.uk/index.htm British Museum website (searchable index of the collection: https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection ). National Gallery website (for a searchable index of the collection, go to ‘Search’ and click ‘Paintings’): https://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/ . The Perseus website: good for texts and images alike: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/ The Oxford Classical Dictionary and Wikipedia will give you good bibliographies on particular myths and mythical figures.

3) Iphigeneia: K. Dowden, Death and the Maiden: Girls' Initiation Rites in Greek Mythology (Routledge: London and New York, 1989).  E. Hall, Adventures with Iphigenia in Tauris: A Cultural History of Euripides' Black Sea Tragedy (Onassis Series in Hellenic Culture: I.B. Tauris, 2012) . N. Loraux, Tragic Ways of Killing a Woman (Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA and London, 1987).

Some useful titles on myth and mythology: J.Bremmer, ed. Interpretations of Greek Mythology (London, 1987) W. Burkert, Homo Necans: The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth (Berkeley, 1983) ---, Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual (Berkeley, 1979) ---, Greek Religion (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA and London, 1985) T.H. Carpenter, Art and Myth in Ancient Greece (London, 1991) E. Csapo, Theories of Mythology (Malden, 2003). L. E. Doherty, Gender and the Interpretation of Classical Myth . (London, 2001) K. Dowden and N. Livingstone, eds. A Companion to Greek Mythology (Wiley-Blackwell: Oxford, 2011). L. Edmunds, Approaches to Greek Myth . Baltimore (1990) T. Gantz, Early Greek Myth . (Baltimore, 1993 F. Graf, Greek Mythology: An Introduction (Baltimore, 1993). K. Kerényi, The Gods of the Greeks . (London, 1958) ---,  The Heroes of the Greeks . London (1959) S. Price and E. Kearns, The Oxford Dictionary of Classical Myth and Religion (Oxford: 2003). K. Schefold, Myth and Legend in Early Greek Art (London, 1966) ---, Gods and Heroes in Late Archaic Greek Art (Cambridge: 1992). A. Snodgrass, Homer and the Artists (Cambridge, 1998) H.A. Shapiro, Myth into Art: Poet and Painter in Classical Greece (London, 1994) J-P. Vernant., Myth and Society in Ancient Greece (Brighton, 1980) ---, Myth and Thought among the Greeks (London, 1983) J-P. Vernant and P. Vidal-Naquet, M yth and tragedy in Ancient Greece (New York, 1988) P. Veyne, Did the Greeks Believe their Myths? (Chicago, 1988) P. Vidal-Naquet, The Black Hunter: Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World (Baltimore, 1986) R. D. Woodard, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Greek Mythology (Cambridge, 2007) S. Woodford, Images of Myths in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge, 2003)

Specific recommended readings:

1) Medea: J.J. Clauss and S. I. Johnston (eds),  Medea: Essays on Medea in Myth, Literature, Philosophy and Art . (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1997).  E. Griffiths,  Medea (Routledge: London and New York, 2006. J. Mossman, Medea: Introduction, Translation and Commentary.  Aris & Phillips, Warminster 2011)

2) Heracles: W. Burkert, "Heracles and the Master of Animals." In  Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual , 78–98. Sather Classical Lectures 47 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1982). M.W. Padilla, The Myths of Herakles in Ancient Greece: Survey and Profile (University Press of America: Lanham MA, 1998). E. Stafford, Herakles. Gods and Heroes of the Ancient World (Routledge, New York, 2011).

2016 High School Essay Contest

The PLATO High School Essay Contest awards will be given to the best philosophical essays written by high school students, in response to the year’s contest essay question.

Awards : First place – $250 Second place – $150 Third place – $100

All winning essays will be published in PLATO’s journal Questions: Philosophy for Young People .

Contest Details: Eligibility : All high school students in the U.S. are eligible to enter.

Submission Process: Please submit the essay as a .doc or .docx file. The first page of the entry should be a cover page that includes a one-paragraph bio, your name, contact information (phone and email), grade and school. The essay should begin on page 2 (please make sure your name is not listed on the pages containing the essay).  It should be emailed to: [email protected] with the subject line: “2016 PLATO Essay Contest Entry.”

Essay length : 2,000 words maximum

Judging : The papers will be read and judged by a panel of high school philosophy teachers and philosophy professors. Deadline: January 31, 2016

2016 PLATO Essay Contest Question

What is the moral status of non-human animals? What value should their lives have? Do all non-human animals have the same moral status? Or do some species have greater moral worth than others?

