phd philosophy of economics

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Doctor of Philosophy in Economics

Program description.

The PhD in Economics degree program provides a cutting-edge education in economic theories and the development of a rigorous toolkit of mathematical and econometric techniques. Students also gain extensive exposure to various research areas in economics that allow them to think critically about how to approach the analysis of economic problems and contribute to the knowledge base of the discipline. The program is particularly strong in the areas of public economics, applied microeconomics, macroeconomics, data analysis, and the economics of conflict.

Career Opportunities

Graduates of the program seek positions such as: academic, data analyst, economist in financial institutions, management firms, and consulting firms both in private and domestic sector, academics and researcher and government positions (the Federal Reserve banks, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census Bureau, Social Security Administration and Federal Trade Commission.)

Application Requirements

Degree requirements:  Bachelor’s degree from an accredited college or university.

GPA:  Minimum GPA of 3.25 in upper-division and graduate course work in economics and related courses.

Test score required:  Yes

The minimum quantitative score is 158 with students averaging 163 on the quantitative score and 150 of the verbal score. The program does not accept GMAT scores as a substitute for GRE scores.

Letters of recommendation:  3

Applicants must submit three letters of recommendation from individuals who can judge the candidate’s probability of success in graduate school. Use the electronic request form in the graduate application to submit the letters. Contact the graduate academic program department if you have any questions.

Admissions essay required:  Yes

A one-page essay outlining the applicant’s background, reasons for choosing UT Dallas, prior educational experiences, and personal objectives.

Deadlines:  University  deadlines  apply.

Contact Information

Judy Du Graduate Program Administrator Email: [email protected] Phone: 972-883-4964 Office: GR 2.808

Degree Information Dr. Seth Giertz Director of Graduate Studies Email: [email protected] Phone: 972-883-6234 Office: GR 2.244

EPPS Advising The University of Texas at Dallas 800 W Campbell Rd, GR 31 Richardson, TX 75080-3021 [email protected]

epps.utdallas.edu/

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Doctor of Philosophy in Economics

• Fall January 10

International students may need to surpass the Graduate School’s minimum English language proficiency exam scores for this program. If the graduate program has unique score requirements, they will be detailed below. Otherwise, please refer to the Graduate School’s minimum score guidelines.

Degree Description:

The PhD in Economics is designed to prepare students for careers as professional economists in academia, government, and the private sector. The program is structured so that a student with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics and an appointment as a graduate assistant should be able to complete the required coursework within three academic years, excluding summer sessions. Students with a Master of Arts in Applied Economics degree may be able to complete the required coursework in less time, depending on the content and quality of the previous work. The length of time required to complete the dissertation varies greatly but students usually complete the entire program, including the dissertation, within four years.

Admission Requirements:

Statement of Purpose, Three letters of recommendation, CV, GRE, Unofficial Transcripts

Student Opportunities:

The collaboration between students and professors is really close, our offices are often next to each other, and it is common for professors to coauthor papers with PhD students, which turn into journal publications. In the last years, coauthored papers with our students were published in journals such as BE Journal of Macroeconomics, Economic Inquiry ,  Canadian Journal of Economics ,  Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , and  Economic Letters , among others. In addition, the environment between students and professors is very collegial, and we meet once a week (normally after seminars) for drinks in a more relaxed environment.

We fund around 80% of admitted students, who receive graduate assistantships from our School. The rest of students are often funded by governments in their home countries, or foundations, such as the Fulbright or the Soros Foundations.

Career Opportunities:

Professional Economists in academia, government, and the private sector

Career Placements:

Health Research Scientist, Texas A&M Assistant Professor, Eastern Washington University Economist and Research Fellow, Center for Disease Control in Atlanta

Contact Information:

• Jaimie Dahl, Asst. to the Director, & Graduate Coordinator [email protected]
• Jeffrey Luckstead, Associate Professor, & Graduate Studies Chair [email protected]

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Economics

About the Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Economics

UNSW’s Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Economics is offered by one of the world's top institutions in Economics (ranked 42nd in QS Subject Rankings - 2023) and will equip you with the expertise needed to become a globally focused and socially engaged researcher. 

You’ll be joining a cohort of high-achieving research students in tackling modern-day challenges at the forefront of economics, working alongside leaders in the field. This is your opportunity to become integrated into the UNSW Business School’s community of scholars.

The program is comprised of two components. You’ll begin by undertaking rigorous coursework covering microeconomic and macroeconomic theory, econometrics and applied economic analysis. As part of your doctoral program, you’ll also be involved in research projects even from an early stage. This research training will equip you with the skills required to identify, analyse and solve problems in the field. 

You’ll then pursue independent research under the supervision of high-profile UNSW academics, culminating in a doctoral thesis. Your PhD thesis will allow you to showcase your research skills and enable you to make an original contribution to the field of Economics. There will also be exciting opportunities throughout to interact with industry leaders, and to develop your teaching portfolio.

Our training is geared toward preparing you for a career in academia, although other career paths (e.g., consulting, government, industry, non-profit) are also enabled.

The vast majority of our higher degree research students are supported through a tuition waiver and stipend of around A$35-45K per year.

Before formally applying or contacting potential supervisors, you must complete an Expression of Interest (EOI) by sending the required material to [email protected] . Please read the "Instructions for Applicants" section below.

PhD program structure

Stream 1: 1-year of masters’ coursework + 3-year phd program (fully funded for coursework and phd).

Key Information:

• 1-year of Masters’ Coursework + 3-year PhD Program (fully funded both for coursework and PhD)
• The program starts in Term 1 (early February)
• No part-time option is available

Year One: Master of Pre-Doctoral Business Studies (MPDBS)

Year one will equip you with the skills required to identify, analyse and solve problems in the field, while helping you formulate your research agenda and identify potential thesis supervisors for the PhD component of the program. 

You will undertake coursework covering microeconomic and macroeconomic theory, econometrics and applied economic analysis. You’ll also have the opportunity to develop practical research skills by assisting in research projects. Upon successful completion of the first year, you’ll be awarded a Master of Pre-Doctoral Business Studies. 

A brief overview of the first year is presented below. Please visit the UNSW Handbook for full course structure details.

• Term 1:  COMM8100  + ECON7001  +  ECON7004
• Term 2:  COMM8102  +  ECON7002  + Research Assistance Work
• Term 3:  COMM8103  +  ECON7101  +  ECON7102

Year Two: Specialised Coursework and Identification of Thesis Topic

Year two will help you in further developing skills specialized towards dealing with the challenges relevant to your research topic. You’ll continue in the Economics stream with a further year of advanced coursework. 

You’ll choose up to eight additional research courses from a range of electives in consultation with your supervisor and PGRC, with the opportunity to take subjects outside of your specialised discipline. In year two, you’ll also be identifying your thesis topic with the aid of your supervisor. 

You’ll engage in literature review and research design and present your research proposal to the School of Economics at the end of the year.

Years Three – Four: Original Research and Your Doctoral Thesis

In the final three years of the program, you will be focused on conducting full-time research and completing your doctoral thesis. 

This is your opportunity to address some of the biggest challenges at the frontier of Economics and make a significant contribution to the field. Your research will offer new ways of critical thinking and withstand critical analysis from expert researchers in the area.

Stream 2: Direct Entry into the 3-year PhD Program

• Direct Entry into the 3-year PhD Program
• Note: it requires outside scholarship (or ARC Funding Support from your selected supervisor) AND a degree in Economics with research component (e.g., First-class Honours or Master’s in Economics) 
• You are expected to start in Term 1 (early February)
• A part-time option may be available (subject to approval)

Year One: Coursework and Identification of Thesis Topic

Year one will equip you with skills required to identify, analyse and solve problems relevant to your research topic.

You’ll choose up to eight research courses from a range of electives in consultation with your supervisor and PGRC, with an opportunity to take subjects outside of your specialised discipline.

These will include the four core courses listed below (unless you are exempted from taking them). You’ll also be identifying your thesis topic with the aid of your supervisor.

You’ll engage in literature review and research design and present your research proposal to the School of Economics at the end of the year. 

• Term 1:  ECON7001  +  ECON7004
• Term 2:  COMM8102  +  ECON7002

Years Two – Three: Original Research and Your Doctoral Thesis

In the final three years of the program, you will be focused on conducting full-time research and completing your doctoral thesis.

This is your opportunity to address some of the biggest challenges at the frontier of Economics and make a significant contribution to the field.

Your research will offer new ways of critical thinking and withstand critical analysis from expert researchers in the area.

Instructions for Applicants

Before formally applying or contacting potential supervisors, you need to complete the Expression of Interest (EOI) process by sending the following material to [email protected] . The EOI process opens 27 May  and closes 26 August . Only selected applicants will be invited to apply via the UNSW central portal.  

Important: make sure that you satisfy the UNSW academic and language entry requirements before submitting your EOI. Please read the Entry Requirements  section below. 

Subject: MPDBS Application

• Your name, citizenship, and whether you are a citizen or permanent resident of Australia.
• Your degree(s), institution(s) and year(s) of completion of previous studies.
• A list of advanced economics, mathematics and statistics courses taken and the grades you obtained for these courses.
• Names of two references (recommendation letter writers) and their contact details (e.g., affiliation, title, email).
• Names of two academics you wish to work with at UNSW.
• Three to five academic papers you have recently read that relevant for your research interest.

Attachments (in PDF):

• Your academic CV.
• Your official academic transcripts from previous degree(s).
• Your official GRE results.
• A research proposal or statement of purpose.
• If applicable, proof of your English Language requirement.

Subject: Direct Entry PhD Application

• A description of your Honours or Master’s thesis.
• Your funding source: outside scholarship, external grant, or support from potential supervisor.
• A copy of your Honours or Master’s thesis.

Academic Entry Requirement

The minimum academic entry requirement for Stream 1 is the equivalent of a four-year UNSW Bachelor’s degree in a relevant discipline (Economics, Finance, and related subjects) with first or upper second class honours. The minimum academic entry requirement for Stream 2 is the equivalent of a four-year UNSW Bachelor’s degree with an Honours year (research), or the equivalent of a UNSW Masters’ degree with substantial research component with first or upper second class honours.

Note: an upper second class honours is equivalent to a weighted average mark of at least 75/100 (i.e., a Distinction) at UNSW and is allocated to roughly the top 30% of students. Grading systems vary across countries. For more information, read this guide for grade equivalencies between countries .

If you are unsure if you satisfy the academic entry requirement, contact us at [email protected] and we will provide feedback.

English Language Requirement

UNSW recognises the follow countries as English-speaking: American Samoa, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Canada, Fiji, Gibraltar, Ghana, Guyana, Ireland, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, The Gambia, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom (including Northern Ireland), United States of America, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

If you are not a citizen of an English-speaking country, then you will need to establish that you have sufficient English language fluency. There are four ways to establish sufficient English language fluency: English Tests (including IELTS, TOEFL, Pearson and Cambridge), UNSW Global English Course, Prior Study, or an English Waiver. For details on each of these, please review our English language requirements .

• University of Bologna, Department of Economics, Research Fellow
• The National University of Singapore, Asia Competitiveness Institute, Research Fellow
• Monash University, Centre for Global Business, Research Fellow
• University of Oxford, Magdalen College, Research Fellow, then ETH Zurich, Department of Management, Technology and Economics, Assistant Professor
• Shenzhen Research Institute of Big Data, Research Fellow
• Monash University, Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics, Research Fellow
• The University of Melbourne, School of Mathematics and Statistics (Lecturer)
• University of New South Wales, CEPAR, Research Fellow
• University of Sydney, School of Economics, Research Fellow
• Wuhan University, Economics and Management School, Assistant Professor
• Australian National University, ANU College of Business and Economics, Associate Lecturer
• East China University of Science and Technology, School of Business, Lecturer
• University of Toronto, Department of Economics, Research Fellow
• South China Normal University, School of Economics and Management, Lecturer
• University of Sydney, Research Fellow, then University of Technological Sydney, Economics Discipline, Chancellor's Post-Doctoral Research Fellow
• University of Geneva, Faculty of History, Economics and Society, Research Fellow, then South Mediterranean University, Mediterranean School of Business, Assistant Professor
• Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, School of Public Administration, Associate Professor
• International University of Japan, Graduate School of International Relations, Assistant Professor
• University of New South Wales, School of Economics, Research Fellow
• Shanghai Tech University, School of Entrepreneurship and Management, Assistant Professor
• University of Bath, Department of Economics, Lecturer
• Sun-yat Sen University, Department of Economics, Assistant Professor 
• University of Technology Sydney, Research Fellow, then Macquarie University, Centre for the Health Economy, Honorary Research Fellow
• Zurich University of Applied Sciences, ZHAW, Research Fellow
• Jinan University, Institute for Economic and Social Research, Assistant Professor
• University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, Research Fellow
• Curtin University, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Lecturer, then Macquarie University, Macquarie Business School, Lecturer
• University of Technology Sydney, CHERE, Research Fellow
• University of Peradeniya, Department of Agricultural Economics and Business Management, Professor
• University of Technology Sydney, CHERE, Senior Research Fellow
• Monash University, Centre for Health Economics, Research Fellow
• Monash University, Monash Business School, Research Fellow
• UNSW, School of Economics, Research Fellow
• Durham University, Business School, Lecturer
• UCL Australia, Faculty of Engineering Science, Lecturer
• Shandong University, School of Economics, Assistant Professor
• University of Sydney, Charles Perkins Centre, Research Fellow
• University of Mannheim, Department of Economics, Research Fellow, then Monash University, School of Economics, Lecturer
• University of Tasmania, Tasmanian School of Business and Economics, Lecturer
• City University of London, Department of Economics, Lecturer
• Shangdong University, School of Economics, Lecturer
• Fukushima University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Associate Professor

Your PhD will set you on the path to a career in a premier research institution, anywhere in the world. Throughout your research degree, you’ll also have many opportunities to develop your teaching portfolio.

Beyond academia, there’s also significant demand in the private and public sectors for people with deep knowledge and sound research and analytical skills*.

Whether you’re looking to pursue a career in academia, or take your research skills out to industry, a PhD in Economics from UNSW will get you there.

* Source:  2019 Advancing Australia’s Knowledge Economy Report

The UNSW Business School is ranked within the Top 50 worldwide for Economics and Econometrics.

An increasing number of PhD graduates find employment in business, government, and the non-profit sector. Nineteen of the largest ASX companies have PhD graduates on their senior executive teams.

Degree type

Postgraduate Research

Commencing terms

Term 1 – February

Program code

Delivery mode, domestic / international.

International

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PhD in History and Philosophy of Economics

Welcome to our PhD Program

“Someone said: « The dead writers are remote from us because we know so much more than they did. » Precisely, and they are that which we know.” Thomas S. Eliot ( Tradition and the Individual Talent , 1919).

The Centre Walras-Pareto was founded in 1990 as a Centre for research into the history of economics, with special attention to the Lausanne School of Economics in the continuation of the Chair of Political Economy that was first held by Léon Walras and then by Vilfredo Pareto at the University of Lausanne (until 1890 the Académie de Lausanne ). Nowadays in a leading interdisciplinary Centre in the history of economic thought in Europe, our professors are supervising students in the PhD Program in History and Philosophy of Economics .

In terms of research, we are interested in the historical development of economic and political ideas and methods, the institutional and material settings in which these ideas and methods are produced and used, and their social and normative implications and impact. In short, the variety of works done within our PhD program falls around three main issues – interpretation , epistemology , and contextuality .

Individual PhD projects, or PhD that are part of larger projects funded by external sources such as the Swiss National Science Foundation, are pursued under a very close supervision. As a consequence, our PhD program is very selective, and accepts only a few doctoral students to ensure a high quality and tailor-made supervision project.

Doing a PhD at the Centre Walras-Pareto is also a unique opportunity to be part of a stimulating team of scholars devoted to the history of economic thought and philosophy, who share the scarce characteristic of being both physically present at the University of Lausanne, and well inserted in international networks.

If you want to learn more about the PhD in History and Philosophy of Economics , please browse the following pages and contact us for further information.

Doctoral Program in History and Philosophy of Economics University of Lausanne Centre Walras Pareto d'études interdisciplinaires de la pensée économique et politique Geopolis 5222 Quartier de La Mouline CH-1015 Lausanne

roberto.baranzini@unil.ch +41 21 692 28 42

Doctoral Program

The Ph.D. program is a full time program leading to a Doctoral Degree in Economics.  Students specialize in various fields within Economics by enrolling in field courses and attending field specific lunches and seminars.  Students gain economic breadth by taking additional distribution courses outside of their selected fields of interest.

General requirements

Students  are required to complete 1 quarter of teaching experience. Teaching experience includes teaching assistantships within the Economics department or another department .

University's residency requirement

135 units of full-tuition residency are required for PhD students. After that, a student should have completed all course work and must request Terminal Graduate Registration (TGR) status.

Department degree requirements and student checklist

1. core course requirement.

Required: Core Microeconomics (202-203-204) Core Macroeconomics (210-211-212) Econometrics (270-271-272).  The Business School graduate microeconomics class series may be substituted for the Econ Micro Core.  Students wishing to waive out of any of the first year core, based on previous coverage of at least 90% of the material,  must submit a waiver request to the DGS at least two weeks prior to the start of the quarter.  A separate waiver request must be submitted for each course you are requesting to waive.  The waiver request must include a transcript and a syllabus from the prior course(s) taken.  

2.  Field Requirements

Required:  Two of the Following Fields Chosen as Major Fields (click on link for specific field requirements).  Field sequences must be passed with an overall grade average of B or better.  Individual courses require a letter grade of B- or better to pass unless otherwise noted.

Research fields and field requirements :

• Behavioral & Experimental
• Development Economics
• Econometric Methods with Causal Inference
• Econometrics
• Economic History
• Environmental, Resource and Energy Economics
• Industrial Organization
• International Trade & Finance
• Labor Economics
• Market Design
• Microeconomic Theory
• Macroeconomics
• Political Economy
• Public Economics

3.  Distribution

Required:  Four other graduate-level courses must be completed. One of these must be from the area of economic history (unless that field has already been selected above). These courses must be distributed in such a way that at least two fields not selected above are represented.  Distribution courses must be passed with a grade of B or better.

4.  Field Seminars/Workshops

Required:  Three quarters of two different field seminars or six quarters of the same field seminar from the list below.   

Texas A&M University Catalogs

Doctor of philosophy in economics.

The Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Program in Economics emphasizes analytical and quantitative skills and exposes students to a broad range of contemporary policy issues to prepare them for careers in academic, business, or government careers. In their first two semesters of study, students receive rigorous training in three core areas: microeconomics, macroeconomics, and econometrics.

After completing the core sequences, students choose three fields of specialization for intensive study. For most students, work on the dissertation begins in the third year and occupies them through the fourth or fifth year of residence.  

Steps to Fulfill a Doctoral Program

Program Requirements

• Student's Advisory Committee

Degree Plan

Transfer of credit, research proposal, preliminary examination, preliminary examination format, preliminary examination scheduling, preliminary examination grading, failure of the preliminary examination, retake of failed preliminary examination, final examination, final examination grading, dissertation, student’s advisory committee.

After receiving admission to graduate studies and enrolling, the student will consult with the head of their major or administrative department (or chair of the intercollegiate faculty) concerning appointment of the chair of the advisory committee. The student’s advisory committee will consist of  no fewer than four members of the graduate faculty  representative of the student’s several fields of study and research, where the chair or co-chair must be from the student’s department (or intercollegiate faculty, if applicable), and  at least one or more of the members must have an appointment to a department other than the student’s major department . The outside member for a student in an interdisciplinary degree program must be from a department different from the chair of the student’s committee.

The chair, in consultation with the student, will select the remainder of the advisory committee. Only graduate faculty members located on Texas A&M University campuses may serve as chair of a student’s advisory committee. Other Texas A&M University graduate faculty members located off-campus may serve as a member or co-chair (but not chair), with a member as the chair.

If the chair of a student’s advisory committee voluntarily leaves the University and the student is near completion of the degree and wants the chair to continue to serve in this role, the student is responsible for securing a current member of the University Graduate Faculty, from the student’s academic program and located near the Texas A&M University campus site, to serve as the co-chair of the committee. The Department Head or Chair of Intercollegiate faculty may request in writing to the Associate Provost and Dean of the Graduate and Professional School that a faculty member who is on an approved leave of absence or has voluntarily separated from the university, be allowed to continue to serve in the role of chair of a student’s advisory committee without a co-chair for up to one year. The students should be near completion of the degree. Extensions beyond the one year period can be granted with additional approval of the Dean.

The committee members’ signatures on the degree plan indicate their willingness to accept the responsibility for guiding and directing the entire academic program of the student and for initiating all academic actions concerning the student. Although individual committee members may be replaced by petition for valid reasons, a committee cannot resign  en masse . The chair of the committee, who usually has immediate supervision of the student’s research and dissertation or record of study, has the responsibility for calling all meetings of the committee. The duties of the committee include responsibility for the proposed degree plan, the research proposal, the preliminary examination, the dissertation or record of study and the final examination. In addition, the committee, as a group and as individual members, is responsible for counseling the student on academic matters, and, in the case of academic deficiency, initiating recommendations to the Graduate and Professional School.

The student’s advisory committee will evaluate the student’s previous education and degree objectives. The committee, in consultation with the student, will develop a proposed degree plan and outline a research problem which, when completed, as indicated by the dissertation (or its equivalent for the degree of Doctor of Education or the degree of Doctor of Engineering), will constitute the basic requirements for the degree. The degree plan must be filed with the Graduate and Professional School prior to the deadline imposed by the student’s college and no later than 90 days prior to the preliminary examination.

This proposed degree plan should be submitted through the online Document Processing Submission System located on the website  http://ogsdpss.tamu.edu . A minimum of 64 hours is required on the degree plan for the Doctor of Philosophy for a student who has completed a master’s degree. A student who has completed a DDS/DMD, DVM or a MD at a U.S. institution is also required to complete a minimum of 64 hours. A student who has completed a baccalaureate degree but not a master’s degree will be required to complete a 96-hour degree plan. Completion of a DDS/DMD, DVM or MD degree at a foreign institution requires completion of a minimum of 96 hours for the Doctor of Philosophy. A field of study may be primarily in one department or in a combination of departments. A degree plan must carry a reasonable amount of 691 (research). A maximum of 9 hours of 400-level undergraduate courses may be used toward meeting credit-hour requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy.

Additional coursework may be added by petition to the approved degree plan by the student’s advisory committee if it is deemed necessary to correct deficiencies in the student’s academic preparation. No changes can be made to the degree plan once the student’s Request for Final Examination is approved by the Graduate and Professional School.

Approval to enroll in any professional course (900-level) should be obtained from the head of the department (or Chair of the intercollegiate faculty, if applicable) in which the course will be offered before including such a course on a degree plan.

No credit may be obtained by correspondence study, by extension or for any course of fewer than three weeks duration.

For non-distance degree programs, no more than 50 percent of the non-research credit hours required for the program may be completed through distance education courses.

To receive a graduate degree from Texas A&M University, students must earn one-third or more of the credits through the institution’s own direct instruction. This limitation also applies to joint degree programs. 

Courses for which transfer credits are sought must have been completed with a grade of B or greater and must be approved by the student’s advisory committee and the Graduate and Professional School. These courses must not have been used previously for another degree. Except for officially approved cooperative doctoral programs, credit for thesis or dissertation research or the equivalent is not transferable. Credit for “internship” coursework in any form is not transferable. Courses taken in residence at an accredited U.S. institution or approved international institution with a final grade of B or greater will be considered for transfer credit if, at the time the courses were completed, the courses would be accepted for credit toward a similar degree for a student in degree-seeking status at the host institution. Credit for coursework taken by extension is not transferable. Coursework  in which no formal grades are given or in which grades other than letter grades (A or B) are earned (for example, CR, P, S, U, H, etc.) is not accepted for transfer credit . Credit for coursework submitted for transfer from any college or university must be shown in semester credit hours, or equated to semester credit hours.

Courses used toward a degree at another institution may not be applied for graduate credit. If the course to be transferred was taken prior to the conferral of a degree at the transfer institution, a letter from the registrar at that institution stating that the course was not applied for credit toward the degree must be submitted to the Graduate and Professional School.

Grades for courses completed at other institutions are not included in computing the GPA. An official transcript from the university at which transfer courses are taken must be sent directly to the Office of Admissions.

The general field of research to be used for the dissertation should be agreed on by the student and the advisory committee at their first meeting, as a basis for selecting the proper courses to support the proposed research.

As soon thereafter as the research project can be outlined in reasonable detail, the dissertation research proposal should be completed. The research proposal should be approved at a meeting of the student’s advisory committee, at which time the feasibility of the proposed research and the adequacy of available facilities should be reviewed. The approved proposal, signed by all members of the student’s advisory committee, the head of the student’s major department (or chair of the intercollegiate faculty, if applicable), must be submitted to the Graduate and Professional School at least 20 working days prior to the submission of the Request for the Final Examination.

Compliance issues must be addressed if a graduate student is performing research involving human subjects, animals, infectious biohazards and recombinant DNA. A student involved in these types of research should check with the Office of Research Compliance and Biosafety at (979) 458-1467 to address questions about all research compliance responsibilities. Additional information can also be obtained on the website  http:// rcb.tamu.edu .

Examinations

The student’s major department (or chair of the interdisciplinary degree program faculty, if applicable) and their advisory committee may require qualifying, cumulative or other types of examinations at any time deemed desirable. These examinations are entirely at the discretion of the department and the student’s advisory committee.