To answer this question, consider this scenario. Lana has come to you for advice. She is wondering whether to become a moral vegetarian like some of her friends. These friends have persuaded her that eating meat contributes to factory farming and unfair treatment of animals—she is definitely against that. However, she wonders if deciding to not eat meet would sufficiently address her concerns about animal rights. Maybe she should become a vegan instead. If she is convinced that animals have a moral standing, then surely she should give up buying leather shoes and beauty products too. But if this is true, where will this line of reasoning lead her? Will she soon find herself not walking on the street for fear of stepping on an ant? Lana wants to do the right thing, but she feels confused. What should she do? What do you tell her?

Directions:  Write an essay that provides a reasoned, sincere and well-supported argument in response to the question, focusing on the ethical dilemma.

Give your essay a title, number your pages, and proofread it carefully.

Your essay should advance reasons to help support your own conclusions about the question. The best essays will not simply summarize arguments put forth by others or make assertions, but will ask questions and make claims based on evidence and considered reflection. Strive to be consistent in your reasoning by testing your position against other practical and ethical commitments. Be sure to represent arguments that oppose your own point of view and defend your position against such challenges.

We ask that you reference at least one of the sources listed below. These texts can be a source of information, but they can also be used to spur inquiry. If you decide to quote from the text, be sure to interpret the passage in your own words. Explain what you understand the philosopher to be saying and why what he or she is saying is important for your argument. For example, the philosopher’s position might support, complicate or challenge your own response to the question. We do not require you to cite other sources, though you may.

Here are two online philosophy resources about animals rights that may prove helpful:

* Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , particularly, in this case, an article by Lori Gruen:  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/

* Equality for Animals by Peter Singer: http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/1979—-.html

If you use outside references, list them at the end of the essay using the citation style above (MLA style). For notes within the essay, use author’s name and page, e.g. (Kant, p. 222).

Please do not use Wikipedia or dictionary definitions in your essay.

For more information or questions about the PLATO High School Essay Contest, please email: [email protected]

2014-15 PLATO ESSAY CONTEST

Announcement: We have our winners for the 2014/15 essay contest. Congratulations and thanks to all who participated!

First place Syra Mehdi Noble and Greenough School, Dedham, MA “Aristotle’s Theory of Friendship Tested”

Second place Julia Walton Academy of Notre Dame du Namur Villanova, PA “In the Place Beyond Utility and Pleasure”

Third Place Brendan Bernicker Radnor High School Radnor, PA “So Tyler, Did Jamie Cheat?”

Read the winning essays

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PLATO is part of a global UNESCO network that encourages children to participate in philosophical inquiry. As a partner in the UNESCO Chair on the Practice of Philosophy with Children, based at the Université de Nantes in France, PLATO is connected to other educational leaders around the world.

If you would like to change or adapt any of PLATO's work for public use, please feel free to contact us for permission at [email protected] .

Year 9 Aristotelian Award

The nationwide Aristotelian Award was launched by The Perse during the 2021-22 academic year with the aim of inspiring Year 9 pupils across the UK to develop their independent research skills.

Competition information

The Aristotelian Award has been set up to promote the independent study skills in Year 9 pupils while simultaneously providing an avenue to explore super-curricular interests in the arts, humanities and sciences.

The competition is split into two categories – art/humanities and sciences. Prizes are awarded to winners in both categories of the competition.

The 2023-24 competition has now closed. The 2024-25 Aristotelian Award will open in autumn 2024.   Watch this space for more details.

Submit your 2022 Aristotelian award here

2023-24 winners.

View the work of this year’s winners Abi Griffiths (Caterham School) and Matthew Soh (The Perse School). For more on the 2023-24 competition, click here .

• Abi Griffiths (Arts/Humanities) – Select a cultural advance from the ancient world and discuss why it is still relevant today
• Matthew Soh (Sciences) – Businesses who do not use AI in the workplace will fall dramatically behind those who do. Discuss

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1st Annual Patricia Trottier and Gwyn Morgan Student Essay Contest

The Manning Foundation is pleased to present the  1 st  Annual Patricia Trottier and Gwyn Morgan Student Essay Contest  sponsored by  C2C Journal , Institute for Liberal Studies, Generation Screwed, and the Aristotle Foundation.

Submissions will address a current political, cultural or economic topic of the author’s choosing broadly consistent with the principles of free markets, democratic governance, individual liberty, reason, personal responsibility and freedom of conscience and expression. In the spirit of open inquiry and free expression the contest welcomes essays that challenge conventional orthodoxies.