The preliminary examination is required. The preliminary examination for a doctoral student shall be given no earlier than a date at which the student is within 6 credit hours of completion of the formal coursework on the degree plan (i.e., all coursework on the degree plan except 681, 684, 690, 691, 692, 693, 695, 697, 791, or other graduate courses specifically designated as S/U in the course catalog). The student should complete the Preliminary Examination no later than the end of the semester following the completion of the formal coursework on the degree plan.

The objective of preliminary examination is to evaluate whether the student has demonstrated the following qualifications:

a.     a mastery of the subject matter of all fields in the program;

b.     an adequate knowledge of the literature in these fields and an ability to carry out bibliographical research;

c.     an understanding of the research problem and the appropriate methodological approaches.

The format of the preliminary examination shall be determined by the student’s department (or interdisciplinary degree program, if applicable) and advisory committee, and communicated to the student in advance of the examination. The exam may consist of a written component, oral component, or combination of written and oral components.

The preliminary exam may be administered by the advisory committee or a departmental committee; herein referred to as the examination committee.

Regardless of exam format, a student will receive an overall preliminary exam result of pass or fail. The department (or interdisciplinary degree program, if applicable) will determine how the overall pass or fail result is determined based on the exam structure and internal department procedures. If the exam is administered by the advisory committee, each advisory committee member will provide a pass or fail evaluation decision.

Only one advisory committee substitution is allowed to provide an evaluation decision for a student’s preliminary exam, and it cannot be the committee chair.

If a student is required to take, as a part of the preliminary examination, a written component administered by a department or interdisciplinary degree program, the department or interdisciplinary degree program faculty must:

a.     offer the examination at least once every six months. The departmental or interdisciplinary degree program examination should be announced at least 30 days prior to the scheduled examination date.

b.     assume the responsibility for marking the examination satisfactory or unsatisfactory, or otherwise graded, and in the case of unsatisfactory, stating specifically the reasons for such a mark.

c.     forward the marked examination to the chair of the student’s advisory committee within one week after the examination.

Students are eligible for to schedule the preliminary examination in the Academic Requirements Completion System (ARCS) if they meet the following list of eligibility requirements:

Student is registered at Texas A&M University for a minimum of one semester credit hour in the long semester or summer term during which any component of the preliminary examination is held. If the entire examination is held between semesters, then the student must be registered for the term immediately preceding the examination.

An approved degree plan is on file with the Graduate and Professional School prior to commencing the first component of the examination.

Student’s cumulative GPA is at least 3.000.

Student’s degree plan GPA is at least 3.000.

At the end of the semester in which at least the first component of the exam is given, there are no more than 6 hours of coursework remaining on the degree plan (except 681, 684, 690, 691, 692, 693, 695, 697, 791, or other graduate courses specifically designated as S/U in the course catalog). The head of the student’s department (or Chair of the Interdisciplinary Degree Program, if applicable) has the authority to approve a waiver of this criterion.

Credit for the preliminary examination is not transferable in cases where a student changes degree programs after passing a preliminary exam.

If a written component precedes an oral component of the preliminary exam, the chair of the student’s examination committee is responsible for making all written examinations available to all members of the committee. A positive evaluation of the preliminary exam by all members of a student’s examination committee with at most one dissension is required to pass a student on their preliminary exam.

The student’s department will promptly report the results of the Preliminary Examination to the Graduate and Professional School via the Academic Requirements Completion System (ARCS) within 10 working days of completion of the preliminary examination.

If an approved examination committee member substitution (one only) has been made, their approval must be submitted to the Graduate and Professional School via ARCS. The approval of the designated department approver is also required on the request.

After passing the required preliminary oral and written examinations for a doctoral degree, the student must complete the final examination within four years of the semester in which the preliminary exam is taken. Exams taken in between terms will expire at the end of the term that ended prior to the exam. For example, a preliminary exam taken and passed during the Fall 2023 semester will expire at the end of the Fall 2027 semester. A preliminary exam taken in the time between the Summer and Fall 2023 semesters will expire at the end of the Summer 2027 semester.

First Failure

Upon approval of a student’s examination committee (with no more than one member dissenting), and approval of the Department and Graduate and Professional School, a student who has failed a preliminary examination may be given one re-examination. In accordance with Student Rule 12.5, the student’s department head or designee, intercollegiate faculty, or graduate advisory committee should make a recommendation to the student regarding their scholastic deficiency.

Second Failure

Upon failing the preliminary exam twice in a doctoral program, a student is no longer eligible to continue to pursue the PhD in that program/major. In accordance with Student Rule 12.5.3 and/or 12.5.4, the student will be notified of the action being taken by the department as a result of the second failure of the preliminary examination.

Adequate time must be given to permit a student to address inadequacies emerging from the first preliminary examination. The examination committee must agree upon and communicate to the student, in writing, an adequate time-frame from the first examination (normally six months) to retest, as well as a detailed explanation of the inadequacies emerging from the examination. The student and committee should jointly negotiate a mutually acceptable date for this retest.  When providing feedback on inadequacies, the committee should clearly document expected improvements that the student must be able to exhibit in order to retake the exam.  The examination committee will document and communicate the time-frame and feedback within 10 working days of the exam that was not passed.

Candidates for the doctoral degrees must pass a final examination by deadline dates announced in the  Graduate and Professional School Calendar  each semester. A doctoral student is allowed only one opportunity to take the final examination.

No unabsolved grades of D, F, or U for any course can be listed on the degree plan. The student must be registered for any remaining hours of 681, 684, 690, 691, 692, 791 or other graduate courses specifically designated as S/U in the course catalog during the semester of the final exam. No student may be given a final examination until they have been admitted to candidacy and their current official cumulative and degree plan GPAs are 3.00 or better.

Refer to the  Admission to Candidacy  section of the graduate catalog for candidacy requirements.

A request to schedule the final examination must be submitted to the Graduate and Professional School via ARCS a minimum of 10 working days in advance of the scheduled date. Any changes to the degree plan must be approved by the Graduate and Professional School prior to the submission of the request for final examination.

The student’s advisory committee will conduct this examination. Only one committee member substitution is allowed with the approval of the Graduate and Professional School. If the substitution is for the sole external member of the advisory committee - with an appointment to a department other than the student's major department - then the substitute must also be external to the student's major department. In extenuating circumstances, with the approval of the Graduate and Professional School, an exception to this requirement may be granted.

The final examination is not to be administered until the dissertation or record of study is available in substantially final form to the student’s advisory committee, and all concerned have had adequate time to review the document. Whereas the final examination may cover the broad field of the candidate’s training, it is presumed that the major portion of the time will be devoted to the dissertation and closely allied topics. Persons other than members of the graduate faculty may, with mutual consent of the candidate and the chair of the advisory committee, be invited to attend a final examination for an advanced degree. A positive vote by all members of the graduate committee with at most one dissension is required to pass a student on their exam. A department can have a stricter requirement provided there is consistency within all degree programs within a department. Upon completion of the questioning of the candidate, all visitors must excuse themselves from the proceedings.

The student’s department will promptly report the results of the Final Examination to the Graduate and Professional School via the Academic Requirements Completion System (ARCS) within 10 working days of completion of the final examination. The Graduate and Professional School will be automatically notified via ARCS of any cancellations.

A positive evaluation of the final exam by all members of a student’s advisory committee with at most one dissension is required to pass a student on their final exam. If an approved committee member substitution (1 only) has been made, their approval must be submitted to the Graduate and Professional School via ARCS.

The dissertation,  which must be a candidate's original work demonstrates the ability to perform independent research . Whereas acceptance of the dissertation is based primarily on its scholarly merit, it must also exhibit creditable literary workmanship. Dissertation formatting must be acceptable to the Graduate and Professional School as outlined in the Guidelines for Theses, Dissertations, and Records of Study.

After successful defense and approval by the student’s advisory committee and the head of the student’s major department (or chair of intercollegiate faculty, if applicable), a student must submit the dissertation in electronic format as a single PDF file to https://etd.tamu.edu/ . Additionally, a dissertation approval form with original signatures must be received by the Graduate and Professional School through the Academic Requirements Completion System (ARCS). Both the PDF file and the completed ARCS approval form must be received by the deadline.

Deadline dates for submitting are announced each semester or summer term in the Graduate and Professional School Calendar (see Time Limit statement). These dates also can be accessed via the  Graduate and Professional School website .

Each student who submits a document for review is assessed a one-time thesis/dissertation processing fee through Student Business Services. This processing fee is for the thesis/dissertation services provided. After commencement, dissertations are digitally stored and made available through the Texas A&M Libraries.

A dissertation that is deemed unacceptable by the Graduate and Professional School because of excessive corrections will be returned to the student’s department head or chair of the intercollegiate faculty . The manuscript must be resubmitted as a new document, and the entire review process must begin anew. All original submittal deadlines must be met during the resubmittal process to graduate.

Additional Requirements

Continuous registration, admission to candidacy.

• 99-Hour Cap on Doctoral Degree

Application for Degree

A student who enters the doctoral degree program with a baccalaureate degree must spend one academic year plus one semester in resident study at Texas A&M University. A student who holds master’s degree when they enter a doctoral degree program must spend one academic year in resident study. One academic year may include two adjacent regular semesters or one regular semester and one adjacent 10-week summer semester. The third semester is not required to be adjacent to the one year. Enrollment for each semester must be a minimum of 9 credit hours each to satisfy the residence requirement. A minimum of 1 credit hour must be in a non-distance education delivery mode. Semesters in which the student is enrolled in all distance education coursework will not count toward fulfillment of the residence requirement.

To satisfy the residence requirement, the student must complete a minimum of 9 credit hours per semester or 10-week summer semester in resident study at Texas A&M University for the required period. A student who enters a doctoral degree program with a baccalaureate degree may fulfill residence requirements in excess of one academic year (18 credit hours) by registration during summer sessions or by completion of a less-than-full course load (in this context a full course load is considered 9 credit hours per semester).

Students who are employed full-time while completing their degree may fulfill total residence requirements by completion of less-than-full time course loads each semester. In order to be considered for this, the student is required to submit a Petition for Waivers and Exceptions along with verification of employment to the Graduate and Professional School. An employee should submit verification of employment at the time they submit the degree plan. See  Registration .

See  Residence Requirements .

All requirements for doctoral degrees must be completed within a period of ten consecutive calendar years for the degree to be granted. A course will be considered valid until 10 years after the end of the semester in which it is taken. Graduate credit for coursework more than ten calendar years old at the time of the final oral examination may not be used to satisfy degree requirements.

After passing the required preliminary oral and written examinations for a doctoral degree, the student must complete the final examination within four years of the semester in which the preliminary exam is taken. Exams taken in between terms will expire at the end of the term that ended prior to the exam. For example, a preliminary exam taken and passed during the fall 2019 semester will expire at the end of the fall 2023 semester. A preliminary exam taken in the time between the summer and fall 2019 semesters will expire at the end of the summer 2023 semester.

A final corrected version of the dissertation or record of study in electronic format as a single PDF file must be cleared by the Graduate and Professional School within one year of the semester in which the final exam is taken. Exams taken in between terms will expire at the end of the term that ended prior to the exam. For example, a final exam taken and passed during the fall 2022 semester will expire at the end of the fall 2023 semester. A final exam taken in the time between the summer and fall 2022 semesters will expire at the end of the summer 2023 semester. Failure to do so will result in the degree not being awarded.

A student in a program leading to a Doctor of Philosophy who has completed all coursework on their degree plan other than 691 (research) are required to be in continuous registration until all requirements for the degree have been completed. See  Continuous Registration Requirements .

To be admitted to candidacy for a doctoral degree, a student must have:

• completed all formal coursework on the degree plan with the exception of any remaining 681, 684, 690 and 691, or 791.
• a 3.0 Graduate GPA and a Degree Plan GPA of at least 3.0 with no grade lower than C in any course on the degree plan,
• passed the preliminary examination (written and oral portions),
• submitted an approved dissertation proposal,
• met the residence requirements. The final examination will not be authorized for any doctoral student who has not been admitted to candidacy.

A student is required to possess a competent command of English. For English language proficiency requirements, see the Admissions section of this catalog. The doctoral (PhD) foreign language requirement at Texas A&M University is a departmental option, to be administered and monitored by the individual departments of academic instruction.

99-Hour Cap on Doctoral Degrees

In Texas, public colleges and universities are funded by the state according to the number of students enrolled. In accordance with legislation passed by the Texas Legislature, the number of hours for which state universities may receive subvention funding at the doctoral rate for any individual is limited to 99 hours. Texas A&M and other universities will not receive subvention for hours in excess of the limit.

Institutions of higher education are allowed to charge the equivalent of non-resident tuition to a resident doctoral student who has enrolled in 100 or more semester credit hours of doctoral coursework.

Doctoral students at Texas A&M have seven years to complete their degree before being charged out-of-state tuition. A doctoral student who, after seven years of study, has accumulated 100 or more doctoral hours will be charged tuition at a rate equivalent to out-of-state tuition. Please note that the tuition increases will apply to Texas residents as well as students from other states and countries who are currently charged tuition at the resident rate. This includes those doctoral students who hold GAT, GANT, and GAR appointments or recipients of competitive fellowships who receive more than $1,000 per semester. Doctoral students who have not accumulated 100 hours after seven years of study are eligible to pay in-state tuition if otherwise eligible.

Doctoral students who exceed the credit limit will receive notification from the Graduate and Professional School during the semester in which they are enrolled and exceeding the limit in their current degree program. The notification will explain that the State of Texas does not provide funding for any additional hours in which a student is enrolled in excess of 99 hours. Texas A&M University will recover the lost funds by requiring students in excess of 99 hours to pay tuition at the non-funded, non-resident rate. This non-funded, non-resident tuition rate status will be updated for the following semester and in all subsequent semesters until receipt of a doctoral degree. Please see the  Tuition Calculator  at the non-resident rate for an example of potential charges.

The following majors are exempt from the 99-Hour Cap on Doctoral Degrees and have a limit of 130 doctoral hours:

• Biochemistry and Molecular Biophysics
• Biomedical Sciences
• Clinical Psychology
• Counseling Psychology
• Genetics and Genomics
• Health Services Research
• Medical Sciences
• Microbiology
• Neurosciences (College of Medicine)
• Oral and Craniofacial Biomedical Sciences
• Pharmaceutical Sciences
• Public Health Sciences
• School Psychology

For information on applying for your degree, please visit the  Graduation  section.

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• PhD in Economics

Doctor of Philosophy in Economics

• MA in Economics, Data, and Policy 2 year program (NEW!)
• MA in Economics, Data, and Policy 1 year program (NEW!)
• MA in Economics
• MA in Economic Policy in Global Markets
• MS in Business Analytics
• MS in Finance
• PhD in Business Administration
• Regulations
• Admission Requirements
• Job Market Candidates
• Past Placements
• Doctoral Defenses
• BA in Philosophy, Politics & Economics
• BA/BSc in Data Science and Society

The PhD program in economics prepares you to conduct cutting-edge original research addressing the fundamental economic questions of our time.  Learn the skills of leading economists, choose from many specializations, and develop your own research program.  You can utilize your knowledge in faculty positions in academia, in governmental organizations, as well as in the private sector.

At a glance:

• One or two years of coursework on state-of-the-art knowledge and skills.
• Independent research period guided by faculty members.
• Tuition waiver and a generous stipend for all students.

You will take courses taught by internationally recognized faculty with PhD degrees from some of the world’s leading universities, including Harvard, MIT, and Princeton.  After choosing two fields of specialization, you will select an advisor from these faculty members to guide you as you hone your skills and develop your own research program. 

Fast transition to research, close supervision:  

• Low coursework for students from qualified MA programs. Extensive coursework reduction for graduates from  MA in Economics at CEU .    
• We expect that you have taken core courses in a research-oriented MA program. If you have insufficient training, we encourage you to apply to  MA in Economics  first and opt for the research track once you are admitted.  
• High faculty-to-student ratio. Supervision by researchers  working on the cutting edge of their fields .  
• Regular one-on-one coaching in presentation skills.  
• Access to detailed micro-level datasets on the region and the related institutional knowledge.  
• Seminar series  hosting top researchers  in  a variety of fields.  

Placements in academia, policy and private sector:  

As a PhD economist, your skills will be in high demand from many different types of organizations.  You can become a faculty member at a university, a researcher at a central bank or other national or international governmental organization, or a consultant or other professional in the private sector.

Program Heads:  Prof. Andrea Weber  (for the U.S. and Austrian accredited program) and  Prof. László Mátyás  (for the Hungarian accredited program).

Program Administrator: Zsuzsanna Bordas (room: QS B-507, email: [email protected] )

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• Doctor of Philosophy

Economics Doctor of Philosophy

The primary mission of our graduate program is to educate students as research economists. As they pursue PhD degrees, our graduate students acquire a wide range of skills that make them excellent university teachers and professional economists. An advanced degree in economics offers an exciting range of career choice in academia, business and government.

About 80 graduate students are in the economics PhD program. Our entering class consists of approximately 15-20 students selected from a very competitive pool of approximately 300 applicants from all over the world. In recent years, we have ranked in the top echelon of all departments at The Ohio State University in the number of university fellowships awarded to new graduate students . Almost all of our PhD students are supported through research and teaching assistantships with competitive stipends and full tuition waiver. We also provide conference travel support, dissertation research support and support for the job market preparations of our dissertation students.

The faculty and department The dedication of our graduate faculty  to excellence in economics education is reflected in the depth and breadth of their research activities. Our faculty includes three Fellows of the Econometric Society and several editors and associate editors of top-ranked economics journals. We are in the Top 10 ranked economics programs among public universities and in the top 25 of all U.S. economics departments in terms of publication productivity.

Optional Practical Training (OPT)

International graduates of this major are approved by the Department of Homeland Security for three (3) years of work permission in the United States after graduation. Visit the Office of International Affairs website for more information.

If you have a disability and experience difficulty accessing this content, please contact [email protected] .

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Economics - Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Our PhD program focuses on a solid core curriculum in economic theory and econometrics. Beyond this, we offer a number of specialized fields of study: econometrics, economic development, economic history, industrial organization, international trade and finance, labor and human resources, natural resources and environmental economics and public economics.

Master's Degree in Economics

The Department of Economics does not currently offer a stand-alone MA degree program, although students enrolled in our PhD program will earn their MA degree as they progress toward their doctorate.

Requirements

Admission requirements, course requirements, preliminary examinations, third-year research colloquium, comprehensive examination, admission to candidacy and dissertation requirements, administration: examining committees for examinations, dissertation guidelines.

An applicant for admission as a regular degree student must:

• Hold a baccalaureate degree from a college or university of recognized standing, or have done work equivalent to that required for such a degree and equivalent to the degree given at this university. The undergraduate GPA must be at least 2.75 (2.00=C).
• Have completed intermediate microeconomic and macroeconomic theory courses, 6 credit hours of calculus at the university level or equivalent, and statistics.
• Submit Graduate Record Examination (GRE) scores for aptitude (verbal and quantitative). International applicants whose native language is not English must also submit a TOEFL score with a speaking component, even if they have attended college in an English-speaking country.
• Arrange for the submission of three letters of recommendation.

Graduate study in economics is quantitative and analytical. Students should be comfortable with basic calculus (derivatives and integration), linear algebra, matrix algebra and basic statistics.

The university deadline for international applications is Dec. 1 for the following fall semester. The department encourages international applicants to comply with this deadline. Late applications may be considered; however, they may be at a disadvantage with respect to the award of financial aid. Domestic applicants who wish to be considered for financial assistance should apply by Jan. 15. Students must begin the program in a fall semester.

Degree Requirements

Students are expected to complete all requirements for the PhD degree within five years of entering the program (the maximum time allowed by the Graduate School is six years). The schedule of required courses is centered on this expectation. Failure to make timely and satisfactory progress toward the degree may result in loss of financial assistance or dismissal from the program.

• obtain written approval from the DGS to waive the requirement for ECON 7800 due to sufficient mathematical preparation in prior studies, or
• pass the final examination in ECON 7800 at a level of B- without taking the course.
• Six elective courses at the 8000 level. Basic fields are econometrics, economic development, economic history, industrial organization, international trade and finance, labor and human resources, natural resources and environmental economics and public economics. Ordinarily, a student would take two elective courses in a basic field of specialization in preparation for a dissertation.
• 6 credit hours in a research colloquium.
• At least 30 credit hours of dissertation.
• At least four of the core courses must be taken on the Boulder campus. Courses transferred for credit must be approved by the DGS. After entry into the PhD program, all remaining courses must be taken on the Boulder campus.
• All courses for PhD credit taken on the Boulder campus must be passed with a grade of B- or better. A student who receives a grade of C+ or lower in a core course must retake that course the following academic year.
• No more than 12 credit hours (exclusive of dissertation credit hours) from a single faculty member may be counted toward PhD requirements. Independent study is allowed only to satisfy elective requirements. No more than 6 credit hours of independent study may be applied to the PhD degree and no more than 3 credit hours of independent study may be taken from a single faculty member. In consultation with the DGS, students may choose to take up to two graduate offerings in other departments as elective courses.
• See the Plan of Study tab for course recommendations.

Written preliminary examinations in microeconomic theory, macroeconomic theory and econometrics must be taken in the examination period following the successful completion of core courses in these areas. Under most circumstances this period would be in August prior to the second year. An examination attempted and failed must be taken again and passed in the next examination period. A second failure results in dismissal from the program, subject to appeal to the GCRC under extraordinary circumstances. In no case are attempts beyond the third granted.

Students who have failed any of the core courses are ineligible to take the preliminary examination in the area of failure. These students must retake the failed course(s) in the following year and attempt the relevant preliminary examination in the first scheduled examination period after they pass.

Students who fail to pass all three preliminary examinations within two-and-one-half years of beginning the PhD program must exit the program.

An MA degree will be awarded to students who have successfully completed all core courses in the PhD program, completed 30 hours of graduate credit with a 3.00 GPA and performed satisfactorily within two attempts on at least two out of three preliminary examinations.

Third-year students are expected to register for 3 credit hours per semester in the research colloquium, which will meet weekly under the direction of a faculty member. The purpose of the colloquium is to provide students the opportunity and guidance to complete the required third-year paper and to facilitate progress toward the dissertation stage.

Students must take an oral comprehensive examination before admission to PhD candidacy. This examination may occur either at the time of the student's research presentation in ECON 8219 or at a later date, and will encompass the materials in the presentation and all relevant coursework completed by the candidate. Students who fail this comprehensive examination will be given a second chance during the following semester. For those students for whom the presentation in ECON 8219 does not serve as the oral comprehensive examination, a separate oral examination must be scheduled before admission to candidacy. Students who do not pass this exam by the end of their fifth year must exit the program.

Students are formally admitted to candidacy for the PhD degree after completing all course requirements and all preliminary and comprehensive examinations and after earning four semesters of residency (see the Doctoral Degree Requirements section of this catalog for details). After admission to candidacy, students must register each fall and spring semester for dissertation credit ( ECON 8999 ) until attaining the degree; the accumulated credit for the thesis must total at least 30 credit hours to attain the degree. A student must prepare a written dissertation and successfully pass an oral examination before a dissertation committee and other interested persons on its content before receiving the degree. The minimum residence requirement for the PhD degree is six semesters of scholarly work beyond the bachelor's degree.

Examining committees for preliminary examinations consist of three members of the economics department who teach in the relevant area. Examining committees for comprehensive examinations consist of at least three members of the economics department.

• Written examinations are numbered so that insofar as possible the identity of the student is unknown. Each faculty member grades independently and writes no comments in the examination booklet. A meeting of the graders is called by the chair of the examination committee and the committee grade is submitted to the graduate program manager. The possible grades include "High Pass," "Pass" and "Fail."
• In cases where there is a question of pass or fail on any exam, if two of the members of the examination committee vote affirmatively, a grade of pass will be recorded; if two of the members of the grading committee vote negatively, a grade of fail will be recorded. If the vote of the grading committee is tied and the third member is absent (but will be available within seven days), the decision to pass or to fail is to be made by the reconvened grading committee. If fewer than two members of the grading committee are present and voting, or if the vote of the grading committee is tied and the third member is not available within seven days, the decision to pass or fail will be made by the Graduate Curriculum and Review Committee; in such circumstances the grade is reported as pass or fail, based on a majority vote.
• When examination results are reported, a student who failed should have an opportunity to discuss their performance with a member of the examining committee.
• In the spring term of the academic year following the research colloquium, each student must submit a written dissertation proposal and conduct an oral defense of that proposal before his or her basic committee. A dissertation proposal form must be signed by each member of the basic committee and submitted to the graduate program manager. The basic committee consists of the student's faculty supervisor and three other faculty members from the department. An acceptable proposal must include a statement of purpose and a justification for the importance of the work; a full literature review and a statement of how this research will contribute to the literature; and a detailed description of the methodologies to be used and of the data bases, if appropriate.
• Normally students are expected to complete their dissertation by the end of their fifth academic year. The graduate program manager provides details on submission of the dissertation and arrangements for the oral defense. The final defense is conducted before a basic committee of four faculty members from the department plus one outside member. After the defense, minor changes are agreed upon between candidate and supervisor before the final dissertation is submitted.

Plan of Study

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Doctor of philosophy in economics.

The Ph.D. program in economics provides a solid foundation in modern economic analysis, develops expertise in two fields in economics, provides milestones and incentives for dissertation research, and supports graduate student professional development and placement. The department has a long-standing tradition of producing Ph.D. economists with strong foundational skills and expertise. Please visit the department website for additional information.