The essay contest is open to  undergraduate students only  studying in Canada and to Canadian students studying abroad. Essays must be a minimum of 1,500 words and no more than 2,500 words. Submissions will be reviewed by a panel with three essays being chosen to split a prize pool of $5,000 (the grand prize winner receiving $2,500).  Further, the three authors will be awarded the opportunity to work with a professional editor and have their essays published in  C2C Journal  along with channels supported by sponsoring organizations.

Essays must be submitted here before midnight on October 22 nd . Winners will be announced prior to December 15 th .

For contest entry details please click  here . Inquiries may be directed by e-mail only to  [email protected] .

Happy writing!  We look forward to reading the submissions.

Manning Foundation  

• [email protected]
• Unit 413, 9-3151 Lakeshore Road Kelowna, B.C. V1W 3S9

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Aristotelian Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of David Charles

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Honouring the seminal influence of David Charles to philosophical scholarship, this volume offers fresh interpretations and assessments of Aristotle’s thinking in metaphysics and related areas such as philosophy of language, psychology, natural philosophy, and mathematics. Sixteen leading scholars and philosophers explore issues of enduring philosophical interest arising from close readings of Aristotle’s major works. Part I offers analyses of Aristotle’s account of definition by David Bronstein and Marko Malink, as well as contributions to contemporary philosophy of language, from an Aristotelian perspective, by Stephen Williams and the late Paul Snowdon. In Part II central issues in Aristotle’s understanding of essence and categories are taken up by Jennifer Whiting, Christof Rapp, and Michail Peramatzis, while Verity Harte examines Plato’s metaphysics of classification. Part III turns to Aristotle’s concepts of form, matter, and final causation. Mary Louse Gill, Lindsay Judson, and Thomas Johansen examine different aspects of his hylomorphism, while James Lennox discusses the place of the good in Aristotle’s teleology. In the final part, modality, change, and space are in focus. Kei Chiba examines Aristotle’s concepts of entelekheia (‘completeness’) and potentiality, Ursula Coope and Frank Lewis address Aristotle’s account of change, and Vassilis Karasmanis explores the discontinuity of space. The volume also contains an introduction and a list of David Charles’ publications.

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North College Hill teen uses art to help kids quit vaping

See samantha murry-shakir's award-winning cartoon.

 Samantha Murry-Shakir's still a teenager, but she's been creating art for well over a decade.  

Back in first grade, she made a bear out of torn brown construction paper and pasted it onto a turquoise background – a project she later entered in a citywide contest.  

“I'm an artist,” said Murry-Shakir, 18, who graduated from North College Hill High School earlier this year. “I’ve been doing art for as long as I can remember.” 

This past spring, Samantha’s artistic and writing skills landed her the first-place prize in her school-wide anti-vaping contest. 

“There are risks with every puff,” she wrote in her award-winning essay. “My peers may be stuck in this cycle of flavored vapor for years.” 

Part of the issue, she said, is how easily teens can acquire vapes. North College Hill High School, for instance, is less than a five-minute walk from a vape shop.  

She channeled the discouragement she felt from seeing classmates vaping in between classes into her submission, where she expressed concern about how vapes affect teens' mental and physical health. 

“I could totally write an essay about that,” she remembered thinking. “I have some feelings.” 

Murry-Shakir used an app called MediBang as a tool to draw her cartoon. Digital art is her preferred medium, though she likes to dabble in watercolor and acrylic as well. 

In her free time, Murry-Shakir works at her local public library. “I like to read a lot. I own at least 250 books,” she said.  

Her job is shelving books, but she says the library’s a great hangout spot for kids who want to use computers, hang out with friends, or do homework after school. 

Murry-Shakir is only at the beginning of her writing and drawing career. In August, she’ll attend the University of Cincinnati to major in fine arts. After college, she’s got her sights set on a career in publishing and illustration. 

“I want to become an author,” she said. “Or at the very least, a graphic novel illustrator.” 

Speaking Up About Mental Health Essay Contest Winners Announced

Congratulations to the 18 winners and six honorable mentions for the 2024 Speaking Up About Mental Health Essay Contest.

The contest challenges high school students ages 16-18 to raise awareness of mental health. It gives students a platform to share ways to eliminate and/or reduce mental health stigma faced by young people, especially in diverse communities. More than 370 teens from 33 states submitted essays.

The National Institute of Mental Health, the National Institute on Minority Health and Health Disparities and the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development co-sponsored the contest. It’s part of a Health and Human Services–wide initiative to tackle the nation’s mental health crisis.