Admission to Graduate Studies

An applicant seeking to pursue graduate study in the College may be admitted as either a degree-seeking or non-degree seeking student. Policies and procedures of Graduate Studies govern the process of Graduate admission. These may be found in the Graduate Studies section of the online catalog.

Please consult the Departments & Programs section of the online catalog for information regarding program-specific admissions criteria and requirements. Special admissions requirements pertain to Interdisciplinary Studies degrees, which may be found in the Graduate Studies section of the online catalog.

Graduate Admission

The economics department seeks well-trained economists with strong quantitative skills for its Ph.D. program. In particular, applicants should have taken the equivalent of a minimum of three courses in calculus and a course in linear algebra (twelve to fifteen semester hours). A course in real analysis is not required, but exposure to logical mathematical derivation is very useful.

The department strives to provide a comprehensive financial aid package to strong applicants. This typically includes a paid graduate teaching assistant (GTA) position for up to five years. A GTA position also includes a full tuition waiver and other benefits such as subsidized health insurance. Outstanding applicants may receive a fellowship that reduces or eliminates teaching commitment for one or two semesters and may include funding for summer research. The department also strives to provide some financial support for students to present research at academic conferences every year.

Non-native speakers of English must meet English proficiency requirements . Please note that the requirements for admission are different from those for a teaching/research assistant.

The deadline for an applicant to be considered for admission and financial aid is January 5 . Applicants should submit a graduate application online .

Ph.D. Degree Requirements

Course requirements.

In addition to meeting general requirements, the Ph.D. candidate in economics must complete a minimum of 48 credit hours of course work in economics and at least 1 credit hour of ECON 999 Doctoral Dissertation

Qualifying Examinations

Each Ph.D. student is required to pass written qualifying examinations in microeconomics and macroeconomics after completion of the core courses in these areas. A student who does not pass a qualifying examination may be permitted one retake, ordinarily within a few weeks of the first attempt.

In order to demonstrate competency in econometrics, each Ph.D. student must complete ECON 817 and ECON 818 , with a combined grade point average of 3.0. A student who does not achieve the 3.0 combined grade point average is required to pass, without retake, a written comprehensive examination in econometrics.

Fields of Specialization and Electives

Each student must demonstrate competence in at least 2 fields of specialization in economics by completing 2 courses in each of their chosen fields. In addition, each student takes 3 elective courses in economics. Fields of specialization and elective courses are selected in consultation with the advisor.

Seminar Workshops

Beginning in Year 3, each student is required to enroll in ECON 910 and attend the weekly department seminars for 5 continuous semesters or until graduation (whichever is earlier).

Second-Year Paper 

Each student is required to complete a second-year paper by the end of the fourth semester (second year) of study.

Third-Year Paper

Each student is required to complete a third-year paper by the end of the sixth semester (third year) of study.

Research Skills and Responsible Scholarship

Every doctoral student is required to have training in research skills and responsible scholarship pertinent to economics research. Enrollment in one semester of ECON 910 and successfully completing the third year paper requirement satisfies these requirements.

Comprehensive Oral Examination

Each student is required to pass the comprehensive oral examination by the end of the eighth semester (fourth year) of study. It is strongly recommended that a student pass this exam by the end of the seventh semester.

Dissertation

Following the comprehensive oral examinations, the candidate must organize and write a dissertation on his or her chosen topic under the supervision of a dissertation committee.

Final Oral Examination

The candidate must defend the dissertation successfully in a final oral examination.

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PhD in Economics

The PhD program in Economics is offered by the Research School of Economics (RSE), and caters to candidates of the highest academic ambition. RSE offers a diverse and stimulating intellectual environment, attracting candidates as well as faculty from all over the world. The School values open academic discourse, encourages collaboration, and is continuously searching for ideas that push and shift the research frontier. Our world-class faculty teach, supervise and support candidates on their journeys to become thought leaders in academia, government, national and international research institutions, think tanks, and business.

CRICOS #: 048345A

Duration: 2 to 4 years full time (4 to 8 years part time)

Before you submit an application for entry to the program, you should:

• ensure you meet the admission requirements outlined below.
• identify potential supervisors – that is, one or two academic economists at ANU who conduct research in your area of interest.

You can find information on researchers and their research areas in the  ANU researchers database  and  RSE staff directory .

While other ANU schools may recommend contacting potential supervisors before submitting an application,  this is not required  for entry into RSE’s PhD program. Instead, you only need to list the name(s) of potential supervisors in your online application form.

Potential supervisors cannot guarantee entry into the PhD program. Admission will depend on the strength of your application relative to others in the pool.

After you’ve completed the steps above, you can proceed with an  online application .

Application deadlines

The first semester of the ANU academic year starts in February, and the second semester starts in July. In general, successful applicants will start their PhD program with RSE in Semester 1 of the following year. While all applications for first semester entry must be submitted  before 31 October,  international applicants wishing to be considered for an  ANU scholarship  should submit their applications  before   31 August .

To be considered for a scholarship, your application must be accompanied by all the supporting documents listed below, including the referee reports. Request for referee reports are triggered and sent to your nominated referees at the time of submission of program application. It is thus important that you submit your application in advance (2-3 weeks) to allow time for your referees to provide their reports prior to the scholarship deadline.

If you’re currently completing an academic degree and haven’t yet received your final results and transcript, you should still submit all available documents before the deadline, and forward remaining results once you receive them. We won’t make a final decision on your application until we’ve received all the required documents.

If you’re admitted to the program, you’ll be expected to attend the pre-PhD summer course, Mathematical Techniques for Advanced Economic Analysis, which is offered during January and February, before the start of the semester.

Due to the sequencing of the coursework required for our PhD program, we’ll only consider applications for entry in the second semester (starting in July) if you have completed the ANU Master of Economics, or if you have a strong background in mathematical and statistical techniques.

ANU Master of Economics students interested in applying for entry into our PhD program should discuss their applications with the RSE Masters convenor  after completing the first year of the Master coursework ). All applications for entry in Semester 2 must be submitted  before  31 March .

The admission requirements for the PhD program in Economics reflect the advanced knowledge in economics that candidates will need to undertake the coursework component of the degree, and the research experience and skills needed to successfully undertake and complete the research thesis.

The minimum qualification requirement for admission to the PhD program in Economics is:

• a Bachelor degree with First Class Honours or Second Class Honours Division A in economics from an approved university, or
• a Bachelor degree with First Class Honours or Second Class Honours Division A in mathematics and/or statistics from an approved university, which includes a major or equivalent in economics, and a final grade at least of distinction in a third-year economics course, or
• an ANU Master of Economics, or an equivalent postgraduate qualification  in economics  from an approved university, with results that the convenor deems to be at least equivalent to Second Class Honours Division A at ANU.

Additionally, you will have to show evidence of your:

• advanced knowledge of microeconomic theory, macroeconomic theory and econometrics
• adequate background in mathematical methods and mathematical economics (at a minimum, at the level of the book  Mathematics for Economists  by Simon and Blume)
• research experience, e.g. in the form of an honours or Master thesis or research project, at a standard equivalent to a Second Class Honours Division A degree.

Admission to the PhD program in Economics is competitive and we can only admit a limited number of applicants each year. Meeting the minimum entry requirements does not guarantee you a place in the program.

If you don’t satisfy the eligibility criteria, or if you have the required qualifications but would prefer to have a refresher before applying to enter the PhD program, you can choose to first complete the  Master of Economics .

English language requirements

All applicants must satisfy the University’s  English language admission requirements . An international applicant who is not a native English speaker may satisfy these requirements by submitting evidence of an  IELTS  overall score of at least 6.5, and with no component less than 6.0, or a paper-based  TOEFL  score of at least 570, with at least 4.5 in the essay component.

Application and supporting documentation

You must submit your application online via the  ANU Application Manager .

In addition to the standard information required in the online application, you must submit the following supporting documents as part of your application:

• transcripts from previous study
• a brief research proposal that outlines your proposed area of research and the questions that you plan to address as part of your PhD thesis – see guidelines on how to  prepare a persuasive research proposal
• a copy of your honours or Master thesis
• details about your previous study in economics (e.g. course outlines of advanced economic theory and econometrics courses taken, including details of textbooks used)
• official  TOEFL  or  IELTS  results (where applicable) to demonstrate that you satisfy the University’s  English language requirements
• nomination of three referees. A referee report form will automatically be sent to the referees you list in your online application. Your application will be complete and ready for assessment once we receive all documents, including referee reports.

GRE requirement

As part of your application, you must also submit your  GRE General Test  results. The GRE  designated   institution code  for the  ANU College of Business and Economics  is  7833 . You should use this code to submit your official GRE results.

You’re exempt from the GRE requirement if you’ve already completed some of the coursework required for the PhD as part of an ANU Master of Economics or ANU Honours in Economics degree. Similarly, you’re exempt if you’ve completed an Honours in Economics degree from an Australian or New Zealand university, but we encourage you to provide GRE results to improve your chances of admission and scholarship support.

Offers of admission

The HDR (higher degree by research) convenor will review all complete applications submitted by the relevant deadline.

If your application is short-listed, you may be required to attend an interview (face to face or online).

We may send you an offer of admission if you satisfy the eligibility criteria and your area of interest matches those of RSE academics with supervisory capacity. However, since admission is competitive and supervisory capacity is limited, we won’t send any offers of admission until  after the relevant application deadline , irrespective of the date when you submit your application.

The PhD program in Economics consists of two components –  coursework  and  research .

Candidates undertake the research component after successfully completing the required coursework.

PhD coursework component

Pre-phd course.

All admitted candidates are expected to arrive in Canberra four to six weeks before the beginning of the semester and attend the pre-PhD course in Mathematical Techniques for Advanced Economic Analysis.

Candidates undertaking a PhD are normally required to successfully complete eight semester-length courses (including five compulsory courses) over two consecutive semesters of full-time study. Candidates holding the ANU Master of Economics degree may be exempt from part of the coursework requirement, at the discretion of the HDR convenor.

The coursework for the PhD in Economics consists of:

• ECON8011  Microeconomic Theory
• ECON8022  Macroeconomic Theory (Master)
• EMET8014  Advanced Econometrics I
• ECON8021  Topics in Microeconomic Theory
• ECON8001  Topics in Macroeconomics
• EMET8008  Advanced Econometrics II
• ECON8053  Game Theory
• ECON8076  Topics in Game Theory
• ECON8080  Advanced Behavioral Economics
• ECON8050  Economic Growth 
• ECON8009  International Monetary Economics
• ECON8070  Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policy
• ECON8014  Computational Methods in Economics
• EMET8001  Applied Micro-Econometrics
• EMET8010  Applied Macro and Financial Econometrics
• EMET8012  Business and Economic Forecasting
• MATH6110  Analysis 1: Metric Spaces and Applications
• MATH6212  Analysis 2: Lebesgue Integration and Hilbert Spaces
• MATH6214  Advanced Functional Analysis, Spectral Theory and Applications
• ECON8002  Applied Welfare Economics
• ECON8003  Economic Policy Issues
• ECON8010  The Economics of Taxation and Redistribution
• ECON8034  Public Sector Economics
• ECON8041  Labour Economics and Industrial Relations
• ECON8039  Health Economics
• ECON8037  Financial Economics
• ECON8038  Industrial Organisation
• ECON8047  Law and Economics
• ECON8040  Resource and Environmental Economics
• ECON8015  International Economics
• ECON8006  International Trade Theory

PhD research component

Upon successful completion of the compulsory courses and electives, PhD candidates proceed to the research component of their program. PhD candidates with two or more fails in their coursework cannot proceed to the research component.

The research component normally takes 36 months of full-time research. During this time, candidates write their thesis.

In each of the three years of research (when studying full-time), each candidate is expected to present their research at one of the  seminars run by RSE .

Research supervisory panel

When a PhD candidate is admitted to the program, a provisional supervisor – usually the HDR convenor – oversees the candidate’s progress until a primary supervisor is appointed. The Director of the School and the HDR convenor determine the primary supervisor and supervisory panel in consultation with the candidates.

Sometimes candidates change their topic, and this could necessitate changes in the supervisory panel. These changes are coordinated by the primary supervisor or the HDR convenor. All supervisory changes have to be approved by the convenor of the program and the Delegated Authority in accordance with ANU HDR policies and procedures.

RSE research seminar program

The RSE  research seminar series  consists of weekly seminars presented by national and international researchers. PhD candidates are expected to attend and participate regularly in the seminars throughout their candidature. Beginning with their thesis proposal review, candidates are also expected to present in the seminar series at least once every year.

Research integrity training

Within three to six months of enrolment, all PhD candidates must complete the  Research Integrity Training  and pass the exam. Completion of this course and exam is a compulsory milestone for all PhD candidates.

Thesis proposal review

In their second year of study, PhD candidates must submit a thesis proposal for review by their supervisory panel. The purpose of the review is to assess the originality, significance, adequacy and achievability of the candidate’s thesis plan.

The candidate generally submits their thesis proposal in conjunction with their first seminar presentation. The proposal includes a description of the research to be undertaken in the thesis, and a summary of the thesis structure and time plan. Successful completion of the thesis proposal review is required to continue in the program.

Annual progress review

It is University policy that each candidate’s progress be reviewed periodically. In each year of their program, PhD candidates are required to submit an  annual plan and report  as a basis for periodic progress review. This document provides details on work completed by the candidate since the previous review, current progress, and any problems that may impact their research. It also outlines the coursework and research the candidate intends to undertake in the following 12 months.

Oral Presentation

In their final year, candidates are required to give a final  oral presentation  on their research, usually three months before submitting their thesis.

Read more about  research candidate milestones .

Thesis submission and examination

The culmination of the PhD in Economics is a written thesis which, upon completion, is submitted for examination. The thesis is examined by two or three experts in the relevant field.

The PhD degree is awarded on the basis of the examination of the thesis. The examiners would be aware that the candidate has completed coursework requirements, but the level of performance in coursework is not taken into account in examining the candidate’s thesis for the award of the degree.

For more information on the process, visit our page on  submitting a thesis .

For information about scholarships available to HDR candidates, visit our page on  scholarships and fees .

Read details of some of our alumni’s recent  job placements .

A list of current PhD candidates in Economics is available on the RSE website .

• Doctor of Philosophy in Economics (PhD)
• Graduate School
• Prospective Students
• Graduate Degree Programs

Go to programs search

The Ph.D. program in economics at UBC owes its strength to the quality of its research faculty, extensive opportunity for student-faculty interaction, and a diverse offering of specializations for thesis work. Our faculty members specialize in a wide range of topics, including development economics, economic history, applied and theoretical econometrics, economics of inequality and gender, environmental economics, industrial organization, international finance, international trade, labour economics, macroeconomics, applied and theoretical micro, political economy, and public economics.

For specific program requirements, please refer to the departmental program website

What makes the program unique?

The Vancouver School of Economics at UBC is one of the world's best: in a recent ranking based on research publications, the department ranked in the top 20 worldwide, and number one in Canada.

Each year, we typically admit about 15 new students to our program. As a result, our program is small enough to provide extensive research supervision, yet large enough to offer expertise in a wide range of fields.

UBC Economics has the best graduate program in the country, and one of the best in the world. The graduate students at UBC have an astonishing track record of obtaining academic jobs in prestigious universities and research institutes.

Mahdi Ebrahimi Kahou

Quick Facts

Program enquiries, admission information & requirements, 1) check eligibility, minimum academic requirements.

The Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies establishes the minimum admission requirements common to all applicants, usually a minimum overall average in the B+ range (76% at UBC). The graduate program that you are applying to may have additional requirements. Please review the specific requirements for applicants with credentials from institutions in:

• Canada or the United States
• International countries other than the United States

Each program may set higher academic minimum requirements. Please review the program website carefully to understand the program requirements. Meeting the minimum requirements does not guarantee admission as it is a competitive process.

English Language Test

Applicants from a university outside Canada in which English is not the primary language of instruction must provide results of an English language proficiency examination as part of their application. Tests must have been taken within the last 24 months at the time of submission of your application.

Minimum requirements for the two most common English language proficiency tests to apply to this program are listed below:

TOEFL: Test of English as a Foreign Language - internet-based

Overall score requirement : 93

IELTS: International English Language Testing System

Overall score requirement : 6.5

Other Test Scores

Some programs require additional test scores such as the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) or the Graduate Management Test (GMAT). The requirements for this program are:

The GRE is required by some applicants. Please check the program website.

2) Meet Deadlines

3) prepare application, transcripts.

All applicants have to submit transcripts from all past post-secondary study. Document submission requirements depend on whether your institution of study is within Canada or outside of Canada.

Letters of Reference

A minimum of three references are required for application to graduate programs at UBC. References should be requested from individuals who are prepared to provide a report on your academic ability and qualifications.

Statement of Interest

Many programs require a statement of interest , sometimes called a "statement of intent", "description of research interests" or something similar.

• Supervision

Students in research-based programs usually require a faculty member to function as their thesis supervisor. Please follow the instructions provided by each program whether applicants should contact faculty members.

Instructions regarding thesis supervisor contact for Doctor of Philosophy in Economics (PhD)

Citizenship verification.

Permanent Residents of Canada must provide a clear photocopy of both sides of the Permanent Resident card.

4) Apply Online

All applicants must complete an online application form and pay the application fee to be considered for admission to UBC.

Research Information

Research facilities.

The school houses the Centre for Labour Studies and manages the British Columbia Inter-University Research Data Centre. As a result, unique training opportunities, research funding, and access to data and computing resources are available to our Ph.D. students.

Tuition & Financial Support

Financial Support

Applicants to UBC have access to a variety of funding options, including merit-based (i.e. based on your academic performance) and need-based (i.e. based on your financial situation) opportunities.

Program Funding Packages

Virtually all of the School's research faculty hold grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and other funding agencies, implying that opportunities for research assistantships and dissertation support are ample.

From September 2024 all full-time students in UBC-Vancouver PhD programs will be provided with a funding package of at least $24,000 for each of the first four years of their PhD. The funding package may consist of any combination of internal or external awards, teaching-related work, research assistantships, and graduate academic assistantships. Please note that many graduate programs provide funding packages that are substantially greater than $24,000 per year. Please check with your prospective graduate program for specific details of the funding provided to its PhD students.

Average Funding

• 33 students received Teaching Assistantships. Average TA funding based on 33 students was $13,467.
• 17 students received Research Assistantships. Average RA funding based on 17 students was $13,717.
• 19 students received Academic Assistantships. Average AA funding based on 19 students was $3,513.
• 49 students received internal awards. Average internal award funding based on 49 students was $22,471.
• 3 students received external awards. Average external award funding based on 3 students was $30,000.

Scholarships & awards (merit-based funding)

All applicants are encouraged to review the awards listing to identify potential opportunities to fund their graduate education. The database lists merit-based scholarships and awards and allows for filtering by various criteria, such as domestic vs. international or degree level.

Graduate Research Assistantships (GRA)

Many professors are able to provide Research Assistantships (GRA) from their research grants to support full-time graduate students studying under their supervision. The duties constitute part of the student's graduate degree requirements. A Graduate Research Assistantship is considered a form of fellowship for a period of graduate study and is therefore not covered by a collective agreement. Stipends vary widely, and are dependent on the field of study and the type of research grant from which the assistantship is being funded.

Graduate Teaching Assistantships (GTA)

Graduate programs may have Teaching Assistantships available for registered full-time graduate students. Full teaching assistantships involve 12 hours work per week in preparation, lecturing, or laboratory instruction although many graduate programs offer partial TA appointments at less than 12 hours per week. Teaching assistantship rates are set by collective bargaining between the University and the Teaching Assistants' Union .

Graduate Academic Assistantships (GAA)

Academic Assistantships are employment opportunities to perform work that is relevant to the university or to an individual faculty member, but not to support the student’s graduate research and thesis. Wages are considered regular earnings and when paid monthly, include vacation pay.

Financial aid (need-based funding)

Canadian and US applicants may qualify for governmental loans to finance their studies. Please review eligibility and types of loans .

All students may be able to access private sector or bank loans.

Foreign government scholarships

Many foreign governments provide support to their citizens in pursuing education abroad. International applicants should check the various governmental resources in their home country, such as the Department of Education, for available scholarships.

Working while studying

The possibility to pursue work to supplement income may depend on the demands the program has on students. It should be carefully weighed if work leads to prolonged program durations or whether work placements can be meaningfully embedded into a program.

International students enrolled as full-time students with a valid study permit can work on campus for unlimited hours and work off-campus for no more than 20 hours a week.

A good starting point to explore student jobs is the UBC Work Learn program or a Co-Op placement .

Tax credits and RRSP withdrawals

Students with taxable income in Canada may be able to claim federal or provincial tax credits.

Canadian residents with RRSP accounts may be able to use the Lifelong Learning Plan (LLP) which allows students to withdraw amounts from their registered retirement savings plan (RRSPs) to finance full-time training or education for themselves or their partner.

Please review Filing taxes in Canada on the student services website for more information.

Cost Estimator

Applicants have access to the cost estimator to develop a financial plan that takes into account various income sources and expenses.

Career Outcomes

76 students graduated between 2005 and 2013. Of these, career information was obtained for 75 alumni (based on research conducted between Feb-May 2016):

Sample Employers in Higher Education

Sample employers outside higher education, sample job titles outside higher education, phd career outcome survey, career options.

The market for Ph.D. economists is strong and the School actively supports the placement of our Ph.D. job market candidates. Our students have obtained positions at leading research and teaching universities around the world. A number of graduates also obtained excellent positions at government agencies, central banks, non-governmental organizations, and in the private sector.

At the Vancouver School of Economics, we are dedicated to ensuring the success of our students on the job market.

Enrolment, Duration & Other Stats

These statistics show data for the Doctor of Philosophy in Economics (PhD). Data are separated for each degree program combination. You may view data for other degree options in the respective program profile.

ENROLMENT DATA

Completion Rates & Times

• Research Supervisors

This list shows faculty members with full supervisory privileges who are affiliated with this program. It is not a comprehensive list of all potential supervisors as faculty from other programs or faculty members without full supervisory privileges can request approvals to supervise graduate students in this program.

• Anderson, Siwan (Micro-level institutions, role of gender, studies of rural governments)
• Baylis, Patrick (Economics; Climate Changes and Impacts; Economic Planning of Energy; climate change economics; energy economics; environmental economics)
• Beaudry, Paul (National and International macroeconomic issues, Business cycles, inflation, financial markets, the macro-economic effects of technological change and globalization, and the determinants of aggregate employment and wages)
• Bostanci, Gorkem (Macroeconomics (including monetary and fiscal theory); Industry economics and industrial organization; Firm Dynamics; Input Allocation and Productivity; Labor Demand; intellectual property)
• Copeland, Brian (International trade, environmental economics, interaction between globalization, the environment, and the sustainability of renewable resources)
• Devereux, Michael (Economics, Macro and Monetary Economics Economic Policy, Monetary and Fiscal Policy, Deficits, Exchange Rates, Capital Flows, Financial Crises, International, monetary)
• Drelichman, Mauricio (Economic history, Spain, Argentina)
• Farinha Luz, Vitor (Microeconomic Theory,)
• Ferraz, Claudio (governance and accountability in developing countries; how politics affect public service delivery; the effects of electoral rules on political selection; the role of the state in high crime and violence environments)
• Fortin, Nicole (Wage inequality and its links to labour market institutions and public policies, including higher education policies economic progress of women, gender equality policies, and gender issues in education)
• Francois, Patrick (African Autocracies, Economics of Developing Countries, Indian Village Governance, Macro, development, problems in development economies, political economy and non profits)
• Gallipoli, Giovanni (Macroeconomics (including monetary and fiscal theory); Economic Policies; Economic Phenomena on a National or International Level; Economic Phenomena on an Individual or Organizational Level; applied microeconomics; computational economics; labor economics; macroeconomics; Consumption theory and measurement)
• Gao, Ying (Microeconomic theory; Signaling Games; Information Design)
• Green, David (Antibiotic Resistance,  Infectious Disease, Epidemiology, Determinants of the wage and employment structure bridging between macro labour and micro labour identification issues)
• Hnatkovska, Viktoriya (International finance, macroeconomics, development economics in India )
• Hoffmann, Florian (Labor Economics, Macro Economics, Income Inequality, Education, Mobility )
• Hwang, Il Myoung (empirical industrial organization and market design; evaluating different school choice mechanisms)
• Jaccard, Torsten (Economics; international trade)
• Juhasz, Reka (Economics; international trade; Economic History; Development and Growth; industrial policy and industrialization)
• Kasahara, Hiroyuki (Econometrics and international trade )
• Lahiri, Amartya (Exchange rates and monetary policy, growth and development, international economics, macroeconomics, and development economics)
• Lemieux, Thomas (labour market issues, Applied, labour, earnings inequality in Canada and other countries I am also interested in econometric methods used to analyze the earnings distribution and regression discontinuity designs)
• Li, Hao (Microeconomic theory, theory of contracts and organizations, and games and decisions )
• Li, Wei (Contract theory, applied game theory, and information economics I am deeply interested in the interaction of information and incentives in various economics and political environments )
• Lowe, Matthew (preference formation; social integration; political selection)

Doctoral Citations

Sample Thesis Submissions

• Partition estimation : theory and application
• Essays on household finance
• Trade credit, yield spreads, and supply chain vulnerabilities : insights into economic distortions and firm stability
• Essays in development economics : language, firms and information in Africa
• Essays in behavioral economics
• Three essays on industry and the environment
• Essays on worker mobility, spatial labor markets, and urban real estate markets
• Production network economies with household heterogeneity : a sufficient statistics approach
• Essays on the economics of crime and violence
• Essays in economic history and development
• Essays in optimal monetary policy
• Essays in labour economics
• Algorithmic learning in games
• Essays in development economics and economic history
• Essays on fiscal and monetary policy during economic crises

Related Programs

Same specialization.