Read the award-winning essays at https://go.nih.gov/eQCZ1X5 . NIH recognizes these talented essay winners for their thoughtfulness and creativity in addressing youth mental health.

The essays are written in the students’ own words and are unedited.

The NIH Record

The NIH Record , founded in 1949, is the biweekly newsletter for employees of the National Institutes of Health.

Published 25 times each year, it comes out on payday Fridays.

Associate Editor: Dana Talesnik [email protected] (link sends e-mail)

Assistant Editor: Eric Bock [email protected] (link sends e-mail)

Staff Writer: Amber Snyder [email protected] (link sends e-mail)

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Staff essay contest winners celebrated.

Four Princeton staff members have been honored for their writing in the 10th annual Princeton Writes essay contest.

By Adrianne Da Ponte, Advancement   The 2023-2024 contest invited participants to describe a space they would like to create “within our University community or elsewhere.” Thirty-one staff members representing 27 academic and administrative units took up the challenge. An essay by Alison Cummins, office and events coordinator at the Sharmin and Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Iran and Persian Gulf Studies, won the Princeton Writes prize. Essays by Joseph Gessner, Julie Meyers, and Alice Señeres received honorable mentions.

Chancellor Green’s rotunda served as the setting for a celebration of honorees and their fellow contest participants on June 6. Princeton Writes  Program Director John Weeren thanked all entrants for constructing spaces “designed to nourish ourselves and engage with others,” whether “magical” or “grounded in the here and now.”

Cummins’ prizewinning essay is less about creating a space from scratch than coming to terms with a space that once existed and is now both a source of longing and a catalyst for re-imagination. In passages of vivid color and intimate detail,  The Blue Room(Link is external) (Link opens in new window) evokes a beloved childhood bedroom and draws readers into a reflection on growing up and the ways in which the past shapes the present.

As a writer with primary interests in plays and fiction, Cummins enjoyed the chance to explore non-fiction writing through her essay. Her educational background includes a master’s degree in writing for the stage and screen from University College Dublin, along with a BA in sociology and minors in English and creative writing from Muhlenberg College. She has had several plays produced and is currently working on a novel.

Throughout her life, Cummins has enjoyed opportunities to travel and to live and study abroad, including a brief stint in Nepal cut short by the pandemic. She brings this international perspective to her work at the Mossavar-Rahmani Center, where frequent event-planning responsibilities enable her to engage with scholars and artists from around the world. 

For Gessner, a mail carrier with Print and Mail Services who also happens to be a playwright, this year’s contest provided a welcome opportunity to connect his writing to his lifelong interest in the natural environment. In his essay,  A Thousand Trees from Now(Link is external) (Link opens in new window) , he proposes the creation of a “mini-forest” on Princeton’s campus. Modeled on a method developed by botanist Akira Miyawaki, this concept relies on native plants and intensive cultivation to rapidly replicate mature forest communities on small plots in locations around the world.

As Gessner envisions it, this Princeton forest would build community—not only among plants but also among the generations of people involved in its cultivation and stewardship. The theme of community, of finding and building “the connections between things,” is a through-line in Gessner’s life and work. His undergraduate studies in sociology shaped an abiding interest in cultural encounters, both between and within communities. A move to Princeton some 25 years ago from rural south Jersey represented a personal cultural shift, one that he relishes on daily rounds and in conversations within what he calls the University “ecosystem.” His latest project is a play about a billionaire trying to sell her plan to revive a struggling mining town.

Meyers’ essay,  Hidden Daggers(Link is external) (Link opens in new window) , envisions the creation of a “Well, Come!” center on campus that offers warmth, comfort, and solace to all who enter. She recounts her own experience as a college student facing the death of her mother while her roommates eagerly discussed plans for winter break, a reminder that even seemingly innocuous conversations can unwittingly inflame hidden suffering. Meyers’ center is meant to be a place of sanctuary where this pain need not remain concealed.

In the loss of her mother, Meyers found inspiration for her life’s work—fundraising for causes that matter. “Although I chose not to go into medicine, I knew I could make a difference speaking about health and other vital issues,” says Meyers, whose first job involved fundraising for breast cancer. Through subsequent fundraising and communications teaching roles, she has continued to work for causes she believes in, and sees her life as an experience of gratitude. Now an associate director for donor relations in University Advancement, Meyers relishes the opportunity to express gratitude to those whose generosity helps sustain Princeton’s mission.