• Master of Arts in Economics (MA)

Related Disciplines

• Doctor of Philosophy in Geography (PhD)
• Doctor of Philosophy in History (PhD)
• Doctor of Philosophy in Interdisciplinary Studies (PhD)
• Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science (PhD)

Further Information

Specialization.

Economics covers many fields including: macroeconomics, labour economics, international trade and finance, environmental economics, industrial organization, information and incentives, economic theory, health economics, development economics, and economic history.

UBC Calendar

Program website, faculty overview, academic unit, program identifier, classification, social media channels, supervisor search.

Departments/Programs may update graduate degree program details through the Faculty & Staff portal. To update contact details for application inquiries, please use this form .

Sebastian Gomez Cardona

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This city won’t disappoint. It has it all: sea, parks, mountains, beaches and all four seasons, including beautiful summers and mild, wet winters with snow.

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Philosophy of Economics

“Philosophy of Economics” consists of inquiries concerning (a) rational choice, (b) the appraisal of economic outcomes, institutions and processes, and (c) the ontology of economic phenomena and the possibilities of acquiring knowledge of them. Although these inquiries overlap in many ways, it is useful to divide philosophy of economics in this way into three subject matters which can be regarded respectively as branches of action theory, ethics (or normative social and political philosophy), and philosophy of science. Economic theories of rationality, welfare, and social choice defend substantive philosophical theses often informed by relevant philosophical literature and of evident interest to those interested in action theory, philosophical psychology, and social and political philosophy. Economics is of particular interest to those interested in epistemology and philosophy of science both because of its detailed peculiarities and because it possesses many of the overt features of the natural sciences, while its object consists of social phenomena.

1.1 The emergence of economics and of economies

1.2 contemporary economics and its several schools, 2.1 positive versus normative economics, 2.2 reasons versus causes, 2.3 social scientific naturalism, 2.4 abstraction, idealization, and ceteris paribus clauses in economics, 2.5 causation in economics and econometrics, 2.6 structure and strategy of economics: paradigms and research programmes, 3.1 classical economics and the method a priori, 3.2 friedman and the defense of “unrealistic assumptions”, 4.1 popperian approaches, 4.2 the rhetoric of economics, 4.3 “realism” in economic methodology, 4.4 economic methodology and social studies of science, 4.5 case studies, 5.1 individual rationality, 5.2 collective rationality and social choice, 5.3 game theory, 6.1 welfare, 6.2 efficiency, 6.3 other directions in normative economics, 7. conclusions, economic methodology, ethics and economics, rationality, other works cited, related entries, 1. introduction: what is economics.

Both the definition and the precise domain of economics are subjects of controversy within philosophy of economics. At first glance, the difficulties in defining economics may not appear serious. Economics is, after all, concerned with aspects of the production, exchange, distribution, and consumption of commodities and services. But this claim and the terms it contains are vague; and it is arguable that economics is relevant to a great deal more. It helps to approach the question, “What is economics?” historically, before turning to comments on contemporary features of the discipline.

Philosophical reflection on economics is ancient, but the conception of the economy as a distinct object of study dates back only to the 18th century. Aristotle addresses some problems that most would recognize as pertaining to economics, mainly as problems concerning how to manage a household. Scholastic philosophers addressed ethical questions concerning economic behavior, and they condemned usury — that is, the taking of interest on money. With the increasing importance of trade and of nation-states in the early modern period, ‘mercantilist’ philosophers and pamphleteers were largely concerned with the balance of trade and the regulation of the currency. There was an increasing recognition of the complexities of the financial management of the state and of the possibility that the way that the state taxed and acted influenced the production of wealth.

In the early modern period, those who reflected on the sources of a country’s wealth recognized that the annual harvest, the quantities of goods manufactured, and the products of mines and fisheries depend on facts about nature, individual labor and enterprise, tools and what we would call “capital goods”, and state and social regulations. Trade also seemed advantageous, at least if the terms were good enough. It took no conceptual leap to recognize that manufacturing and farming could be improved and that some taxes and tariffs might be less harmful to productive activities than others. But to formulate the idea that there is such a thing as “the economy” with regularities that can be investigated requires a bold further step. In order for there to be an object of inquiry, there must be regularities in production and exchange; and for the inquiry to be non-trivial, these regularities must go beyond what is obvious to the producers, consumers, and exchangers themselves. Only in the eighteenth century, most clearly illustrated by the work of Cantillon, the physiocrats, David Hume , and especially Adam Smith (see the entry on Smith’s moral and political philosophy ), does one find the idea that there are laws to be discovered that govern the complex set of interactions that produce and distribute consumption goods and the resources and tools that produce them (Backhouse 2002).

Crucial to the possibility of a social object of scientific inquiry is the idea of tracing out the unintended consequences of the intentional actions of individuals. Thus, for example, Hume traces the rise in prices and the temporary increase in economic activity that follow an increase in currency to the perceptions and actions of individuals who first spend the additional currency (1752). In spending their additional gold imported from abroad, traders do not intend to increase the price level. But that is what they do nevertheless. Adam Smith expands and perfects this insight and offers a systematic Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations . From his account of the demise of feudalism (1776, Book II, Ch. 4) to his famous discussion of the invisible hand, Smith emphasizes unintended consequences. “[H]e intends only his own gain; and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it” (1776, Book IV, Ch. 2). The existence of regularities, which are the unintended consequences of individual choices gives rise to an object of scientific investigation.

One can distinguish the domain of economics from the domain of other social scientific inquiries either by specifying some set of causal factors or by specifying some range of phenomena. The phenomena with which economists are concerned are production, consumption, distribution and exchange—particularly via markets. But since so many different causal factors are relevant to these, including the laws of thermodynamics, metallurgy, geography and social norms, even the laws governing digestion, economics cannot be distinguished from other inquiries only by the phenomena it studies. Some reference to a set of central causal factors is needed. Thus, for example, John Stuart Mill maintained that, “Political economy…[is concerned with] such of the phenomena of the social state as take place in consequence of the pursuit of wealth. It makes entire abstraction of every other human passion or motive, except those which may be regarded as perpetually antagonising principles to the desire of wealth, namely aversion to labour, and desire of the present enjoyment of costly indulgences.” (1843, Book VI, Chapter 9, Section 3) In Mill’s view, economics is mainly concerned with the consequences of individual pursuit of tangible wealth, though it takes some account of less significant motives such as aversion to labor.

Mill takes it for granted that individuals act rationally in their pursuit of wealth and luxury and avoidance of labor, rather than in a disjointed or erratic way, but he has no theory of consumption, or explicit theory of rational economic choice, and his theory of resource allocation is rather thin. These gaps were gradually filled during the so-called neoclassical or marginalist revolution, which linked choice of some object of consumption (and its price) not to its total utility but to its marginal utility. For example, water is obviously extremely useful, but in much of the world it is plentiful enough that another glass more or less matters little to an agent. So water is cheap. Early “neoclassical” economists such as William Stanley Jevons held that agents make consumption choices so as to maximize their own happiness (1871). This implies that they distribute their expenditures so that a dollar’s worth of water or porridge or upholstery makes the same contribution to their happiness. The “marginal utility” of a dollar’s worth of each good is the same.

In the Twentieth Century, economists stripped this theory of its hedonistic clothing (Pareto 1909, Hicks and Allen 1934). Rather than supposing that all consumption choices can be ranked by how much they promote an agent’s happiness, economists focused on the ranking itself. All that they suppose concerning evaluations is that agents are able consistently to rank the alternatives they face. This is equivalent to supposing first that rankings are complete — that is, for any two alternatives x and y that the agent considers, either the agent ranks x above y (prefers x to y ), or the agent prefers y to x , or the agent is indifferent. Second, economists suppose that agent’s rankings of alternatives (preferences) are transitive. To say that an agent’s preferences are transitive is to claim that if the agent prefers x to y and y to z , then the agent prefers x to z , with similar claims concerning indifference and combinations of indifference and preference. Though there are further technical conditions to extend the theory to infinite sets of alternatives and to capture further plausible rationality conditions concerning gambles, economists generally subscribe to a view of rational agents as at least possessing complete and transitive preferences and as choosing among the feasible alternatives whichever they most prefer. In the theory of revealed preference, economists have attempted unsuccessfully to eliminate all reference to subjective preference or to define preference in terms of choices (Samuelson 1947, Houtthaker 1950, Little 1957, Sen 1971, 1973, Hausman 2012, chapter 3).

In clarifying the view of rationality that characterizes economic agents, economists have for the most part continued to distinguish economics from other social inquiries by the content of the motives or preferences with which it is concerned. So even though people may seek happiness through asceticism, or they may rationally prefer to sacrifice all their worldly goods to a political cause, economists have supposed that such preferences are rare and unimportant to economics. Economists are concerned with the phenomena deriving from rationality coupled with a desire for wealth and for larger bundles of goods and services.

Economists have flirted with a less substantive characterization of individual motivation and with a more expansive view of the domain of economics. In his influential monograph, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science , Lionel Robbins defined economics as “the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” (1932, p. 15). According to Robbins, economics is not concerned with production, exchange, distribution, or consumption as such. It is instead concerned with an aspect of all human action. Robbins’ definition helps one to understand efforts to apply economic concepts, models, and techniques to other subject matters such as the analysis of voting behavior and legislation, even as economics maintains its connection to a traditional domain.

Contemporary economics is diverse. There are many schools and many branches. Even so-called “orthodox” or “mainstream” economics has many variants. Some mainstream economics is highly theoretical, though most of it is applied and relies on rudimentary theory. Theoretical and applied work can be distinguished as microeconomics or macroeconomics. There is also a third branch, econometrics which is devoted to the empirical estimation, elaboration, and to some extent testing of microeconomic and macroeconomic models (but see Summers 1991 and Hoover 1994).

Microeconomics focuses on relations among individuals (with firms and households frequently counting as honorary individuals and little said about the idiosyncrasies of the demand of particular individuals). Individuals have complete and transitive preferences that govern their choices. Consumers prefer more commodities to fewer and have “diminishing marginal rates of substitution” — i. e. they will pay less for units of a commodity when they already have lots of it than when they have little of it. Firms attempt to maximize profits in the face of diminishing returns: holding fixed all the inputs into production except one, output increases when there is more of the remaining input, but at a diminishing rate. Economists idealize and suppose that in competitive markets, firms and individuals cannot influence prices, but economists are also interested in strategic interactions, in which the rational choices of separate individuals are interdependent. Game theory, which is devoted to the study of strategic interactions, is of growing importance in economics. Economists model the outcome of the profit-maximizing activities of firms and the attempts of consumers optimally to satisfy their preferences as an equilibrium in which there is no excess demand on any market. What this means is that anyone who wants to buy anything at the going market price is able to do so. There is no excess demand, and unless a good is free, there is no excess supply.

Macroeconomics grapples with the relations among economic aggregates, such as relations between the money supply and the rate of interest or the rate of growth, focusing especially on problems concerning the business cycle and the influence of monetary and fiscal policy on economic outcomes. Many mainstream economists would like to unify macroeconomics and microeconomics, but few economists are satisfied with the attempts that have been made to do so, especially via so called “representative agents” (Kirman 1992, Hoover 2001a). Macroeconomics is immediately relevant to economic policy and hence (and unsurprisingly) subject to much more heated (and politically-charged) controversy than microeconomics or econometrics. Schools of macroeconomics include Keynesians (and “new-Keynesians”), monetarists, “new classical economics” (rational expectations theory — Begg 1982, Carter and Maddock 1984, Hoover 1988, Minford and Peel 1983), and “real business cycle” theories (Kydland and Prescott 1991, 1994; Sent 1998).

Branches of mainstream economics are also devoted to specific questions concerning growth, finance, employment, agriculture, housing, natural resources, international trade, and so forth. Within orthodox economics, there are also many different approaches, such as agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama 1980), the Chicago school (Becker 1976), or public choice theory (Brennan and Buchanan 1985, Buchanan 1975). These address questions concerning incentives within firms and families and the ways that institutions guide choices.

Although mainstream economics is dominant and demands the most attention, there are many other schools. Austrian economists accept orthodox views of choices and constraints, but they emphasize uncertainty and question whether one should regard outcomes as equilibria, and they are skeptical about the value of mathematical modeling (Buchanan and Vanberg 1989, Dolan 1976, Kirzner 1976, Mises 1949, 1978, 1981, Rothbard 1957, Wiseman 1983, Boettke 2010, Holcombe 2014, Nell 2014a, 2014b, 2017, Boettke and Coyne 2015, Hagedorn 2015, Horwitz 2015, Dekker 2016, Linsbichler 2017 ).

Traditional institutionalist economists question the value of abstract general theorizing and emphasize evolutionary concepts (Dugger 1979, Wilber and Harrison 1978, Wisman and Rozansky 1991, Hodgson 2000, 2013, 2016, Hodgson and Knudsen 2010, Delorme 2010, Richter 2015). They emphasize the importance of generalizations concerning norms and behavior within particular institutions. Applied work in institutional economics is sometimes very similar to applied orthodox economics. More recent work in economics, which is also called institutionalist, attempts to explain features of institutions by emphasizing the costs of transactions, the inevitable incompleteness of contracts, and the problems “principals” face in monitoring and directing their agents (Coase 1937; Williamson 1985; Mäki et al. 1993, North 1990; Brousseau and Glachant 2008).

Marxian and socialist economists traditionally articulated and developed Karl Marx’s economic theories, but recently many socialist economists have revised traditional Marxian concepts and themes with tools borrowed from orthodox economic theory (Morishima 1973, Roemer 1981, 1982, Bowles 2012, Piketty 2014, Lebowitz 2015, Auerbach 2016, Beckert 2016, Jacobs and Mazzucato 2016).

There are also socio-economists , who are concerned with the norms that govern choices (Etzioni 1988, 2018), behavioral economists , who study the nitty-gritty of choice behavior (Winter 1962, Thaler 1994, Ben Ner and Putterman 1998, Kahneman and Tversky 2000, Camerer 2003, Camerer and Loewenstein 2003, Camerer et al. 2003, Loewenstein 2008, Thaler and Sunstein 2008, Saint-Paul 2011, Oliver 2013), post-Keynesians , who look to Keynes’s work and especially his emphasis on demand (Dow 1985, Kregel 1976, Harcourt and Kriesler 2013 Rochon and Rossi 2017), evolutionary economists , who emphasize the importance of institutions (Witt 2008, Hodgson and Knudsen 2010, Vromen 2009, Hodgson 2013, 2016, Carsten 2013, Dopfer and Potts 2014, Wilson and Kirman 2016), neo-Ricardians , who emphasize relations among economic classes (Sraffa 1960, Pasinetti 1981, Roncaglia 1978), and even neuroeconomists , who study neurological concomitants of choice behavior (Camerer 2007, Camerer et al. 2005, Camerer et al. 2008, Glimcher et al. 2008, Loewenstein et al. 2008, Rusticinni 2005, 2008, Glimcher 2010). Economics is not one homogeneous enterprise.

2. Six central methodological problems

Although the different branches and schools of economics raise a wide variety of epistemological and ontological issues concerning economics, six problems have been central to methodological reflection (in this philosophical sense) concerning economics:

Policy makers look to economics to guide policy, and it seems inevitable that even the most esoteric issues in theoretical economics may bear on some people’s material interests. The extent to which economics bears on and may be influenced by normative concerns raises methodological questions about the relationships between a positive science concerning “facts” and a normative inquiry into values and what ought to be. Most economists and methodologists believe that there is a reasonably clear distinction between facts and values, between what is and what ought to be, and they believe that most of economics should be regarded as a positive science that helps policy makers choose means to accomplish their ends, though it does not bear on the choice of ends itself.

This view is questionable for several reasons (Mongin 2006, Hausman, McPherson, and Satz 2017). First, economists have to interpret and articulate the incomplete specifications of goals and constraints provided by policy makers (Machlup 1969b). Second, economic “science” is a human activity, and like all human activities, it is governed by values. Those values need not be the same as the values that influence economic policy, but it is debatable whether the values that govern the activity of economists can be sharply distinguished from the values that govern policy makers. Third, much of economics is built around a normative theory of rationality. One can question whether the values implicit in such theories are sharply distinguishable from the values that govern policies. For example, it may be difficult to hold a maximizing view of individual rationality, while at the same time insisting that social policy should resist maximizing growth, wealth, or welfare in the name of freedom, rights, or equality. Fourth, people’s views of what is right and wrong are, as a matter of fact, influenced by their beliefs about how people in fact behave. There is evidence that studying theories that depict individuals as self-interested leads people to regard self-interested behavior more favorably and to become more self-interested (Marwell and Ames 1981, Frank et al . 1993). Finally, people’s judgments are clouded by their interests. Since economic theories bear so centrally on people’s interests, there are bound to be ideological biases at work in the discipline (Marx 1867, Preface). Positive and normative are especially interlinked within economics, because economists are not all researchers and teachers. In addition, economists work as commentators and as it were “hired guns” whose salaries depend on arriving at the conclusions their employers want. The bitter polemics concerning macroeconomic policy responses to the great recession beginning in 2008 testify to the influence of ideology.

Orthodox theoretical microeconomics is as much a theory of rational choices as it a theory that explains and predicts economic outcomes. Since virtually all economic theories that discuss individual choices take individuals as acting for reasons, and thus in some way rational, questions about the role that views of rationality and reasons should play in economics are of general importance. Economists are typically concerned with the aggregate results of individual choices rather than with the actions of particular individuals, but their theories in fact offer both causal explanations for why individuals choose as they do and accounts of the reasons for their choices. See also the entries on methodological individualism and reasons for action: justification, motivation, explanation .

Explanations in terms of reasons have several features that distinguish them from explanations in terms of causes. Reasons purport to justify the actions they explain, and indeed so called “external reasons” (Williams 1981) only justify action, without purporting to explain it. Reasons can be evaluated, and they are responsive to criticism. Reasons, unlike causes, must be intelligible to those for whom they are reasons. On grounds such as these, many philosophers have questioned whether explanations of human action can be causal explanations (von Wright 1971, Winch 1958). Yet merely giving a reason — even an extremely good reason — fails to explain an agent’s action, if the reason was not in fact “effective.” Someone might, for example, start attending church regularly and give as his reason a concern with salvation. But others might suspect that this agent is deceiving himself and that the minister’s attractive daughter is in fact responsible for his renewed interest in religion. Donald Davidson (1963) argued that what distinguishes the reasons that explain an action from the reasons that fail to explain it is that the former are also causes of the action. Although the account of rationality within economics differs in some ways from the folk psychology people tacitly invoke in everyday explanations of actions, many of the same questions carry over (Rosenberg 1976, ch. 5; 1980, Hausman 2012).

An additional difference between explanations in terms of reasons and explanations in terms of causes, which some economists have emphasized, is that the beliefs and preferences that explain actions may depend on mistakes and ignorance (Knight 1935). As a first approximation, economists can abstract from such difficulties caused by the intentionality of belief and desire. They thus often assume that people have perfect information about all the relevant facts. In that way theorists need not worry about what people’s beliefs are. (If people have perfect information, then they believe and expect whatever the facts are.) But once one goes beyond this first approximation, difficulties arise which have no parallel in the natural sciences. Choice depends on how things look “from the inside”, which may be very different from the actual state of affairs. Consider for example the stock market. The “true” value of a stock depends on the future profits of the company, which are of course uncertain. In 2006 house prices in the U.S. were extremely inflated. But whether they were “too high” depended at least in the short run, on what people believe. They were excellent investments if one could sell them to others who would be willing to pay even more for them. Economists disagree about how significant this subjectivity is. Members of the Austrian school argue that these differences are of great importance and sharply distinguish theorizing about economics from theorizing about any of the natural sciences (Buchanan and Vanberg 1989, von Mises 1981).

Of all the social sciences, economics most closely resembles the natural sciences. Economic theories have been axiomatized, and articles and books of economics are full of theorems. Of all the social sciences, only economics boasts an ersatz Nobel Prize. Economics is thus a test case for those concerned with the extent of the similarities between the natural and social sciences. Those who have wondered whether social sciences must differ fundamentally from the natural sciences seem to have been concerned mainly with three questions:

(i) Are there fundamental differences between the structure or concepts of theories and explanations in the natural and social sciences? Some of these issues were already mentioned in the discussion above of reasons versus causes.

(ii) Are there fundamental differences in goals? Philosophers and economists have argued that in addition to or instead of the predictive and explanatory goals of the natural sciences, the social sciences should aim at providing us with understanding . Weber and others have argued that the social sciences should provide us with an understanding “from the inside”, that we should be able to empathize with the reactions of the agents and to find what happens “understandable” (Weber 1904, Knight 1935, Machlup 1969a). This (and the closely related recognition that explanations cite reasons rather than just causes) seems to introduce an element of subjectivity into the social sciences that is not found in the natural sciences.

(iii) Owing to the importance of human choices (or perhaps free will), are social phenomena too irregular to be captured within a framework of laws and theories? Given human free will, perhaps human behavior is intrinsically unpredictable and not subject to any laws. But there are, in fact, many regularities in human action, and given the enormous causal complexity characterizing some natural systems, the natural sciences must cope with many irregularities, too.

Economics raises questions concerning the legitimacy of severe abstraction and idealization. For example, mainstream economic models often stipulate that everyone is perfectly rational and has perfect information or that commodities are infinitely divisible. Such claims are exaggerations, and they are clearly false. Other schools of economics may not employ idealizations that are this extreme, but there is no way to do economics if one is not willing to simplify drastically and abstract from many complications. How much simplification, idealization, abstraction or “isolation” (Mäki 2006) is legitimate?

In addition, because economists attempt to study economic phenomena as constituting a separate domain, influenced only by a small number of causal factors, the claims of economics are true only ceteris paribus — that is, they are true only if there are no interferences or disturbing causes. What are ceteris paribus clauses, and when if ever are they legitimate in science? Questions concerning ceteris paribus clauses are closely related to questions concerning simplifications and idealizations, since one way to simplify is to suppose that the various disturbing causes or interferences are inactive and to explore the consequences of some small number of causal factors. These issues and the related question of how well supported economics is by the evidence have been the central questions in economic methodology. They will be discussed further below mainly in Section 3 .

Many important generalizations in economics are causal claims. For example, the law of demand asserts that a price increase will ( ceteris paribus ) diminish the quantity demanded. (It does not merely assert an inverse relationship between price and demand. When demand increases for some other reason, such as a change in tastes, price increases .) Econometricians have also been deeply concerned with the possibilities of determining causal relations from statistical evidence and with the relevance of causal relations to the possibility of consistent estimation of parameter values. Since concerns about the consequences of alternative policies are so central to economics, causal inquiry is unavoidable.

Before the 1930s, economists were generally willing to use causal language explicitly and literally, despite some concerns that there might be a conflict between causal analysis of economic changes and “comparative statics” treatments of equilibrium states. Some economists were also worried that thinking in terms of causes was not compatible with recognizing the multiplicity and mutuality of determination in economic equilibrium. In the anti-metaphysical intellectual environment of the 1930s and 1940s (of which logical positivism was at least symptomatic), any mention of causation became suspicious, and economists commonly pretended to avoid causal concepts. The consequence was that they ceased to reflect carefully on the causal concepts that they continued implicitly to invoke (Hausman 1983, 1990, Helm 1984, Runde 1998). For example, rather than formulating the law of demand in terms of the causal consequences of price changes for quantity demanded, economists tried to confine themselves to discussing the mathematical function relating price and quantity demanded. There were important exceptions (Haavelmo 1944, Simon 1953, Wold 1954), and during the past generation, this state of affairs has changed dramatically.

For example, in his Causality in Macroeconomics (2001b) Kevin Hoover develops feasible methods for investigating large scale causal questions, such as whether changes in the money supply ( M ) cause changes in the rate of inflation P or accommodate changes in P that are otherwise caused. If changes in M cause changes in P , then the conditional distribution of P on M should remain stable with exogenous changes in M , but should change with exogenous changes in P . Hoover argues that historical investigation, backed by statistical inquiry, can justify the conclusion that some particular changes in M or P have been exogenous. One can then determine the causal direction by examining the stability of the conditional distributions. Econometricians have made vital contributions to the contemporary revival of philosophical interest in the notion of causation. In addition to Hoover’s work, see for example Geweke (1982), Granger (1969, 1980), Cartwright (1989), Sims (1977), Zellner and Aigner (1988), Pearl (2000), Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (2001).

One relatively secure way to determine causal relations is via randomized controlled experiments. If the experimenters sort subjects randomly into experimental and control groups and vary just one factor, then, unless by bad luck the two groups differ in some unknown way, changes in the outcomes given the common features of the control and treatment groups should be due to the difference in the one factor. Indeed, in the case of quantitative variables, one can calculate average causal effects (Deaton 2010). This makes randomized controlled trials very attractive, though no panacea, since the treatment and control groups may not be representative of the population in which policy-makers hope to apply the causal conclusions, and the causal consequences of the intervention might differ across different subgroups within the control and treatment groups (Worrall 2007, Cartwright and Hardie 2013).

For both practical and ethical reasons, it is often hard to experiment in economics (though, as discussed in section 4.5, far from impossible). But with some ingenuity and with far greater enthusiasm for experimentation than had been the case previously, economists are experimenting much more frequently both in the laboratory and in the field. In addition, as a substitute for experimentation, or as a way of stretching the limits on experimentation, economists in recent years have become very enthusiastic about so-called “instrumental variable” techniques. For example, merely examining the correlation between economic growth and development aid, even controlling for other factors known to influence economic growth is unlikely to reveal the causal influence of aid on growth, because aid may reciprocally depend on growth and well as many factors that are hard to measure that also influence growth. These problems can be to some extent circumvented if economists can find an “instrumental” variable x upon which aid depends that influences growth (if at all) only by its influence on aid and which is probabilistically independent of all other determinants of growth. In that case, one can use the effect of x on growth to estimate the effect of aid on growth. Instrumental variable techniques, policy experimentation, and reliance on “natural experiments” have become widespread, though they bring with them new problems extrapolating experimental results to the target population (Deaton 2010; Cartwright and Hardie 2013).

In the wake of the work of Kuhn (1970) and Lakatos (1970), philosophers are much more aware of and interested in the larger theoretical structures that unify and guide research within particular research traditions. Since many theoretical projects or approaches in economics are systematically unified, they pose questions about what guides research, and many economists have applied the work of Kuhn or Lakatos in the attempt to shed light on the overall structure of economics (Baumberg 1977, Blaug 1976, de Marchi and Blaug 1991, Bronfenbrenner 1971, Coats 1969, Dillard 1978, Hands 1985b, Hausman 1992, ch. 6, Hutchison 1978, Latsis 1976, Jalladeau 1978, Kunin and Weaver 1971, Stanfield 1974, Weintraub 1985, Worland 1972). Whether these applications have been successful is controversial, but the comparison of the structure of economics to Kuhn’s and Lakatos’ schema served to highlight distinctive features of economics and may have contributed to some of the changes that economics has undergone. For example, asking what the “positive heuristic” of mainstream economics consists in permits one to see that mainstream theoretical models typically attempted to demonstrate that an economic equilibrium will obtain, and thus that mainstream models were unified in more than just their common assumptions. Since the success of research projects in economics is controversial, understanding their global structure and strategy helped to clarify their drawbacks as well as their advantages.

3. Inexactness, ceteris paribus clauses, tendencies, “unrealistic assumptions” and models

As mentioned in the previous section, the most important methodological issue concerning economics involves the very considerable simplification, idealization, and abstraction that characterizes economic theory and the consequent doubts these features of economics raise concerning whether economics is well supported. Claims such as, “Agents prefer larger commodity bundles to smaller commodity bundles,” raise serious questions, because if they are interpreted as universal generalizations, they are false; and philosophy of science has traditionally supposed that science is devoted to the discovery of genuine laws—that is, true universal generalizations. Even though it is false that everyone always prefers larger commodity bundles to smaller, the generalization seems informative and useful. Can a science rest on false generalizations? If these claims are not universal generalizations, then what is their logical form? And how can claims that appear in this way to be false or approximate be tested and confirmed or disconfirmed? These problems have bedeviled economists and economic methodologists from the first methodological reflections to the present day.

The first extended reflections on economic methodology appear in the work of Nassau Senior (1836) and John Stuart Mill (1836). Their essays must be understood against the background of both the economic theory and the philosophy of science of their times. Like Smith’s economics (to which it owed a great deal) and modern economics, the “classical” economics of the middle decades of the 19th century traced economic regularities to the choices of individuals facing social and natural constraints. But, as compared to Smith, more reliance was placed on severely simplified models. David Ricardo’s Principles of Political Economy (1817), draws a portrait in which wages above the subsistence level lead to increases in the population, which in turn require more intensive agriculture or cultivation of inferior land. The extension of cultivation leads to lower profits and higher rents; and the whole tale of economic development leads to a gloomy stationary state in which profits are too low to command any net investment, wages slide back to subsistence levels, and only the landlords are affluent.

Fortunately for the world, but unfortunately for economic theorists of the mid 19th century, the data consistently contradicted the trends the theory predicted (de Marchi 1970). Yet the theory continued to hold sway for more than half a century, and the consistently unfavorable data were explained away as due to various “disturbing causes.” It is consequently not surprising that Senior’s and Mill’s accounts of the method of economics emphasize the relative autonomy of theory.

Mill distinguishes between two main kinds of inductive methods. The method a posteriori is a method of direct experience. In his view, it is only suitable for phenomena in which few causal factors are operating or in which experimental controls are possible. Mill’s famous methods of induction provide an articulation of the method a posteriori . In his method of difference, for example, one holds fixed every causal factor except one and checks to see whether the effect ceases to obtain when that one factor is removed. The goal is to identify exceptionless causal laws.

Mill maintains that direct inductive methods cannot be used to study phenomena in which many causal factors are in play. If, for example, one attempts to investigate whether tariffs enhance or impede prosperity by comparing the prosperity of nations with high tariffs and nations without high tariffs, the results will be uninformative, because prosperity depends on so many other causal factors. So, Mill argues, one needs instead to employ the method a priori . Despite its name, this too is an inductive method. However, unlike the method a posteriori , the method a priori is an indirect inductive method. Scientists first determine the laws governing individual causal factors in domains in which Mill’s methods of induction are applicable. Having then determined the laws of the individual causes, they investigate their combined consequences deductively. Finally, there is a role for “verification” of the combined consequences, but owing to the causal complications, this testing has comparatively little weight. The testing of the conclusions serves only as a check on the scientist’s deductions and as an indicator of whether there are significant disturbing causes that scientists have not yet accounted for.

Mill gives the example of the science of the tides. Physicists determined the law of gravitation by studying planetary motion, in which gravity is the only significant causal factor. Then physicists develop the theory of tides deductively from that law and information concerning the positions and motions of the moon and sun. The implications of the theory will be inexact and sometimes badly mistaken, because many subsidiary causal factors influence tides. Testing theories of tides can uncover mistakes in the deductions physicists made, and it may uncover evidence concerning the role of the subsidiary factors. But because of the causal complexity, such testing does little to confirm or disconfirm the law of gravitation, which has already been established. Although Mill does not often use the language of “ ceteris paribus ”, his view that the principles or “laws” of economics hold in the absence of “interferences” or “disturbing causes” provides an account of how the principles of economics can be true ceteris paribus (Hausman 1992, ch. 8, 12).

Because economic theory includes only the most important causes and necessarily ignores minor causes, its claims, like claims concerning tides, are inexact. Its predictions will be imprecise, and sometimes far off. Mill maintains that it is nevertheless possible to develop and confirm economic theory by studying in simpler domains the laws governing the major causal factors and then deducing their consequences in more complicated circumstances. For example, the statistical data are ambiguous concerning the relationship between minimum wages and unemployment of unskilled workers; and since the minimum wage has never been extremely high, there are no data about what unemployment would be in those circumstances. On the other hand, everyday experience teaches economists that firms can choose among more or less labor-intensive processes and that a high minimum wage will make more labor-intensive processes more expensive. On the assumption that firms try to keep their costs down, economists have good (though not conclusive) reason to believe that a high minimum wage will increase unemployment.

In defending a view of economics as in this way inexact and employing the method a priori, Mill thought he was able to reconcile his empiricism and his commitment to Ricardo’s economics. Although Mill’s views on economic methodology were challenged later in the nineteenth century by economists who believed that theory was too remote from the contingencies of policy and history (Roscher 1874, Schmoller 1888, 1898), Mill’s methodological views dominated the mainstream of economic theory for a century (for example, Cairnes 1875). Mill’s vision survived the so-called neoclassical revolution in economics beginning in the 1870s and is clearly discernible in the most important methodological treatises concerning neoclassical economics, such as John Neville Keynes’ The Scope and Method of Political Economy (1891) or Lionel Robbins’ An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (1932). Hausman (1992) argues that current methodological practice closely resembles Mill’s methodology, despite the fact that few economists explicitly defend it.

Although this way of interpreting Mill and the methodology of economics is coherent and conforms to an old-fashioned empiricist philosophy of science that finds the nomological force of generalizations in their universality, it is not faithful to the way in which economists see their theories. Rather than regarding generalizations such as acquisitiveness as universal laws carrying implicit ceteris paribus qualifications in their antecedents, economists are much more likely to regard these generalizations as “tendencies” that continue to operate even when defeated by interferences and that need to be studied separately (Woodward 2003). Even Mill speaks of tendencies, though without reconciling his talk of tendencies with his empiricism. If one sets aside metaphysical qualms about tendencies and counterfactuals, the most natural way to see economic theorizing is as the counterfactual investigation of combinations of tendencies. As the discussion below of models confirms, such views are congenial to economists and puzzling to philosophers with empiricist scruples.

Conceptualizing of economic inquiry as the study of models and tendencies, seems to shift the terms of the problems posed by inexactness rather than to offer a solution. Julian Reiss has, in effect, rediscovered the problem in an influential essay, “The Explanation Paradox.” (2013), where he argues that the following three propositions are inconsistent: (1) Economic models are false. (2) Economic models are explanatory. (3) Explanation requires truth.The formulation is a bit obscure, since models are not single sentences or propositions that can be true or false, but it should be clear that Reiss’s putative paradox is a reformulation of the problem posed by the inexactness of economic theories or models.

Although some contemporary philosophers have argued that Mill’s method a priori is largely defensible (Bhaskar 1975, Cartwright 1989, and Hausman 1992), by the middle of the Twentieth Century Mill’s views appeared to many economists out of step with their understanding of contemporary philosophy of science. Without studying Mill’s text carefully, it was easy for economists to misunderstand his terminology and to regard his method a priori as opposed to empiricism. Others took seriously Mill’s view that the basic principles of economics should be empirically established and found evidence to cast doubt on some of the basic principles, particularly the view that firms attempt to maximize profits (Hall and Hitch 1938, Lester 1946, 1947). Methodologists who were well-informed about contemporary developments in philosophy of science, such as Terence Hutchison (1938), denounced “pure theory” in economics as unscientific.

Philosophically reflective economists proposed several ways to replace the old-fashioned Millian view with a more up-to-date methodology that would continue to justify much of current practice (see particularly Machlup 1955, 1960 and Koopmans 1957). By far the most influential of these efforts was Milton Friedman’s 1953 essay, “The Methodology of Positive Economics.” This essay has had an enormous influence, far more than any other work on methodology.

Friedman begins his essay by distinguishing in a conventional way between positive and normative economics and conjecturing that policy disputes are typically really disputes about the consequences of alternatives and can thus be resolved by progress in positive economics. Turning to positive economics, Friedman asserts (without argument) that correct prediction concerning phenomena not yet observed is the ultimate goal of all positive sciences. He holds a practical view of science and finds the value of science in predictions that will guide policy.

Since it is difficult and often impossible to carry out experiments and since the uncontrolled phenomena economists observe are difficult to interpret (owing to the same causal complexity that bothered Mill), it is hard to judge whether a particular theory is a good basis for predictions or not. Tendencies are not universal laws. A claim such as “firms attempt to maximize profits” will be “unrealistic” in the sense that it is not a true universal generalization. Although not in these terms, Friedman objects to criticisms of tendencies that in effect complain that they are merely tendencies, rather than universal laws. If his criticism stopped there, it would be sensible, although it would avoid the problems of understanding and appraising claims about tendencies.

But Friedman draws a much more radical conclusion. In his terminology, the mistake economists make who criticize claims such as “firms attempt to maximize profits” lies in the attempt to test theories by the “realism” of their “assumptions” rather than by the accuracy of their predictions. He maintains that the realism of a theory’s assumptions is irrelevant to its predictive value. It does not matter whether the assumption that firms maximize profits is realistic. Theories should be appraised exclusively in terms of the accuracy of their predictions. What matters is exclusively whether the theory of the firm makes correct and significant predictions.

As critics have pointed out (and almost all commentators have been critical), Friedman refers to several different things as “assumptions” of a theory and means several different things by speaking of assumptions as “unrealistic” (Brunner 1969). Since Friedman aims his criticism to those who investigate empirically whether firms in fact attempt to maximize profits, he must take “assumptions” to include central economic generalizations, such as “Firms attempt to maximize profits,” and by “unrealistic,” he must mean, among other things, “false.” In arguing that it is a mistake to appraise theories in terms of the realism of assumptions, Friedman is arguing at least that it is a mistake to appraise theories by investigating whether their central generalizations are true or false.

It would seem that this interpretation would render Friedman’s views inconsistent, because in testing whether firms attempt to maximize profits, one is checking whether predictions of theory concerning the behavior of firms are true or false. An “assumption” such as “firms maximize profits” is itself a prediction. But there is a further wrinkle. Friedman is not concerned with every prediction of economic theories. In Friedman’s view, “theory is to be judged by its predictive power exclusively for the class of phenomena which it is intended to explain” (1953, p. 8 [italics added]). Economists are interested in only some of the implications of economic theories. Other predictions, such as those concerning the results of surveys of managers, are irrelevant to policy. What matters is whether economic theories are successful at predicting the phenomena that economists are interested in. In other words, Friedman believes that economic theories should be appraised in terms of their predictions concerning prices and quantities exchanged on markets. In his view, what matters is “narrow predictive success” (Hausman 2008a), not overall predictive adequacy.

So Friedman permits economists to ignore the disquieting findings of surveys, or the fact that people do not always prefer larger bundles of commodities to smaller bundles of commodities. Nor do economists need to be concerned about whether there is a tendency to prefer more commodities to fewer. They need not be troubled that some of their models suppose extravagantly that all agents know the prices of all present and future commodities in all markets. All that matters is whether the predictions concerning market phenomena turn out to be correct. And since anomalous market outcomes could be due to any number of uncontrolled causal factors, while experiments are difficult to carry out, it turns out that economists need not worry about ever encountering evidence that would strongly disconfirm fundamental theory. Detailed models may be confirmed or disconfirmed, but fundamental theory is safe. In this way one can understand how Friedman’s methodology, which appears to justify the eclectic and pragmatic view that economists should use any model that appears to “work” regardless of how absurd or unreasonable its assumptions might appear, has been deployed in service of a rigid theoretical orthodoxy. For other discussions of Friedman’s essay, see Bear and Orr 1969, Boland 1979, Hammond 1992, Hirsch and de Marchi 1990, Mäki 1990a, Melitz 1963, Rotwein 1959, and Samuelson 1963.

Over the last two decades there has been a surge of experimentation in economics, and Friedman’s methodological views probably do not command the same near unanimity that they used to. But they are still enormously influential, and they still serve as a way of avoiding awkward questions concerning simplifications, idealizations, and abstraction in economics rather than responding to them.

A century ago economists talked of their work in terms of “principles,” “laws,”, and “theories.” That language has not disappeared altogether: economists still talk of “game theory”, “consumer choice theory”, or the “law of demand”. But nowadays the standard intellectual tool or form in economics is a “model.” Econometricians speak of models and structures. Economists are more comfortable describing the axioms concerning rational choice as constituting a model of rational choice than as delineating a theory of rational choice. Many of the most distinguished commentators on models regard them as fictional worlds, whose study informs our understanding of actual phenomena (Frigg, 2010). “Creating models is ‘world-making.’” (Morgan 2012, pp. 95, 405). In their view, economists are able to investigate how causal factors would operate in the absence of interferences by constructing models —that is fictional economies—in which the interferences are absent. Uskali Mäki maintains that “Models are experiments. Experiments are models.” (2005). Dani Rodrik (2015) argues that economics consists of a collection of models, and that doing economics consists in selecting or customizing a model from this collection. Is the ubiquity of talk of models just a change in terminological fashion, or does the concern with models (which is by no means unique to economics) signal a methodological shift? What are models? These questions have been discussed by Cartwright 1989, 1999, Godfrey Smith 2006, Grüne-Yanoff 2009, Hausman 1992, 2015a, Kuorikoski and Lehtinen 2009, Mäki, ed. 1991, Mäki 2005, 2009a, 2009b, Morgan 2001, 2004, 2012, Morgan and Morrison 1999, Rappaport 1998, Sugden 2000, 2009, Weisberg 2007, and Lehtinen, Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2012.

The view of models to which economists are most attracted is philosophically problematic, because it is apparently committed to the existence of fictional entities whose properties and causal propensities economists can investigate. In experiments, whether carried out in a laboratory or in the field, experimenters interact causally with flesh and blood experimental subjects, and the outcome may contradict the economist’s predictions. In investigating a model, in contrast, the economist “interacts” with fictional entities, which are arguably nothing other than his or her own thoughts, and the logical implications of the axioms that define the model are never disappointed. This is not to say that the logical investigation of models never results in surprises. Humans are not logically omniscient, and discovering the implications of a set of axioms may be an arduous task. But it is a different task than carrying out an experiment in the laboratory or the field, and ontology of the “worlds” that economists allegedly “create” and then study is deeply puzzling. Although less faithful to economic practice, it is far more intelligible philosophically to regard models as predicates or as definitions of predicates (Hausman 1992). For example, when economists write down a model of a firm with a single output and just two inputs, they are defining a concept that they can use to describe actual firms.

4. Influential approaches to economic methodology

The past half century has witnessed the emergence of a large literature devoted to economic methodology. That literature explores many methodological approaches and applies its conclusions to many schools and branches of economics. Much of the literature has focused on the fundamental theory of mainstream economics — the theory of the equilibria resulting from constrained rational individual choice — but the tremendous importance of macroeconomics in determining the proper responses to the great recession beginning in 2008, coupled with the rapidly increasing role of empirical and experimental inquiries in the day-to-day work of economists have seen echoes in methodological inquiries (Backhouse 2010). Since 1985, there has been a journal Economics and Philosophy devoted specifically to philosophy of economics, and since 1994 there has also been a Journal of Economic Methodology . This section will sample some of the methodological approaches of the past two decades.

Karl Popper ’s philosophy of science has been influential among economists, as among other scientists. Popper defends what he calls a falsificationist methodology (1968, 1969). Scientists should formulate theories that are “logically falsifiable” — that is, inconsistent with some possible observation reports. “All crows are black” is logically falsifiable; it is inconsistent with (and would be falsified by) an observation report of a red crow. (Probabilistic claims are obviously not in this sense falsifiable.) Popper insists on falsifiability on the grounds that unfalsifiable claims that rule out no observations are uninformative. They provide no guidance concerning what to expect, and there is nothing to be learned from testing them. Second, Popper maintains that scientists should subject theories to harsh test and should be willing to reject them when they fail the tests. Third, scientists should regard theories as at best interesting conjectures. Passing a test does not confirm a theory or provide scientists with reason to believe it. It only justifies on the one hand continuing to employ the hypothesis (since it has not yet been falsified) and, on the other hand, devoting increased efforts to attempting to falsify it (since it has thus far survived testing). Popper has defended what he calls “situational logic” (which is basically rational choice theory) as the correct method for the social sciences (1967, 1976). There appear to be serious tensions between Popper’s falsificationism and his defense of situational logic, and his discussion of situational logic has not been as influential as his falsificationism. For discussion of how situational logic applies to economics, see Hands (1985a).

Given Popper’s falsificationism, there seems little hope of understanding how extreme simplifications can be legitimate or how current economic practice could be scientifically reputable. Economic theories and models are almost all unfalsifiable, and if they were, the widespread acceptance of Friedman’s methodological views would insure that they are not subjected to serious test. When models apparently fail tests, they are rarely repudiated. Economists conclude instead merely that they chose the wrong model for the task, or that there were disturbing causes. Economic models, which have not been well tested, are often taken to be well-established guides to policy, rather than merely conjectures. Critics of neoclassical economics have made these criticisms (Eichner 1983), but most of those who have espoused Popper’s philosophy of science have not repudiated mainstream economics and have not been harshly critical of its practitioners.

Mark Blaug (1992) and Terence Hutchison (1938, 1977, 1978, 2000), who are the most prominent Popperian methodologists, criticize particular features of economics, and they both call for more testing and a more critical attitude. For example, Blaug praises Gary Becker (1976) for his refusal to explain differences in choices by differences in preferences, but criticizes him for failing to go on and test his theories severely (1980a, chapter 14). However, both Blaug and Hutchison understate the radicalism of Popper’s views and take his message to be little more than that scientists should be critical and concerned to test their theories.

Blaug’s and Hutchison’s criticisms have sometimes been challenged on the grounds that economic theories cannot be tested, because of their ceteris paribus clauses and the many subsidiary assumptions required to derive testable implications (Caldwell 1984). But this response ignores Popper’s insistence that testing requires methodological decisions not to attribute failures of predictions to mistakes in subsidiary assumptions or to “interferences.” For views of Popper’s philosophy and its applicability to economics, see de Marchi (1988), Caldwell (1991), Boland (1982, 1989, 1992, 1997), and Boylan and O’Gorman (2007), Backhouse (2009), and Thomas (2017).

Applying Popper’s views on falsification literally would be destructive. Not only neoclassical economics, but all significant economic theories would be condemned as unscientific, and there would be no way to discriminate among economic theories. One major problem with a naive reading of Popper’s views is that one cannot derive testable implications from theories by themselves. To derive testable implications, one also needs subsidiary assumptions concerning probability distributions, measurement devices, proxies for unmeasured variables, the absence of interferences, and so forth. This is the so-called “Duhem-Quine problem” (Duhem 1906, Quine 1953, Cross 1982). These problems arise generally, and Popper proposes that they be solved by a methodological decision to regard a failure of the deduced testable implication to be a failure of the theory. But in economics the subsidiary assumptions are dubious and in many cases known to be false. Making the methodological decision that Popper requires is unreasonable and would lead one to reject all economic theories.

Imre Lakatos (1970), who was for most of his philosophical career a follower of Popper, offers a broadly Popperian solution to this problem. Lakatos insists that testing is always comparative. When theories face empirical difficulties, as they always do, one attempts to modify them. Scientifically acceptable (in Lakatos’ terminology “theoretically progressive”) modifications must always have some additional testable implications; otherwise they are purely ad hoc . If some of the new predictions are confirmed, then the modification is “empirically progressive,” and one has reason to reject the unmodified theory and to employ the new theory, regardless of how unsuccessful in general either theory may be. Though progress may be hard to come by, Lakatos’ views do not have the same destructive implications as Popper’s. Lakatos appears to solve the problem of how to appraise mainstream economic theory by arguing that what matters is empirical progress or retrogression rather than empirical success or failure. Lakatos’ views have thus been more attractive to economic methodologists than Popper’s.

Developing Thomas Kuhn’s notion of a “paradigm” (1970) and some hints from Popper, Lakatos also presented a view of the global theory structure of whole theoretical enterprises, which he called “scientific research programmes.” Lakatos emphasized that there is a “hard core” of basic theoretical propositions that define a research programme and that are not to be questioned within the research programme. In addition members of a research programme accept a common body of heuristics that guide them in the articulation and modification of specific theories. These views have also been attractive to economic methodologists, since theory development in economics is sharply constrained and since economics appears at first glance to have a “hard core.” The fact that economists do not give up basic theoretical postulates that appear to be false might be explained and justified by regarding them as part of the “hard core” of the “neoclassical research programme”.

Yet Lakatos’ views do not provide a satisfactory account of how economics can be a reputable science despite its reliance on extreme simplifications. For it is questionable whether the development of neoclassical economic theory has demonstrated empirical progress. For example, the replacement of “cardinal” utility theory by “ordinal” utility theory (see below Section 5.1 ) in the 1930s, which is generally regarded as a major step forward, involved the replacement of one theory by another that had no additional empirical content. Furthermore, despite his emphasis on heuristics as guiding theory modification, Lakatos still emphasizes testing. Science is for Lakatos more empirically driven than mainstream economics has been (Hands 1992). It is also doubtful whether research enterprises in economics have “hard cores” (Hoover 1991, Hausman 1992, ch. 6). For attempts to apply Lakatos’ views to economics see Latsis (1976), and Weintraub (1985). As is apparent in de Marchi and Blaug (1991), writers on economic methodology have in recent years become increasingly disenchanted with Lakatos’ philosophy (Backhouse 2009).

There is a second major problem with Popper’s philosophy of science, which plagues Lakatos’ views as well. Both maintain that there is no such thing as empirical confirmation (for some late qualms, see Lakatos 1974). Popper and Lakatos maintain that evidence never provides reason to believe that scientific claims are true, and both also deny that results of tests can justify relying on statements in practical endeavours or in theoretical inquiry. There is no better evidence for one unfalsified proposition than for another. On this view, someone who questions whether there is enough evidence for some proposition to justify relying on it in theoretical studies or for policy purposes would be making the methodological “error” of supposing that there can be evidence in support of hypotheses. With the notable exception of Watkins (1984), few philosophers within the Popperian tradition have faced up to this challenging consequence.

One radical reaction to the difficulties of justifying the reliance on severe simplifications is to deny that economics passes methodological muster. Alexander Rosenberg (1992) maintains that economics can only make imprecise generic predictions, and it cannot make progress, because it is built around folk psychology, which is a mediocre theory of human behavior and which (owing to the irreducibility of intentional notions) cannot be improved. Complex economic theories are scientifically valuable only as applied mathematics, not as empirical theory. Since economics does not show the same consistent progress as the natural sciences, one cannot dismiss Rosenberg’s suggestion that economics is an empirical dead end. But his view that it has made no progress and that it does not permit quantitative predictions is hard to accept. For example, contemporary economists are much better at pricing stock options or designing auctions than economists were even a generation ago.