Señeres, an associate dean for academic affairs in the Graduate School, never thought of herself as a writer until she started taking classes through Princeton Writes . The easy camaraderie of these sessions gave her the confidence to enter this year’s contest. Her essay, Tell Me About It(Link is external) , which imagines a campus coffee shop built around “deep but brief interactions,” was inspired by a transformative encounter in her own life.

In her role at the Graduate School, Señeres works with students in the sciences and engineering, guiding them through every touchpoint of their careers at Princeton, from admissions to program completion. Formerly a professor of mathematics and director of the Learning Centers at Rutgers University, she brings to her work at Princeton a deep understanding of the challenges and rewards of graduate education.

The central theme of her essay—finding opportunities to listen to others and to trust in even fleeting connections—has also informed many of her life decisions, whether choosing to embark on a new doctoral program, pulling up stakes and spending a year in Germany on a Fulbright, or taking up horseback riding as an adult.

Princeton Writes , established in 2013, provides a welcoming space for employees and students to strengthen their practical communication skills through workshops, tutorials, practice-based learning groups, and other forms of support. 

Among these offerings is Writing Space, a congenial and creative community of writers and would-be writers who meet monthly between September and June in the classroom in B03 New South. Writing Space gives participants the opportunity, inspiration, and motivation they need to set aside time to write and is sometimes the starting point for winning essays. 

To join the Writing Space mailing list, email [email protected] .

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From the Aristotle Contest to a Master’s Degree in Philosophy

Published: July 15, 2024

Posted In: Awards and Honours , Graduate , St. George , Undergraduate

Each year, the University of Toronto (in collaboration with the Ontario Philosophy Teachers’ Association ) administers the Aristotle Contest , which recognizes the best philosophical essays by current Canadian high school students. Entrants choose their subject from one of three different prompts relating to contemporary issues in philosophy. The winner receives a $500 cash prize, while the second-placed essayist receives $400 and the third-ranking writer $300; starting this year, the awards come from the generous support of donor Anita Angelini . For those still toying with the idea of participating, the 2024 contest is accepting submissions until July 29 .

Eric Fishback won the contest in 2018 with an essay titled “The Universal Objective Truths of Aesthetics .” Six years later, as he graduates from our master’s program, we follow up with him and see what’s changed.

Tell us a little bit about yourself—what’s happened since high school?

I’ve been interested in philosophy since the end of high school. After I won the Aristotle Contest, I decided I was going to apply to philosophy programs, and the University of Toronto was the best-looking program for the things I was interested in: logic, metaphysics, and epistemology. After four years, I finished my undergraduate here and then I applied for a master’s program, which I’ve recently completed. So I’ve been on this academic path of philosophy, and we’ll see what the future holds.

What are you studying within the field of philosophy?

My primary interests are the crossover of epistemology [study of knowledge], metaphysics [study of existence and reality], and logic. I’m looking at questions about how metaphysics is even possible, and logical results and their implications for metaphysics. And then I’m more generally interested in deontic logic [study of obligation and permission] or non-classical logics, that sort of thing.

Can you walk us through your process of writing the Aristotle essay? Do you have advice for students who are interested in submitting to the contest?

There’s not a lot of opportunities for you to engage with philosophy in high school. I heard about the contest from a relative, and I was very interested in the questions being asked, so I decided to submit something as a way of seeing if I wanted to pursue philosophy further.

The Aristotle competition doesn’t have the largest word count [1,200], so I chose the topic where I thought I could offer the most interesting full-fledged argument in the least amount of time. When you’re writing as a student, especially with limited time and words, you want to try and contribute your own original thoughts to the greatest extent possible without having to reference too many outside sources. That’s a strategy that I still engage in.

How did winning the Aristotle Contest impact your life? Did it affect your decision to go to U of T?

It wasn’t necessarily night and day, but I did get a sense of confidence from winning it—as if now I might actually have what it takes to write philosophy and succeed in the field. I always knew that I wanted to go to the University of Toronto, but after winning the Aristotle, I felt like I really had a chance to get accepted.

What appealed to you about studying philosophy at the University of Toronto?

When I was applying to universities, I didn’t know what specific area of philosophy I was interested in. The University of Toronto has the largest philosophy department in Canada, and so the sheer number of courses offered here impacted my decision. There were several specific courses available to undergraduate students that blew my mind. I couldn’t believe that you could take a course solely on Spinoza!

It seemed like an enticing place to be able to explore different areas of philosophy that I was interested in, and come away with a better sense of what I wanted to do in the future.

How do you think the field of philosophy has changed or will change during your lifetime?

I wonder if we’re going to see a move to more systematic thinking. Right now, I feel like philosophical work is very fractured and atomic. A lot of people are currently concerned about the status of metaphysics, and I think there’s going to be more of a drive to create more structured metaphysical systems. This is pure speculation, of course—I’m no authority—but that’s what I’m seeing from my position right now.

Also, there’ve been efforts recently—at least at the University of Toronto—to make the philosophical field more international and reconsider the type of the philosophers that we focus on. For example, we’re now studying philosophers from the Sanskrit, Confucian, and Buddhist traditions, and I feel like there’s a lot of potential in considering those philosophers more seriously. Previously, philosophy studies centered around a pantheon of maybe six dudes, and if you couldn’t relate to any of them, you would probably be less inclined to study philosophy. Now there’s an opportunity to add new perspectives and bring more people into the fold.

Is there a philosopher that you feel particularly drawn to? Do you have any philosophical words to live by?

Well, the philosophers who I relate to are not necessarily the philosophers that I study. I like Kierkegaard, Boethius, and St. Augustine.

I feel like there’s a difference between philosophy that’s good to live by and philosophy that’s good to learn from. In terms of philosophical words to live by, I would recommend staying away from the metaphysicians and leaning more towards the ethicists.

Now it’s time for questions that are just for fun. If you could have any piece of our existing art displayed in your house for a month, what would you pick and why?

I would choose Edward Hopper’s Nighthawks . I really like that painting, but I don’t even think I would feel comfortable having it displayed in my apartment for a month. It would probably get stolen.

You can choose any philosopher—living or dead—to have dinner with. However, after dinner, you have to spar with them in a friendly boxing cage match. Who do you choose, and do you think you’ll win?

I would choose Schopenhauer, but I choose him dead. That way, I would have a better chance of winning in the boxing match … although I imagine the dinnertime conversation would be notably worse.

Interview by Avi Kleinman

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‘My Descent Into the True Crime Rabbit Hole’: The Week 8 Winner of Our Summer Reading Contest

Hayne Kim, 16, writes about how an essay in the Times Opinion section made her rethink her binge-watch habits.

By The Learning Network

For 15 years, our Summer Reading Contest has been inviting teenagers around the world to tell us what New York Times pieces get their attention and why. This year, for the first time, students can submit either written comments or 90-second video responses.

In the eighth week of our 10-week challenge, we received 1,095 entries, and we list the finalists below. Scroll down to read the work of our winner, Hayne Kim , and to take a look at the variety of topics that caught these students’ eyes, including the Olympics, giant pandas, “brain rot,” JD Vance, flip phones, “Ballerina Farm,” Billy Joel and toxic beauty standards.

You can read the work of all of our winners since 2017 in this column , and you can participate in the contest any or every week this summer until Aug. 16. Just check the top of this page , where we post updates, to find the right place to submit your response.

Hayne Kim, 16, from Tokyo, reacts to a Guest Essay from the Opinion section, “ My Sister Was Murdered 30 Years Ago. True Crime Repackages Our Pain as Entertainment. ” She writes:

My descent into the true crime rabbit hole was thanks to YouTuber Stephanie Soo. On far too many lazy Sunday afternoons than I would like to admit, I sat slouched in front of my laptop with my eyes fixed on the flashy fluorescent screen, an unhealthily huge bowl of Takis at hand. Video after video, I clung on to Stephanie’s every last syllable as she fed me one tragic tale after another through spoonfuls of uncanny suspense. I continued to devour Stephanie’s stories just as quickly as I licked the MSG off my sticky red fingers. Until I read this article. At the ripe age of six, Annie Nichol lost her older sister Polly at the hands of a murderer. Subsequent to Polly’s murder, Annie was continually met with floods of faceless reporters, writers, producers — strangers — all with an unquenchable thirst for details and an eager desire to dramatize. This constant bombardment of the gates that protected her private, sacred memories of her sister caused Annie immense pain and post-traumatic stress. Suddenly, the hefty plates of Stephanie Soo videos I had wolfed down churned uneasily in my stomach. I realized just how desensitized I had become. A human being’s lived-in nightmare is not meant to be hastily packaged into a sixty-something-minute monetized video. The inability of myself and countless others to immediately recognize this serves as a testament to the unsettling effects of mass media consumption.

In alphabetical order by the writer’s first name.