An equally radical but opposite reaction is Deirdre McCloskey’s, who denies that there are any non-trivial methodological standards that economics must meet (1985, 1992, 1994, 2000, McCloskey and Ziliak 2003, Ziliak and McCloskey 2008). In her view, the only relevant and significant criteria for assessing the practices and products of a discipline are those accepted by the practitioners. Apart from a few general standards such as honesty and a willingness to listen to criticisms, the only justifiable criteria for any conversation are those of the participants. Economists can thus dismiss the arrogant pretensions of philosophers to judge economic discourse. Whatever a group of respected economists takes to be good economics is automatically good economics. Philosophical standards of empirical success are just so much hot air. Those who are interested in understanding the character of economics and in contributing to its improvement should eschew methodology and study instead the “rhetoric” of economics — that is, the means of argument and persuasion that succeed among economists.

McCloskey’s studies of the rhetoric of economics have been valuable and influential (1985, esp. ch. 5–7, McCloskey and Ziliak 2003, Ziliak and McCloskey 2008), but a great deal of her work during the 1980s and 1990s consists of philosophical critiques of economic methodology rather than studies of the rhetoric of economics. Her philosophical critiques are problematic, because the position sketched in the previous paragraph is hard to defend and potentially self-defeating. It is hard to defend, because epistemological standards have already influenced the conversation of economists. The standards of predictive success which lead one to have qualms about economics are already standards that many economists accept. The only way to escape these doubts is to surrender the standards that gave rise to them. But McCloskey’s position undermines any principled argument for a change in standards. Furthermore, as Rosenberg has argued (1988), it seems that economists would doom themselves to irrelevance if they were to surrender standards of predictive success, for it is upon such standards that policy decisions are made.

McCloskey does not, in fact, want to preclude the possibiity that economists are sometimes persuaded when they should not be or are not persuaded when they should be. For she herself criticizes the bad habit some economists have of conflating statistical significance with economic importance (1985, ch. 9, McCloskey and Ziliak 2003, Ziliak and McCloskey 2008). McCloskey typically characterizes rhetoric descriptively as the study of what in fact persuades, but sometimes she instead characterizes it normatively as the study of what ought to persuade (1985, ch. 2). And if rhetoric is the study of what ought rationally to persuade, then it is methodology, not an alternative to methodology. Questions about whether economics is a successful empirical science cannot be conjured away.

Economic methodologist have paid little attention to debates within philosophy of science between realists and anti-realists (van Fraassen 1980, Boyd 1984, Psillos 1999, Niniluoto 2002, Chakravarty 2010, Dicken 2016), because economic theories rarely postulate the existence of unobservable entities or properties, apart from variants of “everyday unobservables,” such as beliefs and desires. Methodologists have, on the other hand, vigorously debated the goals of economics, but those who argue that the ultimate goals are predictive (such as Milton Friedman) do so because of their interest in policy, not because they seek to avoid or resolve epistemological and semantic puzzles concerning references to unobservables.

Nevertheless there are two important recent realist programs in economic methodology. The first, developed mainly by Uskali Mäki, is devoted to exploring the varieties of realism implicit in the methodological statements and theoretical enterprises of economists (see Mäki 1990a, b, c, 2007, and Lehtinen, Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2012). The second, which is espoused by Tony Lawson and his co-workers, mainly at Cambridge University, derives from the work of Roy Bhaskar (1975) (see Lawson 1997, 2015, Bhaskar et al. 1998, Fleetwood 1999, Brown and Fleetwood 2003, Ackroyd and Fleetwood 2004, Edwards, Mahoney, and Vincent 2014). In Lawson’s view, one can trace many of the inadequacies of mainstream economics (of which he is a critic) to an insufficient concern with ontology. In attempting to identify regularities on the surface of the phenomena, mainstream economists are doomed to failure. Economic phenomena are in fact influenced by a large number of different causal factors, and one can achieve scientific knowledge only of the underlying mechanisms and tendencies, whose operation can be glimpsed intermittently and obscurely in observable relations. Mäki’s and Lawson’s programs have little to do with one another, though Mäki (like Mill, Cartwright, and Hausman) shares Lawson’s and Bhaskar’s concern with underlying causal mechanisms. See also the entry on scientific realism .

Throughout its history, economics has been the subject of sociological as well as methodological scrutiny. Many sociological discussions of economics, like Marx’s critique of classical political economy, have been concerned to identify ideological distortions and thereby to criticize particular aspects of economic theory and economic policy. Since every political program finds economists who testify to its economic virtues, there is a never-ending source of material for such critiques. For example, in the wake of the near collapse of the international financial system in 2008, American economists who argued for austerity were mostly Republicans, while those who defended efforts to increase aggregate demand were mostly Democrats.

The influence of contemporary sociology of science and social studies of science, coupled with the difficulties methodologists have had making sense of and rationalizing the conduct of economics, have led to efforts at fusing economics and sociology (Granovetter 1985, Swedberg 1990, 2007) as well as to a sociological turn within methodological reflection itself. Rather than showing that there is good evidence supporting developments in economic theory or that those developments have other broadly epistemic virtues, methodologists and historians such as D. Wade Hands (2001); Hands and Mirowski 1998), Philip Mirowski (1990, 2002, 2004, 2013), and E. Roy Weintraub (1991) have argued that these changes reflect a wide variety of non-rational factors, from changes in funding for theoretical economics, political commitments, personal rivalries, attachments to metaphors, or mathematical interests.

Furthermore, many of the same methodologists and historians have argued that economics is not only an object of social inquiry, but that it can be a tool of social inquiry into science. By studying the incentive structure of scientific disciplines and the implicit or explicit market forces impinging on research (including of course research in economics), it should be possible to write the economics of science and the economics of economics itself (Hands 1995, Hull 1988, Leonard 2002, Mirowski and Sent 2002).

Exactly how, if at all, this work is supposed to bear on questions concerning how well supported are the claims economists make is not clear. Though eschewing traditional methodology, Mirowski’s monograph on the role of physical analogy in economics (1990) is often very critical of mainstream economics. In his Reflection without Rules (2001) D. W. Hands maintains that general methodological rules are of little use. He defends a naturalistic view of methodology and is skeptical of prescriptions that are not based on detailed knowledge. But he does not argue that no rules apply.

The above survey of approaches to the fundamental problems of appraising economic theory is far from complete. For example, there have been substantial efforts to apply structuralist views of scientific theories (Sneed 1971, Stegmüller 1976, 1979) to economics (Stegmüller et al. 1981, Hamminga 1983, Hands 1985c, Balzer and Hamminga 1989). The above discussion documents the diversity and disagreements concerning how to interpret and appraise economic theories. It is not surprising that there is no consensus among those writing on economic methodology concerning the overall empirical appraisal of specific approaches in economics, including mainstream microeconomics, macroeconomics, and econometrics. When practitioners cannot agree, it is questionable whether those who know more philosophy but less economics will be able to settle the matter. Since the debates continue, those who reflect on economic methodology should have a continuing part to play.

Meanwhile, there are many other more specific methodological questions to address, and it is a sign of the maturity of the subdiscipline that a large and increasing percentage of work on economic methodology addresses more specific questions. There is plethora of work, as a perusal of any recent issue of the Journal of Economic Methodology or Economics and Philosophy will confirm. Some of the range of issues currently under discussion were mentioned above in Section 2. Here is a list of three of the many areas of current interest:

1. Although more concerned with the content of economics than with its methodology, the recent explosion of work on feminist economics is shot through with methodological and sociological self-reflection. The fact that a considerably larger percentage of economists are men than is true of any of the other social sciences and indeed than most of the natural sciences raises questions about whether there is something particularly masculine about the discipline. Important texts are Ferber and Nelson (1993, 2003), Nelson (1995, 1996, 2001), Barker and Kuiper (2003). Since 1995, there has been a journal, Feminist Economics , which pulls together much of this work.

2. During the past decades, laboratory experimentation in economics has expanded rapidly. Laboratory experimentation has many different objectives (see Roth 1988) and apparently holds out the prospect of bridging the gulf between fundamental economic theory and empirical evidence. Some of it casts light on the way in which methodological commitments influence the extent to which economists heed empirical evidence. A good deal of laboratory experimentation in contemporary economics is in the service of behavioral economics, which prides itself on heeding experimental evidence concerning the structure and determinants of individual choices. Although behavioral economics has secured a foothold within mainstream economics, it remains controversial substantively and methodologically, and its implications for normative economics, discussed below in section 6, are controversial.

For example, in the case of preference reversals, discussed briefly below in Section 5.1, economists devoted considerable attention to the experimental findings and conceded that they disconfirmed central principles of economics. But economists have been generally unwilling to pay serious attention to the theories proposed by psychologists that predicted the phenomena before they were observed. The reason seems to be that these psychological theories do not have the same wide scope as the basic principles of mainstream economics (Hausman 1992, chapter 13). Hesitation concerning neuroeconomics (Camerer et al. 2005, Camerer 2009, Marchionni and Vromen 2014, Rustichini 2005, 2009, Glimcher and Fehr 2013, Reuter and Montag 2016, Vromen and Marchionni 2018) is also common. In an extremely influential essay, “The Case for Mindless Economics.” Gul and Pesandorfer (2008) argue that the findings of behavioral economics (and neuroeconomics) are irrelevant to economics. They are at most of heuristic value. They maintain that the findings of behavioral economics are irrelevant to economics, because they do not concern market choices and their consequences, which are the only germane data. Sometimes Gul and Pesandorfer appear to identify economic theory with the empirical consequences economists are concerned with, while at other points they echo Milton Friedman (see section 3.2) and deny that the “realism” of the “assumptions” of economic models matters. They do not address sophisticated defenses of realism concerning mental states like Dietrich and List (2016). It seems to me that theoretical resistance to engaging with behavioral economists like that one finds in Gul and Pesandorfer’s essay is weakening. But it is clear that the methodological commitments governing theoretical economics are much more complex and more specific to economics than the general rules proposed by philosophers such as Popper and Lakatos.

The relevance of laboratory experimentation remains controversial. Behavioral economists are enthusiastic, while more traditional theorists question whether experimental findings can be generalized to non-experimental contexts and, more generally, concerning the possibilities of learning from experiments (Caplin and Schotter 2008). For discussions of experimental economics, see Guala (2000a, b, 2005), Hey (1991), Kagel and Roth (1995, 2016), Plott (1991), Smith (1991), Starmer (1999), Camerer (2003), Bardsley and Cubitt 2009, Durlauf and Blume (2009), Branas-Garza and Cabrales (2015), Fréchette and Schotter (2015), Jacquemet and L’Haridon (2018), and the June, 2005 special issue of the Journal of Economic Methodology . Al Roth’s Game Theory, Experimental Economics, and Market Design Page (http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~aroth/alroth.html) is a useful source. For recent work on behavioral economics see the Journal of Behavioral Economics , the Review of Behavioral Economics , and Behavioural Public Policy.

3. During the past generation, there has been a radical transformation in the attitudes of economists toward empirical causal inquiry, especially in the form of field experiments and natural experiments, often employing instrumental variables. For example, about two-thirds of the articles in the February, 2018 American Economic Review are based on empirical studies. The titles of the first four entries in the table of contents are: “The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges,” “Implications of US Tax Policy for House Prices, Rents, and Homeownership,” “The Welfare Cost of Perceived Policy Uncertainty: Evidence from Social Security,” “The Economic Consequences of Hospital Admissions.” If one goes back twenty-five years, only about one-eighth of the first issue of the 1993 American Economic Review appear to rely on any empirical studies. The first four entries are: “Today’s Task for Economists,” “Trigger Points and Budget Cuts: Explaining the Effects of Fiscal Austerity,” “Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections,” “The Macroeconomics of Dr. Strangelove.” A Rip Van Winkle who had gone to sleep in 1983 reading the principal economics journals would be staggered when he awoke in 2018.

Field experiments have been especially important in development economics where the results of various foreign aid projects have too often provided meagre benefits. One can find good introductions to this work in Carpenter et al. (2005), Duflo and Banerjee (2011, 2017), Gugerty and Karlan (2018), Karlan and Appel (2011, 2016), Kremer and Glennerster (2011), List and Samek (2018), and Mullainathan and Shafir (2013). See also the Poverty Action Lab . Although field experiments appear to be hard-nosed inquiries that establish what works and what does not work, matters are not so simple (Deaton 2010, Cartwright and Hardie 2013). Without knowledge of the mechanisms, it is all too easy for an intervention that works splendidly at a specific time and place to fail abysmally when tried elsewhere. Atheoretical inquiry, even when methodologically sophisticated, has severe limits as a tactic of knowledge acquisition.

The empirical turn in economics has also had the effect of increasing the importance of economic history. With some ingenuity, especially in identifying possible instrumental variables, history is full of “natural experiments.” For example (J. Hausman 2016), in 1936, the American Congress voted to pay pensions to veterans of World War I eight years before they were due to be paid. Because the percentages of veterans differed across states, Hausman can use the differing economic performances of states to estimate the effects of the economic stimulus the pensions provided. Although less decisive than randomized controlled trials (which are often impossible to carry out), examination of historical episodes such as this one provide significant evidence concerning economic hypotheses.

5. Rational choice theory

Insofar as economics explains and predicts phenomena as consequences of individual choices, which are themselves explained in terms of alleged reasons, it must depict agents as to some extent rational. Rationality, like reasons, involves evaluation, and just as one can assess the rationality of individual choices, so one can assess the rationality of social choices and examine how they are and ought to be related to the preferences and judgments of individuals. In addition, there are intricate questions concerning rationality in strategic situations in which outcomes depend on the choices of multiple individuals. Since rationality is a central concept in branches of philosophy such as action theory, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of mind, studies of rationality frequently cross the boundaries between economics and philosophy.

The barebones theory of rationality discussed above in Section 1.1 takes an agent’s preferences (rankings of states of affairs) to be rational if they are complete and transitive, and it takes the agent’s choice to be rational if the agent does not prefer any feasible alternative to the one he or she chooses. Such a theory of rationality is clearly too weak, because it says nothing about belief or what rationality implies when agents do not know (with certainty) everything relevant to their choices. But it may also be too strong, since, as Isaac Levi in particular has argued (1986), there is nothing irrational about having incomplete preferences in situations involving uncertainty. Sometimes it is rational to suspend judgment and to refuse to rank alternatives that are not well understood. On the other hand, transitivity is a plausible condition, and the so-called “money pump” argument demonstrates that if one’s preferences are intransitive and one is willing to make exchanges, then one can be exploited. (Suppose an agent A prefers X to Y , Y to Z and Z to X , and that A will pay some small amount of money $ P to exchange Y for X , Z for Y , and X for Z . That means that, starting with Z , A will pay $ P for Y , then $ P again for X , then $ P again for Z and so on. Agents are not this stupid. They will instead refuse to trade or adjust their preferences to eliminate the intransitivity (but see Schick 1986).

On the other hand, there is considerable experimental evidence that people’s preferences are not in fact transitive. Such evidence does not establish that transitivity is not a requirement of rationality. It may show instead that people are sometimes irrational. In the case of so-called “preference reversals,” for example, it seems plausible that people in fact make irrational choices (Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971, Tversky and Thaler 1990). Evidence of persistent violations of transitivity is disquieting, since standards of rationality should not be impossibly high.

A further difficulty with the barebones theory of rationality concerns the individuation of the objects of preference or choice. Consider, for example, data from multistage ultimatum games. Suppose A can propose any division of $10 between A and B . B can accept or reject A ’s proposal. If B rejects the proposal, then the amount of money drops to $5, and B gets to offer a division of the $5 which A can accept or reject. If A rejects B ’s offer, then both players get nothing. Suppose that A proposes to divide the money with $7 for A and $3 for B . B declines and offers to split the $5 evenly, with $2.50 for each. Behavior such as this is, in fact, common (Ochs and Roth 1989, p. 362). Assuming that B prefers more money to less, these choices appear to be a violation of transitivity. B prefers $3 to $2.50, yet declines $3 for certain for $2.50 (with some slight chance of A declining and B getting nothing). But the objects of choice are not just quantities of money. B is turning down $3 as part of “a raw deal” in favor of $2.50 as part of a fair arrangement. If the objects of choice are defined in this way, there is no failure of transitivity.

This plausible observation gives rise to a serious problem. Unless there are constraints on how the objects of choice are individuated, conditions of rationality such as transitivity are empty. A ’s choice of X over Y , Y over Z and Z over X does not violate transitivity if “ X when the alternative is Y ” is not the same object of choice as “ X when the alternative is Z ”. John Broome (1991) argues that further substantive principles of rationality are required to limit how alternatives are individuated or to require that agents be indifferent between alternatives such as “ X when the alternative is Y ” and “ X when the alternative is Z .”

To extend the theory of rationality to circumstances involving risk (where the objects of choice are lotteries with known probabilities) and uncertainty (where agents do not know the probabilities or even all the possible outcomes of their choices) requires further principles of rationality, as well as controversial technical simplifications. Subjective Bayesians suppose that individuals in circumstances of uncertainty have well-defined subjective probabilities (degrees of belief) over all the payoffs and thus that the objects of choice can be modeled as lotteries, just as in circumstances involving risk, though with subjective probabilities in place of objective probabilities. See the entries on Bayes’ theorem and Bayesian epistemology . The most important of the axioms needed for the theory of rational choice under conditions of risk and uncertainty is the independence condition. It says roughly that the preferences of rational agent between two lotteries that differ in only one outcome should match their preferences between the differing outcomes. Although initially plausible, the independence condition is very controversial. See Allais and Hagen (1979) and McClennen (1983, 1990).

A considerable part of rational choice theory is concerned with formalizations of conditions of rationality and investigation of their implications. When an agent’s preferences are complete and transitive and satisfy a further continuity condition, then they can be represented by a so-called ordinal utility function. What this means is that it is possible to define a function that represents an agent’s preferences so that U ( X ) > U ( Y ) if and only if the agent prefers X to Y , and U ( X ) = U ( Y ) if and only if the agent is indifferent between X and Y . This function merely represents the preference ranking. It contains no information beyond the ranking. Any order-preserving transformation of “ U ” would represent the agent’s preferences just as well.

When an agent’s preferences in addition satisfy the independence condition and some other technical conditions, then they can be represented by an expected utility function (Harsanyi 1977b, ch. 4, Hernstein and Milnor 1953, Ramsey 1926, and Savage 1972). Such a function has two important properties. First, the expected utility of a lottery is equal to the sum of the (expected) utilities of its prizes weighted by their probabilities. Second, expected utility functions are unique up to a positive affine transformation. What this means is that if U and V are both expected utility functions representing the preferences of an agent, then for all objects of preference, X , V ( X ) must be equal to a U ( X ) + b , where a and b are real numbers and a is positive. In addition, the axioms of rationality imply that the agent’s degrees of belief will satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus.

A great deal of controversy surrounds the theory of rationality, and there have been many formal investigations into weakened or amended theories of rationality. For further discussion, see Allais and Hagen 1979, Barberà, Hammond and Seidl 1999, Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Loomes and Sugden 1982, Luce and Raiffa 1957, Machina 1987, and Gilboa and Schmeidler 2001.

Although societies are very different from individuals, they have mechanisms to evaluate alternatives and make choices, and their evaluations and choices may be rational or irrational. It is not, however, obvious, what principles of rationality should govern the choices and evaluations of society. Transitivity is one plausible condition. It seems that a society that chooses X when faced with the alternatives X or Y , Y when faced with the alternatives Y or Z and Z when faced with the alternatives X or Z either has had a change of heart or is choosing irrationally. Yet, purported irrationalities such as these can easily arise from standard mechanisms that aim to link social choices and individual preferences. Suppose there are three individuals in the society. Individual One ranks the alternatives X , Y , Z . Individual Two ranks them Y , Z , X . Individual Three ranks them Z , X , Y . If decisions are made by pairwise majority voting, X will be chosen from the pair ( X , Y ), Y will be chosen from ( Y , Z ), and Z will be chosen from ( X , Z ). Clearly this is unsettling, but are possible cycles in social choices irrational ?

Similar problems affect what one might call the logical coherence of social judgments (List and Pettit 2002). Suppose society consists of three individuals who make the following judgments concerning the truth or falsity of the propositions P and Q and that social judgment follows the majority.

The judgments of each of the individuals are consistent with the principles of logic, while social judgments violate them. How important is it that social judgments be consistent with the principles of logic?

Although social choice theory in this way bears on questions of social rationality, most work in social choice theory explores the consequences of principles of rationality coupled with explicitly ethical constraints. The seminal contribution is Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem (1963, 1967). Arrow assumes that both individual preferences and social preferences are complete and transitive and that the method of forming social preferences (or making social choices) issues in some social preference ranking or social choice for any possible profile of individual preferences. In addition, Arrow imposes a weak unanimity condition: if everybody prefers X to Y , then Y must not be socially preferred. Third, he requires that there be no dictator whose preferences determine social preferences or choices irrespective of the preferences of anybody else. Lastly, he imposes the condition that the social preference between X and Y should depend on how individuals rank X and Y and on nothing else. Arrow then proved the surprising result that no method of relating social and individual preferences can satisfy all these conditions!

In the sixty years since Arrow wrote, there has been a plethora of work in social choice theory, a good deal of which is arguably of great importance to ethics. For example, John Harsanyi proved that if individual preferences and social evaluations both satisfy the axioms of expected utility theory (with shared or objective probabilities) and that social preferences conform to unanimous individual preferences, then social evaluations are determined by a weighted sum of individual utilities (1955, 1977a). Matthew Adler (2012) has extended an approach like Harsanyi’s to demonstrate that a form of weighted utilitarianism, which prioritizes the interests of those who are worse off, uniquely satisfies a longer list of rational and ethical constraints. When there are instead disagreements in probability assignments, there is an impossibility result: the unanimity condition implies that for some profiles of individual preferences, social evaluations will not satisfy the axioms of expected utility theory (Hammond 1983, Seidenfeld, et al . 1989, Mongin 1995). For further discussion of social choice theory and the relevance of utility theory to social evaluation, see the entry on social choice theory , Sen (1970) and for recent reappraisals Fleurbaey (2007) and Adler (2012).

When outcomes depend on what several agents do, one agent’s best choice may depend on what other agents choose. Although the principles of rationality governing individual choice still apply, arguably there are further principles of rationality governing expectations of the actions of others (and of their expectations concerning your actions and expectations, and so forth). Game theory occupies an increasingly important role within economics, and it is also relevant both to inquiries concerning rationality and inquiries concerning ethics. For further discussion see the entries on game theory , game theory and ethics , and evolutionary game theory .

6. Economics and ethics

As discussed above in Section 2.1 most economists distinguish between positive and normative economics, and most would argue that economics is relevant to policy mainly because of the (positive) information it provides concerning the consequences of policy. Yet the same economists also offer their advice concerning how to fix the economy, and there is a whole field of normative economics.

Economic outcomes, institutions, and processes may be better or worse in several different ways. Some outcomes may make people better off. Other outcomes may be less unequal. Others may restrict individual freedom more severely. Economists typically evaluate outcomes exclusively in terms of welfare. This does not imply that they believe that only welfare is of moral importance. They focus on welfare, because they believe that economics provides an excellent set of tools to address questions of welfare and because they hope that questions about welfare can be separated from questions about equality, freedom, or justice. As sketched below, economists have had some things to say about other dimensions of moral appraisal, but welfare takes center stage. Indeed normative economics is standardly called “welfare economics.”

One central question of moral philosophy has been to determine what things are intrinsically good for human beings. This is a central question, because all plausible moral views assign an important place to individual welfare or well-being . This is obviously true of utilitarianism (which holds that what is right maximizes total or average welfare), but even non-utilitarian views are concerned with welfare, if they recognize the virtue of benevolence, or if they are concerned with the interests of individuals or with avoiding harm to individuals.

There are many ways to think about well-being, and the prevailing view among economists has shifted from hedonism (which takes the good to be a mental state such as pleasure or happiness) to the view that welfare should be measured by the satisfaction of preferences. A number of prominent economists are currently arguing for a return to hedonism, but they remain a minority. (See Bavetta et al. 2014. Clark Flèche 2018, Dolan and Kahneman 2014, Frey 2010, 2018, Frey and Stutzer 2001, Kahneman 1999, 2000a, 2000b, Kahneman and Krueger 2006, Kahneman and Sugden 2005, Kahneman and Thaler 2006, Layard 2006, Ormerod 2008, Radcliff 2013, Weimann and Knabe 2015 and for criticism Davies 2015, Etzioni 2018, and Hausman 2010.) Unlike hedonism, taking welfare to be preference satisfaction specifies how to find out what is good for a person rather than committing itself to any substantive view of a person’s good. Note that equating welfare with the satisfaction of preferences is not equating welfare with any feeling of satisfaction. If welfare can be measured by the satisfaction of preferences, then a person is better off if what he or she prefers comes to pass, regardless of whether that occurrence makes the agent feel satisfied.

Since mainstream economics attributes a consistent preference ordering to all agents, and since more specific models typically take agents to be well-informed and self-interested, it is easy for economists to accept the view that an individual agent A will prefer X to Y if and only if X is in fact better for A than Y is. This is one place where positive theory bleeds into normative theory. In addition, the identification of welfare with the satisfaction of preferences is attractive to economists, because it prevents questions about the justification of paternalism (to which most economists are strongly opposed) from even arising.

Welfare and the satisfaction of preferences may coincide because the satisfaction of preferences constitutes welfare or because people are self-interested and good judges of their own interests and hence prefer what is good for them. There are many obvious objections to the view that the satisfaction of preferences constitutes welfare. Preferences may be based on mistaken beliefs. People may prefer to sacrifice their own well-being for some purpose they value more highly. Preferences may reflect past manipulation or distorting psychological influences (Elster 1983). In addition, if preference satisfaction constitutes welfare, then policy makers can make people better off by molding their wants rather than by improving conditions. Furthermore, it seems unreasonable that social policy should attend to extravagant preferences. Rather than responding to these objections and attempting to defend the view that preference satisfaction constitutes well-being, economists can blunt these objections by taking preferences in circumstances where people are self-interested and good judges of their interests to be merely good evidence of what will promote welfare (Hausman and McPherson 2009, Hausman 2012). There are some exceptions, most notably Amartya Sen (1987a,b,c, 1992), but most economists take welfare to coincide with the satisfaction of preference.

Because the identification of welfare with preference satisfaction makes it questionable whether one can make interpersonal welfare comparisons, few economists defend a utilitarian view of policy as maximizing total or average welfare. (Harsanyi is one exception, for another see Ng 1983). Economists have instead explored the possibility of making welfare assessments of economic processes, institutions, outcomes, and policies without making interpersonal comparisons. Consider two economic outcomes S and R , and suppose that some people prefer S to R and that nobody prefers R to S . In that case S is “Pareto superior” to R , or S is a “Pareto improvement” over R . Without making any interpersonal comparisons, one can conclude that people’s preferences are better satisfied in S than in R . If there is no state of affairs that is Pareto superior to S , then economists say that S is “Pareto optimal” or “Pareto efficient.” Efficiency here is efficiency with respect to satisfying preferences rather than minimizing the number of inputs needed to produce a unit of output or some other technical notion (Le Grand 1991). If a state of affairs is not Pareto efficient, then society is missing an opportunity costlessly to satisfy some people’s preferences better. A Pareto efficient state of affairs avoids this failure, but it has no other obvious virtues. For example, suppose nobody is satiated and people care only about how much food they get. Consider two distributions of food. In the first, millions are starving but no food is wasted. In the second, nobody is starving, but some food is wasted. The first is Pareto efficient, while the second is not.

The notions of Pareto improvements and Pareto efficiency might seem useless, because economic policies almost always have both winners and losers. Mainstream economists have nevertheless found these concepts useful in two ways. First, they have proved two theorems concerning properties of perfectly competitive equilibria (Arrow 1968). The first theorem says that equilibria in perfectly competitive markets are Pareto optimal, and the second says that any Pareto optimal allocation, with whatever distribution of income policy makers might prefer, can be achieved as a perfectly competitive market equilibrium, provided that one begins with just the right distribution of endowments among economic agents. The first theorem has been regarded as underwriting Adam Smith’s view of the invisible hand (Arrow and Hahn 1971, preface; Hahn 1973). This interpretation is problematic, because no economy has ever been or will ever be in perfectly competitive equilibrium. The second theorem provides some justification for the normative division of labor economists prefer, with economists concerned about efficiency and others concerned about justice. The thought is that the second theorem shows that theories of just distribution are compatible with reliance on competitive markets. The two fundamental theorems of welfare economics go some way toward explaining why mainstream economists, whether they support laissez-faire policies or government intervention to remedy market imperfections, think of perfectly competitive equilibria as ideals. But the significance of the theorems is debatable, since actual markets differ significantly from perfectly competitive markets and, when there are multiple market imperfections, the “theory of the second best” shows that fixing some of the imperfections may lead the society away from a perfectly competitive equilibrium (and diminish efficiency and welfare) rather than toward one (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956–7).

The other way that economists have found to extend the Pareto efficiency notions leads to cost-benefit analysis, which is a practical tool for policy analysis (Mishan 1971; Sugden and Williams 1978; Adler and Posner 2000, 2006; Broadman et al. 2010; Boadway 2016). Suppose that S is not a Pareto improvement over R . Some members of the society would be losers in a shift from R to S . Those losers prefer R to S , but there are enough winners — enough people who prefer S to R — that the winners could compensate the losers and make the preference for S ′ ( S with compensation paid) over R unanimous. S is a “potential Pareto improvement” over R . In other terms, the amount of money the winners would be willing to pay to bring about the change is larger than the amount of money the losers would have to be compensated so as not to object to the change. (Economists are skeptical about what one learns from asking people how much they would be willing to pay, and they attempt instead to infer how much individuals are willing to pay indirectly from market phenomena.) When S is a potential Pareto improvement over R , there is said to be a “net benefit” to the policy of bringing about S . According to cost-benefit analysis, among eligible policies (which satisfy legal and moral constraints), one should, other things being equal, employ the one with the largest net benefit. Note that the compensation is entirely hypothetical. Potential Pareto improvements result in winners and losers, the justice or injustice of which is irrelevant to cost-benefit analysis. Justice or beneficence may require that the society do something to mitigate distributional imbalances. Because there is a larger “pie” of goods and services to satisfy preferences (since compensation could be paid and everybody’s preferences better satisfied), selecting policies with the greatest net benefit serves economic efficiency (Hicks 1939, Kaldor 1939).

Despite the practical importance of cost-benefit analysis, the technique and the justification for it sketched in the previous paragraph are problematic. One technical difficulty is that it is possible for S to be a potential Pareto improvement over R and for R to be a potential Pareto improvement over S (Scitovsky 1941, Samuelson 1950)! That means that the fact that S is a potential Pareto improvement over R does not imply that there is a larger economic “pie” in S than in R , because there cannot, of course, be a larger economic pie in S than in R and a larger economic pie in R than in S . A second problem is that willingness to pay for some policy and the amount one would require in compensation if one opposes the policy depend on how much wealth one has as well as on one’s attitude to the policy. Cost-benefit analysis weights the preferences of the rich more than the preferences of the poor (Baker 1975). It is possible to compensate roughly for the effects of income and wealth (Harburger 1978, Fankhauser et al. 1997), but it is bothersome to do so, and cost-benefit analysis is commonly employed without any adjustment for wealth or income.

A further serious difficulty for traditional welfare economics, which has been as it were hiding in plain sight, is the fact that choices are imperfect indicators of preferences, which are in turn imperfect indicators of what enhances well-being. The same facts that show that preference satisfaction does not constitute well-being (false beliefs, lack of information, other-directed and non-rational preferences) show that choices and preferences are sometimes misleading indicators of well-being. Moreover, once one recognizes that preferences are good indicators of welfare only if agents are good judges of what will benefit them, one is bound to recognize that agents are not always good judges of what will benefit themselves, even when they have all the information they need. In some contexts, these problems may be minor. For example, people’s preferences among new automobiles are largely self-interested, thoughtful, and well-informed. In other contexts, such as environmental protection, preferences for ignoring the problems are often badly informed, while preferences to take action are typically not self-interested. Either way, popular preferences among policies to address environmental problems are unlikely to be a good guide to welfare.

Ignoring these problems has been a great convenience to normative economics. If what people choose reveals their preferences, which in turn indicate what is good for them, then, as noted before, government action to steer someone’s choices can never make that person better off, and so questions about whether to endorse paternalistic policies cannot arise. But whether or not it is advisable, successful paternalism is not impossible; and recent work by behavioral economists, which document a wide variety of systematic deliberative foibles, has put questions concerning paternalism back on the table (Ariely 2009, Kahneman 2011). Some economists have searched for ways to identify an agent’s “true” preferences (as described by Infante et al. 2016). Others have argued that policy makers must respect the preferences of agents among their ends or objectives, while overruling preferences among means when these are distorted by bad judgment or false beliefs (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, Le Grand and New 2015). Moreover, Thaler and Sunstein’s proposal that government explore non-coercive methods of influencing people to make better choices (“nudges”) has been popular among policy makers and has arguably shifted philosophical discussion of paternalism away from Mill’s (1859) focus on avoiding coercion (Shiffrin 2000, Hausman and Welch 2010, Le Grand and New 2015).

Although welfare economics and concerns about efficiency dominate normative economics, they do not exhaust the subject, and in collaboration with philosophers, economists have made important contributions to contemporary work in ethics and normative social and political philosophy. Section 5.2 and Section 5.3 gave some hint of the contributions of social choice theory and game theory. In addition economists and philosophers have worked on the problem of providing a formal characterization of freedom so as to bring tools of economic analysis to bear (Pattanaik and Xu 1990, Sen 1988, 1990, 1991, Carter 1999, Sugden 2018). Others have developed formal characterizations of social welfare functions that prioritize the interests of those who are less well off or that favor equality of resources, opportunity, and outcomes and that separate individual and social responsibility for inequalities (Pazner and Schmeidler 1974, Varian 1974, 1975, Roemer 1986b, 1987, Fleurbaey 1995, 2008, Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2014, Greaves 2015, McCarthy 2015, 2017). John Roemer has put contemporary economic modeling to work to offer precise characterizations of exploitation (1982). Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have not only developed novel interpretations of the proper concerns of normative economics in terms of capabilities (Sen 1992, Nussbaum and Sen 1993, Nussbaum 2000), which Sen has linked to characterizations of egalitarianism and to operational measures of deprivation (1999). There are many lively interactions between normative economics and moral philosophy. See also the entries on libertarianism , paternalism , egalitarianism , and economics [normative] and economic justice .

The frontiers between economics and philosophy concerned with methodology, rationality, ethics and normative social and political philosophy are buzzing with activity. This activity is diverse and concerned with very different questions. Although many of these are related, philosophy of economics is not a single unified enterprise. It is a collection of separate inquiries linked to one another by connections among the questions and by the dominating influence of mainstream economic models and techniques.

The following bibliography is not comprehensive. It generally avoids separate citations for methodological essays in collections. It does not list separately the essays on economic methodology from special issues on philosophy and economics. A large number of essays on philosophy of economics can be found in the journals, Economics and Philosophy , The Journal of Economic Methodology and the annual series Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology .

Readers may want to consult the Journal of Economic Methodology , Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2001 Millennium symposium on “The Past, Present and Future of Economic Methodology” the and Binder et al. 2016. For an encyclopedic overview of economic methodology, see the Handbook of Economic Methodology edited by Davis, Hands, and Mäki. For a comprehensive bibliography of works on economic methodology through 1988, see Redman 1989. Essays from economics journals are indexed in The Journal of Economic Literature , and the Index of Economic Articles in Journal and Collective Volumes also indexes collections. Since 1991, works on methodology can be found under the number B4. Works on ethics and economics can be found under the numbers A13, D6, and I3. Discussions of rationality and game theory can be found under A1, C7, D00, D7, D8, and D9.

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There are now a large number of blogs by prominent economists. Though not predominantly concerned with methodology and typically not exclusively concerned with economics, these blogs show economists arguing with one another, responding to current events, and formulating and reformulating their views. The following are of particular interest, but there are many more:

• Brad DeLong Grasping Reality with Both Invisible Hands: Fair, Balanced, and Reality-Based: A Semi-Daily Journal
• Paul Krugman, The Conscience of a Liberal
• Marginal Revolution: Small Steps Toward a Much Better World (Tyler Cowen and Alex Tabbarok)
• Mainly Macro: Comment on Macroeconomic Issues (Simon Wren-Lewis)
• The Grumpy Economist (John Cochrane’s Blog)
• Dani Rodrik’s Weblog: Unconventional thoughts on economic development and globalization
• Beat the Press (Dean Baker)
• The Becker-Posner Blog (Gary Becker and Richard Posner) , terminated in 2014, but still available online.

action | Bayes’ Theorem | economics [normative] and economic justice | epistemology: Bayesian | folk psychology: as a theory | game theory | game theory: and ethics | game theory: evolutionary | Hume, David | individualism, methodological | intentionality | Kuhn, Thomas | Lakatos, Imre | laws of nature: ceteris paribus | Mill, John Stuart | Popper, Karl | preferences | reasons for action: justification, motivation, explanation | risk | scientific explanation | scientific realism | Smith, Adam: moral and political philosophy | social choice theory | socialism | well-being

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Department of Economics

Doctor of philosophy, admission requirements.

Applicants are required to submit three letters of recommendation, a statement of interest, official transcript(s) delivered and/or mailed in a sealed envelope by the Registrar of the college/university attended, and the most recent Graduate Record Examination scores.

Applicants for admission into the Doctor of Philosophy Program in Economics must have earned a Master of Arts degree in economics. Applicants with a Master's degree in a related field may be considered for a conditional admission to the Doctor of Philosophy program upon submission of proof that work completed is equivalent to the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in economics at Howard University.

Students admitted into the Ph.D. program with an MA degree must have a GPA of well over B and a minimum of 24 graduate course credits, including at least 6 credits in economic theory, 3 credits in econometrics, and 3 credits in graduate statistics.

Students may be admitted with a deficiency in mathematics or statistics on the condition that the deficiency be corrected in the first semester. These makeup credits will not count toward completion of the degree program in which the student is enrolled. The student must earn a grade of B or better in these courses.

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Residence Requirements

The completion of minimum course requirements or credits does not guarantee receipt of the degree. The student must have at least four semesters of residence and full-time study (at least 9 credits per semester) or the equivalent in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Howard University. Two of these four semesters of residence and full-time study, or the equivalent, must be consecutive. No graduate student will be permitted to take more than 15 credits per semester.

Financial Assistance

Full-time students admitted to the Ph.D. program may apply for research assistantships which carry a stipend.

Graduate School Requirements (all Ph.D. Students)

Language Requirement

Each student is required to demonstrate in a formal examination a reading proficiency in French, Spanish, German, Russian, Chinese, or Japanese. Under exceptional circumstances, the department may permit students to substitute for a language examination an advanced course that provides skills relevant to dissertation research, such as computer programming, mathematics, or advanced topics in econometrics. Such exceptions must be approved in advance by the Department. The language requirement must be fulfilled before the student is admitted to candidacy.

English Competency and Expository Writing

All graduate students must demonstrate their competency in the English language as evidenced by earning a passing score on the English Proficiency Examination administered by the Graduate School. Students who do not pass the examination must successfully complete a course on expository writing, "Writing Workshop in Exposition for Graduate Students." All graduate students, both part-time and full-time, must satisfy this requirement during their first year of enrollment. Students will not be allowed to advance to candidacy without having satisfied this requirement. Doctoral students who have demonstrated competency at the Master's level at Howard University need not do so again at the doctoral level.

Responsible Conduct of Research

The Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR) Workshop is intended to provide students with information on pertinent federal and University guidelines and regulations pertaining to the responsible conduct of research as well as to instruct them in a method of utilizing moral reasoning skills in responding to ethical dilemmas in research. Workshop topics include intellectual property, data sharing and understanding of Institutional Review Board (IRB) policies and procedures, data acquisition and management, and mentoring. The RCR training workshop is a requirement for admission to candidacy. To receive the RCR certificate, students must complete all required training sessions and successfully complete a learning assessment exercise at the end of the workshop.

Additional Details

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GS.Howard.edu/admissions/admission-requirements

Doctor of Philosophy and the Dissertation (all Ph.D. students)

The Dissertation Proposal and Admission to Candidacy

After completing the requirements listed above, the student must prepare a formal written dissertation proposal under the supervision of a member of the graduate faculty. Selecting a principal advisor for the dissertation proposal is extremely important to the future of the student. In general, the student should choose an advisor who has extensive research experience in the field in which the student proposes to write the dissertation. For example, a dissertation focusing on economic development in Nigeria should be supervised by a member of the graduate faculty who has published in development economics; a dissertation focusing on racial discrimination in home mortgage lending in Detroit should be supervised by a member of the graduate faculty who has published in urban economics. The graduate faculty member may decline the invitation to serve as principal advisor in a specific case, but all graduate faculty members are expected to serve as principal advisors from time to time. Hence, any graduate faculty member may be approached by a student seeking a principal advisor.

Once substantial work has been done on the proposal by the student under the supervision of a principal advisor, it is advisable to maintain the principal advisor-student relationship until the dissertation is completed. However, the student may elect to change advisors for any reason if he/she wishes, understanding that such a change may require substantial changes in the student's proposal and, ultimately, his/her dissertation. Once the written proposal is completed to the satisfaction of the principal advisor, the student presents the dissertation proposal orally in a formal seminar to the faculty. Once the faculty judges the proposal to be satisfactory, the student and the advisor prepare the requisite paperwork for advancement to candidacy. Once such paperwork is approved by the Graduate School, the student becomes a doctoral candidate.

The Dissertation

Once the student advances to candidacy, the preparation of the dissertation begins. The dissertation is an original, creative work that advances knowledge in the discipline of economics. The dissertation may be a single paper studying a specific research question. In recent years, the "three-essay" dissertation has also become a popular and appropriate approach to the dissertation. In this dissertation model, the student addresses three different questions within the same general area of inquiry with separate essays. Essays may also focus on different aspects of the same problem. For example, a student may write one article as a primarily theoretical exploration of a topic, a second as a general modeling exercise, and a third as a specific application of a model to a particular example. Each of these essays could become the foundation for an article submitted for publication to a refereed scholarly journal. In all cases, each of the three essays is a self-contained research project; the three essays are combined into a single final product for presentation to the faculty.

As a doctoral candidate, the student is required to enroll for twelve (12) dissertation credit hours over the course of the dissertation process. The principal advisor and the student work together to complete the staffing of the dissertation committee. This committee is made up of the principal advisor and two additional graduate faculty members from the Department of Economics. Its members advise the student throughout the dissertation process. A formal defense of the dissertation is required. The dissertation cannot be defended during the same semester that the student advances to candidacy. The examination committee is made up of the principal advisor, two additional graduate faculty members drawn from the Department of Economics, an economist drawn from outside the university who, based on his/her credentials is judged by the Economics Department and Graduate School to be qualified to serve as a graduate faculty member, and a Howard University graduate faculty member drawn from a department other than the Department of Economics. After the student presents the formal oral defense of the dissertation, the examination committee determines whether the defense was satisfactory and whether the written dissertation is completely correct. Should the student fail the defense as a whole, a second opportunity for a defense may be established by the Department and Graduate School within six (6) months of the first examination. Should the student be judged to have passed the oral defense itself but have additional corrections or changes to make to the written document, the examination committee will determine the process and timing for ensuring that such corrections meet the requirements of its members for the satisfactory completion of the dissertation evaluation process.

General Requirements for Students Entering the PhD Program

Ba, bs, or mba degree.

General Program Requirements

Students entering this track must earn a minimum of 72 credits beyond the baccalaureate degree, of which 12 must be devoted to dissertation work, 24 to electives and to the area of concentration, and 36 to the following core course requirements:

Core Course Requirements

• Microeconomic Theory I (ECOG-200)
• Microeconomic Theory II (ECOG-201)
• Microeconomic Theory III (ECOG-205)
• Macroeconomic Theory I (ECOG-203)
• Macroeconomic Theory II (ECOG-202)
• Macroeconomic Theory III (ECOG-206)
• History of Economic Analysis (ECOG-204)
• Workshop in Economic Research (ECOG-207)
• Econometrics I (ECOG-211)
• Econometrics II (ECOG-212)
• Advanced Topics in Econometrics (ECOG-216)
• Mathematics for Economists (ECOG-213)

Areas of Specialization

The Department offers four areas of specialization. The required courses for the Ph.D. degree in each of the specializations are as follows:

• Growth and Development Economics - ECOG-220, ECOG-221, ECOG-228
• Urban Economics - ECOG-230, ECOG-231, ECOG-237
• Labor Economics - ECOG-261, ECOG-262, ECOG-263
• International Economics-ECOG-244, ECOG-249, ECOG-245

The Major Field

Each student chooses a primary area of specialization (the Major Field) from among the four areas. The student completes the three required courses (all three courses in the area of specialization labeled I, II, and III) with a grade of B or better in each course. The student then takes the comprehensive examination or chooses to write a field paper related to their Major Field. To acquire certification in their Major Field, the student must pass the three courses (with a grade of B or higher), pass the comprehensive examination, or, instead of the field comprehensive examination, write a research paper that, in the judgment of the faculty in that field of specialization, demonstrates mastery of that field.

The Minor Field

Each student chooses a second area of specialization (called the Minor Field) either from the four areas (Growth and Development, Urban, Labor, or International) or from the elective field courses. If the minor field is chosen from the four areas, students must complete two courses (either I and II or I and III) in their area of choice with no grade lower than a B. If the student chooses the minor field from among the elective field courses, the student must complete the field course and either Independent Study (ECOG 290, 291, 292, 293, or 294) or Research Topics in Economics (ECOG 295, 296, or 297) related to their field of choice. The student must receive a B or better in each of these two courses. There are no further requirements for certification of the Minor Field. Neither a comprehensive examination nor a field paper is required for the Minor Field.

Students may earn up to 6 credits in an internship program as part of their elective choices (Internship I, ECOG 298 and Internship II, ECOG 299).

Comprehensive Examinations

Students must pass comprehensive examinations (which are offered twice annually) in the following four areas: microeconomic theory, macroeconomic theory, econometrics, and the major field. The student may substitute a research paper in the student's Major Field for the major-field comprehensive examination. This research paper must, in the judgment of the faculty in that field of specialization, demonstrate mastery of that field.

Students are required to take the Ph.D. comprehensive examinations in both microeconomic theory and macroeconomic theory after they have successfully completed the required macroeconomic and microeconomic theory course sequences. If the student passes both of these examinations, the student becomes eligible to take the comprehensive examinations in econometrics and the student's Major Field.

MA or MS Degree in Economics

Students must earn a minimum of 72 credits beyond the baccalaureate degree. Up to 24 credits from the student's MA program may be transferred into the Ph.D. program. Eighteen (18) credit hours must be earned in the core courses. Twenty-one (21) credit hours are earned in the major field and electives, and twelve (12) credit hours must be devoted to dissertation work.

The Department offers four areas of specialization. The student selects one area of specialization called the Major Field. The required courses for the Ph.D. degree in each of the specializations are:

• Growth and Development Economics - ECOG-221, ECOG-228
• Urban Economics - ECOG-231, ECOG-237
• Labor Economics - ECOG-262, ECOG-2632
• International Economics - ECOG-249, ECOG-245

Field Prerequisites

Each of these two-course sequences has a prerequisite. Specifically, the prerequisites are:

• Growth and Development Economics - ECOG-220
• Urban Economics - ECOG-230
• Labor Economics - ECOG-261
• International Economics - ECOG-244

If the student has taken an equivalent course and achieved a grade of B or better at a different university, it may be substituted for the field prerequisite if the Director of Graduate Studies approves.

Each student chooses his/her first area of specialization (called the Major Field) from among the four areas. The student completes the prerequisite (or approved equivalent course from another university) and two required courses (all three courses in the area of specialization labeled, II, and III) with a grade of B or better in each course. The student takes the comprehensive examination in that field or chooses to write a major paper related to that field. The student must either pass the comprehensive examination or receive approval by a graduate faculty member of the major paper to achieve certification in the Major Field.

Each student chooses a second area of specialization (called the Minor Field) either from the Department's four areas of specialization (Growth and Development, Urban, Labor, or International) or from the elective field courses. If the minor field is chosen from the four areas of specialization, the student must complete two courses (either I and II or I and III within that area) with no grade lower than a B. If the student chooses the minor field from among the elective field courses, the student completes the field course and either Independent Study (ECOG-290, ECOG-291, ECOG-292, ECOG-293, or ECOG-294) or Research Topics in Economics (ECOG-295, ECOG-296, or ECOG-297) related to the field of choice. The student must receive a B or better in each of these two courses. There are no further requirements for certification of the Minor Field. Neither a comprehensive examination nor a field paper is required for the Minor Field.

Students must pass comprehensive examinations (which are offered twice annually) in the following four areas: microeconomic theory, macroeconomic theory, econometrics, and the major field. The student may substitute a research paper in his/her major field for the major-field comprehensive examination.

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Our PhD programme offers you the chance to become an agent of change, having the chance to explore multidisciplinary opportunities in research. You will be supported in your research by internationally respected experts in the field who will challenge you academically to enhance your PPE knowledge, skills, and experiences.

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As one of the first universities to offer a Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) degree, we have an established and strong reputation around the world.

Inspiring and innovative

We combine intellectual rigour with a friendly and inclusive atmosphere. You will have access to support, resources, and facilities across our three innovative departments.

Explore funding for MPhil/PhD researchers and wider postgraduate support.

Supervision

You will be supported by academic supervisors. Supervisors will normally share or complement your research interests.

Training and support

The PhD programme is undertaken over three years (full-time), with progression points at the end of the first and second year.

Throughout this time, your supervisors will guide you through the process of clarifying and completing your doctoral thesis.

In addition, during the first year, a range of subject-specific research training modules will be available to support your through the exploratory phase of this programme.

Course location

You will be based in the  School of Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE)  located on  Campus West . 

You should live in or near York during your PhD programme, whether part-time or full-time. We do not offer distance learning arrangements for this programme.

Entry requirements

Applicants should have a 2:1 at undergraduate degree level, and have or be completing a Masters degree. Fields of previous study may be Philosophy, Politics or Economics (singularly or in combination).

Other fields of study may be considered, however, it should be clear from your academic record that you are suitably prepared for the research that you propose to do. If your area of previous study is another field, please make sure to discuss this with potential supervisors to ensure you are suitable to apply for this PhD programme.

You should also be able to demonstrate proven interdisciplinary PPE skills and experience.

English language requirements

If English is not your first language, you must provide evidence of your ability.

Apply for the PhD in Philosophy, Politics and Education (PPE)

Take a look at the  supporting documents  you may need for your application.

Identify a supervisor

You should speak to potential supervisors before making your application, and you should say in the application who they are. They should be academics whose research overlaps with the area you wish to study.