Anagha Nagesh on What Trump Means When He Mispronounces ‘Kamala’

Desi Miller on “ 104 Shows. $260 Million. After 10 Years, Billy Joel Closes a Chapter. ”

Gabriel Lam on “ Giant Pandas Will Head to D.C.’s National Zoo From China ”

Minghao Li on “ If You Know What ‘Brainrot’ Means, You Might Already Have It. ”

Vivian Wan on “ The Book Bag That Binds Japanese Society "

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参与冲突调停的中国：积极而有限的调停者角色 — 2024 China Focus Essay Contest Runner Up

From Beijing International Studies University

国际安全问题事关人类生存与发展，俄乌冲突和巴以问题是现今最受关注的地区安全热点事件。中国秉持负责任大国立场，自俄乌和中东地区局势升级以来，主动积极开展“穿梭外交”，在两次地缘冲突中展现出中国调停机制的内生逻辑共性。然而，尽管中国“穿梭外交”被国际社会认为是重要的，但所发挥的积极作用实则有限，中国对地区安全稳定的影响受到现实阻碍。

一、中国调停的逻辑共性  

俄乌冲突和巴以问题存在不同的现实诱因，但两者在触发条件、结果导向和利益复合方面具备相同点。两者都包含复杂历史因素，牵涉地缘政治冲突。两者最终都导向冲突双方的大规模军事战斗，引发人道主义危机。两者都涉及多利益相关方，存在极大冲突外溢风险。中国在俄乌冲突和巴以问题升级后迅速作出反应，与冲突各方进行外交联系和信息交换，主动积极参与调停冲突局面，开展“穿梭外交”。从中国对这两场地区安全事件的调停中，可以窥见中国调停机制的内生逻辑共性。 

首先，中国在调停过程中秉持和平解决冲突的总体方向，坚持以停火作为解决安全问题方案，以谈判促进双方达成共识。2023 年2 月，中国政府发布《全球安全倡议概念文件》。该文件阐明中国在全球安全问题上的“六个坚持”核心原则 [1]。这份文件为日后中国提出处理俄乌冲突和巴以问题的立场文件提供了基本政治遵循。文件的主旨在于消弭冲突根源，实现持久和平，维护全球安全。中国的立场建立在该文件倡导的共同安全理念、国际法基本原则、联合国宪章宗旨和原则、和平协商方式及全球治理观的基础上。

在俄乌冲突爆发一周年之际，中国政府发布《关于政治解决乌克兰危机的中国立场》文件，从尊重各国主权、摒弃冷战思维、停火止战、启动和谈、解决人道主义危机、保护平民和战俘、维护核电站安全、减少战略风险、保障粮食外运、停止单边制裁、确保产业链供应链稳定、推动战后重建十二个方面表明中国采用和平手段化解俄乌冲突的基本立场 [2]。2023 年11 月，在巴以冲突造成大量平民伤亡后，中国政府发布《中国关于解决巴以冲突的立场文件》，提出全面停火止战、切实保护平民、确保人道主义救援、加大外交斡旋、寻求政治解决五项建议，表达了中国尝试推动巴以冲突和平解决的立场态度 [3]。两份文件反映出中国作为地区安全问题的潜在调停者，在“穿梭外交”过程中重视和平解决问题的调停基本导向，始终将停火作为实际且必要的调停议程，积极促进谈判达成冲突各方共识，坚持国际法基本原则和人道主义原则，保持调停立场的连贯性。

其次，中国在调停过程中融入道义价值判断。中国对于导致冲突爆发的深层原因的界定基于中国处理国际关系的道德原则。关于俄乌冲突爆发的根本原因，中国认为本质上是因为北约扩张导致了俄乌局势升级。中国也反对通过军事集团扩张的方式解决俄乌冲突问题。面对巴以冲突的严峻形势，中国在调停过程中坚持站在巴勒斯坦人民一边，支持巴勒斯坦人民争取生存权、建国权、回归权，根本上遵循道德原则的价值逻辑。从中国调停过程中表现的道义精神来看，中国非常注重处理国际关系问题的政治声誉。在认可冲突各方合理维护国家利益的基础上，中国的道义原则与现行国际法原则紧密联系，以道德层面的更高标准审视和判断国际问题的是非曲直。由于在调停中融入道义价值判断，中国“穿梭外交”避免暂时性的和平方案，追求根本性的永久和平，兼顾现实主义的利益考量和理想主义的正义要求，着眼于合理化解地区冲突，创造良性政治效益。