You can find details on the research interests of our academic staff and how to contact them by using the following:

• Staff research interests for Philosophy
• Staff research interests for Politics
• Staff research interests for Economics

If you need help in identifying potential supervisors please contact Professor Greg Currie , who is in charge of admissions to the programme. He is happy to talk through your ideas with you. 

If your application is unsuitable for interdisciplinary supervision, we may encourage you to submit a single-subject application instead. 

Submitting your application

You will be required to submit the following documents:

• Application form
• Research proposal
• Academic transcripts
• Details of two referees
• Your curriculum vitae (CV)
• Personal statement

You can apply and send all your documentation electronically through our online system. You don’t need to complete your application all at once: you can start, save and finish it later.

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Find out all you need to know about applying to York.

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Discover York

We offer a range of campus accommodation to suit you and your budget, from economy to deluxe.

Student life

Explore campus and city life and hear what our current students have to say about living here.

Lively, full of culture and beautiful, York is regularly voted one of the best places to live and visit in the UK.

• CEU PU - Deutsch
• Közép-európai Egyetem

Doctoral programs at CEU are fully funded study programs with a standard duration of 4 years that award a US and an Austrian degree.

The aim of the Doctor of Philosophy in Economics program is to prepare professional economists for research, teaching or government service careers. Coursework in the program is designed to ensure that students acquire rigorous knowledge in the core areas of economic theory and research methodology. During the research period, students will develop into independent researchers, with the ability to contribute to the analysis of fundamental economic questions facing transition and market economies.

Sample Courses for the Doctoral Program

Core courses

• Advanced Macroeconomics
• Advanced Econometrics

Optional courses

• Advanced Labor Economics
• Advanced Microeconometrics
• Financial Economics
• Psychology and Economics
• Economic and Social Networks
• Empirical Industrial Organization
• Growth and Development

Entry Requirements for the Doctoral Program

In addition to meeting the General CEU Admissions Requirements, applicants must submit: • a 500-word research proposal • three letters of recommendation • general GRE

Successful applicants usually possess an MA (or equivalent) in economics (or a related field).

CEU application details

• Who Can Apply
• Funding and Fees
• How To Apply

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MSc Philosophy of Economics and the Social Sciences

• Graduate taught
• Department of Philosophy Logic and Scientific Method
• Application code V7U1
• Starting 2024
• Home full-time: Closed
• Home part-time: Closed
• Overseas full-time: Closed
• Location: Houghton Street, London

The MSc in Philosophy of Economics and the Social Sciences offers a unique opportunity to pursue a critical understanding of the methods of economics and other social sciences, alongside ethical questions about the use of science in policy, the economy, and civil society.

The LSE is widely recognised as the world’s leading social science university, and our department excels at philosophical research that is continuous with the social and natural sciences and is socially relevant. Teachers on the programme conduct pathbreaking research at the intersection of philosophy and a range of social sciences, including behavioural science, cognitive science, economics, health policy, data science, and politics. Courses that you can take as part of the degree address a wide range of questions in the field, including:

• What forms of explanation and understanding are possible in the social sciences, and how secure and objective is the knowledge they provide?
• What are the strengths and weaknesses of common methods in economics and parts of political science, e.g., modelling individuals as perfectly rational individuals who maximize the expected satisfaction of their preferences?How do they compare with other social sciences methods, such as those that focus on understanding people’s outlook, cultural identity, and the norms they wish to follow?
• What is the nature of social categories such as gender and race, and what roles do these categories play in shaping the social world and structuring human lives? Should we rethink these categories?
• How should we morally evaluate societies, both in terms of the distribution of opportunities and well-being they provide and in terms of the nature of the interpersonal relationships they engender?
• What are the merits and drawbacks of key forms of social organization, including markets, democratic deliberation, and top down hierarchies? How are these forms of social organization, and their impacts, changing due to new technologies, including Artificial Intelligence?
• What should the role of social sciences and the expertise they provide be in public debate and policy-making? How should scientific uncertainty and disagreement be handled in the public forum?

Programme details

For more information about tuition fees and entry requirements, see the fees and funding and assessing your application sections.

Entry requirements

Minimum entry requirements for msc philosophy of economics and the social sciences.

Upper second class honours (2:1) degree or equivalent in any discipline. You should also demonstrate a considered interest in the areas covered by the MSc.

Competition for places at the School is high. This means that even if you meet the minimum entry requirement, this does not guarantee you an offer of admission.

If you have studied or are studying outside of the UK then have a look at our  Information for International Students  to find out the entry requirements that apply to you.

Assessing your application

We welcome applications from all suitably qualified prospective students and want to recruit students with the very best academic merit, potential and motivation, irrespective of their background.

We carefully consider each application on an individual basis, taking into account all the information presented on your application form, including your:

- academic achievement (including predicted and achieved grades) - statement of academic purpose - two academic references - CV

See further information on supporting documents

You may also have to provide evidence of your English proficiency, although you do not need to provide this at the time of your application to LSE.  See our English language requirements .

When to apply

Applications for this programme are considered on a rolling basis, meaning the programme will close once it becomes full. There is no fixed deadline by which you need to apply, however, to be considered for any LSE funding opportunity, you must have submitted your application and all supporting documents by the funding deadline. See the fees and funding section for more details. 

Fees and funding

Every graduate student is charged a fee for their programme.

The fee covers registration and examination fees payable to the School, lectures, classes and individual supervision, lectures given at other colleges under intercollegiate arrangements and, under current arrangements, membership of the Students' Union. It does not cover living costs or travel or fieldwork.

Tuition fees 2024/25 for MSc Philosophy of Economics and the Social Sciences

Home students: £17,424  Overseas students: £27,480

The Table of Fees shows the latest tuition amounts for all programmes offered by the School.

The amount of tuition fees you will need to pay, and any financial support you are eligible for, will depend on whether you are classified as a home or overseas student, otherwise known as your fee status. LSE assesses your fee status based on guidelines provided by the Department of Education.

Further information about fee status classification.

Fee reduction

Students who completed undergraduate study at LSE and are beginning taught graduate study at the School are eligible for a  fee reduction  of around 10 per cent of the fee.

Scholarships and other funding

The School recognises that the  cost of living in London  may be higher than in your home town or country, and we provide generous scholarships each year to home and overseas students.

This programme is eligible for needs-based awards from LSE, including the  Graduate Support Scheme ,  Master's Awards , and  Anniversary Scholarships . 

Selection for any funding opportunity is based on receipt of an offer for a place and submitting a Graduate Financial Support application, before the funding deadline. Funding deadline for needs-based awards from LSE:  25 April 2024 .

In addition to our needs-based awards, LSE also makes available scholarships for students from specific regions of the world and awards for students studying specific subject areas.  Find out more about financial support.

Government tuition fee loans and external funding

A postgraduate loan is available from the UK government for eligible students studying for a first master’s programme, to help with fees and living costs. Some other governments and organisations also offer tuition fee loan schemes.

Find out more about tuition fee loans

Further information

Fees and funding opportunities

Information for international students

LSE is an international community, with over 140 nationalities represented amongst its student body. We celebrate this diversity through everything we do.  

If you are applying to LSE from outside of the UK then take a look at our Information for International students . 

1) Take a note of the UK qualifications we require for your programme of interest (found in the ‘Entry requirements’ section of this page). 

2) Go to the International Students section of our website. 

3) Select your country. 

4) Select ‘Graduate entry requirements’ and scroll until you arrive at the information about your local/national qualification. Compare the stated UK entry requirements listed on this page with the local/national entry requirement listed on your country specific page.

Part-time study Part time study is only available for students who do not require a student visa.

Programme structure and courses

You will choose philosophy course options from across the department for a total of three units. Out of this three units, subject to approval from the Programme Director, you may take up to one unit from options outside the department. In addition, you will take part in the non-assessed dissertation seminar. This will prepare you to complete your dissertation of 10,000 words, which will be on a topic in the philosophy of economics and/or other social sciences, broadly construed. The dissertation constitutes a further full unit, for a programme total of four units.

(* denotes half a unit)

One course from:

Philosophy of Economics

History of Economics: Making Political Economy into a Social Science*

History of Economics: Ideas, Policy and Performativity*

Rationality and Choice

Philosophy of Economics: Methodology and Foundations of Economics*

Philosophy of Economics: Ethics and Economics*

Business and Organisational Ethics*

Physics and Uncertainty: From Quantum Jumps to Stock Market Crashes*

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

Philosophy of Society*

Ethics of Data and AI*

Genes, Brains and Society*

Philosophy of Gender and Race*

Courses from a range of options up to the value of two units (students who take "Rationality and Choice" choose courses up to the value of one and half unit)

Dissertation Seminar (non-assessed) This non-assessed course will prepare you to write your dissertation.  

Dissertation An independent research project on an approved topic of your choice, of 10,000 words.

For the most up-to-date list of optional courses please visit the relevant School Calendar page .

You must note, however, that while care has been taken to ensure that this information is up to date and correct, a change of circumstances since publication may cause the School to change, suspend or withdraw a course or programme of study, or change the fees that apply to it. The School will always notify the affected parties as early as practicably possible and propose any viable and relevant alternative options. Note that the School will neither be liable for information that after publication becomes inaccurate or irrelevant, nor for changing, suspending or withdrawing a course or programme of study due to events outside of its control, which includes but is not limited to a lack of demand for a course or programme of study, industrial action, fire, flood or other environmental or physical damage to premises.

You must also note that places are limited on some courses and/or subject to specific entry requirements. The School cannot therefore guarantee you a place. Please note that changes to programmes and courses can sometimes occur after you have accepted your offer of a place. These changes are normally made in light of developments in the discipline or path-breaking research, or on the basis of student feedback. Changes can take the form of altered course content, teaching formats or assessment modes. Any such changes are intended to enhance the student learning experience. You should visit the School’s  Calendar , or contact the relevant academic department, for information on the availability and/or content of courses and programmes of study. Certain substantive changes will be listed on the  updated graduate course and programme information page.

Teaching and assessment

Contact hours and independent study.

You will typically have, for each examined course, at least 20 hours of lectures and 30 hours of seminars (seminar sizes do not normally exceed 15 students). Hours vary according to courses and you can view indicative details in the Calendar  within the Teaching section of each course guide . In addition, there will be 30 hours of teaching on the dissertation research and writing seminar. Additional contact time concerning one-on-one dissertation and class teaching support is available during office hours and by appointment at your request. You will be assigned an academic adviser within the Department who will be available to discuss your personal and academic concerns.

You are also expected to complete independent study outside of class time. This varies depending on the programme, but requires you to manage the majority of your study time yourself, by engaging in activities such as reading, note-taking, thinking and research.

Teaching methods

LSE is internationally recognised for its teaching and research and employs  teaching staff with a range of experience and status. Courses may be taught by individual members of faculty, such LSE Fellows, Assistant Professors, Associate Professors, and Professors. Many departments also employ Guest Teachers and visiting faculty. Graduate teaching assistants, who are usually doctoral research students, and in the majority of cases, teach classes for  undergraduate courses only. You can view indicative details for the teacher responsible for each course in the relevant  course guide .

All taught courses are required to include formative coursework which is unassessed. It is designed to help prepare you for summative assessment which counts towards the course mark and to the degree award. LSE uses a range of formative assessment, such as essays, problem sets, case studies, reports, quizzes, mock exams, team presentations and many others. Summative assessment may be conducted during the course or by final examination at the end of the course. An indication of the formative coursework and summative assessment for each course can be found in the relevant  course guide .

Extra-curricular activities and learning

Our students form a tight social group. The Department facilitates this by hosting a number of social occasions through the year. In addition, London has a wide range of opportunities for socialising, with a great many additional philosophical activities offered by the Institute of Philosophy and the University of London.

Academic support

You will be assigned an academic mentor who will be available for guidance and advice on academic or personal concerns.

There are many opportunities to extend your learning outside the classroom and complement your academic studies at LSE.  LSE LIFE  is the School’s centre for academic, personal and professional development. Some of the services on offer include: guidance and hands-on practice of the key skills you will need to do well at LSE: effective reading, academic writing and critical thinking; workshops related to how to adapt to new or difficult situations, including development of skills for leadership, study/work/life balance and preparing for the world of work; and advice and practice on working in study groups and on cross-cultural communication and teamwork.

LSE is committed to enabling all students to achieve their full potential and the School’s  Disability and Wellbeing Service  provides a free, confidential service to all LSE students and is a first point of contact for all disabled students.

Student support and resources

We’re here to help and support you throughout your time at LSE, whether you need help with your academic studies, support with your welfare and wellbeing or simply to develop on a personal and professional level.

Whatever your query, big or small, there are a range of people you can speak to who will be happy to help.  

Department librarians   – they will be able to help you navigate the library and maximise its resources during your studies. 

Accommodation service  – they can offer advice on living in halls and offer guidance on private accommodation related queries.

Class teachers and seminar leaders  – they will be able to assist with queries relating to specific courses. 

Disability and Wellbeing Service  – they are experts in long-term health conditions, sensory impairments, mental health and specific learning difficulties. They offer confidential and free services such as  student counselling,  a  peer support scheme  and arranging  exam adjustments.  They run groups and workshops.  

IT help  – support is available 24 hours a day to assist with all your technology queries.   

LSE Faith Centre  – this is home to LSE's diverse religious activities and transformational interfaith leadership programmes, as well as a space for worship, prayer and quiet reflection. It includes Islamic prayer rooms and a main space for worship. It is also a space for wellbeing classes on campus and is open to all students and staff from all faiths and none.   

Language Centre  – the Centre specialises in offering language courses targeted to the needs of students and practitioners in the social sciences. We offer pre-course English for Academic Purposes programmes; English language support during your studies; modern language courses in nine languages; proofreading, translation and document authentication; and language learning community activities.

LSE Careers  ­ – with the help of LSE Careers, you can make the most of the opportunities that London has to offer. Whatever your career plans, LSE Careers will work with you, connecting you to opportunities and experiences from internships and volunteering to networking events and employer and alumni insights. 

LSE Library   –   founded in 1896, the British Library of Political and Economic Science is the major international library of the social sciences. It stays open late, has lots of excellent resources and is a great place to study. As an LSE student, you’ll have access to a number of other academic libraries in Greater London and nationwide. 

LSE LIFE  – this is where you should go to develop skills you’ll use as a student and beyond. The centre runs talks and workshops on skills you’ll find useful in the classroom; offers one-to-one sessions with study advisers who can help you with reading, making notes, writing, research and exam revision; and provides drop-in sessions for academic and personal support. (See ‘Teaching and assessment’). 

LSE Students’ Union (LSESU)  – they offer academic, personal and financial advice and funding.  

PhD Academy   – this is available for PhD students, wherever they are, to take part in interdisciplinary events and other professional development activities and access all the services related to their registration. 

Sardinia House Dental Practice   – this   offers discounted private dental services to LSE students.  

St Philips Medical Centre  – based in Pethwick-Lawrence House, the Centre provides NHS Primary Care services to registered patients.

Student Services Centre  – our staff here can answer general queries and can point you in the direction of other LSE services.  

Student advisers   – we have a  Deputy Head of Student Services (Advice and Policy)  and an  Adviser to Women Students  who can help with academic and pastoral matters.

Student life

As a student at LSE you’ll be based at our central London campus. Find out what our campus and London have to offer you on academic, social and career perspective. 

Student societies and activities

Your time at LSE is not just about studying, there are plenty of ways to get involved in  extracurricular activities . From joining one of over 200 societies, or starting your own society, to volunteering for a local charity, or attending a public lecture by a world-leading figure, there is a lot to choose from. 

The campus 

LSE is based on one  campus  in the centre of London. Despite the busy feel of the surrounding area, many of the streets around campus are pedestrianised, meaning the campus feels like a real community. 

Life in London 

London is an exciting, vibrant and colourful city. It's also an academic city, with more than 400,000 university students. Whatever your interests or appetite you will find something to suit your palate and pocket in this truly international capital. Make the most of career opportunities and social activities, theatre, museums, music and more. 

Want to find out more? Read why we think  London is a fantastic student city , find out about  key sights, places and experiences for new Londoners . Don't fear, London doesn't have to be super expensive: hear about  London on a budget . 

Student stories

On our website , you can find testimonials from students who have completed our MSc programmes. Find out about their experience of the programme, what they found most valuable and how it has helped to develop their career to date.

Preliminary reading

J Baggini and P S. Fosl  The philosopher's toolkit: a compendium of philosophical concepts and methods  (Wiley Blackwell, 2010)

R Bradley Decision theory with a human face (Cambridge, 2017) (suitable for those with a background in decision theory).

N Cartwright and E Montuschi Philosophy of social science: A new introduction (Oxford,  2014)

D Hausman The inexact and separate science of economics , second edition (Cambridge, 2023)

D Hausman The philosophy of economics: An anthology (Cambridge, 2008)

D Hausman, M McPherson, D Satz Economic analysis, moral philosophy and public policy , third edition (2017)

H Kincaid  The Oxford handbook of philosophy of social science  (Oxford, 2012)

M Martin and L C McIntyre  Reading in the philosophy of social science  (Cambridge, 1994) 

D Steel and F Guala  The philosophy of social science reader  (Routledge, 2010)

Quick Careers Facts for the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method

Median salary of our PG students 15 months after graduating: £34,500

Top 5 sectors our students work in:

• Education, Teaching and Research            
• Government, Public Sector and Policy   
• Consultancy      
• Health and Social Care  
• International Organisations

The data was collected as part of the Graduate Outcomes survey, which is administered by the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA). Graduates from 2020-21 were the fourth group to be asked to respond to Graduate Outcomes. Median salaries are calculated for respondents who are paid in UK pounds sterling and who were working in full-time employment.

Past programme graduates have gone on to a wide variety of careers, ranging from law, forming their own start-up, working in the City and working at Google. We have a very good record of students entering excellent PhD programmes.

Further information on graduate destinations for this programme

Support for your career

Many leading organisations give careers presentations at the School during the year, and LSE Careers has a wide range of resources available to assist students in their job search. Find out more about the  support available to students through LSE Careers .

Find out more about LSE

Discover more about being an LSE student - meet us in a city near you, visit our campus or experience LSE from home. 

Experience LSE from home

Webinars, videos, student blogs and student video diaries will help you gain an insight into what it's like to study at LSE for those that aren't able to make it to our campus.  Experience LSE from home . 

Come on a guided campus tour, attend an undergraduate open day, drop into our office or go on a self-guided tour.  Find out about opportunities to visit LSE . 

LSE visits you

Student Marketing, Recruitment and Study Abroad travels throughout the UK and around the world to meet with prospective students. We visit schools, attend education fairs and also hold Destination LSE events: pre-departure events for offer holders.  Find details on LSE's upcoming visits . 

How to apply

Virtual Graduate Open Day

Register your interest

Visit the Philosophy website

Related Programmes

Msc philosophy of science.

Code(s) V5UG

MSc Philosophy and Public Policy

Code(s) V7U8

MSc Sociology

Code(s) L3U2

MSc Social Research Methods

Code(s) L3T1

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MPhil. PhD in Economics

The Master of Philosophy (M.Phil.) and the Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) degrees are research degrees. Research degrees involve independent study, directed by a supervisor, and the production of a thesis. The essential difference between the master and doctoral levels, aside from the length of the registration period, lies in the quality of a successful Ph.D. thesis, which must be judged to be the result of original research, an addition to knowledge and worthy of publication either in full or in an abridged form in a refereed journal. The award of a M.Phil./Ph.D. also requires the candidate to defend his/her thesis at a public, oral examination. The maximum period for registration for full time M.Phil. and Ph.D. students are three (3) years and five (5) years respectively and part time students' maximum registration is five (5) years and seven (7) years respectively.

Candidates seeking entry to the M.Phil. programme should hold a Bachelor’s degree (Second Class Honours or above), in addition to the courses outlined in the M.Sc. programme. M.Phil. students are required to read for courses totalling a minimum of six (6) credits, and courses must be of the graduate level. 

Candidates seeking entry to the Ph.D. programmes should hold Master’s degree from an approved university with a specialty in the area of study. Students may be required to attend an interview prior to being accepted. Students applying for M.Phil./Ph.D. degrees must prepare an appropriate research proposal for consideration in the area in which they wish to pursue. Ph.D. students are required to read for courses totalling a minimum of nine (9) credits and courses must be of the graduate level. 

The intention of these taught courses is to provide students with research techniques and skills that will not only help them to complete their current research topic, but will also stand them in good stead for life after university. M.Phil./Ph.D candidates who have completed the M.Sc. in Economics are encouraged to apply for exemption from taught courses. The Department will decide on the eligibility and acceptance of candidates.

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Philosophy of Economics, Patricia Marino

Philosophy of economics is a topic I became interested in during the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. A lot of my post-PhD research before then had been in ethical theory, but I studied math as a graduate student before switching to philosophy, and I’ve retained an interest in the philosophy of mathematics. Opinion pieces in the news around 2009 were referring to “economic models,” and I thought not only would the philosophy of economics bring together my various interests, but it would also be a great subject to teach — both philosophically rich and relevant to contemporary social and political life.

Philosophy of economics is a small-ish subfield in the North American context, and I didn’t have a range of syllabi to consider in thinking about what to assign. The course is a second-year undergraduate course, and for the first syllabus in 2014, I drew on Dan Hausman’s entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy to get a sense of what were seen as the most central topics (such as methodology, rational choice theory, and normative issues) and used my own interests to choose readings and to add other topics (such as feminist philosophy of economics and the popular debate over “is economics a science?”). I generally assign readings that are original articles or chapters rather than textbooks, even if they are more challenging for the students. We spend a lot of time in class discussing what is going on in a given text as well as engaging with the ideas in a more complex way.

For the first offering of the course, I incorporated readings by women but fell short of producing a reading list with representational diversity along dimensions such as race and work reflecting non-western perspectives. I also was not satisfied with the readings on some topics — especially on normative issues. I’ve taught the class roughly every two years since then and continue to update the topics and readings. With respect to diversity, an idea that has been useful for me has been to consider that if my readings end up being mostly by white men, it may be partly because the topic has been framed in my thinking in a mistakenly narrow kind of way. I have found anthologies such as Toward a Feminist Philosophy of Economics useful for finding apt new readings on topics such as perspectives on labor beyond the western context.

Philosophy of Economics attracts students with a wide range of educational backgrounds. From the beginning, my university’s Economics Department has been supportive and encouraging, and as of 2016 the course is cross-listed as both a Philosophy course and an Econ course; students can take the course toward their major in both programs. The University of Waterloo is a large public university in Canada, known especially for its programs in STEM subjects such as math and computer science, and the course also attracts a lot of students from those programs for whom it is an elective. I try to emphasize to my students that it’s not a problem if they are coming to class with backgrounds different from those of other students; students without preparation in either philosophy or economics can learn as we go. A lot of writing on topics in the philosophy of economics is done by economists as well as philosophers; adding these readings helps make the course feel like familiar territory to a wider range of students. To make it work, I craft assignments giving a choice of topics, and for the first paper, I have an optional rewrite: any student can rewrite the first paper in response to my feedback and improve their grade. The optional rewrite works well for a range of students. Some who do the rewrite are new to philosophy and benefit from an extra learning phase; others are philosophy majors who want to hone their skills to improve from good papers to writing excellent ones.

For each reading, I post a list of discussion questions about a week in advance. These include “reading questions” and “reflection/discussion questions” Reading questions are questions such as “What is the distinction Milton Friedman draws between ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ economics?” They focus the student’s attention on a particular part of the reading and ask the student to pay close attention to what an author is saying or arguing. Roughly speaking, they have right and wrong answers. In contrast, the “reflection and discussion questions” are questions such as “Do S. Charusheela’s arguments challenge the conclusions of Ann Cudd about the usefulness of game theory in feminist theorizing about household dynamics? Why or why not?” They are open-ended and invite students to form their own ideas and perspectives. During class time, I use both the reading and the discussion/reflection questions to structure lectures and discussions.

One purpose of study questions is to push students to think as they read. A second purpose is to help them not feel overwhelmed: I tell them the study questions focus on the parts of the reading we will concentrate on in class and in assessments, so they do not have to master an entire reading. A third purpose is to help students who want to contribute to class discussion but feel more confident having had a chance to prepare in advance.

Where possible, I have a smallish component of the grade for participation, mostly to incentivize students to stay engaged. I used to base that component on speaking up in class, but I came to believe that was not a good system, as students vary a lot with respect to feeling comfortable speaking in front of a group. I now count a wide range of additional activities as “participation” including speaking with me one-on-one, emailing me their ideas or contributions, or posting to the online discussion. Still, a continuing challenge is that a minority of the students do the majority of the talking; that is something I am still working on.

The Syllabus Showcase of the APA Blog is designed to share insights into the syllabi of philosophy educators. We include syllabi in their original, unedited format that showcase a wide variety of philosophy classes. We would love for you to be a part of this project. Please contact Series Editor, Dr. Smrutipriya Pattnaik via smrutipriya23@gmail.com, or Editor of the Teaching Beat, Dr. Nathan Eckstrand via eckstna@gmail.com with potential submissions.

• Patricia Marino

Patricia Marino is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Waterloo in Canada, where she works in ethics, philosophy of economics, epistemology, and philosophy of sex and love. She is the author of Moral Reasoning in a Pluralistic World (McGill-Queens University Press, 2015) and Philosophy of Sex and Love: An Opinionated Introduction (Routledge, 2019) as well as articles on moral dilemmas, ambivalence, and other topics. Her current research engages topics in formalization and quantification.

• Editor: Nathan Eckstrand
• Editor: Smrutipriya Pattnaik
• philosophy of economics

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