最后，中国在调停过程中诉诸联合国安理会机制。中国尊重《联合国宪章》宗旨及原则，认可联合国在化解地缘危机层面的积极作用，因此联合国安理会是中国调停俄乌冲突和巴以问题的“主战场”。针对俄乌冲突持续且复杂态势，中国在联合国安理会多次表达促进政治解决、维护共同安全、管控风险外溢的建议。关于巴以问题持续升温局面，中国支持推动巴以冲突和平解决的决议草案，从人道主义出发多次申明尽快实现停火、进行人道救援的主张。综合来看，中国致力于发挥联合国安理会机制的调停作用，重视运用国际力量化解矛盾。

二、中国积极而有限的调停作用  

中国作为当今世界重要的全球性大国，主动开展“穿梭外交”无疑具有积极影响。中国特使与冲突各方积极沟通，尽最大努力促成和平化解矛盾。然而从客观角度分析，中国调停发挥的积极作用是有限的，主要原因如下：

1、地缘政治角力排斥和平主张。两场地区安全冲突掺杂地缘政治对抗。从地理上看，中国与俄乌和中东两个战场距离远，对于当地军事形势的实际掌握和影响范围有限，调停主张不易切实改变战斗状况。中国的和平建议难以阻止地缘危机在冲突利益方政治对抗下愈演愈烈。冲突方不愿意放弃地缘政治斗争可能带来的有利于己方的势力扩张，不接受通过谈判妥协从而丧失潜在的地缘政治优势。地缘政治对抗的利益考量使得包括盟友及幕后支持者在内的冲突各方排斥通过谈判达成停火止战的永久和平手段。 

2、中国调停机制的宏观模糊性。中国调停机制强调原则性、根本性、道义性。中国从整体层面出发进行调停，尊重和遵循国际规范，并在调停机制中将国际规范作为推动冲突各方相向而行、达成共识的制度依据，尝试在道义层面促使各方作出改变。整体层面的规范建议往往着眼于宏观指导，建议的效应宽泛而模糊，对于冲突当事方组织内部中基层人员缺少微观具体的实际参考价值。中国尝试运用国际社会集体力量的调停努力对冲突当事方而言也缺乏强制约束力。道义层面出发的主张难以动摇冲突当事方基于自身利益的军事对抗。因此，中国调停主张和建议的宏观模糊性在形势复杂、利益交错的地区安全冲突中难以切中当事方的现实要害，也就难以使当事方真正实现完全停火。

3、美国基于对立立场阻碍中国调停。美国作为俄乌冲突和巴以问题的间接参与者，为乌克兰和以色列提供了精神支持和物质援助。同时，美国也是联合国安理会常任理事国，坐拥大国地位，完全有实力排斥中国的调停主张。自俄乌冲突爆发以来，美国多次向乌克兰援助武器装备。2024 年3 月，美国又宣布向乌克兰提供高达 3 亿美元的武器装备 [4]。巴以冲突持续升级后，美国数次在联合国安理会否决中国赞成的有关加沙局势决议草案，并提出自己的决议草案。中国驻联合国代表认为美国提交的草案回避了停火问题，并含糊其辞避免要求立即停火，从中方立场考虑投下了反对票 [5]。美国深层次介入俄乌冲突和巴以问题，在两场冲突中包含着美国方面的利益考量和扩张意图。考虑到美国在国际社会长期与中国存在立场和理念分歧，美国将努力使本国在俄乌和中东问题上的利益最大化，阻碍中国调停发挥实际效益。 

三、中国参与调停的重要意义  

中国作为国际社会负责任大国，参与地区安全问题调停具有宏观层面的重要意义。中国负担起了大国化解国际冲突，维护国际秩序的道义责任。同时，中国在调停过程中展现了积极正面的大国形象。中国的调停主张和建议为俄乌冲突和巴以问题的和平解决提供了中国政治方案，为冲突各方迈向和平作出了应有的贡献。 

中国参与地区安全冲突调停，为中国自身积累了处理国际冲突的经验。中国通过参与地区安全冲突的调停，深入掌握和了解俄乌和中东地区现状，了解当事方利益诉求，学习处理调停过程中的障碍，积累运用国际调停机制的经验，为中国参与国际事务拓宽视野，提升中国整体外交能力。 同时，中国的调停在未来发挥的作用依然有限。中国的调停建议将遭遇更加强烈的现实阻碍。当事方基于自身利益的排斥和主要以美国为代表的西方国家的阻挠将继续妨碍中国发挥调停实际作用。中国参与调停的实际效益还需要经受长期的观察审视。

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